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Abstract 
From the late 19th to the late 20th century, the cities and industries of the world became 
increasingly reliant on fireproof materials made from asbestos. As asbestos was used 
more and more in building materials and household appliances, its harmful effect on 
human health, such as asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma, became apparent. The 
dangers surrounding the mineral led to the collapse of the industry in the 1980s. While the 
market demand and medical rejection of asbestos were international, they were also 
experienced in the mining and processing communities at the core of the global industry. 
In the town of Asbestos, Quebec, home of the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the 
world, we can see how this process of market boom and bust shaped a fierce local cultural 
identity.  
This dissertation examines the global asbestos industry from a local perspective, 
showing how the people of Asbestos, Quebec had international reach through the work 
they did and the industry they continue to support today. This thesis explores how the 
boundaries between humans and the environment were blurred in Asbestos as a strong 
cultural identity was created through the interaction between people and the natural 
world. This work advances our understanding of the interdependence of the local-global 
relationship between resource industries and international trade networks, illustrating the 
ways it shapes communities and how communities shape it. Bringing bodies of land, 
human bodies, and the body politic of Asbestos, Quebec into the history of the global 
asbestos trade helps demonstrate how this local cultural identity grew to influence 
national policy and global debates on commodity flows, occupational health, and 
environmental justice.  
 
Keywords: Asbestos (Quebec), asbestos, Johns-Manville Co., mining, asbestosis, 
mesothelioma, lung cancer, chrysotile, Asbestos Strike, 1949, history, cultural identity, 
Canada, Jeffrey Mine, environmental history, medical history. 
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Introduction: Asbestos and Cultural Identity 
 If you want to understand Asbestos, the place, you have to understand asbestos the 
mineral. While I was researching Asbestos in December 2007, G. Claude Théroux of the 
Société d’Histoire d’Asbestos took a piece of raw asbestos from his pocket and threw it 
onto the table between us. “You want to know Asbestos? Now you know it.” Looking at 
the table in shock, I asked, “Aren’t you afraid of getting sick?” At the start of my 
research, before I had begun to understand the strong connection the townspeople had to 
asbestos, this was an understandable question. The people of Asbestos are unafraid of the 
mineral that not only gives the town its name, but also its past, its cultural identity, and its 
hope for the future. A retired history teacher who put himself through university by 
working at the Jeffrey Mine, Théroux handled the mineral with a familiarity passed down 
to him through generations who made Asbestos their home. His actions attest to 
something I quickly learned: Asbestos and asbestos, the people and the place, are 
unpredictable and interconnected.  
Asbestos is a small community located in the l’Estrie region1 of Quebec, halfway 
between Montreal and Quebec City, north of Sherbrooke and south of the St. Lawrence 
River. It is the site of the Jeffrey Mine, the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the world, 
which once met 80% of the global demand for the mineral and was owned for a large part 
of its history by the American Johns-Manville Company (JM).2 The mine is the source of 
the community’s pride and sorrow, success and collapse, but to those from outside 
Asbestos, the town is widely known for two other reasons. Within a historical context, it 
is known as the scene of a dramatic strike that occurred there from February to June 1949, 
which some historians claim started Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, which was a socio-
political movement during the 1950s and 1960s in which the French Canadian majority in 
the province became increasingly secular, gained control of the province’s major 
industries and businesses, and rallied their political strength and ambitions to affect major 
changes within Quebec and the rest of Canada through waves of neonationalism and 
                                                 
1
 This region of Quebec has been referred to in a number of different ways, starting with the “Eastern Townships” in 
1806. Then, with the increased French Canadian population due to extremely high birth rates and a need for new land 
later in the 19th century it became the “Cantons de l’Est,” and finally, in the 1940s, what it is known as today, “l’Estrie.” 
2
 The Canadian Mining Journal, 22 January 1919, p. 31. 
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reform liberalism.3 Within a more contemporary context, Asbestos is known for the 
support it continues to receive from the federal and provincial governments in order to 
keep the Jeffrey Mine, and therefore the community, alive.4 While both associations 
mention Asbestos, neither of these perspectives adequately take into account the complex 
history of the community and how this history informs present realities and debate.5 Just 
as Théroux explained that in order to know Asbestos I had to understand the mineral, one 
cannot fully understand the current asbestos debate in Canada without understanding the 
cultural identity and history of the community.   
Cultural identity is an important element of this dissertation. The term refers to the 
constantly developing common values, expectations, and ambitions that were shaped 
through shared experiences, success, and failure in Asbestos. Theorist Patrick Colm 
Hogen writes that cultural identity is at the centre of both world politics and everyday 
life,6 and this dissertation will show how this local-global relationship was negotiated in 
Asbestos to shape the ways the local population saw itself in the community and in the 
world. Social philosopher Stuart Hall also reminds us that cultural identity is constantly 
changing with shifting situations and aspirations,7 and I will argue that in Asbestos, this 
was also community identity, undergoing constant change as townspeople balanced local 
needs with global industry. While it is often understood within a larger national or ethnic 
context, a local cultural identity developed in Asbestos through a lived system of common 
beliefs and practices. This system was informed and influenced by how the working class 
French Canadian majority and the upper class Anglophone elite interacted with each other 
                                                 
3
 Historical perspectives on the Quiet Revolution vary. See, for example, Michael D. Behiels, Prelude to Quebec’s 
Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1985), Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, Jean-Claude Robert, and François Ricard, Quebec: A History, 1867-
1929, Robert Chodos, trans. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1983), Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change 
and Political Crisis, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), and Pierre Vallières, White Niggers of America: 
The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec Terrorist, Joan Pinkham, trans. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971). 
4
 The industry collapsed in the early 1980s, but as recent as 2010, the federal government gave pro-asbestos lobby 
groups a quarter of a million dollars, promoted the mineral in international markets, and prevented the United Nations 
from banning trading of the mineral. The Quebec government also supports the industry, and in June 2010 it backed a 
$58 million bank loan to further develop the Jeffrey Mine and sustain the dwindling local workforce for at least 25 
more years. See, “Asbestos Mine Workers to Build Reserve Fund,” CBC News, 14 June 2010, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2010/06/14/asbestos-jeffrey-mine.html, accessed 15 June 2010, and Kathleen 
Ruff, “Deathbed Reprieve for Killer Industry?” Toronto Star, 6 June 2010, p. 1. 
5
 This assertion is based on a thorough survey of the published materials on Asbestos, Quebec. The historical studies on 
the community deal entirely with the 1949 strike and contemporary news items about Asbestos focus solely on 
government subsidies of the industry. 
6
 Patrick Colm Hogen, Colonialism and Cultural Identity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. xi. 
7
 Stuart Hall, “Who Needs ‘Identity’?” Questions of Cultural Identity, Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, eds. (London: 
SAGE, 2003), p. 4. 
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and the natural world, giving character and purpose to the land, the people, and the 
politics of the community. While townspeople were often divided, their actions and 
reactions were rooted in this cultural identity, and by tracing its development in Asbestos, 
this dissertation will advance our understanding of the ways in which boundaries between 
people and the natural world dissolve in resource communities.  
What follows is a history detailing the lifecycle of a resource community, but 
more than that, this dissertation will show how at a very local level, the people of 
Asbestos developed a strong cultural identity by interacting with the natural world 
through work, which they used as an important tool of global political influence. I intend 
to advance our understanding of the interdependence of this local-global relationship and 
illustrate the ways it shapes resource communities and how resource communities shape 
it.  
Origins of the mineral, the community, and the industry 
Much of this dissertation is rooted in the mineral found deep inside the Jeffrey 
Mine and how its extraction and production created a community and supported a global 
industry. The term “asbestos” encompasses six different types of the mineral found 
throughout the world. The chemical makeup changes due to origins and eras, and the 
chrysotile, white asbestos found in North America and parts of Russia and South Africa—
Quebec’s two main competitors—is the only type that was made from geological shifts of 
serpentine rock. The other five, amosite, athophyllite, crocidolite, tremolite, and 
actinolite, were formed in amphibole rock, and while some of these possess longer fibres 
that are more easily woven, they are more difficult to access and in some cases, much 
more harmful to human health. The chrysotile found in Asbestos has a chemical makeup 
of Mg3Si2O5(OH)4: magnesium, silicon, and oxygen.8 The magnesium makes the mineral 
fireproof, able to withstand heat up to 3000°F and higher,9 but it also makes asbestos 
carcinogenic. 
The fact that asbestos causes cancer has severely damaged the marketability of the 
mineral and is what makes the Canadian government’s continued support of the industry 
so unsettling, but the mineral was once considered both magical and modern because of 
                                                 
8
 Cornelis Klein, “Rocks, Minerals, and a Dusty World,” in Reviews in Mineralogy: Health Effects of Mineral Dusts, 
Brooke T. Mossman and George D. Guthrie Jr., eds. (Chelsea: Mineralogical Society of America, 1993), p. 17.  
9
 W.E. Sinclair, Asbestos: Its Origin, Production and Utilization, Mining Publications Ltd., ed. (London: Salisbury 
House, 1959), p. 11.  
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its fireproof qualities. A fibrous rock that can be broken apart by hand until it resembles 
raw cotton, asbestos was woven into a variety of goods that would not burn, rust, or decay 
with age. Because it was fireproof and relatively easy to weave, asbestos was used 
historically as a tool against the hazards of fire, to fortify ceramic cooking pots in the 
Neolithic Age, as a wick in candles burning on holy alters, as the fabric of death shrouds 
for ancient kings on funeral pyres, and as a prop in a parlour trick by Charlemagne, who 
threw asbestos tablecloths into fires at parties, pulling them out clean and unscathed.10  
The magical qualities of asbestos made the mineral an oddity until the invention 
of electricity, which caused widespread fires throughout the major cities of the world. The 
First World War also illustrated the importance of fireproof buildings, and the mineral 
was a key component in reconstruction efforts following the conflict. Asbestos promised 
safety and a better life for those who used it, and profits for those who sold it. This 
combination of magical and modern has influenced the development of the cultural 
identity in Asbestos, fully entwined with the mineral found in the Jeffrey Mine.  
The Jeffrey Mine is the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the world because of 
how the mineral is laid out in the land on which the community was built. The deposit in 
Asbestos was shaped during a process of geological shifts and collisions that began 
during the Precambrian period 750 million years ago, when the supercontinent of Rodinia 
broke into smaller landmasses that clashed together, then separated again.11 Major 
tectonic shifts pushed mountain chains that were once part of the ocean floor into the 
landmass that was to become North America during the Devonian period between 410 
and 355 million years ago, creating the Appalachian mountain range that extends from 
Greenland to the southern United States, passing through what was to become Asbestos.12 
The intense heat and friction of this process splintered the serpentine rock at this 
                                                 
10
 Rachel P. Maines, Asbestos and Fire: Technological Trade-Offs and the Body at Risk (New Jersey: Rutgers, 2005), 
pp. 27-28, and Geoffrey Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 2. 
11
 Paul D. Ryan, “Caledonides,” in The Oxford Companion to the Earth, Paul Hancock and Brian J. Skinner, eds. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca: 
2048/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t112.e99. Accessed 5 October 2007. 
12
 David A. Rothery, “Obduction,” in The Oxford Companion to the Earth, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048 /views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t112.e622, and 
D.L. Dineley, “Devonian,” in The Oxford Companion to the Earth, http://www.oxford 
reference.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/views/ ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t112.e215. Accessed 5 October 
2007. 
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particular site,13 and in its re-crystallization, the chemical composition was changed and 
veins of asbestos fibre were formed. 
The majority of asbestos deposits throughout the world are found along a linear 
plane, with veins usually several metres in length, which means that several mines need to 
be established in the same area, often beside each other and by multiple companies, in 
order to reach the entire deposit. Contrary to the norm, the mineral deposit in Asbestos is 
found in veins that run in a circular pattern, forming a rounded knoll. This meant that the 
Jeffrey Mine was the only pit needed in Asbestos to extract the rich mineral deposit, 
which cut back on costs and time. From the beginning, the land at what would become 
Asbestos was unique. 
The knoll at Asbestos made the town one of the most profitable asbestos mining 
communities in the world. Quebec chrysotile at one point made up 95% of the global 
trade of the mineral and the Jeffrey Mine produced the majority of this supply.14 By 
focusing on the massive movement of land and people that was required to extract this 
quantity of mineral, amounting to 30,000 tonnes a day by 1960,15 I will show how the 
focused examination of a small resource community can advance our understanding of 
the ways in which people interact with the natural world. In doing so, I will challenge the 
historiography of bodies, resource communities, occupational health and safety, the 
asbestos industry, and working class-managing class relations in 19th and 20th century 
Quebec.  
Historiography 
This study is rooted in the idea that bodies are historical, shaped by both time and 
place. Bodies are also inherently physical, and this physicality and tangibility is a 
recurring theme in the history of Asbestos. Medical historians M.S.R. Jenner and B.O. 
Taithe criticize the historiography of human body studies for being too abstract and 
narrowly focusing on the authority scientists, doctors, and politicians appear to have over 
disease and disease management.16 This dissertation provides a more holistic examination 
of different, yet complimentary bodies in Asbestos in order to highlight the ways in which 
                                                 
13
 David S. O’Hanley, “The Origin of the Chrysotile Asbestos Veins in Southwestern Quebec,” Canadian Journal of 
Earth Sciences, vol. 24, no. 1-3 (January 1987), p. 8. 
14
 Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, p. 2.  
15
 The Canadian Mining Journal, February 1960, p. 160. 
16
 M.S. R. Jenner and B.O. Taithe, “The Historiographical Body,” Medicine in the Twentieth Century Roger Cooter and 
Johns Pickstone, eds. (Newark: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 193. 
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they participate in a process of mutual exchange that contributes to the complex local 
cultural identity: bodies of land, human bodies, and the body politic.  
“Bodies of land” refers to three interconnected physical realities in Asbestos: the 
mineral, the Jeffrey Mine, and the property on which the community was built. The 
global demand for the mineral relied on high extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine, and 
this level of production required the mine to continually expand into the community, 
which was built on land rich with asbestos deposits. The need for more workable and 
liveable land meant that the people of Asbestos were frequently moving away from the 
edges of the Jeffrey Mine as it grew to eclipse homes, businesses, and neighbourhoods. 
The examination of bodies of land in Asbestos establishes a foundation for how the 
community interacted with the natural environment in such an intensely familiar way, 
passed on by generations, that a cultural identity was formed. I will use a combination of 
surveyor reports, engineer analyses, industry assessments, town council minutes, and 
local newspaper articles to reveal how the land in Asbestos was managed and understood 
in the community. 
Historical studies of land have been fundamental to the field of environmental 
history, which has the relationship between culture and the natural world as a key pillar. 
In his article, “Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?” historian 
Richard White urges scholars to re-examine the connection between work and nature to 
recognize that through labour, resource workers have “achieved a bodily knowledge of 
the natural world.”17 In The Organic Machine, White asserts that through labour, humans 
and the natural world become inseparable, and argues that we cannot understand human 
history without understanding natural history because of this connection.18 Using White’s 
assertions as a foundation, I will take his idea further, showing that bodily knowledge of 
nature is gained not only by those who work directly with it, such as the men and women 
at the Jeffrey Mine, but also by those who lived around it. The people of Asbestos not 
only knew the land through work, they—men, women, children, young and old—knew it 
intimately, simply by living in the community: hearing the sounds of the machines in the 
pit, seeing and breathing in the asbestos dust that hovered over neighbourhoods, 
                                                 
17
 Richard White, “‘Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?’: Work and Nature,” Uncommon 
Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, William Cronon, ed. (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 172. 
18
 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), p. 
113.  
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experiencing the terror of rocks crashing through their homes during blasting, and using 
the mine as a focal point of celebration, community spirit, and play. In Clearcutting the 
Pacific Rainforest, historian Richard A. Rajala describes how the rapid industrialization 
of British Columbia’s forestry industry turned the forest into a “giant factory without a 
roof.”19 This was true for Asbestos as well, but where Rajala’s factory occurred in the 
distant woods, the one in Asbestos was in the heart of the community. 
In making the Jeffrey Mine a “factory,” Johns-Manville constantly increased its 
reliance on new technologies to improve extraction rates. In The Industrial 
Transformation of Subarctic Canada, environmental historian Liza Piper writes that 
international markets commoditized the land and separated it from local mining 
populations,20 but this dissertation will question her assertion about how people in 
resource communities were distanced from the resources they worked with and the ways 
in which they challenged this distance. Piper’s northern mining communities differ from 
Asbestos, and this study will further our understanding of how international markets can 
work to strengthen and politicize the connection between people and the natural world 
and influence a proud local identity.  
While pride is a strong element in the cultural identity of Asbestos, so too is risk, 
and this dissertation will lead to a renewed perspective on how pride and risk can 
complement each other in resource communities. It will do so by showing how the 
connection between people and land can negatively affect human bodies, and how those 
affected can choose to confront or ignore this reality. My use of the term “human bodies,” 
refers to the workers at the Jeffrey Mine who extracted and processed asbestos, and the 
internal medical effects the mineral had on them and the community. Historian David 
Cantor criticizes many medical histories because they tend to treat “the body and the 
disease as two distinct entities,”21 but this study will humanize the diseases asbestos 
                                                 
19
 Richard A. Rajala, Clearcutting the Pacific Rainforest: Production, Science, and Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1998), p. 30.  
20
 Liza Piper, The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), p. 9.  
21 David Cantor, “The Diseased Body,” Medicine in the Twentieth Century, p. 347. For more studies on occupational 
health and industrial medicine that attempt to get away from this historiographical trend, see, Daniel M. Berman, Death 
on the Job: Occupational Health and Safety Struggles in the United States (Monthly Review Press, 1980), Claudia 
Clark, Radium Girls: Women and Industrial Health Reform, 1910-1935 (University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 
Alan Derickson, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster (Cornell University Press, 1998), Alan Derickson, 
Workers’ Health: Workers’ Democracy: The Western Miners’ Struggle, 1891-1925 (Cornell University Press, 1988), 
Bennett M. Judkins, We Offer Ourselves as Evidence: Toward Workers’ Control of Occupational Health (Greenwood 
Press, 1986), George Rosen, The History of Miners’ Diseases: A Medical and Social Interpretation (Schuman’s Press, 
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causes, analyzing the lived experiences of those whose health was directly affected by the 
mineral and of those who were left to reconcile a cultural identity based on interaction 
with toxic land. I will achieve this by relying on confidential medical files and reports, 
never before used in studies of Asbestos, and international medical journals to bring 
crucial context and perspective to the history of health in the community.  
The three main diseases asbestos causes are asbestosis, lung cancer, and 
mesothelioma. Asbestosis is a fibrosis, or hardening, of the fluid in the lungs that happens 
when microscopic asbestos fibres are inhaled over an extended period of time and build 
up in the lining of the lungs, preventing them from expanding and contracting as they 
should, leading to death by suffocation. Lung cancer is something most people are 
familiar with, but because of its association with the tobacco industry, asbestos 
historically has been overlooked as a causal factor. Mesothelioma is another asbestos-
related cancer that manifests on the linings of major organs, resulting in a fast-acting, 
rarely curable disease. All three take between 15 and 30 years to develop, and all three 
have led to many deaths in Asbestos. 
Environmental contamination and its effects on human health have been explored 
in many disciplines including geography, natural science, history, and sociology. Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring focuses on the harmful effects of pesticides on the natural world 
and urges us to rethink the connection between people and the environment. Her personal 
experience with cancer also illustrates how the contamination of nature can negatively 
affect human health.22 Since then, scholars have attempted to bring large corporations that 
are responsible for environmental contamination to account, often employing an “us vs. 
them” dichotomy. Within this framework, asbestos workers are victims to industry 
leaders who exploit the land and the people who work it.  
Investigative reporter Paul Brodeur has published several monographs on the 
asbestos industry using this dichotomy, including Expendable Americans and Outrageous 
Misconduct, and German reporter Günter Wallraff has followed suit with Lowest of the 
Low.23 Historians Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner have also published on the 
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negative health effects industry has on its workers and the environment, including Deadly 
Dust and Deceit and Denial.24 Markowitz and Rosner write that, “the linking of health 
issues with traditional environmental and labor [sic] concerns may be a potent force in 
stimulating a new, grass-roots opposition to corporate power.”25 They hope that through a 
reorganization of traditional American corporate structure, the health of the environment 
and the working class will be improved. These studies are important in helping us 
understand issues of environmental justice and how companies and governments make 
decisions that put marginalized communities, minorities, and the working class at direct 
bodily risk.  
In her examinations of the South African asbestos industry, historian Nancy 
Jacobs explains that, “it is necessary to recognize that environmental and social justice are 
linked and that power imbalances will determine the ways men and women, rich and 
poor, and blacks and whites live with each other and the natural world.”26 In the case of 
Asbestos, this power imbalance could be seen between the working class majority and the 
elite managing class of JM officials. This dissertation will show that as early as the 1920s, 
JM knew of the severe health risks asbestos posed to human bodies, but actively 
prevented this knowledge from reaching its workers and the general public. I will 
demonstrate how the company intentionally treated the people of Asbestos as 
experimental bodies to determine the full extent of how the mineral found in the Jeffrey 
Mine can affect human health: the community became a perfectly contained test 
laboratory.27  
Because of the traditional lack of political influence people from lower classes 
have had, medical and social philosopher Michel Foucault explains that they have always 
been “the most suitable subjects for an experimental course,”28 and it is easy to see how 
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this could apply in Asbestos. With this study, however, I intend to broaden our 
understanding of environmental and social justice through a close examination of how the 
people of Asbestos came to know of the risks they were subject to, and how they chose to 
internalize this knowledge as a part of their cultural identity. In doing so, this dissertation 
will show that, while important, studies such as Brodeur’s, Jacobs’, and Markowitz and 
Roser’s, have put environmental and social justice in a “black box.” Philosopher of 
science Bruno Latour explains that black boxes are often used to simplify complex issues, 
and that instead of offering an explanation, scientists and scholars “draw a little box about 
which they need to know nothing but its input and output.”29 At the moment, 
environmental injustice is in a black box that tells us that corporations and governments 
put marginalized and working class communities at risk for the sake of industry. This 
dissertation will challenge this simplification.  
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental 
justice as being “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people…with 
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies…It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of 
protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-
making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.”30 Johns-
Manville has a history of suppressing medical knowledge and gaining government allies 
to ensure industrial profits, while it knowingly put its workers at environmental and 
occupational risk. By examining how the people of Asbestos internalized their knowledge 
of the land and their own bodies in order to deal with the risks the industry posed to their 
health, this dissertation will show that for much of its history, this was a community 
where environmental justice was achieved. This assertion does not mean that I will 
excuse JM’s deceitful practices, as it is clear from this study that company officials 
intentionally and continuously put workers at risk. By giving the people of Asbestos 
agency over their own bodies, showing when they learned about the negative health 
effects of the mineral and how they internalized this knowledge as part of their complex 
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cultural identity, I will argue that the understanding of risk in Asbestos is partly what has 
given the local body politic global influence.  
“Body politic” refers to the community of Asbestos, which has historically been 
made up of three different factions sharply divided by class: workers, middle class 
community leaders, and upper class company officials. I have used government 
documents, town council minutes, company correspondence and local newspaper reports 
to show how a dynamic body politic was formed through conflict and cooperation. This 
body politic relied, and continues to rely, heavily on a local understanding of the 
connection between people and the natural world. The symptoms of asbestos-related 
disease are difficult to overlook or ignore, and this study will show that the people of 
Asbestos knew the mineral they extracted from the Jeffrey Mine was negatively affecting 
their bodies by 1949 at the very latest. Markowitz and Rosner write “at the heart of the 
current struggle [for environmental justice] is the very difficult question of how industry 
or the government decides what is safe,”31 but this dissertation will show that the body 
politic in Asbestos—the people themselves—decided what was and what was not safe. 
They did this through a community understanding of bodily risk.  
The study of risk has a rich historiography that illuminate how the community 
reacted to the health threats of the mineral.32 Theorist Mary Douglas emphasizes that the 
question is not whether risks are real, but rather how they are politicized, and the 
importance of local knowledge and accountability when it comes to the understanding of 
risk.33 This dissertation will show that the people of Asbestos were aware of the dangers 
the mineral posed to their bodies long before the general public was, but chose to accept 
the risks rather than reject the industry and the cultural identity they had created around it. 
Douglas’ analysis supports this argument, and she writes that people accept risk not 
because they lack the knowledge necessary to properly assess danger, but rather because 
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risk is a fundamental element of their community that can be ignored by focusing on the 
benefits that come with living in a successful resource town.34  
The understanding of risk in Asbestos can be attributed to the community being 
what theorist Ulrich Beck describes as a “risk society:” a society organized in response to 
the risks that it faces. For Beck, this requires a reorganization of local power and 
authority to allow the exceptional condition—in this case, the people of Asbestos 
choosing to live and work with a dangerous mineral—to become the norm.35 An 
examination of the local body politic shows how the “exceptional condition” was 
accepted in Asbestos and worked into the community’s cultural identity. In doing so, I 
will further our understanding of how people in resource communities internalize the 
connection between humans and the natural world, to show that the risk of a lost identity 
can be more threatening than the bodily risk of a toxic land and industry.  
The commitment to community survival in Asbestos is one articulated in actions, 
not words. While the community does have a historical society, its archive consists 
mainly of maps, company newsletters, and local newspapers. Private papers and personal 
diaries are not available to researchers. Furthermore, the people of Asbestos have a 
history of being wary of outsiders, which has become more pronounced since the industry 
collapsed and the community has been attacked in the press for continuing to support the 
Jeffrey Mine. Because of this, I was unable to obtain oral histories from community 
members, despite their general support of my work, shown through telephone calls, 
emails, and Christmas cards sent, checking in on how my study was progressing, and 
possibly making sure I was not writing a scathing anti-Asbestos piece. The lack of oral 
interviews and personal diaries is a problem cultural history has constantly come up 
against, but despite this challenge, I have used the words of townspeople whenever I have 
found them in newspaper articles or letters to government officials, and the other sources 
I use have allowed me to closely examine how the actions of the people of Asbestos 
reveal the shaping of a strong cultural identity.  
Aside from source availability, my focus on actions in this study is largely due to 
the belief that actions reveal a lived experience. Oral history can often tell how an event is 
remembered, but by examining actions within their historical context, we can advance our 
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understanding of how the people of Asbestos internalized their experiences as individuals 
and as a community. Historian Joy Parr explains that this internalization is often done 
through the human body. In Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the 
Everyday, Parr writes that bodies “are not only being conditioned by circumstances, they 
are also enduring reservoirs of past practice, which actively influence subsequent 
responses.”36 The people of Asbestos continue to lobby the provincial and federal 
governments to support the industry despite the dangers of the mineral and their 
knowledge of what it does to their bodies. I will argue that they do so because the local 
cultural identity was formed through a complex history of their bodies interacting with 
the natural world, the mineral, and the Jeffrey Mine.  
This connection and resulting identity is not one that is expressed in words, and 
Parr reminds us that, “Our senses are the conduits through which knowledge of 
technology and the environment flow and, through retuning habit and reflex…Most of 
these adaptations are held beyond speech, often outside conscious awareness.”37 Studying 
the actions of the people of Asbestos will allow me to access the thoughts and feelings of 
community members that they may not even realize they had. Foucault calls this 
“unconscious knowledge,”38 and it describes the way people instinctively react to the 
situations that surround them every day. The way the people of Asbestos instinctively 
react to events and ideas in this history will contribute to our understanding of resource 
communities and how local identities are formed through a connection between humans 
and the natural environment.  
The focus on bodies and the unconscious knowledge they can reveal distinguishes 
this study from other histories of mining communities.39 I have used these studies as a 
foundation for my own, but the differences between the communities other scholars 
examine and Asbestos are striking and help us understand the development of a complex 
local cultural identity. Like many other mining towns, Asbestos began with a transient 
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male-dominated population, but quickly grew into a community of families.40 The way 
Asbestos differs from these other histories, however, is that the Jeffrey Mine was a place 
for both male and female labour. In her study of Arizona mining communities, Linda 
Gordon discusses the militancy of miners’ wives in reinforcing white family values and 
racial divisions,41 but the inclusion of women workers in Asbestos created a different 
community character than the one Gordon describes. Female employees were restricted to 
the dusty textile department at the factory beside the pit, but the Jeffrey Mine quickly 
became a place of romance, with JM newsletters advertising the attractiveness of its 
single female workers—referred to as “Asbestos beauties,”—and the habit of its male 
employees to look to the department to find wives.42 Families often began at the Jeffrey 
Mine, and many local women were not completely dependent on the wages of their 
fathers or husbands for their wellbeing. Women were also actively involved in the politics 
of the community, participating in strikes, protests, and even violence. The action and 
inclusion of the women of Asbestos in traditionally male realms of class conflict affected 
the entire community and influenced the development of the local cultural identity.  
In addition to the inclusion of women in the Jeffrey Mine’s workforce, Asbestos 
differed from other mining towns in that although it was a single company and single 
industry community, the major decisions regarding the mine and those who depended on 
it were not always made from head offices far away.43 JM did have its headquarters in 
New York City, with an office in Montreal, but because of the strong cultural identity in 
Asbestos, decisions regarding the operations of the Jeffrey Mine were often negotiated in 
the community amongst workers, town council, and company officials. The people of 
Asbestos insisted again and again on keeping issues surrounding land and people local, 
resenting any action that breached the community’s borders. According to labour 
historian Gregory S. Kealey, “[c]lass is to be studied as a relationship, an effect of 
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struggles, in constant motion and reorganization,”44 and this study of Asbestos will show 
us that class relationships are also time and place dependent, with the balance of power 
continuously shifting.  
The shifting balance of power influenced the local cultural identity, and in 1949 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau noticed, “the whole working class at Asbestos seems to possess an 
unprecedented self-confidence.”45 This dissertation will show that confidence of Jeffrey 
Mine workers during the 1949 strike Trudeau was referring to was a direct result of the 
historically grounded cultural identity that was formed in Asbestos through the interaction 
of people and the natural world. Their confidence has since grown and the community has 
maintained a common front in their global pursuit of industrial success. Although 
Trudeau was impressed by the confidence of the workers, this is the first study that 
examines its roots. In fact, aside from a local history produced by the community in 1999, 
this is the first study on Asbestos that focuses on more than the five-month strike of 1949, 
and it is the only one that examines the subject from a holistic perspective. Despite the 
occasional reference in labour and Quebec history textbooks,46 Asbestos remains absent 
from historical analyses that are not focused solely on the 1949 labour dispute, and even 
then, the community is barely present. 
Trudeau’s 1956 collection on the strike is a reason for this absence, as he wrote 
that, “It is the date, rather than the particular place or the industry that is decisive. The 
strike might well have happened elsewhere…”47 Although he diminished the importance 
of the community, Trudeau acknowledged that the “foundations of Quebec society were 
shaken at Asbestos,”48 due in part, to the confidence of Jeffrey Mine workers. He also 
stated that the conflict was “a violent announcement that a new era had begun…[and] a 
turning point in the entire religious, political, social, and economic history of the Province 
of Quebec.”49 Although his rhetoric was powerful, the context I provide in this 
dissertation shows that Trudeau was wrong: the people, the place, and the industry 
involved in the 1949 strike were what made the dispute matter, not just in the history of 
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Quebec, but also in the history of Canada and the history of international trade and labour 
issues. The strike was a local conflict with global ramifications because of the industry’s 
global reach, and the goals of Jeffrey Mine workers differed greatly from the ones 
Trudeau described.  
Because of Trudeau’s attention-garnering personality and politics, however, 
studies of Asbestos since 1956 have been overshadowed by his interpretation of the 
strike, which has led to a historiographical pattern that has placed the community on the 
periphery of the conflict and Quebec history. Very little scholarship has been produced on 
the strike since 1956, with nothing adequately contradicting Trudeau’s conclusions. In 
2004, Esther Delisle and Pierre K. Malouf wrote Le Quatuor d’Asbestos: Autour de la 
grève de l’amiante, which focuses on the political battle that arose over asbestos-related 
disease rather than on the strike or the community.50 Although bearing the name of the 
town in its title, Le Quatuor had little to do with the land or the people of Asbestos, 
focusing instead on the mining community of East Broughton and the political discourse 
of the era. Suzanne Clavette followed this publication in 2005 with Les Dessous 
d’Asbestos: Une lutte idéologique contre la participation des travailleurs, which 
promised to reveal the community’s experience of the strike, but again focused on events 
and opinions happening outside of Asbestos, bringing community members into an 
abstract ideological battle they were not concerned with.51 Even leading Quebec labour 
historian Jacques Rouillard focuses his studies on the socio-political impact the strike had 
on the province, not on the community,52 and Quebec historian Jocelyn Létourneau 
provides a study of Asbestos focusing only on the historical memory of the 1949 strike, 
not the lived experience.53  
An explanation of this historiography is simple: the people involved in initially 
publicizing the 1949 strike became major figures in Québécois and Canadian politics and 
history. Maurice Duplessis, often taking on the villain’s role in these accounts, was 
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Quebec premier for 18 years and had a major impact on the development of the province. 
Jean Marchand, secretary for the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada 
(CTCC), slept in the homes of the workers during the strike54 and went on to become a 
federal cabinet minister, a senator, and a Companion of the Order of Canada. Gérard 
Pelletier, university friend of Marchand and reporter for Le Devoir, also became a federal 
cabinet minister, a Canadian ambassador and Companion of the Order of Canada. Pierre 
Trudeau, who briefly joined Pelletier in Asbestos, was Prime Minister of Canada for 15 
years. Both André Laurendeau and Pierre Laporte wrote on the provincial implications of 
the strike for Le Devoir and later served in the Quebec legislature.  
The role of these historical figures in the 1949 strike has dominated studies of the 
conflict, overshadowing the real people and reasons behind the labour dispute, and 
turning Asbestos into a place of symbols and myths concerning the state of Quebec on the 
eve of the Quiet Revolution.55 The people of Asbestos are uncomfortable with this 
reputation and this dissertation will bring them back into the history of the strike to show 
how a local perspective can tell a broader history about resource communities, 
industrialization, health, risk, and political influence. Asbestos was and is much more 
than a labour dispute: it reveals the mutual exchange between humans and the natural 
world, and the ways in which this connection can be internalized to shape an 
internationally powerful cultural identity rooted in place.  
Throughout this study, the term “place” will be used to describe the geographic 
area of Quebec now known as Asbestos, as well as the various socio-historical 
constructions of it that were created, debated, and championed. Place is a characterization 
that reveals political, social, and cultural expectations and values,56 and it meant and 
continues to mean different things to different people in Asbestos. Despite these 
differences, what remains central is physical engagement with the land. Anthropologist 
Tim Ingold notes that, “cultural knowledge and bodily substance…undergo continuous 
generation in the context of an ongoing engagement with the land.”57 Expanding on 
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Ingold’s understanding, this study will use place to show how bodies interact, change, and 
grow within the framework outlined by anthropologist Keith H. Basso, who explains that 
the way people understand the land influences how they understand themselves.58 In a 
place named Asbestos, site of the largest chrysotile mine in the world, people use their 
historical conceptions of bodies of land and human bodies to inform and influence their 
collective body politic. Because of the way bodies interact throughout the history of 
Asbestos, I will use these three entities—land, people, politics—as organizational tools in 
order to frame this analysis in time and place.  
Methodology 
The main sources I employ in my analysis of how bodies interact in Asbestos are 
local resources that have always been available to the public yet rarely used in previous 
studies. In addition, I use confidential JM documents obtained through the Johns-
Manville Claims Resolution Management Corporation’s Asbestos Claims Research 
Facility (ACRF) established by the company to facilitate workers compensation 
legislation. The local sources have been invaluable to gaining an understanding of the 
people who lived and worked in Asbestos, especially the local newspaper, L’Asbestos, 
later Le Citoyen, and the town council minutes, which reveal the community’s growth, 
triumphs, fears, and slow collapse. These sources bring the bodies of Asbestos to life. 
For the confidential JM documents, I am indebted to David Egilman, an American 
doctor and scholar working to ensure the success of class action lawsuits launched by 
labour groups against asbestos companies, and Geoffrey Tweedale, a global asbestos 
trade historian based in the United Kingdom. Both Egilman and Tweedale allowed me 
access to the files they had collected via subpoenas throughout the course of their own 
research, a great deal of which focused on Asbestos. The files Egilman provided mostly 
come from JM’s ACRF in Denver, Colorado. These include confidential medical reports 
concerning the workers at the Jeffrey Mine and the people of Asbestos, but others, 
compiled in an “Asbestos Chronology” document, reveal the systematic pattern of 
discovery, panic, and denial that JM officials practiced in Asbestos between 1918 and 
1983. The documents Tweedale provided were of a similar nature, and included the 
confidential files of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association (QAMA)—a lobby group 
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made up of company heads—which reveal secret medical studies, cover-ups, and 
attempts by company officials to prevent the industry from collapsing. QAMA has 
destroyed these files, but Tweedale was able to subpoena copies of them first. Tweedale 
also provided me with the private collection of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, who led Mount 
Sinai Hospital’s Environmental and Occupational Health Division and was seen as one of 
the biggest threats to the asbestos industry because of his commitment to exposing the 
negative health effects of the mineral in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither Egilman nor 
Tweedale have used the documents relating to Asbestos in their work because they 
focused on different aspects of the global industry,59 thus this study is the first time much 
of this information will be used. Following the lead of both Egilman and Tweedale, I 
have given these documents to Théroux at the Société d’Histoire d’Asbestos, who gave 
me one of my first lessons on how to “know” the community. 
This study advances our understanding of how we can know Asbestos by 
illuminating the ways people and the natural environment connect in the community and 
how this connection becomes the backbone of a local cultural identity with global 
repercussions. Chapter 1 will provide an analysis of how the Jeffrey Mine and the town of 
Asbestos were established via geological shifts, human migration, and the development of 
a local community completely reliant on one natural resource. This chapter will end in 
1918, when JM purchased the Jeffrey Mine and irrevocably changed the character and 
direction of the community. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 each cover the same time period, 1918-
1949, but from different points of view: the history of Asbestos as told from the 
perspective of the land in Chapter 2, human bodies in Chapter 3, and the community in 
Chapter 4. This division in perspective will help illustrate how the people and the land 
became interconnected in Asbestos and the ways this connection influenced community 
dynamics and identity. Chapter 5 will unite these three perspectives once again in a close 
examination of the 1949 strike, told from the point of view of the people of Asbestos. The 
strike, much like JM’s arrival in 1918, fundamentally changed the community, and 
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impacted the development of the local cultural identity that had the survival of the 
community as a fundamental characteristic. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will follow the pattern of 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, each from the perspective of a different “bodily” aspect of Asbestos: 
the land, the people, and the community. These chapters will cover the period following 
the strike of 1949 until 1983, when the industry collapsed and JM filed for bankruptcy 
and left the town. These final chapters will show how the local population internalized the 
industrial collapse of their community from the perspective of the land they worked and 
lived on, their own bodies, and their collective identity, built on generations interacting 
with the Jeffrey Mine.  
In telling the history of Asbestos in this way, I will rely on the methodological 
frame laid out in Judith Walzer Leavitt’s Typhoid Mary,60 in which she describes the 
same history in each chapter, told from differing perspectives. I chose to do this to 
emphasize the importance of each of these bodies in the history of Asbestos. Taken 
together, these chapters form a cohesive, chronological understanding of the ways bodies 
interact to shape a local cultural identity with global reach that has been greatly neglected 
in previous studies, and adds texture and depth to the past and present of Asbestos. I 
hope, as Leavitt does, to “encourage readers to engage, as I have, in the process of 
interpretation, and to find their own integrated meanings”61 within these perspectives, and 
each chapter will begin with a brief look at Asbestos today, showing how the past is 
reflected in the present. The effects of the connection between people and the natural 
world on the body politic are not contained in Asbestos, and the mutual exchange of 
bodies can be seen in resource communities throughout Quebec, Canada, and the world. 
By using Asbestos as an example, we as a society can re-evaluate other resource 
communities, past and present, with a fuller understanding of the challenges, dangers, and 
triumphs they must confront. We can also reassess Canada’s continued support of the 
asbestos industry with a more holistic, physical, and local understanding of what it was, 
what it is, and what it should become. 
Through the process of working the Jeffrey Mine and establishing a community 
around it, the people of Asbestos entered into a relationship of mutual exchange with the 
land, shaping it, and being shaped by it. This relationship, driven by global markets yet 
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intensely local, produced a complex cultural identity in Asbestos that has been politicized 
on national and international levels. How does a connection to the natural environment 
develop into a strong cultural identity? How does a local identity develop global 
influence? Can one small community affect national and international politics? To answer 
these questions, this study will examine the history of the Jeffrey Mine and the culture the 
people of Asbestos created around it by balancing their needs with the needs of the land, 
and developing a connection to the Jeffrey Mine that surpassed the comforts of a steady 
paycheque. By analyzing the land, the people, and the politics of the community in this 
history of place, we will see how people with a fierce local cultural identity came to 
influence national policy and global debates on commodity flows, occupational health, 
and environmental justice. 
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Chapter 1: Creation Stories, 1791-1918 
In the beginning, there was asbestos. Well, not exactly, but looking at the Jeffrey 
Mine in Asbestos today, it is easy to think that the land has looked like this forever, 
waiting beneath a surface of trees and grass, the mineral deposits running as deep as the 
surrounding Appalachians are high. Asbestos, Quebec and the massive deposits of the 
mineral that gave the town its name had many “beginnings” that depend on which 
creation story you align yourself with, as they have undergone several starting points that 
rely on differing perspectives and change according to people, time, and agendas. The 
land has not always looked like it does now, as it was shaped and reshaped over long 
periods of time. 
The multiple creation stories of Asbestos reveal the changing values and 
aspirations of the people who took interest in the land where the community would be 
built, ranging from surveyor assessments to the expectations of families. This chapter will 
show how the foundations for the community that would become Asbestos were 
constantly changing as the land was defined and redefined time and again. I will bring 
this change into a larger context of evolving land, people, and community, in order to 
establish the beginnings of a complicated and complementary local cultural identity. In 
doing so, I will establish a foundation for this history of Asbestos and trace the 
foundations of how people and the natural world interact to create a resource community 
with a strong identity that influences how the local population sees its past, present, and 
future.  
While working through the ways land, people, and politics interacted to form 
these stories, this chapter will address broader histories and larger contexts when 
conflicting creation stories built upon each other from 1791 to 1918. I will show how 
radically the land was changed in order to establish the Jeffrey Mine, and how much 
physical human effort was required to do so. The period covered by this chapter was one 
of struggle for the waves of migrating workers who attempted to make the Jeffrey Mine 
profitable. Much of this history is one of disappointment, but when a fuller understanding 
of the land and how people should work it was achieved, the local industry and 
community began to thrive. Asbestos fibre was born of geological friction and heat. 
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Asbestos the place would follow suit, being created and re-created with the friction and 
heat of clashing cultures, ideologies, and aspirations.  
Ownership and Purpose, 1791-1879 
After the land of Asbestos was formed by massive geological shifts, what is now 
the province of Quebec became a place on which diverse peoples would imprint their 
conceptions of what the environment could offer. While these conceptions often differed 
from culture to culture, person to person, they all believed in the benefits the natural 
environment would bring them. Now 21,400 square kilometres,62 l’Estrie has been 
somewhat of a “floating” region with boundaries fluctuating in the space south of the St. 
Lawrence River, north of the American border, west of the Chaudière River, and east of 
the Richelieu region.63 The Abenaki First Nations, who had been pushed northward from 
the eastern United States due to an increase of white settlers in the early 18th century, 
were one of the first peoples to place cultural expectations and aspirations on the region. 
The Abenaki used this territory as hunting and fishing grounds and a village was 
established on the banks of the St. Francis River. The British attacked the village in 1759 
during the Seven Years War and kept prisoners there after killing 200 Aboriginals.64 As 
the territory switched hands from the French Crown to the British with the Treaty of Paris 
of 1763, the Abenaki population went into rapid decline due to disease and war. L’Estrie 
was about to be redefined based on distinctly British cultural values. 
While the British won the vast territory of New France in the Conquest of 1763, 
its management of the area was cautious. Confronted by a growing Francophone 
population in the area surrounding what was to become l’Estrie, and an increasingly 
restless American colony to the south that was about to break into revolution, British 
officials remade the region a “buffer-zone” between the two groups,65 afraid of what 
would happen if they were to meet. The natural resources of the territory went largely 
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unexplored as the Abenaki population dwindled and the region became a deliberately 
unsettled space under British rule.  
The way the region was used by the colonial government was changed after the 
American Revolution. British Loyalists headed north in search of territory still held by the 
Crown and colonial officials were confronted by the problem of finding them a place to 
settle while keeping a firm hold on the rest of their North American colonies. This led to 
the Royal Constitution Act of 1791, which established elected houses of assembly in 
Upper and Lower Canada to appease any rebellious sentiments that may have been 
prevalent following the American and French Revolutions. British officials decided that 
the unsettled buffer-zone was the ideal place for a strong and loyal Anglophone 
settlement to neutralize radical American sentiments and the growing French Canadian 
population. In many ways, the British saw this region as “empty land” waiting for what 
they believed to be the proper type of settlers. The presence of the Abenaki was 
negligible. Lower Canada was to become pacified and civilized through a British 
understanding of the land in l’Estrie. 
The Abenaki used the land for small hunting and fishing communal settlements 
along rivers, but the British method was more widespread and focused on individual land 
ownership and use. In addition to these two systems was yet another land-based ideology 
in the surrounding area based on the French seigneurial system. British officials wanted 
the region to be in sharp contrast with the Francophone seigneuries found in Lower 
Canada, which they saw as the product of an antiquated land management system.66 
Seigneuries were rectangular tracts of land lining the banks of the St. Lawrence and other 
rivers, which were necessary for communication and transportation. No new seigneuries 
were formed after the Conquest as British officials were committed to a strict land 
management system in which land was purchased rather than granted, and square lots 
were sold far from access roads and rivers. Townships were established in the buffer-zone 
region of l’Estrie, and showed the British Crown’s determination to bring its North 
American colonies into a different type of order. 
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The townships of l’Estrie were first surveyed and mapped between 1792 and 
1808,67 just before the region was opened to Anglophone settlers. The number of British 
Loyalists who moved to the townships is disputed in the literature. Historian J.I. Little 
writes that the region was a place where “land-hungry Americans,” not Loyalists, 
settled.68 However, historian Gilles Parent claims, “l’arpentage des townships, terminé 
vers 1796, est suivi par l’établissement de centaines de Loyalists en provenance des Etats-
Unis.”69 Despite these conflicting perspectives, Americans, both loyal and independent, 
settled in the region in the early 19th century and the boundary between the new United 
States and British Lower Canada was blurred.  
Settlement in the region was a complicated and slow process that involved a 
leader-associate system of land purchasing,70 which required a group of interested settlers 
to designate a “leader” who would make the journey to l’Estrie to survey the township he 
and his fellow associates wanted to purchase. Purchasers were often overwhelmed by the 
“wild” nature of the region.71 With its dense, dark forests, the land seemed too rugged, 
too secluded, and certainly not ideal for farming because of the amount of work it would 
take to clear fields. British officials needed to tame the region in order to draw people to 
it. 
The construction of roads was intended to make the region less isolated and more 
accessible. The first of these was cleared by the British Army in 1810 and ran from 
Shipton Township down to the American border where it connected with a more complex 
transportation network.72 Named after James Craig, the Governor of Lower Canada, 
Craig’s Road ran past the future site of Asbestos. However, both the Governor and the 
road quickly became unpopular with French Canadians. Craig was removed from office 
while the road was being constructed because of his vocal mistrust of the Francophone 
population,73 and the road became unusable after the first thaw in 1811 washed it out. 
British plans to use roads and immigration to tame the land of l’Estrie had failed. 
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Following the Conquest of 1763 the Francophone population of Lower Canada 
doubled approximately every twenty-five years.74 Because of this growth and the 
subsequent overcrowding of seigneuries, the population looked towards l’Estrie as a new 
place to settle, but the unfamiliar township system, the isolation of the region, and the 
presence of British and American settlers prevented many from doing so.75 By 1839, the 
British American Land Company (BAL Co.), in possession of 1,250,000 acres, had a 
monopoly over the region’s land sales.76 In accordance with the colonial aspirations for 
l’Estrie, BAL Co. was not interested in selling township land to Francophone farmers and 
instead advertised heavily in major British urban centres during the 1830s.  
BAL Co. promotional literature contained no reference to transportation problems 
or the ruggedness of the land and instead focused on, “[t]he undulating nature of the 
ground, and the fertility of irrigation from the numerous streams of running water…in 
which respect its superiority over other parts of Canada and the United States is distinctly 
established.”77 Settlers lured by these descriptions were confronted by a crude reality 
when they arrived in the region, but it was often too late to back out of the sale.  
While this was an effective way to sell land in l’Estrie, the Rebellion of 1837-38 
in Lower Canada put a freeze on British immigration78 and gave the growing French 
Canadian population a chance to respond to the colonial government’s township system. 
Patriot leader Louis-Joseph Papineau drew up 92 Resolutions in order to advocate radical 
changes in how Lower Canada was managed. Resolution 84 was an attack on how land 
was sold in l’Estrie, and an insistence that seigneuries replace the townships.79 These 
demands were discussed and debated throughout the province. Although the rebellion 
failed, many of its goals were soon fulfilled. By 1840 the Francophone population in 
Lower Canada had risen to 600,000 from 335,000 in 1815 and needed the land available 
in l’Estrie to expand on.80 The rebellion was over, but the issues it raised remained. 
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Rather than address the pressing issue of overpopulation in Lower Canada, the 
colonial government focused on establishing the Canadian Geological Survey (CGS). The 
CGS began in 1842 with the global recognition of the earth sciences and the wealth that 
could come from understanding what lay beneath the land. The fact that gold was found 
along the border of l’Estrie and the Chaudière River in 1823 also contributed to the shift 
in how the region was understood by colonial officials: moving from a place of settlement 
struggles and rebellious targets, the area became a potential gold mine. 
This new way of looking at and using the land added to the colonial government’s 
creation story of l’Estrie and reclassified the region according to new ideas of practicality 
and use. William Edmund Logan, a Montrealer schooled in Britain, was appointed head 
of the CGS in 1842 and he explored l’Estrie until his death in 1875.81 The region had a 
geological past that captured his curiosity, and Logan submitted the CGS’s first survey 
report on Quebec in 1849, offering a detailed description of the land where Asbestos 
would be founded.  
In charge of the survey assignments, Logan chose l’Estrie as his area of focus 
because of the wide variety of minerals found throughout the region. His report focused 
on the region’s most distinctive feature, the Appalachians, and what the land surrounding 
the mountains offered to settlers and the colonial government.82 Fellow surveyor 
Alexander Murray concentrated on what lay below the earth’s crust and examined the 
geological history of l’Estrie, focusing solely on finding rocks and minerals that could be 
of value. This was why, when he became the first to discover asbestos in the region, he 
gave it only a brief mention in his report before moving on. The mineral held little 
practical application and no economic value in this period. When Murray wrote about the 
mineral’s presence in Shipton Township, where Asbestos came to be located, he stated,  
The ranges of serpentine and some of their immediately associated strata 
would probably afford a large amount and variety of material for 
ornamental architecture and purposes of decoration…this rock, when free 
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from veins of asbestus [sic], is in general susceptible of a very high polish, 
and in the district displays a great diversity of the richest green colours.83 
 
Murray’s dismissal of asbestos in favour of an ornamental rock demonstrates its lack of 
value in the mid-19th century, but his observations offer a detailed description of how 
asbestos appeared in its rawest form, deep within the earth. Asbestos hindered what 
Murray otherwise considered valuable rocks and minerals, but his descriptions would be 
crucial for prospectors looking for the fibre later in the century when it had increased in 
value, because they gave key geologically-based indicators as to where it could be found.  
Murray did not mention the mineral in his list of “various substances capable of 
application to useful purposes,”84 and because he did not have the technology to dig 
deeper beneath the surface and trace the asbestos deposits, the veins of fibre running 
through the serpentine rock did not appear extensive. The winding nature of the asbestos 
veins through and around more desirable rocks and minerals meant that the land in this 
area of the region had little value. Logan’s and Murray’s surveys did not launch the start 
of an asbestos industry in Quebec, but they did have an impact on how l’Estrie would be 
reshaped to accommodate new aspirations for the region. 
One of the initial goals of the colonial government when opening l’Estrie for 
settlement, aside from creating a “truly patriotic” Anglophone presence in French 
Canada,85 was to create a thriving agricultural community based on the British land 
management system. After exploring l’Estrie, Logan reported that the region’s 
agricultural prospects were limited because of the type of soil found there and the 
difficulties that came with being so far from reliable transportation links and markets.86 
Just five years earlier, BAL Co. had revised its promotional literature to highlight the 
improvements that had been made to the roadways in the region, as well as the close 
proximity of the townships to major cities like Montreal and Quebec, Boston and New 
York,87 but Logan’s report challenged these claims, as it cost approximately fifty percent 
                                                 
83
 Alexander Murray, “Report of Alexander Murray, Esq., Assistant Provincial Geologist, Addressed to W.E. Logan, 
Esq., Provincial Geologist,” Canadian Geological Survey (Montreal: Lovell and Gibson, 1849), p. 388. “Asbestus” was 
an alternative spelling of “asbestos” at this time. 
84
 Ibid, p. 380. 
85
 Dominion of Canada Legislature, “First Report of the Special Committee,” p. 42.   
86
 Logan, “Geological Survey of Canada: Report of Progress for the Year 1847-48,” p. 363. 
87
 British American Land Company, Lands for Sale in the Eastern Townships of Lower Canada (London: 1842), p. 2. 
 29
more to ship grain from l’Estrie to larger markets.88 Lack of access continued to hinder 
the region’s economic success, and without major improvements to the transportation 
network it would not meet the aspirations of the colonial government.  
Acknowledging this problem in his report, Logan believed that seasonal fluxes 
that made the land too wet or too dry were the main obstacle to maintaining reliable 
transportation networks in the region until a railway could be established.89 Roads had to 
be cleared and re-cleared every season to retain shape and structure on land that was in 
constant motion, but a railway running through specific, well-suited parts of the region 
could overpower the land. This idea complemented what colonial officials had already 
been deliberating,90 and plans were made to bring the train to l’Estrie. 
The decision to build railways through the region was made with a commitment to 
social, economic, and environmental progress and change. The land would be radically 
reshaped to fit new technologies that could withstand seasonal changes that had existed 
for millennia. Although people traditionally settled new territory along riverbanks, the 
technological changes the railway brought to the land trumped the advantages of living by 
a river. With the opening of the Grand Trunk Railway in 1852, people flocked to l’Estrie 
to settle along the line, which bypassed the future site of Asbestos by four miles.91 The 
colonial government hoped that this improvement to the region’s transportation system 
would help increase the Anglophone population in the area92 and high hopes were placed 
on the “most gigantic railway in the world”93 as it spread throughout the region, reaching 
the ports at Montreal, Quebec City, and Portland, Maine. The line ensured that 
agricultural goods produced in the townships could reach larger markets, but more 
important than the goods the Grand Trunk exported from the region were the people and 
industry the railway brought into it. 
As the CGS made its way through l’Estrie, the population crisis in the rest of 
Lower Canada was worsening. No longer having any room to expand the seigneuries, 
French Canadians of the area began to emmigrate to the north-eastern United States en 
masse because land was easy to purchase and the obstacles that made settling in l’Estrie 
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difficult were not present. In a report to the Legislative Assembly of the United Canadas, 
a special committee on the issues of settlement in l’Estrie reported positively that, “before 
thirty years are past, we may find more French Canadians in the States of Vermont and of 
Maine, than in the Eastern Townships.”94 While this was something the government 
applauded, the Catholic clergy feared that living among revolutionary Americans would 
negatively influence French Canadians, and priests urged them to settle in l’Estrie 
instead.95 Because of this, the region went from being sixty-six percent Anglophone 
before the Grand Trunk, to a French Canadian majority just twenty years later.96  
The change in the population of l’Estrie during the second half of the 19th century 
was termed a “conquête pacifique” at the time by Quebec nationalist Jules-Paul 
Tardivel.97 Although peaceful, this conquest over the land and the population that 
controlled it revolutionized the way l’Estrie was perceived by those who had aspirations 
for it to be an Anglophone safe-haven in Quebec, especially because it coincided with a 
transformation of the environment. By 1862 the region had reached a population of 
200,000 largely due to the influx of French Canadians,98 but although these new settlers 
came from agricultural communities, the economic focus of l’Estrie was shifting towards 
the industrialization of the land and new creation story.  
While some of the French Canadians who emigrated to l’Estrie in the second half 
of the 19th century began farms within the township system, many followed the railway 
lines around the region, getting temporary seasonal work in the new industrial centres that 
grew along them.99 This marked a radical shift in how the Francophone population of 
Lower Canada chose to earn a living and use the land. The Grand Trunk brought a new 
culture to the region in the form of French Canadians, while subsequent lines brought 
industries that would exploit the land in new ways. The construction of a railroad tears up 
the landscape, smoothes it down, and makes it “efficient.” Land in l’Estrie was altered 
and built up so that seasonal fluxes in water levels would not sink or flood the tracks as 
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they had done to the roads. This process mirrored the work of Logan and Murray during 
their surveys of the region because it once again uncovered the valuable rocks and 
minerals under the earth’s crust.  
The construction of the Quebec Central railway, which ran through l’Estrie on its 
way from Lake Huron to Quebec City,100 uncovered massive amounts of asbestos in the 
northeastern portion of the region near the community of Thetford in the 1870s. The 
claim to this discovery was contested between an Anglophone named Robert Ward and a 
Francophone named Fecteau,101 which illustrated how the region was changing in the 
second half of the 19th century with a new population and a new way of using the land. 
The discovery at Thetford coincided with a growing marketability for the fireproof 
mineral. While it was relatively valueless in 1848, by the time it was uncovered along the 
tracks of the Quebec Central, American manufacturers had started to specialize in 
asbestos-based building products to meet the growing demands of industrializing 
America.102 L’Estrie was quickly becoming a region in which different factions of the 
population—English, French, upper class, working class—would fight over who 
controlled the land, and asbestos would often be central to this struggle.  
For many years the deposits at Thetford, 100km away from Asbestos, were 
considered the largest in the world and the area surrounding the growing community was 
known as the “asbestos belt.”103 By the 1850s, the presence of asbestos was well known 
in l’Estrie, and because of Murray’s detailed descriptions, the mineral was easily 
identifiable to those without geological training, especially because it often appeared in 
outcroppings of serpentine rock and required no digging. This was how gentleman farmer 
William H. Jeffrey discovered the mineral at the site of Asbestos today in the late 1870s 
and convinced Charles Webb, who owned the land, to go into business with him. Jeffrey 
controlled the mine operations and Webb controlled the budget.104 While neither knew 
they would be carving out what would become the world’s largest asbestos mine, Jeffrey 
and Webb’s efforts in 1879 began a major redefinition of the land on which the town of 
Asbestos would be established.  
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A Land Revolution, 1879-1899 
The sharp influx of French Canadians into the region led to a rapid rise in 
urbanization and industrialization. The asbestos industry was one of the major factors in 
this radical change to how the land was seen and used, as it altered the township system 
and created small mining communities that grew and shrank according to profits. 
Changes to the land and how people used it came quickly as farmers turned into industrial 
entrepreneurs and drastically altered the ecology of the region by ripping up trees and 
crops, and digging deep into the rock underneath. A year following Jeffrey’s discovery of 
asbestos, the Acte général des mines du Québec was put in place to monitor the new 
industries of the region and ensure the government received a portion of any profits that 
came from the land.105 In 1881, the Quebec government appointed Joseph Obalski as 
director of mining services. Obalski would help redefine how people and land interacted 
in the region: if l’Estrie was not going to succeed as an agrarian, English society that 
would eventually dominate French Canada, it would be a region where the land and the 
people would be used to their fullest economic potential.   
The way the Jeffrey Mine was created illustrated this new philosophy. Work 
began in 1881, with Jeffrey and Webb employing fourteen men: seven French Canadians 
and seven British immigrants.106 Although it is unclear which of these men were in 
supervisory roles, and if one linguistic group was favoured over another, the blend of 
English and French cultures in the 1880s established a foundation for the development of 
a local cultural identity in Asbestos. The work was slow and arduous, and while asbestos 
can be extracted via underground shafts, the Jeffrey Mine was to be opencast, an 
economically practical method107 that had a tremendous ecological effect on the land and 
landscape, and changed how it was understood by the people who lived around it.  
The creation of the Jeffrey Mine was a long process that involved a real physical 
struggle with the land. Operations could only be carried out in the summer months when 
the earth was not frozen due to the extreme cold of winter, or soaking wet due to the 
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thaws of the spring.108 The first stage in the process involved a crew of men clearing the 
land of its surface soil with picks, shovels, and the occasional ox-driven scraping cart. 
They dug between five and twenty five feet down into the land until the bottle-green 
serpentine rock housing the veins of asbestos was uncovered. One man holding a drill-bit 
and three or four others hitting the bit with sledgehammers then drilled holes into the 
rock. Young boys were always present in mining operations at this time, and at the 
Jeffrey Mine, they carried buckets of drinking water from crew to crew. Explosives were 
then packed into these holes and large pieces of rock surrounded by asbestos veins were 
blasted free.109 This was labour-intensive, hard physical work that allowed these men to 
gain a firm understanding of the land from the inside out. Once the serpentine was twice 
broken apart by explosives, “the pieces containing the asbestos are then removed to the 
cobbing shop, where boys break them up with small hammers and assort the asbestos 
according to quality.”110 The presence of boys during the creation of a mine illustrates 
how a new mining culture was being created in the region: these boys were coming of age 
as they helped industrialize the region and this was how they were taught land should be 
used. No longer raised on farms, these young men came to know the land through mining, 
and this knowledge influenced how the local cultural identity developed.  
The dangers involved with blasting large rocks out of the ground also meant that 
the culture growing around the Jeffrey Mine was one that understood physical risk from 
the very beginning. In the 19th century, the medical profession in Quebec was deeply 
divided along linguistic lines. Although the province was the first in Canada to form a 
regulated medical society,111 until 1843 McGill University was the only institution in 
Quebec with the ability to grant medical degrees in English.112 This limited the 
accessibility of the profession until Francophone institutions were given the same 
granting rights, but because of continued linguistic barriers, their Association des 
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médecins de langue française de l’Amérique du Nord, established in 1902,113 exchanged 
knowledge and theories with the medical community in France, not North America.114 
Furthermore, because the Catholic Church was responsible for establishing and running 
hospitals and clinics in Quebec,115 medical knowledge was often overpowered by 
religious ideology, which distanced health care from the scientific method.116 Health care 
was not a prime concern for the workers carving out the Jeffrey Mine and access to 
doctors was limited in the region. Miners had to accept the risks that came with their 
occupation and if they were injured, there was a chance they would die. The major health 
threat associated with asbestos was the act of mining itself; there was no awareness of the 
specific dangers the mineral posed to human health. 
It was time-consuming and dangerous to create the opencast Jeffrey Mine. The 
mineral can and has been mined using both underground and opencast methods, largely 
depending on the technology available at the time and the way the deposit is laid out in 
the land. Because market prices for asbestos were based on fibre length—with the longest 
being the most valuable—opencast mining often provided the best access to full veins of 
the mineral. Hard rock resources, such as coal and silver, have traditionally been mined 
underground because their market value was based on quantity, not size.117 Underground 
mining has historically only been used for the major asbestos deposits found in Canada, 
Russia, and South Africa when opencast methods could not be employed due to lack of 
physical space. In the time and place the Jeffrey Mine was being established, opencast 
mining had strong advantages over underground. Engineer Fritz Cirkel explained to the 
Canadian Department of Mines that opencast pits allowed for easier supervision, made 
total extraction of the asbestos fibre possible due to the lack of underground structural 
pillars, and provided clean air for workers to breathe, which suggests that the Jeffrey 
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Mine did not threaten human health as underground mines did.118 The disadvantages of 
opencast mining were that it was difficult to remove barren serpentine rock, operations 
were often halted because of poor weather, and there was a limited amount of space 
where waste rock and fibre could be dumped.119 Because of the amount of unused farm 
land available to them, Jeffrey and Webb committed to the opencast method and a 
community was created around the mine.  
By 1884, a post office had been built close to the pit with a sign on the front of it 
that read “Asbestos.”120 The town of Asbestos had officially begun, and the fact that it 
was given an English name by a government agency, rather than the French equivalent, 
“amiante,” suggests the extent to which Anglophone land ownership and government 
connections dominated the increasingly Francophone-worked region. Change came 
quickly to the new community and the families of the miners that once lived four miles 
away in Danville slowly began to move to Asbestos as production increased and a local 
identity began to take shape. As this happened, a renewed interest in the land grew. The 
mineral’s valueless image of the 1840s had changed, and the CGS reported, “[n]ear 
Danville, four miles from the Grand Trunk railway, a mine of considerable extent has 
been operated for several years….This industry has already grown to large proportions, 
and bids fair to become one of the most important in the Dominion.”121 Inspired by the 
economic potential of the Jeffrey Mine described in the CGS, surveyors and prospectors 
in the 1880s scoured l’Estrie for untapped asbestos deposits with which to earn their 
fortunes, and they used the CGS to search for a more detailed understanding of how and 
where asbestos occurred in the land. The CGS Report of 1885 noted that the deposits “are 
extensive and probably continuous at certain depths nor far from the surface [as] 
evidenced by the frequent outcrops, which often comprise large areas of twelve to twenty 
square miles in extent.”122 This was promising information to those interested in taking a 
lead role in the industrialization of l’Estrie, but making the region’s land useful and 
profitable continued to be a challenge. 
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The Jeffrey Mine was thriving, and went from employing 14 men working during 
the summer months in 1881, to 70 men working all seasons and extracting 15 tonnes of 
the mineral each week in 1885.123 This created a less transient community at Asbestos 
than was common in the other industrial towns of l’Estrie and the mine’s constant use 
drastically changed the rhythms of the land. While 15 tonnes a week was enough to 
ensure the Jeffrey Mine was economically viable, it was a small amount compared to the 
extraction levels at the mines near Thetford, where the real asbestos fever was centred. 
The CGS reported in 1885 that in the four mines surrounding Thetford there were 250 
men employed in “the largest and most important operations” in the region, extracting 
1,100 tonnes during the summer months alone.124 The Jeffrey Mine was decidedly second 
rate in comparison and was constantly being referred to as “the small mine near Danville” 
long after Asbestos was incorporated as a village in 1899. No one had yet assessed the 
true value of the land at Asbestos.  
In 1886 Canada showcased the dominion’s natural resources at the Colonial and 
Indian Exhibition in London, England. Referring to the Thetford display, the official 
report noted that, “much attention was attracted by it, and many enquiries were made 
concerning it. Several asbestos properties were sold as a result of the information 
given.”125 This was a positive reception, but the properties sold were far away from 
Asbestos because surveyors believed that although the Jeffrey Mine’s output was 
“considerable,” 
the serpentine [t]here is quite limited, with steep sides all round, and 
contains a number of veins of asbestos, mostly of small size, though the 
quality of the fibre is good. Faults have affected the value of this property 
considerably, some very good veins with a thickness reaching two inches 
having been cut off completely at a depth of 50 feet from the surface.126 
 
The linear mineral deposits laid out like unrolled yarn at Thetford required multiple mines 
to access the extent of the fibre, but the fibres at Asbestos, almost 100km west of the 
region’s “asbestos belt,” swirled through a rounded serpentine knoll,127 resulting in short, 
broken veins that resembled a brittle bird’s nest—and required only one mine. Because 
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the value of asbestos in the late 19th century was based on fibre length to ensure quicker 
processing and spinning into a wool-like yarn that could be woven into fabric, Thetford’s 
mineral was more desirable.128 Furthermore, the area surrounding the Jeffrey Mine was 
still used for farming even though land ripe for industrialization was being purchased at 
$5 an acre.129 This was why the CGS stressed that “there is no apparent reason why 
[asbestos] should not be found in paying quantity at other points, and it is possible that 
subsequent exploration will largely extend the area where profitable mining operations 
can be carried on.”130  
Quebec’s Director of Mines matched this encouragement. Since his appointment 
in 1881, Joseph Obalski had visited mines throughout Quebec and released a book in 
1889 that promoted the province’s minerals to international markets.131 Because Obalski 
was an engineer and not a geologist, his publications differed somewhat from those of the 
CGS, but shared with them an overall excitement about the asbestos industry, that “has 
already assumed so much development that the output, which only amounted at the outset 
to a few hundred tons had risen...to 6,000 in 1889.”132 The Jeffrey Mine contributed 207 
tonnes to this total, and 400 tonnes the following year, but these were insignificant figures 
compared to those coming from Thetford, which mined 4,803 tonnes in 1890.133  
The exponential increase in the amount of asbestos extracted in l’Estrie fuelled 
Obalski’s excitement over its importance to the economic future of Quebec. He wrote that 
the people of the region produced more asbestos than anywhere else in the world, because 
of its sophisticated transportation network and abundance of the mineral. He also 
expressed his enthusiasm for the industry when he stated that a “remarkable fact…is that, 
while the production has increased with the demand, prices have also risen, so that, of late 
years, asbestos lands have been eagerly sought after. This is owing to the new uses which 
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are being daily discovered.”134 Because of rising prices and demand, there was a sharp 
increase in prospectors throughout l’Estrie who hoped to take advantage of the land. 
Although the Jeffrey Mine was profitable, by 1887 ambition had exceeded ability 
and the amount of men employed in the pit was reduced.135 The industry was not growing 
because it focused only on the extraction of the raw mineral, which when taken from the 
Jeffrey Mine, was sent to the more industrialized United States or Great Britain to be 
further processed,136 limiting the type and extent of employment in the mining 
communities of l’Estrie. What happened to the fibres after they were extracted did not 
interest mine owners or the Canadian government, and geologists constantly urged the 
development of more asbestos pits, not factories. The industrialization of the region only 
focused on the potential wealth of natural resources in their raw form, and factories did 
not yet complement how people saw and used the land in l’Estrie. The lack of factories 
remained even as the asbestos industry led the region in new extraction technologies to 
boost the amount of fibre mined.137  
The first mechanization of the industry came in the late 1880s with the 
introduction of compressed air and steam power for drilling blasting holes and hoisting 
ore in Thetford, not Asbestos.138 Production at the Jeffrey Mine had dwindled, and when 
Obalski visited in 1889, he noted that the pit was approximately 100 feet deep and,  
located on a plateau about 180 feet above the surrounding lands. The mine 
has…yielded in all about 3,080 tons of asbestos. Its present annual output 
is about 325 tons, with an average staff of 35 workmen. It is altogether 
worked by hand labor, without the help of any machinery. The asbestos is 
of very good quality, although the fibres appear short. This mine…is not 
worked in winter time.139  
 
In 1885, the Jeffrey Mine had employed 70 men, extracted over 700 tonnes of asbestos 
annually, and was worked yearlong. Four years later, operations had not advanced 
technologically and production had sharply declined in every other respect. Half of the 
mine’s workforce had moved on, and while this was in part because the distance between 
Asbestos and the Grand Trunk meant transportation costs were high, the main reason was 
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that the mine was poorly managed. Neither Jeffrey nor Webb was an engineer or a 
geologist and their understanding of the land at Asbestos was too rudimentary for it to be 
worked to its fullest potential. However, their lack of knowledge was indicative of the 
time, and British geologist Robert H. Jones wrote of them in his 1897 book on global 
asbestos deposits, “it must not be supposed, that [Jeffrey and Webb’s] want of knowledge 
was in any way blameable, because if this were so, then it must be said that all those 
commercial and scientific men who had, year after year, examined the property, or 
viewed it mineralogically, were equally so. Nothing of the peculiar nature and quality of 
the serpentine in which [they] worked was then known.”140 Those who ran the Jeffrey 
Mine—and the government engineers who studied it—did not yet know the economic 
value of the land at Asbestos.  
Despite the example of the dwindling Jeffrey Mine, surveyors and prospectors 
continued to have faith in the land of l’Estrie. The Canadian economy was undergoing a 
depression from 1873-1896,141 and the dominion had only its natural resources on which 
to rely. Seeing an opportunity, the CGS report of 1887 stressed, “a thorough re-survey of 
these areas is of great importance, since lands which now have a comparatively small 
value may in a very short time be valued at very large sums.”142 Although it appeared that 
some mines were failing, the rising value of asbestos in international markets made 
prospectors look at the land in l’Estrie again. The result was an asbestos rush that left 
many of those untrained in identifying profitable deposits financially ruined and the land 
torn apart.  
Obalski urged caution to those in search of asbestos when he wrote, “serpentine 
fills a great place in the Eastern Townships, but workable asbestos only occurs in a very 
small section.”143 Many prospectors wrongly believed that if they found a serpentine 
outcropping, large asbestos deposits were not far away, which resulted in many failed 
mines scarring the region. In response, Thetford engineer L.A. Klein wrote, 
it takes more than the finding of the serpentine to have a paying asbestus 
[sic] mine...While the undoubted success of some of the existing mines, in 
combination with erroneous ideas…nursed by speculators, lead many to 
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believe that they struck a fortune when a locality was shown to them 
which contained serpentine…with occasionally a small asbestus seam in 
it…not one enterprise has proved successful in this industry which has not 
had anything else to look on than…a good colour.144 
 
As though to reinforce Klein’s point, in 1892, just as the American asbestos 
manufacturing companies amalgamated under the H.W. Johns Manufacturing Co., the 
Jeffrey Mine went bankrupt and was shut down,145 despite the fact that just one year 
earlier, it was known in the industry as “one of the best” producers of asbestos.146 
Examples like this closure led Commissioner of Crown Lands E.S. Flynn to announce 
that the mining industry in Canada had not reached a point in which it could be 
considered profitable.147  
One reason for the Jeffrey Mine’s closing was Jeffrey himself. He was not well-
connected and chose not to belong to the Asbestos Club, an association of mine owners 
around Thetford who met monthly and who would have exposed him to new connections 
and technologies that would have allowed him to mine the land more successfully.148 The 
Asbestos Club was an important factor in the success of the Thetford Mines because it 
facilitated an exchange of knowledge and extraction techniques among mine owners and 
created a strong community identity amongst the local miners, regardless of which 
company they worked for. The fact that Asbestos was located 70km away from Thetford 
and that Jeffrey Mine owners never joined the regional collective, meant that the 
community was both isolated and individual, which helped shape the local-global cultural 
identity this dissertation will trace, despite the mine’s closure. Furthermore, Jeffrey was a 
farmer, and did not understand the geology behind the unique deposits at Asbestos, 
compared to later owners of the mine who would help channel this distinctiveness to 
make the mine the largest of its kind in the world. Jones described Jeffrey as being 
“somewhat obstinate and self-willed, and strictly a man of the old school—independent in 
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his ideas, by no means highly educated, and never much inclined to move out of the old 
grooves.”149  
By 1892, Jeffrey was 83 years old and the four and a half to five tonnes of 
asbestos extracted daily from his mine were not enough to pay the $4,000 in monthly 
wages.150 Liquidators W. Farwell and F.C Thompson took possession of the land.151 This 
was a shock to many in the region, as months earlier the Richmond Guardian visited 
Asbestos and reported that 
five or six years ago, Mr. Webb’s farm house, Mr. Morrill’s, and the 
school house near by, were then the only buildings near the mine, while at 
the mine itself, the office, a small slight wooden structure for the manager, 
a blacksmith’s shop, and a couple of rough sheds for sheltering the men… 
were all that was to be seen; there is now a village crowding round…and 
substantial houses 80 in number…and between 600 and 700 people, all 
dependent on the mine, inhabit them…152 
 
A community had been established next to the Jeffrey Mine, but being completely 
dependent on the industrial success of the land, families and single workers quickly left 
Asbestos. The character of the optimistic mining town changed quickly in 1892 along 
with the other failed mines in l’Estrie, as the workforce in the region became transient, 
flocking to new pits when they opened and retreating back to the more stable mines at 
Thetford when they closed. As the land became increasingly industrialized in l’Estrie, 
worker transiency became widespread as industries rose and fell according to market 
demand and successful management of land and people. Although Asbestos had a school, 
a general store and a post office, when the mine closed, the community did as well. 
Mine closures were common in late-19th century Quebec, and many industry 
leaders blamed closures like the one at the Jeffrey Mine on the provincial government’s 
management of the land.153  According to Honoré Mercier, premier from 1887 to 1891, 
provincial revenue belonged to the Francophone population, not English colonizers who 
controlled industrial development.154 The success of the province would lie in its ability 
to do what it wished with its natural resources and reap the profits that resulted from these 
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ventures. In 1890, Mercier imposed a 3% tax on the output of Quebec mines and a new 
bill that mandated all mining land lying idle for more than two years would become the 
possession of the state.155 This was widely unpopular with industry leaders who believed 
it would “convert the Quebec mining men into straight anarchists”156 because of their 
objection to government intervention in business. The Mining Bill amendments were 
repealed under the new government in 1892 because of this outrage, which the Canadian 
Mining and Mechanical Review deemed part of Mercier’s “race and revenge”157 style of 
governing. Following in the tradition of Louis-Joseph Papineau, Mercier was not the first 
leader in Quebec who emphasized the importance of the land to French Canadians, nor 
would he be the last. 
Despite new taxes and political disagreements, the Jeffrey Mine did not remain 
closed for long. In 1893 the Danville Slate Co. bought the 75 acres of land given up by 
Jeffrey and Webb the year before. Despite its previous bankruptcy, industry reports 
indicated that this “property is one of exceptional value, and will be exploited 
vigorously.”158 A new workforce was called to Asbestos and operations at the mine began 
once more, but with a much different dynamic. After Confederation in 1867, the 
provincial government of Quebec introduced policies to deter British immigration, which 
resulted in a Francophone majority of 69% in the region by 1890.159 Another reason for 
this was the increased development of factory and mining communities in the region that 
drew young French Canadians away from the overcrowded farms of their fathers and into 
an urban environment.160 L’Estrie was now being created as an industrialized, 
Francophone region largely due to mining, and both Thetford and Asbestos were home to 
French Canadian majorities by the 1890s. 
This majority influenced the local cultural identity formed in the years of Jeffrey 
and Webb by establishing a divided, yet connected, Francophone working-class majority 
and Anglophone managing elite. As the Danville Slate Co. took over the Jeffrey Mine in 
1893, Feodor Boas became the new man in charge operations and brought a different 
understanding of the land than Jeffrey, Webb, or any of the engineers and geologists who 
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had previously studied the deposit. Jones wrote that Boas was “not an asbestos man, nor 
did he make any pretence to a knowledge of mineralogy, but all throughout the province 
he was highly esteemed for his uprightness, shrewdness, and sound common sense.”161 
His way of looking at the land created an asbestos revolution and impacted the local 
cultural identity of Asbestos in ways still seen today.  
Along with the pit, the Danville Slate Co. inherited all the waste rock that had 
been taken from the mine over the previous fifteen years.162 While Jeffrey believed this to 
be useless rock that hindered the success of the mine, Boas saw it as the source of its 
future wealth. He discovered what Jeffrey did not notice because of his lack of training: 
the piles of waste taken from the Jeffrey Mine since 1881 were actually piles of asbestic, 
asbestos fibres thought to have little value because they were too short to be woven.163 
The presence of asbestic was one of the reasons Jeffrey, who prided himself on his strict 
grading system while being unaware of the wealth he was discarding,164 struggled and 
why geologists did not believe the mine was as valuable as the pits around Thetford. The 
way Boas looked at the rounded knoll in which the deposit was found led to yet another 
redefinition of the land, the people, and the town of Asbestos. 
Although asbestic could not be woven into cloth, it could, among other things, be 
added to lead paint to fireproof walls and applied to roofing shingles to contain fires in 
communities where houses were built close together. The once paltry demand for asbestic 
had risen so much in international markets by the time Boas discovered it in Asbestos that 
for years he had the workforce at the Jeffrey Mine focus exclusively on the piles of waste 
that surrounded the pit.165 Boas’ discovery produced an asbestos revolution. He found that 
once the surface rock was removed, up to 90% of the Jeffrey Mine was long asbestos 
fibres surrounded by asbestic,166 which meant that most of what was taken from the pit 
could be extracted and sold with little waste. The land was transformed into a place of 
extraordinary value, even surpassing the deposits at Thetford. 
Because of the sudden demand for asbestic, work at the Jeffrey Mine began again 
and old employees mixed with new as the population of Asbestos rapidly doubled in 
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size.167 After one year, Boas employed 150 men, and by 1895, 400 men worked the 
mine.168 The village was home to 1,100 people, a chapel was built to accommodate the 
growing community, and Feodor Boas’ discovery of asbestic began a period of marked 
prosperity. As other mines in l’Estrie continued to fail due to misunderstood deposits and 
poor extraction techniques, the Jeffrey Mine’s success increased exponentially, which 
contrasted with the steady growth and gradual collapse of other mines in the region and 
the communities established around them. 
The discovery of asbestic at the Jeffrey Mine coincided with a boom in the market 
for the product, and a “golden age of capitalism” in Quebec based on the rapid growth of 
industries that exploited the province’s natural resources.169 This growth reflected the new 
way the land was being used in the province and increased industrialization had a strong 
impact on the ecology of l’Estrie. These changes could all be seen at the Jeffrey Mine, 
which quickly grew to become the most profitable asbestos mine in the province:  
this mine never till now attained any special significance, [but] it has 
suddenly sprung into great importance, attaining also considerable 
scientific interest…[I]n the shortest possible space of time, it has stepped 
in front of all the other mines previously named, and effectually [sic] 
revolutionized the whole asbestos industry, by bringing the use of the 
important mineral it deals with within the reach of the whole world. Many 
very important mines throughout the district are in consequence of the 
discoveries here, now closed.170 
 
By 1896, the Jeffrey Mine produced the most asbestos in the province.171 
 The dramatic increase in population and production at the end of the 19th century 
radically altered the land at Asbestos and how people understood it. Bigger and better 
factories were constructed, a railway line was built that connected the mine to the Grand 
Trunk, and blocks of new houses, stores, and churches framed the outskirts of the pit as a 
community was formed.172 This was not a mining town that anyone believed would go 
bust again, and this sense of permanence was inspired by the success of the Jeffrey Mine, 
which influenced a growing local cultural identity.  
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In 1896, Boas continued his efforts to make the Jeffrey Mine profitable and he 
applied to the United States Patent Office for his invention of asbestic wall plaster. He 
found that when mixed with quicklime, asbestic forms a wall plaster that “is fireproof to 
the highest degree and will not crack or curl under the action of heat…It is also…a bad 
conductor of sound. As it is stronger than any other plaster, it is not necessary to have as 
thick a coating applied as usual, and additional economy, with a reduction of weight on 
the building, result.”173 The plaster Boas invented using Jeffrey Mine asbestic 
revolutionized building materials at the turn of the 20th century, with hospitals, schools, 
and homes containing this fireproof, soundproof, long-lasting mineral.  
Boas went to Britain to secure new contracts and wrote that his invention was 
based on the issue of land use: “[t]his waste material accumulates at the mines and around 
the factories, and is a trouble and expense to the industry. Many attempts have been made 
to utilize this waste, but previous to my invention without success. My invention 
therefore provides a useful outlet for this waste material.”174 The overseas contracts 
committed the Jeffrey Mine to extracting 5,000 tonnes of fibre a year175 and the new uses 
Boas found for the ore extracted from the mine, now under the control of the British 
Asbestos and Asbestic Co., complemented other innovations and assured community 
members that they had a prosperous future ahead of them. When the pit was connected to 
the Grand Trunk in 1897, this belief was confirmed in the minds of the 300 employees 
and their families who had made Asbestos their home.176  
The confidence in prosperity was the result of a sudden rise in the use of 
electricity in industry and other walks of life at the end of the 19th century. Early electrical 
technology was a major fire hazard and short asbestic fibres packed to make fireproof 
insulation, combined with a layer of Boas’ wall plaster, was the perfect solution to the 
problem. Electricity and asbestos, both readily available in Quebec, grew rapidly side by 
side and changed Asbestos from a transient mining camp to a permanent community. The 
local cultural identity was greatly affected by their industrial success, which only 
continued to grow with the construction of a five-storey mill beside the open pit. Jones 
described the mill as being “arranged by the hillside [so] that the laden wagons may drive 
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straight through the doorways and along the passages, to deliver and take up their loads at 
the required points, on four out of the five stories, the building in every part being 
excellently ventilated, and well lighted by electricity.”177 The mill and its size were 
indicators of how successful the land had become through the labour of the local 
population. The fact that a mill was now present in Asbestos also demonstrated that the 
ways workers interacted with the mineral were growing, allowing for a broader local 
knowledge of asbestos, and a stronger connection to the land.  
Due to these advancements, in 1899 the community was incorporated as a village 
of 700 acres.178 While this was not the first time the area surrounding the Jeffrey Mine 
was called “Asbestos,” there was a significant difference between an unofficial sign in 
1884 and a solid declaration of place as the community experienced its first major boom. 
Calling the village Asbestos symbolized how much the town was controlled by its 
minority Anglophone population, which ensured that the name was English, not the 
French equivalent, “amiante.” It also acknowledged how completely the local population 
and the natural world were connected through labour and community life. Asbestos was 
not just what its citizens mined; it was becoming who they were. 
The Boom Before the Boom, 1900-1918 
Industries that suddenly appear in the wilderness accelerate the process of turning 
the land and the people who live and work with it into factories of change.179 In 1900 the 
new village of Asbestos began to change rapidly as the demand for the mineral in 
international markets sharply increased and, as Obalski wrote, “l’amiante est devenue 
dans l’industrie mécanique un produit de première nécessité.”180 The international 
demand for the mineral added to the cultural identity in Asbestos and gave the local 
population a confidence not yet seen in the community. This confidence was expressed 
when the townspeople was faced with tragedy: on 22 March 1900, the five-storey mill at 
the Jeffrey Mine burned to the ground due to an electrical fire despite the fact that its roof 
was made of asbestos.181 While this was a costly setback, it was the Jeffrey Mine that 
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brought the people of Asbestos their success and identity, not the mill. Production was 
increased at the mine and even more of the seemingly limitless deposit was extracted, 
helping the community survive the economic threat that the destroyed mill posed. After 
six months of stalled activity, weekly extraction levels were maintained and shifts were 
worked in the mine day and night six days a week in order to meet market demands.182 
When disaster struck the community, the people of Asbestos learned that the Jeffrey Mine 
would carry them through. Because of this dedication to production, New York’s H.W. 
Johns-Manville Co. began to financially back the Asbestos and Asbestic Co.,183 and the 
majority of the fibre extracted from the Jeffrey Mine went directly to the American 
company’s factories to be processed.  
The company had initially become invested in l’Estrie in 1892 when it purchased 
Lot 20, Range A in Coleraine Township, near Thetford184 during an economic trend at the 
turn of the 20th century when Canada’s export of raw goods to Britain had dropped to 
31%, and its exports to the United States had risen to 51%.185 By 1898, the Jeffrey Mine 
was sending the majority of its fibre to the H.W. Johns-Manville Co. As the value of 
asbestos continued to rise, it became an even more reliable industry in which to invest. 
While Britain imported $106,989 worth of raw Canadian asbestos in 1892, the United 
States purchased $375,956 worth, and became the leading manufacturer of asbestos-based 
products.186 The H.W. Johns-Manville Co. made a deal with the Asbestos and Asbestic 
Co. in 1898 to secure the Jeffrey Mine’s asbestic at a higher-than-market rate for its 
manufacturing pursuits.187 Striving to capitalize on this deal, in 1901 Boas applied for a 
patent for artificial stone, yet another asbestos-based innovation. Because of its ability to 
contain sound and fire, this stone, made of asbestic, sand, and lime carbonate, was “a 
great advantage in the manufacture of building materials, bricks, slabs,”188 and was 
particularly desirable in the rapidly urbanizing United States. 
The shift towards American markets inspired many Quebec nationalists, led by 
Henri Bourassa, to lobby in favour of breaking away from the British Empire. Grandson 
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of Louis-Joseph Papineau and follower of Honoré Mercier, Bourassa believed that all 
empires, not just the British, were “hateful” because they restricted the “liberty and 
intellectual and moral progress” of their dominions.189 A closer association with the 
United States appealed to Bourassa because it suggested a break with Britain, but it also 
made him worry that Canada, and Quebec specifically, was trading one empire for 
another.190 Bourassa believed that the province’s natural resources were vital to Quebec’s 
industrial revolution and so they had to be controlled by French Canadians, not an 
Anglophone elite, regardless of where they came from.191 While foreign control seemed 
wrong to nationalists, the people of Asbestos, having reached a population of 10,000 in 
1901,192 saw the benefits of international investment. Their local identity was tied to 
international demand. In 1902 the newly built mill was the largest structure in the district, 
and facilitated a considerable increase in production as the global demand for the mineral 
rose.193 
With the financial support of the H.W. Johns-Manville Co., the Jeffrey Mine grew 
at a rapid pace at the beginning of the 20th century, largely due to asbestic becoming 
fundamental to a wide variety of manufactured goods. By 1905, mining had radically 
altered the land and the pit was 1,200 feet long, 175 feet wide, and 175 feet deep, with 
close to 80% of what was taken from the pit being sellable asbestos or asbestic.194 The 
Jeffrey Mine became renowned for its production levels at a time when asbestos mining 
was the most profitable industry in Quebec and l’Estrie provided 80% of the world’s 
supply.195  
The rectangular shape of the mine was seen as the most efficient way to facilitate 
the extraction of asbestos because it exposed a variety of zones and allowed multiple 
crews to extract the fibre at the same time.196 It also indicated that the land at Asbestos 
would be devoted to mining: no other use was as profitable. Obalski confirmed this when 
he excitedly wrote, “[p]ratiquement on peut dire que la quantité en vue est illimitée, et 
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avec le matériel existant, la facilité et le prix limité de la main d’œuvre ainsi que les 
facilités d’expédition, il n’y a guère de concurrence à redouter, et un bon avenir est 
réservé à cette industrie.”197 The deposits at Asbestos appeared limitless, which was good 
news to outside interests and indicated to the townspeople that work would be available in 
Asbestos for generations to come.  
The growth of the Jeffrey Mine was balanced by the growth of the village of 
Asbestos, and as the mine expanded at the start of the 20th century, the community did as 
well. In 1903 and 1904, curé Antoine Lebel successfully lobbied to have wooden 
sidewalks constructed along the Danville Road from the train station to the church.198 
Sidewalks were suitable for a community of families, and their presence in Asbestos was 
a sign of a stabilizing local cultural identity, fostered by buoyant markets. By 1905, with 
employees at the Jeffrey Mine working an average of 10 hours a day all year long,199 and 
the Quebec government putting advertisements in mining magazines promoting the 
industry,200 the village of Asbestos constructed an impressive 35,000 feet of wooden 
sidewalks along a number of new and expanding roads.201  
The community grew rapidly and reaped the benefits of the leading role the 
mineral was taking in industrial markets, rising in value by 25% in 1905 alone, and 
bringing in $2,162,528.202 As Canada became increasingly industrialized, many resource 
industries boomed, but what made the growth of the asbestos industry especially 
remarkable was that only a fraction of the mineral’s uses and applications had been 
discovered at this time, and market demand and prices would only continue to rise. By 
1908, the Shawinigan Water & Power Co. had installed electricity along the limits of the 
village, the first telephone lines were being connected, 185 family homes had been 
constructed, and the town council had made a commitment to make the “Village 
d’Asbestos un centre prospere qui deviendra la Ville d’Asbestos et aussi, a ciel ouvert, la 
plus grande mine d’amiante au monde.”203 A strong element of the local cultural identity 
                                                 
197
 Obalski, Province de Québec, p. 43. 
198
 L’Asbestos, 11 February 1949, p. 1, and 18 February 1949, p. 1. 
199
 Obalski, Province de Québec, p. 67. 
200
 The Canadian Mining Review, vol. 23 (30 June 1904), p. iii.  
201
 L’Asbestos, 25 February 1949, p. 1. 
202
 The Canadian Mining Review (1907), p. 496. 
203
 L’Asbestos, 4 March 1949, p. 1, 11 March 1949, p. 1, and 18 March 1949, p. 1. 
 50
was the global ambition of the people of Asbestos, fuelled by the economic prosperity of 
the community’s land. 
Throughout the beginning of the 20th century, the Canadian Geological Survey 
continued to investigate the land surrounding Asbestos in order to more fully understand 
the reasons behind its remarkable wealth. The industry had reached a turning point, 
becoming more sophisticated, professional, and profitable, and land management in 
Asbestos was unique in the region, focusing on only one mine, compared to the five to six 
separate mines operating in Thetford at this time. The CGS reported in 1909 that “[a]side 
from the abandoned pits incidental to early prospecting, the only closed works are those 
of ill-judged enterprise that probably ought never to have been begun.”204 After the 
asbestos revolution created by Feodor Boas, the Jeffrey Mine was no longer one of the 
“ill-judged” ventures scarring the landscape of l’Estrie, and by 1909 the CGS noted that it 
was, “cut into a series of benches, generally about 8 to 15 feet high, which afford a 
number of faces from which the rock can be quarried at the same time...[with] some 
underground work…carried on by night.”205 The land continued to be reshaped according 
to new knowledge and ideas on the Jeffrey Mine deposits were formed. This had a direct 
effect on those who worked in the pit each day. Not only were these workers responsible 
for creating these benches around the mine, this new structure required a greater amount 
of men to work at different areas and at different levels all at the same time. The mine 
was rapidly becoming a giant “factory without a roof” and its workers were vital tools in 
the industrialization of the land. These changes helped bring the industry $2,500,000 a 
year by combining new extraction technology, this newly structured pit, and vast mineral 
deposits.206 The leading newspaper in l’Estrie, the Sherbrooke Daily Record, noted this 
industrial progress and reported in 1909 that asbestos was “king” in the region, with gold 
and silver following behind, and that the mineral from the Jeffrey Mine was the best in 
the land.207 
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The Jeffrey Mine and the town of Asbestos, Quebec, 1909208 
Impressive revenue and reputation contributed to changes in government policy at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Previously, Quebec had made money off its natural 
resources by selling the rights to them to private companies, but this changed by 1910, the 
year Henri Bourassa founded his nationalist newspaper, Le Devoir, and rallied against 
non-French Canadian ownership of Quebec’s natural resource industries.209 Bourassa and 
his followers formed a powerful group and the province slowly began to lease rather than 
sell rights to the land. The government’s change in policy came too late to capitalize fully 
on the Jeffrey Mine and it missed out on a share of the £500,000 profit the British 
Asbestos and Asbestic Co. gained for the H.W. Johns-Manville Company in 1910.210 
Bourassa believed that the development of resource industries in Quebec was the key to 
national and economic power, which were the “weapons of this century.”211 In the case of 
asbestos, Quebec had surrendered its “weapons” to the United States: by 1907, the 
industry was largely owned by Americans.  
It was not only the government that failed to receive a share of this money, 
however, and while the citizens of Asbestos were excited about the success of the Jeffrey 
Mine and the sense of permanence and importance it gave the community, they were also 
aware that their wages did not rise with company profits. This was a common experience 
for industrial workers at the time and led to 142 strikes throughout the province between 
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1901 and 1905, mostly in Quebec’s textile and railway industries.212 Companies were 
able to keep wages low because replacement workers were available in abundance if 
employees began to lobby for more money. This was especially true for asbestos, the 
most profitable mining industry in Quebec by 1908,213 because it required only unskilled 
labour and offered positions picking, breaking, and bagging asbestos to any man, woman, 
or child who would not complain. Asbestos was not a transient mining town, however, 
and if Jeffrey Mine workers were replaced, the community would suffer. 
During this first industrial revolution in Quebec, the sharp cultural divide between 
the ruling Anglophone elite and the Francophone working-class majority accentuated 
labour issues in the province. This conflict was illustrated in 1912 when 36 workers at 
Asbestos joined 600 other miners on strike the province to gain a higher salary and meet 
the rising standards of living in an industrial Quebec. On average, the miners in Quebec 
made between $1.50-$1.75 a week in 1912, wages having increased from $1.00 from 
1883-1900 and $1.25-$1.50 between 1900 and 1905,214 but workers at the Jeffrey Mine 
only earned between $1.10 and $1.60 each week.215 This was the standard unskilled 
labour wage in Quebec, but did not adequately reflect the annual revenue gained from the 
asbestos industry, which was $3,800,000 by 1913.216 It also did not match the rising cost 
of living in l’Estrie, and the industry struggled to reconcile profits, fair wages, and 
competition coming from the development of Russian and South African deposits.  
The 36 employees who went on strike at the Jeffrey Mine worked in four groups 
of nine, each working a shift in the pit and the mill. With the introduction of new 
technology to the mining process, the Asbestos and Asbestic Co. attempted to reduce 
their workforce to 32, with eight men in each group.217 The workers at the Jeffrey Mine 
were successful in preventing the employee reduction through a short and peaceful 
strike218 and they demonstrated that while technically unskilled, they would not be 
replaced by machines. This first strike set a pattern for labour disputes to come in 
Asbestos—including the 1949 strike—and shows that the community had developed a 
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cultural identity based on reliable work at the Jeffrey Mine. As soon as machines 
threatened the workforce, strikes would occur. 
Despite being linked to miners throughout the province, the 1912 strike at 
Asbestos was intensely local, and the workers did not rely on help from other strikers, 
unions, government agencies, or company heads. Historian of Quebec Michael D. Behiels 
writes that the workers union was “perceived as an institution central to the 
modernization and democratization of Quebec society,”219 but this was not the case in 
Asbestos. With the number of its employees growing from 750 in 1897 to 2,909 in 
1913,220 it would seem as though the asbestos industry would be ready for a union, it took 
decades for a union to take root in Asbestos because workers were used to relying on 
themselves in industrial disputes and they feared unions would make the industry 
unstable.221 This anti-union attitude was strong throughout the province, but especially so 
in the asbestos industry, which was internationally known for having rich mineral 
deposits that contributed 82% of the global supply, and a docile working class.222 The 
Quebec working class was not yet ready for unions, but Jeffrey Mine workers were 
becoming more confident in their ability to influence how operations at the pit were run.  
The workers in Asbestos eventually received their first pay raise of the 20th 
century because of war, not the 1912 strike. The mineral was already used widely 
throughout the building supply industry, but this was paltry compared to the demand for 
asbestos that was generated by the First World War. This had a significant effect on the 
development of the Jeffrey Mine, the people who worked it, and the community’s 
strengthening cultural identity. By 1914, the industry’s prosperity was bringing major 
changes to the lives of the citizens of Asbestos as the road leading to Danville was paved 
and the first cement sidewalks were poured, both signs of stability and modernity. The 
town also set aside a new space for a larger cemetery, moving 431 coffins from the 
original site to the new one in order to prepare for the future.223 Not only was this an 
indication that the community was growing, but also that it was growing alongside the 
Jeffrey Mine, which had forced the establishment of the new cemetery by expanding onto 
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the land where the original graveyard was located. Moving the cemetery was not a 
pleasant task, but it was one the community was willing to do if it meant giving their local 
industry room to grow. This began a local tradition in Asbestos of sacrificing land to the 
mine for the good of the community. In the process, Asbestos became a “moving 
community,” similar to northern iron mining towns in Sweden, such as Malmberget and 
Kiruna.    
As the war in Europe continued and the demand for asbestos grew, changes to the 
land intensified. In 1914 and 1916, the CGS sent a detachment of surveyors to l’Estrie 
with assignments “best calculated to help the war effort: investigating and reporting on 
problems of mine development, and discovering deposits of economically or strategically 
important minerals.”224 While Shipton Township was known for the Jeffrey Mine 
deposits, surveyors examined it once again to see if there was anything else that could be 
put to use for the war effort, but “[a]ll valuable timber has been removed long since and, 
as several fires have swept the district within the last twenty years, no new stand has 
taken its place…The future of the district is bound up with the mining industry.”225 The 
land surrounding Asbestos had undergone drastic change as its industrialization brought 
in waves of new inhabitants who were only focused on what riches could be discovered 
beneath the surface soil. While logging or agricultural pursuits could not compete with 
the profits of the Jeffrey Mine, the destruction of these resources eliminated the potential 
diversification of the local economy if and when the asbestos industry collapsed. The 
threat of collapse was far from the minds of the people of Asbestos as the Jeffrey Mine 
became of prime importance during the war. While many French Canadians chose not to 
join the army, their wartime contribution in the form of industrial production, especially 
with asbestos, was invaluable. At the outbreak of the war, the Canadian Mining Journal 
acknowledged the importance of the mineral when it reported, “[t]he marked increase in 
disastrous fires is directing more attention every day to the need of fireproof building 
materials that can be relied upon.”226 The demand for asbestos wood, shingles, cement, 
and wall plaster sharply increased, and Jeffrey Mine workers would help meet it. 
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The demand for asbestos increased so considerably—to 133,339 tonnes by 
1916—due to new uses,227 that the Jeffrey Mine needed new technology to expand and 
extract the mineral quickly. W.G. Clarke, engineer at the Jeffrey Mine during this period, 
described the long process of how the pit was expanded and the mineral extracted at 
Asbestos: 
Horses hauled dumpcarts which were loaded by hand, to the dump. 
Sometimes the drivers, mostly young boys…would back the cart too close 
to the edge of the dump and when the latch was released and the load did 
not slide out easily, everything went, load of earth, dumpcart, and the poor 
old horse. In most cases that was the end of the horse. The harness was 
stripped off and the horse shot and buried by succeeding loads of earth.228 
 
While horses were often used in industry, they were not quick or strong enough to meet 
the rising demand when they were alive, and were a considerable disturbance to 
production when they died. Furthermore, the industry was suffering from a severe lack of 
manpower, which slowed production for the booming market.229 As profits continued to 
rise during the war, action was quickly taken to modernize the Jeffrey Mine. 
In 1914, the Asbestos and Asbestic Co. installed twenty-one derricks around the 
open it. These were tall mast-like structures with wires to create a pulley-like system that 
lifted 4x6 foot train carriage boxes full of men and mineral out of the mine.230 While the 
derricks cut back on the use of horses, it was not until steam shovels were introduced at 
the Jeffrey Mine in 1916, three years after many of the other mines in l’Estrie, that horses 
were completely eliminated.231 Two years following this change, the derricks themselves 
became obsolete due to the combination of steam shovels and a railway line running from 
the bottom of the pit to the Grand Trunk at Danville.232 The land and the people who 
worked it were becoming increasingly industrialized, which the people of Asbestos were 
fine with as long as the workforce continued to grow. The 1912 strike demonstrated the 
willingness of Jeffrey Mine workers to protest any threats an increased reliance on 
machines posed. The fact that they did not strike during this period of transformation 
indicates that their connection to the land through labour was maintained. 
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With wartime technological advancements, the Jeffrey Mine attained a degree of 
modernity, efficiency, and success that its initial owners could hardly have imagined in 
1879. By 1918 the Canadian Mining Journal reported, “[n]ow the architect, builder, 
steam-fitter and electrician recognize asbestos as a splendid material for resisting weather, 
fire, acids and other agencies of destruction, and they use it for very many purposes. The 
variety of uses is fast increasing and scarcely a month passes without some new 
application being found…Now it is a necessary article of commerce.”233 These 
improvements, combined with an international market that would only grow when the 
First World War ended, led to the H.W. Johns-Manville Co. completely taking over 
operations at Asbestos. Since 1892, this had been an umbrella company for all of the 
asbestos manufacturing firms operating in the United States and it connected the Jeffrey 
Mine to an immense industrial network that it would feed in the years following the war. 
This would drastically change the community and industry of Asbestos, affecting the 
politics of both land and people. If Feodor Boas created an asbestos revolution in the 
1890s, the H.W. Johns-Manville Co. began an American revolution at the Jeffrey Mine, 
far more technologically advanced, economically connected, and managerially cutthroat 
than anything Quebec had experienced before. While this would not be the last time 
Asbestos would be redefined, the American control over land and people was the most 
formative for the developing local cultural identity, and continues to influence how the 
town and the Jeffrey Mine function today, long after the company’s tenure there. The 
ways in which the international aspirations, ideology, and reach of the H.W. Johns-
Manville Co. radically changed the land, the people, and the community of Asbestos will 
be examined in the next three chapters.  
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Chapter 2: Land With a Future, Not a Past: Bodies of Land, 1918-1949 
 In June 2010, the town of Asbestos was featured on the Australian comedy show, 
The Gruen Transfer. The program’s host challenged two advertising executives to create 
a new ad campaign for the community. Upon hearing the challenge, the audience 
immediately began to laugh, continuing as the executives talked about how difficult it 
was to put a positive spin on a town called Asbestos. One of the two contestants admitted 
that he could not get past the name, so instead created a television commercial promoting 
Asbestos by highlighting other communities around the world with off-putting names, 
such as Accident, Maryland and Boring, Oregon. The tag line for the commercial was, 
“Don’t let our name put you off. Asbestos: Bad Name, Great Destination.”234 The other 
ad executive attempted to use the community’s name to its advantage and made a 
commercial called “Speed Date a Town.” Competing with cities like New York and 
Rome, represented by suave men in expensive suits, the humble Asbestos man, dressed in 
a beige windbreaker, finds no dating success until the narrator says, “Great relationships 
are built on truth, and the truth is, we don’t have a very attractive name. So spend some 
time online with us first, and you’ll see what makes people like you fall in love with a 
town like us.”235 The commercial ends with the Asbestos man meeting his perfect match: 
a woman wearing a gas mask. 
 For the sake of comedy, neither commercial mentioned the Jeffrey Mine or the 
community’s connection to it, established over generations of working the land and 
raising families around it. The connection is what keeps the local community in Asbestos, 
despite the current collapse of their industry, but it is also what keeps tourists and new 
residents away. While the commercials were meant to inspire laughter, they also reveal an 
important dilemma facing the people of Asbestos today: in order to create new interest in 
the community, they have to somehow forsake the Jeffrey Mine, so important to the local 
cultural identity and economy. The reluctance of the community to do so reveals that the 
people of Asbestos continue to see the land as part of their past, present, and future. 
When the Johns-Manville Co. took full control of the Jeffrey Mine in 1918, it 
radically transformed the land and how the community was connected to it. This chapter 
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focuses on how the land was used, understood, and changed in Asbestos between 1918 
and 1949, and how these changes were negotiated within the community. By working the 
Jeffrey Mine and living in such close proximity to it, the people of Asbestos developed a 
complex connection to the mineral and the mine. Their shared experiences with the 
prosperity the Jeffrey Mine gave them during this period influenced the local cultural 
identity and gave the community a global confidence and ambition because of the 
international reach of the industry. This understanding complements and contributes to 
how community members viewed their health and demonstrated their collective strength 
before 1949. The different factions of Asbestos negotiated comfortable patterns and roles 
that will stand in stark contrast to how the land was treated and viewed after the 1949 
strike. 
Between 1918 and 1949, JM and the people of Asbestos negotiated a balance 
between liveable space and workable space, with the Jeffrey Mine dividing and defining 
the two. The community was built on top of a massive asbestos deposit, but the mine that 
JM took over in 1918 exposed only a small fraction of the land’s wealth. Over the next 30 
years, Asbestos would be shaped by how politics and people were set aside to 
accommodate the increasing cultural and economic importance of the land. JM was 
fundamental to this process. While Thetford became successful through a series of 
smaller pits owned by different companies, JM believed that what Asbestos needed for 
success was one giant mine. Based in New York City, company officials embraced a 
“bigger is better” philosophy. The exponential growth of the Jeffrey Mine had a 
tremendous effect on the land and on the community, and it loomed large in the local 
identity. Because of the economic importance of the land and the excitement that came 
from being such vital players in the booming industry, the few local objections to this 
growth went unheeded and the people of Asbestos developed a tradition of sacrificing the 
community to the Jeffrey Mine. 
Small Sacrifices, 1918-1923 
With his discovery of asbestic at the end of the 19th century, Feodor Boas 
revolutionized how the Jeffrey Mine’s asbestos deposit would be used and understood. 
Market forces limited the success of the inventions and new extraction techniques Boas 
brought to Asbestos, but the First World War radically changed this situation as global 
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demand for the fireproof mineral rapidly increased. Although European markets were 
closed to imports during the conflict, the growing war industry in the United States more 
than made up for the loss.236 Prices rose because of the demand for the mineral and 
American manufacturing companies took a special interest in Quebec’s asbestos industry. 
JM focused on the Jeffrey Mine, which was worked night and day following the 
installation of floodlights around the pit after the outbreak of war.237 This American 
interest in the land would change how the people of Asbestos viewed the mine and 
themselves within an international trade network.  
From its foundation, JM was primarily an asbestos manufacturing company, and 
while it eventually owned a few other mines in Canada and the United States, the Jeffrey 
Mine remained its main source for the raw mineral, and the company heavily relied on it 
to supply its factories, processing plants, and customers with asbestos. This was an ideal 
situation for the Quebec government, which under the premiership of Lomer Gouin, 
actively sought to put the province’s natural resources into the hands of American 
businessmen in order to secure Quebec’s future industrial success. Gouin believed that 
French Canadians would learn from these experts and gradually gain control of the 
industries that flowed from the land.238 The United States was seen as a good place from 
which to learn because it was becoming an economic and industrial powerhouse without 
any reliance on the British Empire, and this appealed greatly to French Canadians. 
Asbestos was attractive to JM because it was a single-resource town in which 
every member of the community was in some way connected to the industry and this gave 
the company a great deal of power. As the Jeffrey Mine became more successful, the 
population of Asbestos grew around the pit, with a town square, a hotel, a church, and 
small businesses appearing on the roads that led from it. The lives of the townspeople 
were lived according to the rhythms of the pit, with everyone coming to a halt each day at 
noon and 5:30pm when blasting in the Jeffrey Mine marked the turnover of each shift.239 
In 1918 when JM increased the number of employees, the hours the pit was worked, and 
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the amount of asbestos extracted. Everything and everyone in the community was focused 
on the mine. 
JM’s purchase of the Jeffrey Mine was a sign of prosperity and permanence to the 
people of Asbestos: under the company’s guidance, the community appeared to be 
economically secure. One of the first lessons the townspeople learned from the American 
company, however, was that the permanence that came with prosperity was unlike what 
they expected. In May 1918, Asbestos town council established a committee to determine 
the location of more sidewalks,240 but JM had other plans for the roads in Asbestos. Only 
a few weeks after the committee was established, the company requested that instead of 
sidewalks, they be allowed to run a railway line across rue St-Georges, one of the 
principle streets of the town.241 In the opinion of the company, “permanence” meant that 
all land in Asbestos should be devoted to the success of the Jeffrey Mine, not the comfort 
of the community.  
Town council granted permission for the railway, but reserved the right to change 
the rail line in two years if it hindered the community. In the two trial years that followed, 
however, council and most townspeople subscribed to JM’s way of looking at the land 
and the town. Sidewalks and other community infrastructure were established over the 
coming years, but the success of Asbestos was quickly and firmly linked to the success of 
JM, and town council would root many of its decisions in what was in the best interest of 
the company, not necessarily the local population. The railway acted as an extension of 
the industrialized Jeffrey Mine into the community, and shipments of the mineral were 
constantly taken via train across the main streets of town. The introduction of the railway 
inspired JM officials to ask council if they could close the main roads surrounding the 
Jeffrey Mine for 10 minutes several times each day to allow for the mineral to be safely 
unloaded from the pit in large trucks and transported out of town.242 Because it was 
proposed for the sake of safety, council approved this request, and an era of harmonious 
company-community relations began, with JM gaining more and more control over the 
land surrounding the Jeffrey Mine, blurring the boundaries between liveable space and 
workable space.  
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A rail line and temporary road closures were changes to the land that the people of 
Asbestos could adjust to quickly. They were also signs that JM was willing to invest in 
the community, even if in ways not immediately understood. The American company had 
spread its influence throughout Asbestos and the community was indebted to it. JM 
officials knew they had invested well when they purchased the Jeffrey Mine, and they 
needed the freedom to do whatever they saw fit in the town to maximize their profits. 
The province provided 80% of the world’s supply of asbestos by the end of the 
war,243 but Americans were in full control of the industry on both a local and global scale. 
Despite this, the Canadian Mining Journal wrote that “the future of asbestos is only 
beginning, [and] the variety of its possible uses is immense, [so] that Canada, occupying 
such a dominating position in the asbestos market, may very well look forward not only 
to a greater production of the raw material, but to multiplication of the industries 
concerned with the manufacture and marketing of asbestos in finished form.”244 The 
asbestos industry was Canada’s key to modernization and international economic success. 
The fact that American and British companies owned all the asbestos mines in country 
while local workers remained in subservient positions was not seen as a hindrance to the 
advancement of the Canadian economy even though it replicated the colonial systems of 
years past.  
The town of Asbestos prospered following the First World War because of 
increased market demand, proving at the time that the American ownership of the mine 
improved the local economy and the global reach of the industry. The reconstruction of 
European cities destroyed during the war, such as Louvain and Douaumont, counted for a 
percentage of this rise in demand, but it was the American automobile industry, which 
required asbestos brake linings, that ensured the Jeffrey Mine would continue to grow in 
importance. The rapid rise in the use of electricity, a “close ally” of asbestos,245 
throughout North America and Europe, combined with new laws making wooden 
shingles illegal because of the fires caused by the still new lighting and heating 
technology,246 also suggested to contemporaries that the mineral had “undoubtedly 
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unlimited scope and possibilities for future development.”247 These industrial advances 
were especially favourable to the people of Asbestos because of the large quantities of 
asbestic required for these products. The Canadian Mining Journal explained in 1920 that 
“[w]hile high-grade asbestos is much sought after, probably the most encouraging feature 
of the business at this time is the extension of uses for short fibre material and material 
that formerly was regarded as waste and unsaleable,” and that “[w]ith depth the contents 
of asbestos in the rock seem to increase rather than diminish.”248 The land and labour of 
Asbestos was in great demand internationally, and the community took pride in meeting 
it. 
The Jeffrey Mine’s mineral was ideal for these new products and the people of 
Asbestos saw this as a sign of future prosperity. In 1921 a new school for 215 children 
was built out of wood and asbestos to accommodate the needs of the growing community, 
as well as to keep young boys from working the mine until they were teenagers.249 JM 
was also building at this time, and in June 1921 it announced that it was constructing a 
manufacturing plant in Asbestos within the coming months.250 To the great excitement of 
the community that already had 700 to 1,200 people working for the company, the factory 
would require at least 100 new employees, and was a tangible sign that JM believed the 
Jeffrey Mine would continue to be prosperous and it offered more members of the 
community, including women, the opportunity to know the mineral through the work they 
did.  
The community was proud they possessed one of the largest asbestos mines in the 
world out of their land now the first manufacturing plant for the mineral in Canada. In 
1920, approximately $12,000,000 worth of raw asbestos was exported to manufacturing 
plants in the United States and Britain, but the addition of the plant in Asbestos would 
increase this number at least seven times over.251 The plant was to be the most modern 
factory in the country and was a tangible sign that JM was taking the community down 
the right path. The new plant was built in Asbestos at the beginning of what Quebec 
mining historian Marc Vallières calls the province’s “revolution technologique,” which 
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lasted until 1950.252 In just a few years of having JM run the Jeffrey Mine, the land in 
Asbestos had become a place of modern technology and progress. In no way did it 
resemble the land the Abenaki had relied on in the region, nor did it match the ordered, 
agrarian township system the British Crown introduced in the 18th and 19th century. This 
was now land made unsuitable for anything but the asbestos industry and a French 
Canadian majority worked it. 
Being at the forefront of Quebec’s industrial and technological revolution, 
townspeople began to believe that the land was where the province would find its success 
and Asbestos had a central role in the process. The Jeffrey Mine was reported to be one of 
the best examples of this technological revolution, because the pit had been turned into 
something resembling a machine “laid out in wide benches, [with] the rock being loaded 
into cars of standard gauge by steam-shovels and hauled on trains to the mill by steam 
locomotives on a maximum grade of three percent.”253 JM used the most technologically 
advanced drills and shovels available. The benched method of asbestos mining was 
especially efficient because it allowed for extraction on many different levels at once. In 
order to prevent landslides, however, the pit had to expand in width as well as in depth, 
which had repercussions for the community built alongside it. The new manufacturing 
plant at the Jeffrey Mine was completed in 1923 and consisted of two buildings, each 150 
by1000 feet.254 The company also increased its use of machinery in the pit, which the 
mines at Thetford had not yet done; men who had once loaded chunks of broken rock into 
carting boxes at the bottom of the pit were replaced by steam shovels, and given new 
roles in the pit.255 These developments meant that both production and profits increased in 
Asbestos, but also radically changed the land and the townspeople’s association with it.  
By 1922, the increase of automobiles made the roads in Asbestos congested and 
the bridge leading to Danville was consistently blocked due to shipments from the Jeffrey 
Mine.256 This situation worsened with the manufacturing plant’s increased production. JM 
attempted to solve the problem by extending rue Bourbeau across company property to be 
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a transport route for trucks.257 While this seemed to be a solution, only months after the 
town constructed new cement sidewalks, JM “moved” the main road of the community. 
The Asbestos-Danville road was a core part of the town. It not only ran alongside the 
Jeffrey Mine, but also was where the first residents chose to settle because of its 
proximity to the pit. The benched method of fibre extraction, however, meant the Jeffrey 
Mine was becoming wider and the townspeople were getting in the way of progress. After 
appealing to council, JM’s proposal to relocate part of the Asbestos-Danville road from 
its original location was approved. Council justified this decision when it stated,  
la dite rue Asbestos étant présentement située trop près des puits ouverts 
de la mine d’amiante, où des explosions des mines et les opérations à 
vapeur, l’électricité et autres machines à pouvoir est requis, qu’offre un 
danger appréciable au trafic passant dans cette rue comme elle est située 
precautement, et reconnaissant en même temps, le fait officiel de 
poursuivre les opérations minières, étant si essentiel à la vie et l’intérêt de 
la communauté locale, il est de plus résolu.258  
 
The success of the community depended on the success of the Jeffrey Mine and council 
made it clear that if came to a choice between using the land in Asbestos for community 
infrastructure or for industrial advancement, the industry would always win. A new road 
was to be built by the company 66 feet away from the edge of JM property, which the 
community, used to the risks of living so close to the mine, believed to be a safe distance.  
This new road kept the name of the one appropriated by JM and a tradition began 
in the community where a sense of stability was maintained through place names, even 
though the land was constantly in flux. Moving the road because of rising production 
levels at the Jeffrey Mine was an indication of prosperity for the community, but it was 
also a great disruption to the townspeople, many of whom had to move their homes or 
businesses. With town council minutes listing only eight people in Asbestos who 
protested this move—all of them local businessmen not affiliated with the company259—it 
appears that the majority of the community had subscribed to JM’s philosophy. The mine 
was of principal importance and all other possible uses of land had to be secondary. 
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Groundbreaking Success, 1924-1938 
The industry suffered from post-war over-production in the early 1920s.260 The 
asbestos market was opened once more to Russian and South African fibre, which had 
been restricted due to wartime trade restrictions, and the resulting price wars that came 
from this competition forced many Quebec mines to shut down. Despite these problems, 
JM continued to invest heavily in the Jeffrey Mine. While the mine was temporarily 
closed because of overproduction in January 1924, the Canadian Mining Journal reported 
that “[o]ne can gain an idea of the magnitude of the mining operations of this company 
when one learns that eight big steam shovels are used in the amphitheatre-like open-cast 
workings; that to cope with the mine output, a new crushing plant had to be built, which 
will take care of 500 tons of rock per hour; and that a new mill…is now ready to receive 
the crushed rock.”261 Company officials believed that the “bigger is better” Jeffrey Mine 
required bigger and better technologies. JM was established in the late 19th century when 
New York City was undergoing an era that “viewed largeness itself as progress,” and 
American businessmen saw consolidated monopolies as the fastest and surest route to 
international success.262 This philosophy was applied to many resource industries in the 
United States, including iron and steel, and JM saw the Canadian Jeffrey Mine as the key 
to global success and dominance of the asbestos industry. In order to achieve this goal, 
the land was increasingly industrialized in Asbestos, as were the people who worked it, 
changing jobs in the pit to accommodate new technologies. 
The Jeffrey Mine continued to bring an incredible amount of wealth to JM. In the 
mid-1920s, the growing automobile industry consumed more than 50% of all 
manufactured asbestos products for over a dozen uses.263 To maximize sales, JM, already 
a world-leader in building materials, won contracts from the automobile, railroad, and oil 
industries. While the Jeffrey Mine was not JM’s only asbestos property, it was by far its 
largest and most profitable, allowing the company to expand its product line and 
marketing. One result was that JM extended its presence in the town of Asbestos. Each 
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winter, company equipment plowed the roads of the community264 and when the majority 
of the streets were renamed in 1926, rue Asbestos and part of rue Nicolet were 
rechristened “rue Manville,” which JM immediately began enlarging.265 Furthermore, in 
1926 JM effectively lobbied council for the introduction of bilingual street signs in the 
community;266 while the majority of Asbestos was Francophone, company officials were 
Anglophone and they had an influence in local affairs that was larger than their minority 
status. The linguistic divide in Asbestos mirrored and blended with the town’s class 
divisions, and the Anglophone minority held great power within the community because 
of its managerial role at the Jeffrey Mine. When relations between the managing class and 
working class were good, relations between the English and French residents of the 
community were also good. When they were strained, however, linguistic tensions rose in 
Asbestos, as will be seen in later chapters. 
With record profits being recorded for the industry and Asbestos’ population 
growing to 3,602 by 1926,267 local class relations were good and the linguistic needs of 
JM and its officials were easily met in the prosperous 1920s. In March 1927, town 
council wrote to the Quebec government requesting permission to extend the boundaries 
of Asbestos by 17,588 square feet for the future prosperity of the community.268 The 
request was granted and the town soon covered 800 acres.269 This marked the first major 
step towards the complete manipulation of the land surrounding Asbestos and the people 
who lived on it. Following a request by council to extend the lease on the supply of 
electricity the company provided the town, JM asked for a portion of this new land so that 
it could extend company roads and operations.270  
The request was for 55 acres and JM explained that the community was in the way 
of the Jeffrey Mine’s necessary expansion. The global price of asbestos was increasing 
and with Canada providing 85% of the fibre worldwide271 this was the perfect opportunity 
for the company to increase its land holdings in Asbestos. In order to combat any negative 
feelings towards this expansion, which would require many citizens to move further away 
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from the mine as it grew into existing neighbourhoods, JM announced that it would 
construct four new roads with houses for its employees with families, equipped with such 
modern conveniences as running water, electricity, and streetlights.272 Single male 
employees were housed in the Hotel Iroquois at the edge of the Jeffrey Mine where they 
had their meals provided and rooms cleaned. JM also paid to have all the remaining roads 
in the town covered with gravel. Asbestos was becoming indebted to the company and 
used to the perks that came with progress. 
The 1928 expansion was the first time the Jeffrey Mine, in the words of the 
townspeople, “commence à grignoter le village.”273 For community members to describe 
the pit as being something that “ate” away at the town gives the Jeffrey Mine agency and 
personality in the history of Asbestos, but the local population did not necessarily view 
this “eating” in a negative light, as the mine was what mattered, and if it needed to grow 
to increase profits, the town would sacrifice. Pit expansion changed not only the land, but 
also the way townspeople related to the Jeffrey Mine. For the first time since the mine 
was opened, it had a barbed wire fence around it to prevent children from playing in the 
pit when it was not being worked, clearly distinguishing land for work and land for 
play.274 Many residents were upset over the destruction of the original section of the 
community, but the late 1920s were an exciting time in Asbestos and the expansion was a 
sign of greater things to come. In 1928, l’Estrie was internationally known as “the most 
important asbestos producing territory in the world. The asbestos mined there is the 
standard for the whole industry…[and] with it all other asbestos is compared.”275 The 
majority of the citizens of Asbestos accepted that land with this reputation could not be 
exploited enough and the international reach of Jeffrey Mine labour strongly influenced 
the local cultural identity.  
The global price for asbestos dropped sharply with the onslaught of the Great 
Depression. While JM controlled almost half of all the asbestos mined in Canada in the 
early 1930s,276 it drastically reduced its workforce at the Jeffrey Mine and operated only 
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one shift per day because of the economic crisis.277 JM was so affected by the Depression 
because it was inextricably tied to the collapsed automobile and construction industries. 
The company’s foresight to combine mining and manufacturing under one umbrella could 
not help the situation. The land at Asbestos suddenly lost its value and the community 
was brought to a standstill.  
Townspeople had been willing to sacrifice their land and homes to the progress of 
the Jeffrey Mine in 1928, but the Great Depression and the severe reduction in 
employment did little to convince them they had made the right decision. For JM, 
however, the expansion had not been a mistake and despite global overproduction, 
increased output of Russian fibre, and new geological surveys beginning in Quebec to 
find other valuable minerals,278 the company pushed ahead on its agreed-upon plans for 
expansion. The 55-acre enlargement of the Jeffrey Mine completely destroyed what locals 
referred to as the “nerve centre” of the community, including Le Carré, the store opened 
in 1890 by the first mayor of Asbestos, Henri Roux.279 In return for this loss, the town 
received from JM an equal amount of land to construct a new commercial centre. The 
merchants along the original commercial strip of the town protested the expansion more 
in 1930 than they did in 1928, despite the fact that council had already given the company 
permission to move ahead. Sacrificing the land to the Jeffrey Mine seemed necessary 
when it was first proposed at the height of the industry’s success, but appeared less so 
during the Depression when JM did not employ a full workforce. 
In the opinion of town council, however, the expansion would generate work for 
the community and sustain JM, which “apporte la presque totalité des revenues 
d’Asbestos.”280 Local physician Dr. Elzéar Émard made an official protest against the 
destruction of Le Carré in 1930, and stated that “les dit membres du conseil n’étaient pas 
libres d’agir dans l’intérêt exclusif de la municipalité, ils étaient liés à la dite compagnie 
minière et la résolution a été passée par eux dans le but d’être agréables à la dite 
compagnie, sans songer aux droits des contribuables.”281 Although council demanded a 
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retraction of Émard’s statement, the accusation was apt. While the community wanted to 
encourage JM’s success, the company was not in control of town business, and distance 
between the two was necessary. In order to avoid any more accusations of partiality the 
mayor appealed to the provincial government for a final decision on the expansion.  
In 1931 the Quebec government sided with JM and the first Bill of Expropriation 
for Asbestos was put into effect. Locals were forced to sell their land to the company 
because the success of the community relied on the success of the Jeffrey Mine. Since the 
community depended on the mine for existence and JM was in charge of that mine, the 
company was essentially in charge of Asbestos, and the law of expropriation solidified 
this. It was clear to the townspeople that their emotional attachment to community land, 
seen in their protests of the expropriation, did not matter. Under the rule of JM, the town 
did not have a history preserved in buildings or roads, but rather a future to ensure by 
unrestricted changes to the land. 
Meanwhile, the population of Asbestos continued to grow with the mine. The 
community experienced the sharpest increase in population of any other town in 
Richmond County, reaching 4,396 in 1931.282 Even through the economic downturn town 
council continued to put its faith in the company, and often asked JM officials for advice 
and the use of their engineers when new roads were being constructed.283 Despite this 
faith, JM was forced to close the Jeffrey Mine completely between May 1932 and April 
1933 because of the continued collapse of the automobile industry.284 Many local 
merchants and homeowners directly affected by the expansion of the Jeffrey Mine also 
had their property severely damaged in the process of moving roads and buildings, and 
had to appeal directly to JM for compensation. The industrial freeze in Asbestos 
challenged the local cultural identity that had developed alongside the tremendous 
international demand for the mineral found in the Jeffrey Mine.  
Throughout the Depression, JM planed for the future, even though the Jeffrey 
Mine was closed. It developed new markets for magnesia pipe and boiler insulation to 
compensate for the decreased demand in the auto industry; this quickly became the 
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company’s top selling product.285 Partly due to this innovation, and partly because of a 
sudden revitalization in the automobile sector, by the end of 1933 the asbestos industry 
experienced a 29% increase in production and 71% increase in monetary value over the 
previous year, and the Jeffrey Mine opened once again.286 The effects of this were 
immediate. Town council purchased additional acreage to prepare for community growth 
and to tap into a new water source because the current one had become too 
contaminated.287 While production levels at the mine did not reach pre-Depression 
heights until after the Second World War, by 1935 employees were working an average 
of 58 hours each week, compared to the 70 hours six years earlier,288 and there was every 
indication that the industry, and the land that fed it, was making a strong recovery. 
With production having increased by 19.2% in 1935, town council decided that it 
would generate more growth in the community by extending and paving rue St-Aimé by 
1,400 feet and rue St-Rock by 2,300 feet, each connecting to what was to be the new 
commercial centre of Asbestos.289 While these expansions damaged some homes along 
the roads, they were another sign of permanence and prosperity. Canadian production 
continued to rise in 1936, increasing 43% in quantity and 41% in value from the previous 
year,290 and by 1937, the village of Asbestos officially became a city because of its rising 
population. These developments, both local and global because of the international reach 
of the industry, were rooted in the value of the land: without it, and without JM’s 
Depression-era management, the community could have collapsed. JM’s manufacturing 
plants at Asbestos and Montreal could handle only 5% of the fibre being extracted from 
the Jeffrey Mine,291 and the rest of the raw mineral went to the several hundred factories 
the company ran in the United States, the world’s leading exporter of finished asbestos 
products.292 The land at Asbestos was supplying more fibre than the local population 
could manage and JM officials saw nothing wrong with this situation: Asbestos was 
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connected to the company’s vast American network and as the Jeffrey Mine became 
larger, the extent of the land’s global reach would also grow. 
 With the world economy pulling out of depression, Canada’s asbestos production 
increased from 301,287 tonnes worth $9,958,183 in 1937 to 389,688 tonnes worth 
$14,072,000 in 1938.293 The Jeffrey Mine had become the largest pit in l’Estrie, a 
significant achievement for the land and the people of Asbestos. While JM increasingly 
industrialized the mine, the men and women who worked in the pit and the manufacturing 
plant maintained a close, physical connection to the land. In the bilingual Johns-Manville 
News Pictorial distributed to its local employees each month from 1938 to 1949, the 
company highlighted this connection by focusing on the work of Achille Boudreau and 
Joe Letarte in the first issue. Boudreau was photographed sitting in the pit wearing his 
denim jacket as he “cobbed” the long asbestos fibre out of large pieces of rock by 
breaking it along the fibrous seams with a hammer. Latarte, also a cobber, was pictured 
climbing out of the pit with a bucket of rock in one hand and a burlap bag full of hand-
picked fibre slung over his shoulder as though he was an asbestos Santa.294 Machines 
could not completely distance the workers and the natural world. 
The physical connection between the people of Asbestos and the land did not end 
in the pit. The entire community was intimately acquainted with the Jeffrey Mine simply 
through working and living in such close proximity to it, hearing, seeing, and breathing in 
the sound and dust of progress, and this connection will be seen again and again in the 
following chapters. As the industry recovered from the Depression many asbestos mines 
in the region found it difficult to meet the increased demand because there was no 
physical space to expand operations.295 This was not the case in Asbestos, where industry 
trumped community when it came to issues of land-use, and in 1938 JM appealed to town 
council with a proposal to expand the Jeffrey Mine once again. 
Industrial Revolution Meets Natural Phenomenon, 1938-1949 
The years following the Depression taught the people of Asbestos that if they put 
their faith in the land and JM, they would prosper, and town council approved the 
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company’s request for 14 undeveloped lots in 1938 without hesitation.296 The expansion 
did not directly affect the homes and businesses of the town and was not as controversial 
as the first major enlargement. It was clear that the pit had reached its physical limits, as it 
resembled a steep inverted cone with limited access to fibre at the bottom,297 and workers 
could not dig deeper without expanding wider first, due to the threat of disastrous 
landslides. For the structural stability of the land and the financial stability of the town, 
the Jeffrey Mine had to become wider. 
The expansion was viewed as another example of progress after the economic 
trials of the early 1930s, and in order to compensate for lost land, council purchased 7 
unused lots from Joseph Isabelle in January 1939.298 The town needed more liveable land 
to accommodate a growing workforce and a shrinking community space caused by the 
expanding pit. The following spring, council purchased 14 additional undeveloped lots 
belonging to Euginie Bolduc.299 The town was learning to balance mine and community 
land use. These purchases were well planned, as 1939 saw great development in the land 
of the community, and the Jeffrey Mine was declared to be the largest asbestos mine in 
the world.300 By making the industrialization of the land a priority, the community 
 
 
Mining and haulage arrangement of levels and approaches at the Jeffrey Mine, 1939301 
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attained global recognition. Creating the world’s largest asbestos mine was a great 
achievement for the people of Asbestos, and further added an international element to 
their local cultural identity. 
The local identity in Asbestos was rooted in a land that was constantly changing. 
The original hill on which Jeffrey and Webb found their first asbestos deposits had almost 
disappeared by 1939, but the pit remained about 750 feet above sea level and was 510 
feet deep and 300 feet wide with spiralling benches 35 feet high and at least 75 feet wide 
to accommodate the trucks and trains emerging from the bottom.302 JM believed that the 
pit could be deepened between 100 and 150 feet more, which meant that for a while at 
least, the townspeople would not have to sacrifice any more land to the Jeffrey Mine. 
According to the Canadian Mining Journal, the land in Asbestos told a tale of progress:  
The first impression gathered from a tour of these workings is one of size. 
Here is an operation that handles great quantities of material, and uses 
mammoth machines in the process. [Here] is the largest power shovel in 
Canada; along its levels run standard locomotives hauling trains of cars, 
some of which are 30 yard capacity. Yet as one stands on the high side of 
the pit looking down, these great machines look like toys in that immensity 
of space. It is a big job worked in a big way because some 3,000,000 tons 
of rock and stripping are handled from the pit in a year.303 
 
The Jeffrey Mine had become a natural and a technological phenomenon, and the 
increased use of large machinery took the land in Asbestos to a new level of 
industrialization. Derricks mounted around the mine now held the drills that made the 
blasting holes in five separate working areas of the pit to ensure precision and cut back on 
staff. When JM officials came up with this cost-saving idea, drill manufacturers told them 
that replacing men with machines was impossible,304 so the company invented a way to 
do it and further revolutionize how the land and technology collided in the Jeffrey Mine. 
Locomotives now carried steel, drill bits, explosives, and other supplies around 
the pit and three four-yard electric shovels worked in tandem with one eight-yard shovel 
to load the fibre into empty train cars heading back up to the surface. Because of the 
influx of technology, it might appear as though asbestos extraction was a relatively 
people-less endeavour, but this was not the case. Groups of men operated these machines 
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and packed explosives into the mechanically drilled holes before taking cover. Shifts 
operated 24 hours a day and groups of men appeared ant-like in the pit under the 1000-
watt floodlights that shone on the Jeffrey Mine all night. Employees were also required to 
continuously move the pumps that extracted the estimated 500,000 gallons of surface and 
underground water that filled the pit each day, as well as to pick through the rubble after 
blasting to remove any pieces of wood, blasting wire, or other foreign objects that would 
decrease the value of the mineral packaged at the mill. The connection between the 
people of Asbestos and the mine was changing with the increased industrialization of the 
land, but it remained a strong pillar in the local cultural identity. 
Two-thirds of JM employees in Asbestos were Francophone, while company 
officials were exclusively Anglophone. In addition to the employees who worked directly 
in the Jeffrey Mine, 250 others (including 25 women) were employed at the factory by 
1939, processing approximately twelve train cars of milled asbestos each day.305 While 
socially, culturally, and linguistically different from company heads, by extracting the 
majority of the company’s supply of asbestos, this workforce was a major factor in JM 
controlling a significant portion of the market for the mineral termed “indispensable to 
modern life” by the American government in 1939.306 The market for the fibre increased 
exponentially after the outbreak of the Second World War and a thirty-year boom period 
began. By 1941, JM sales had increased by 50% because of wartime industry 307 and the 
temporary elimination of Russian fibre from competition. The closing of European 
markets during the war did not severely affect the company or its operations at Asbestos 
because its foundations were in Canada and the United States, both countries that 
continued to manufacture and feed the machines of war with the fireproof mineral. In 
fact, the United States wartime industrial boom more than compensated for the loss of 
European sales308 and workers at the Jeffrey Mine often had trouble keeping up with 
demand. 
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It was an exciting era for Asbestos with new technologies and products being 
developed with Jeffrey Mine fibre every day. This included asbestos cement, which saw 
asbestic added to cement to reinforce its strength, and led many contemporaries to believe 
that the “Asbestos Age” was just beginning.309 Asbestos cement was particularly popular 
in America’s construction industry and the Jeffrey Mine’s short asbestic fibre was ideal 
for this product. At the end of 1941, JM approached town council to purchase part of rue 
St-Aimé and rue St-Georges for mine expansion. Although this bordered a central area of 
the town, council granted the request in the spring of 1942: at this time of great local 
prosperity the company could do no wrong and would not be second-guessed.310 In 
return, the town would receive $5,000 for just under 500 feet of road. While the lack of 
protest indicates that the majority of the community agreed mine expansion was a 
positive development, on the same day permission was given to JM, homeowner Joseph 
A. Lambert requested that he be allowed to move his house away from rue St-Amié at his 
own expense. Not everyone was thrilled by living in close proximity to the noise and dust 
that was produced by the Jeffrey Mine 24 hours a day, and between June 1942 and 
February 1943, four other residents requested permission to move their homes away from 
the growing pit.311 These moves demonstrate a quiet acceptance of how land was 
managed in Asbestos. Rather than attempt to prevent mine expansion, residents simply 
moved out of the way. 
As had become custom whenever the Jeffrey Mine “ate” part of Asbestos, there 
was a rollback effect in which the town moved homes and purchased new land located at 
the edges of the community. JM officials typically lived on a knoll far away from the 
Jeffrey Mine, owning cars that took them from their homes to the pit each day. The 
workers, on the other hand, walked to the Jeffrey Mine and for financial reasons, many 
rented affordable housing from JM that was located close to the edges of the pit. The 
families in these homes were moved when the company decided to expand the mine at 
JM’s expense, but residents who owned their houses also chose to continue living close to 
the mine despite its constant growth. These homes were placed on logs and pulled by 
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horses from one location to another each time the Jeffrey Mine grew. In June 1942, town 
council annexed almost 3,000 feet of unused farmland in order to expand the  
 
Moving homes in Asbestos, Quebec, circa 1940312 
 
liveable limits of Asbestos.313 This expansion was important not only in providing new 
land to those displaced by the growing Jeffrey Mine, but also for new residents who had 
moved to the community to work for JM. The mine provided an excellent source of 
wartime employment, operating three shifts working 24 hours each day, seven days a 
week and still not meeting market demands.314 The wartime reduction in male employees 
also allowed for an influx of women in JM operations and by 1943, 25% of the workers at 
the manufacturing plant were female,315 which offered a new way of life to a significant 
portion of the population.  
In 1943, the Jeffrey Mine covered 115 acres of surface land, and 6,000 tons of 
rock and mineral were extracted daily.316 Despite these impressive figures, JM was not 
able to expand the mine quickly enough as the demand for the mineral increased with the 
American entrance into the war in 1941. The Jeffrey Mine was already so close to the 
residential portion of Asbestos that sewage from homes close to it began pouring into the 
pit, contaminating the fibre.317 Until the company was operating with a full workforce and 
with the proper amount of time to expand, a new way of looking at the land had to be 
developed. Reports began to emerge stating that the shortage of asbestos fibre was the 
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result of the opencast method used for extracting the mineral.318 In response to this, the 
president of the Canadian Johns-Manville (CJM) branch, G.K. Foster, approached town 
council at the beginning of 1944 and informed them of the company’s new wartime plan: 
they were going underground. 
Although underground mining was not typically used for asbestos extraction it 
allowed JM to expand operations and increase production quickly, while not infringing on 
the property of the townspeople because shafts required far less land than an open pit. 
Underground operations also hid the drastic changes to the land that opencast mining put 
on display. The first two shafts were built on the south end of rue Bourbeau and were 
10x10 feet wide, about 750 feet deep, and each had a conveyor belt 25 feet high leading 
out of the ground towards the mills in order to prevent rocks from flying into surrounding 
neighbourhoods.319 Town council approved the building of these shafts and in return, JM 
donated a portion of company land in order to extend Boulevard St-Luc. JM also built a 
new Hotel Iroquois beside the shafts on rue Bourbeau in order to house 200 single male 
workers who would be needed to help meet the rising global demand for the fibre.320 
Although Canadian asbestos production rose by more than 100,000 tonnes during the 
Second World War, there was little fear amongst industry insiders that the market would 
collapse during peacetime because of the desirability of the mineral for everyday use.321 
The new British invention of asbestos sheeting was able to withstand extremely high 
temperature and pressure and suitable for fighter jets and commercial airlines, was an 
example of this market transferability.322 In the transition from wartime to peacetime 
markets, JM invested more money into the land at Asbestos to make sure levels of 
production would increase. 
Following the Second World War, employment at the Jeffrey Mine rose with 
returning soldiers, and the development of shaft mining and mill expansion increased JM 
profits by 50%.323 While opencast mining maximized fibre extraction on the largest scale 
                                                 
318
 Oliver Bowles and F.M. Barsigian, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook, E.W. Pehrson and C.E. Needham, eds. 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 1431. 
319
 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 9 August 1944, p. 8. 
320
 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 7 June 1944, p. 81. 
321
 Oliver Bowles and Dorothy I. Marsh, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook, E.W. Pehrson and C.E. Needham, eds. 
(Washington: United States Printing Office, 1944), p. 1478. 
322
 The Canadian Mining Journal, October 1945, p. 940. 
323
 G.W. Josephson and Dorothy I. Marsh, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook, E.W. Pehrson and Allen F. Matthews, eds. 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 150. 
 78
possible, it was also expensive and time-consuming. Underground mining required less 
space and manpower, and protected the fibre from being tainted by the elements and thus 
ensured the highest quality of asbestos taken from the mine. Rather than aggravate the 
local population through further width expansion, JM opted for the extraction method that 
was the least expensive and least invasive for the community. The company’s decision to 
change the way land in the Jeffrey Mine was used suggests that there was a growing 
frustration in Asbestos due to the constant expansion of the pit and expropriation of town 
land. Underground mining, combined with opencast methods, was a way JM could 
increase production while maintaining good company-community relations in Asbestos 
by minimizing changes to town infrastructure and land. 
One group JM could not appease, however, was the local merchants in the 
community. There was constant tension between the company and the smaller 
businessmen of Asbestos. The majority of townspeople were employees at the Jeffrey 
Mine and they usually sided with the company on land issues, but the independent 
proprietors were a vocal minority against JM expansion. The original commercial centre 
of Asbestos had been destroyed when the mine “ate” Le Carré, but local merchants 
attempted to create a new centre on rue Bourbeau years before JM began underground 
shaft mining along it. In November 1946, the company requested permission from council 
to close a large section of rue Bourbeau and rue St-Georges to accommodate this new use 
of the land. While JM offered to extend Boulevard St-Luc in return for this closure and to 
“fournir toute l’aide nécessaire et à défendre les intérêts de la Ville d’Asbestos,” the 
merchants along rue Bourbeau were not satisfied.324 At the same meeting of council, La 
Ligue des Propriétaires d’Asbestos Inc. presented a statement that read, “Nous sousignés, 
propriétaires affectés si jamais la rue Bourbeau venait à être bloquée dans la direction de 
St-Georges-de-Windsor, désirons vous prier d’utiliser toutes les mesures légales afin 
d’empêcher ce blocus qui causerait une grosse dépréciation à nos propriétés.”325 This was 
the first sign of real local conflict over land use in Asbestos and it reveals how difficult 
community relations could be in a single-resource and single-company town. Loss of 
property value and loss of business were main concerns of the merchants when it came to 
the industrialization of rue Bourbeau, but JM’s land management provided the 
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community with stability and profits. Council chose to end the meeting without making a 
decision in order to avoid choosing which segment of the population had the greatest right 
to the land. 
Although JM promised to pay for any damages that might occur during the 
closure of rue Bourbeau, local merchants continued to protest the sale, firmly believing 
that townspeople did not want to shop next to large mining shafts and conveyor belts 
connected to the noisy mill. While they were concerned for their property, their 
commercial futures as independent businessmen in a single-industry town were even 
more important to them. By January 1947 Mayor Albert Goudreau had had enough of the 
debate over rue Bourbeau and demanded council make a firm decision on the subject with 
the interest of the community’s economic future in mind.326  
In response to the mayor’s frustration, council approved JM’s request to close the 
road, “à partir du point marqué par une borne au fer sur le côté est de la rue Bourbeau, la 
dite borne marquant les coins des lots 5-90 et 5-211, et sur une longueur s’étendant 
jusqu’à la ligne de jonction de la rue Bourbeau avec le chemin conduisant à St-Georges-
de-Windsor.”327 Although JM would pay for any property damage, the displeasure of the 
local merchants was noted in the minutes and Goudreau instructed them to address their 
complaints through arbitration discussions with the company directly. It was clear that JM 
had the primary right to both land and business in Asbestos, especially as the demand for 
the fibre rose once again due to newly opened European markets following the Second 
World War. 
With post-war reconstruction demand for asbestos products rising to over 
$25,000,000 a year328 and JM operations in the town growing underneath rue Bourbeau, 
Asbestos once again needed to acquire more land. Between September 1947 and January 
1949 the town underwent a period of immense physical growth, purchasing land from the 
County of Shipton, local property owners, and JM, which was in possession of several 
lots of land that did not contain profitable amounts of asbestos. This began with the 
purchase of seven lots from the county for $700 in September, and was followed with 
additional purchases that month of private and company land in order to extend 
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Boulevard St-Luc, rue Bourbeau, rue St-Georges, Boulevard Olivier, and rue Roi.329 
Council justified such large purchases, including 20,766.52 feet at the end of rue 
Bourbeau, by stating that the town needed new and existing roads to accommodate the 
growing community.330 
The post-war market for asbestos did not abate and in 1947 the industry in Quebec 
exported 10,785,189 tonnes of fibre with a value of $438,356,805.331 By combining open 
pit mining with a new “block-caving” system that was just being introduced, extraction 
levels at the Jeffrey Mine far surpassed those of its regional competitors, including mines 
in Thetford and East Broughton. Block-caving is a form of underground mining 
particularly suited to land that already has a working opencast pit. The benches that 
spiralled up the Jeffrey Mine and allowed for locomotives and trucks to bring fibre to the 
surface were hollowed and mined from the inside out. These blocks were 10x20 feet at 
the beginning and were worked to about 10x35 feet, each being 200 feet from each other 
to prevent the walls from caving in. Men operated giant double-drum mechanical slushers 
that scraped the rock out of the caves and brought it to the surface, loading the ore into 
train cars to be taken to the factory.332 JM was a leader in extraction technology and the 
Jeffrey Mine was often used to test new techniques that would maximize profits. Block-
caving further industrialized the land without visible signs from above and changed the 
structure of the Jeffrey Mine, weakening the benches on which trains and trucks brought 
men and mineral to the surface. 
Block-caving was an extremely efficient way to extract fibre, especially because 
by 1948 the mine had grown to be 3,200 feet long and 2,800 feet wide, reaching the 
absolute limits of JM property. The new method allowed the company to continue 
operations without purchasing more land from the town, so it was a politically as well as 
an economically efficient method that allowed for the immense extraction of between 
19,000 and 22,760 tonnes of rock every 24 hours.333 This shift towards more underground 
extraction once again suggests the unwillingness of JM to expropriate more town land on 
which to expand the Jeffrey Mine, possibly due to a growing tension in company-
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community relations. The entire Jeffrey Mine was run on electricity and coal-fuelled 
steam power, with even the blasting caps being electronically controlled from a tower on 
the edge of the pit, and these technologically-advanced, incredibly noisy and dusty 
methods were what helped JM extract so much fibre in so little time. While townspeople 
grew accustomed to constant noise and dust coming from the Jeffrey Mine, workers did 
not appreciate being replaced by these new machines. This level of production and 
dedication to the industrialization of the land was why Asbestos town council continued 
purchasing land for expansion throughout 1948 to accommodate the population that was 
rising alongside production levels. 
While the mineral had long been nicknamed “white gold” by those in the industry, 
by 1948 asbestos was actually worth as much as gold to Quebec, with the two minerals 
each bringing $430 million to the province since 1876.334 But the land in Asbestos still 
had to support the people that worked it, and town council could not purchase acreage 
quickly enough to meet the demand of the growing population. Moving several 
kilometres away from the Jeffrey Mine onto surrounding farmland to avoid the 
continuous expansion of the pit was never proposed or discussed by town council or the 
local newspaper, which illustrates the close connection the local population had and 
wanted to maintain with the mine335. In March and April 1948 the town purchased 16,605 
feet of land between rue St-Georges and rue Bourbeau from JM and annexed 8 other lots 
from the County of Shipton in preparation for major expansion.336 These purchases were 
fairly straightforward, but when it came to buying land from local property owners, the 
town began to have difficulty. Although council stated that “il est devenu nécessaire et 
même impérieux, à la suite du développement considérable de la ville et en vue d’aide au 
progrès,”337 three citizens refused to sell their land. The community was becoming less 
willing to sacrifice itself to the Jeffrey Mine, suggesting that the local cultural identity 
was changing, and townspeople were taking greater control of the way land was managed 
and used in Asbestos. While this was problematic, council had learned much from JM, 
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and stated that if these owners continued to refuse the sale, the town would begin legal 
action against them in order to expropriate the property. 
The Jeffrey Mine had become fully industrialized during the first half of the 20th 
century and extensions of this industrialization were seen throughout the community. 
Railway lines, new roads, new neighbourhoods, workers being replaced by machines that 
caused more noise and dust coming from the pit, and town council’s willingness to rule in 
favour of JM when it came to local land-use issues, were all signs of the widespread 
industrialization of the land and community. In order to remain competitive in the global 
asbestos industry, the local population had to sacrifice town infrastructure to 
accommodate the Jeffrey Mine’s need for more mineral-rich land. The results of this 
sacrifice were often positive and made the community proud of their industrial 
accomplishments, as seen when the mine became the largest of its kind in the world after 
it expanded into the original section of town.  
The people of Asbestos enjoyed the economic gains the Jeffrey Mine brought 
them, but while everyone appeared to be focused on the success of the community as a 
whole, competing ideologies began to clash over how the land should be used and by 
whom. The people of Asbestos did not like workers being replaced by machines, and 
began to grow wary of the close ties town council had with JM. They were also becoming 
frustrated with the constant moving of houses and shifting of community centres in order 
to accommodate the needs of the company. JM attempted to appease this frustration by 
beginning underground operations that were less invasive to the community, but this did 
not fully address the problem of how decisions concerning land were made in Asbestos. 
The labour of Jeffrey Mine workers is what made the pit the largest asbestos mine in the 
world by 1939, and it also strongly connected the townspeople to the land, giving them an 
ambition for success that convinced them sacrificing community space was often worth 
the economic success and international renown they gained in doing so.  
The contribution Jeffrey Mine workers made to the asbestos industry also gave the 
community a confidence that was rooted in a connection to the natural world and was 
expressed in the local cultural identity, which led townspeople to believe they had a right 
to decide how their land was to be used. Machines replacing workers at the Jeffrey Mine 
would shake their confidence, however, as did town council ruling in favour of JM 
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whenever an issue of land use arose. In January 1949 council purchased 55,125 square 
feet of land to accommodate the growing population,338 but these plans were soon put on 
hold when Jeffrey Mine workers went on strike to ensure their connection to the land in 
the community—and the international industry it fed—was maintained despite the rapid 
industrialization of the pit. The labour dispute would combine issues of land-use, human 
health, and community, to drastically change the way the natural world was used and 
understood in Asbestos.   
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Chapter 3: Negotiating Risk: Human Bodies, 1918-1949 
In 1995, Dr. Gerrit W.H. Schepers published a report on the time he spent at JM’s 
secret laboratory in Saranac, New York. Interning there as a post-doctoral student in 
1949, Schepers discovered the autopsied lungs of at least nine Jeffrey Mine employees 
that JM attorney Yvan Sabourin smuggled to the lab between 1944 and 1946. A study of 
these lungs was deemed necessary because “workers had begun to agitate for 
compensation [for their asbestos-related diseases, and]...such a large number of cases in 
such a small and well-defined group of industrial employees suggested a significant 
problem.”339 JM doctors at Asbestos were only supposed to deal with “active employees,” 
and the lungs Sabourin delivered came from retirees. Not only were these retirees secretly 
autopsied in Asbestos, their lungs were also illegally brought across international borders, 
dissected, placed on nameless slides, studied, and filed away. Schepers was prevented by 
JM from publishing on his discovery for decades. 
While the people of Asbestos did not know of these autopsies or of any diseases 
the doctors at Saranac found in the lungs, they were aware of the state of their own bodies 
and were constantly negotiating the health risks of living next to the world’s largest 
chrysotile asbestos mine. Some risks, like those to the miners themselves, were 
acceptable, others, like those to the women or children of the community, were not. 
Furthermore, while the people of Asbestos knew they were getting sick, before 1949 they 
were not fully aware of the types of disease the mineral was capable of inflicting, nor did 
it occur to them that JM was using their community as a giant research laboratory, with 
workers and their families acting as test mice.  
Today, the cemetery in Asbestos is a place difficult for an outsider to find. While 
homes, businesses, and churches are located on the easternmost part of the community, 
the Cimetière de St-Aimé d’Asbestos is found to the extreme west. What divides the two 
is also what unites them, giving reason for both: the Jeffrey Mine. Without the mine, the 
living side of Asbestos has little reason to exist, having no other industry to sustain it. 
Right next to the cemetery is the mill, historically the dustiest place to work. Located 
beside the mill and behind the rows of tombstones, a large crucifix, and a statue of Jesus 
with the inscription “Je ne meurs pas. J’entre dans la vie” looms the steep rise of the 
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Jeffrey Mine, built up with waste that resembles the knoll where the deposit was 
originally found in 1879. The pit is the heart of the community, bringing it both life and 
death, and this is ingrained into the local cultural identity of Asbestos. 
Over the past fifty to sixty years, asbestos has gone from being perceived as “one 
of Nature’s most marvellous productions,”340 because of its remarkable fireproof abilities, 
to being something that produced a “deadly dust” that slowly and painfully killed 
thousands,341 roughly separated by a period of public ignorance and public outrage. The 
people of Asbestos’ close relationship with the mineral and the industry meant they have 
also celebrated and suffered through these two extremes. But the centrality of the Jeffrey 
Mine to their lives changed their understanding of risk and death, and a unique cultural 
identity was developed through bodily interaction with the mineral. 
This chapter will examine the medical history of the people of Asbestos from 
1918, when JM began to operate the Jeffrey Mine, to 1949, when the workers were 
encouraged to come out against the health risks associated with the mineral and went on 
strike partly to force JM to alleviate these risks. This is when the health of the workers 
first became an international issue. The chapter will rely on sources never before used in 
studies of the people of Asbestos, or of global asbestos-related disease, such as 
confidential medical reports funded and hidden by JM. 
This period is one of innocence and discovery in Asbestos. While JM suppressed 
medical discoveries proving the mineral was dangerous, the townspeople nevertheless 
knew their own bodies and knew something was wrong. They coughed up dust after only 
short periods of work and generations slowly suffocated to death because of the long-term 
bodily effects of the industry. This chapter will show how the townspeople deemed their 
knowledge as secondary in favour of a trust in medical professionals, company officials, 
and the land, which complemented their understanding of their own bodies and needs, 
and the desire to maintain the success of the community and industry. Sacrifice became a 
fundamental element in the local cultural identity during this period, but Jeffrey Mine 
workers were not martyrs. Instead, they were agents, weighing their risks and needs, and 
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acting as they saw fit. This chapter will advance our understanding of how and why the 
community upheld risk and sacrifice as part of the local cultural identity between 1918 
and 1949.  
Discovery and Denial, 1918 to 1930 
When JM arrived in Asbestos in 1918, it brought its own medical professionals 
with it and established a clinic for employees. Not only were these doctors Anglophone, 
they often reported the health conditions of Jeffrey Mine employees to the company 
rather than to the patients themselves. JM doctors were a perk in resource communities at 
this time and as mining historian Larry Lankton notes, they allowed paternalistic 
companies to control workers from “cradle to grave.”342 While there were independent 
doctors in Asbestos, the lives of JM employees were oriented towards the Jeffrey Mine 
and they had mandatory, free yearly check-ups at the company clinic. Few had the 
money, or felt the need, to seek an independent medical opinion. JM had a vested interest 
in the bodies of the people of Asbestos, and their doctors were fundamental to the 
preservation of a calm, healthy workforce. The medical professionals in Asbestos were 
insular, segregated, and did what the company told them to do. JM had doctors stationed 
in some of the company’s processing towns, such as Manville, New Jersey, but workers 
at the Jeffrey Mine were their major concern because it was JM’s main source for the 
mineral.343 Nowhere else were JM workers exposed to such a pure raw form of the 
mineral, and medical professionals funded by the company could monitor the progression 
of disease in Asbestos as though they were in an experimental laboratory, not a 
community. As long as JM doctors reported that Jeffrey Mine employees were healthy, 
the mineral, the industry, and the town, would be safe.  
In 1924, JM opened Canada’s first mineral processing factory in Asbestos, which 
increased profits, provided employment opportunities for women and children, and 
created more mineral dust than the community had ever experienced before. This 
coincided with the first reported asbestos-related death in international medical literature, 
when Dr. W.E. Cooke reported in the British Medical Journal that Nellie Kershaw, who 
worked in a factory processing asbestos near Manchester, England, had died because of 
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her exposure to the mineral. Cooke explained that asbestos caused a fatal respiratory 
disease,344 but the community was unaware of this discovery, and looked forward to the 
prosperity the new factory would bring. Healthcare was changing in Quebec, however, 
and JM officials, who knew of Kershaw’s death, had to adapt. An increased focus on 
tuberculosis due to its wartime occurrence had initiated an aggressive health education 
program on respiratory disease. The government of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau then 
acted on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Labour and made it 
mandatory for companies to carry insurance against compensation claims.345  
Because of this new law, JM partnered with the Sun Life Assurance Co. to keep 
itself protected from any compensation claims. But this was not a simple business 
arrangement. Sun Life medical director Dr. G.W. Wright wrote to his colleague, Dr. 
Knight, in 1926 on how both companies could protect themselves by funding the 
establishment of a Department of Industrial Hygiene at McGill University in Montreal. 
Wright wrote that Sun Life and JM could provide “guidance in regard to matters affecting 
community or individual health—such as, aid in preparation of publicity, occasional 
research matters…field investigations…or industrial hazards....[T]he usefulness of the 
University could be made apparent in relation to group insurance much more readily than 
in any other way.”346 The department was established and ensured that the health issues 
of JM employees in Asbestos would be addressed differently than elsewhere in the 
province, free from the administrative hand the Catholic Church traditionally wielded in 
such affairs. Asbestos was a single-industry and single-company town, and employees 
trusted JM with their health the same way they trusted the company with the town’s land. 
In 1927, W.E. Cooke continued his studies on British factory workers and coined 
the term “asbestosis” to describe the hardening effect the mineral had on human lungs, 
resulting in death by suffocation.347 Two years following Cooke’s new diagnosis, JM 
received its first claim for compensation from textile factory workers in New Jersey 
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suffering from asbestosis.348 The company was now on alert: the industry was becoming 
increasingly lucrative, but JM would be ruined if workers began to die because of it.  
In 1929, Metropolitan Life Assurance, which had taken over JM’s insurance 
policy from Sun Life, urged Frank G. Pedley, one of the only doctors in Canada 
publishing on asbestos-related disease, to approach McGill and “enter into an 
agreement…to secure for the Company certain services and information relating to the 
health of industrial workers.”349 Pedley understood what such a relationship would mean, 
and he wrote, “[s]uch a plan involves a definite quid pro quo, payments specifically 
conditioned upon a commensurate return.”350 Even though the Canadian Medical 
Association acknowledged that the mineral was a possible danger, JM officials knew that 
Pedley was the Canadian authority on asbestos-related disease and to have him on their 
side was a coup.351  
At the beginning of the Great Depression the death rate in Quebec was, much like 
its medical care, divided along linguistic lines, and Francophones had a higher death rate 
in the province than Anglophones.352 This was partly because of a general lack of medical 
care given to French Canadians who could not afford it, but it was also because they were 
more engaged in industrial activity, and so experienced the health problems, poverty, and 
poor nutrition that tended to accompany it. This was a population that worked hard and 
suffered for it, but because of JM, the situation at Asbestos was different, and medical 
care was a definite perk of working at the Jeffrey Mine. 
With the establishment of McGill’s new Department of Industrial Hygiene, 
partially funded by JM, Pedley was hired by the university and in 1930 was invited to 
work with company doctor R.H. Stevenson to assess the health status of Jeffrey Mine 
employees. In his short report published in the Canadian Medical Journal, Pedley 
summarized, “[a]sbestos is a mineral of interest to Canadian physicians.…If work with 
asbestos presented a hazard to the worker it would be reasonable to suppose that cases of 
disease would be reported from time to time, but so far as can be determined no cases of 
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specific disease have been reported among asbestos workers in the Province of 
Quebec.”353 While factory workers in America suffered from asbestos-related disease, the 
heart of the industry, the Jeffrey Mine, did not seem to be causing it.  
This was what Pedley was allowed to publish from his study of workers at both 
Asbestos and Thetford, but it completely misrepresented his findings, and Pedley 
expressed frustration at how much JM and Metropolitan Life edited out of his report.354 
Pedley’s lengthy, detailed, unpublished report offers a valuable first look at how the 
industry affected the bodies of the people of Asbestos. It has not been studied in great 
depth because scholars either did not know of its existence or of its significance when 
considering what and when JM knew about asbestos-related disease, and how many 
medical professionals willingly censored their findings.  
From the beginning, Pedley’s comparison between Jeffrey Mine and Thetford 
workers was misleading. Every JM employee had to pass a physical exam before they 
began working at the Jeffrey Mine. Thetford did not have this restriction.355 This meant 
that any medical problem that a JM employee was diagnosed with occurred during their 
time at the mine, which was important for compensation claims and for injuries such as 
hernias, from which 4 men at Asbestos suffered in 1930.356 Furthermore, while Pedley 
studied 141 men at Asbestos and only 54 at Thetford, the majority of those at the Jeffrey 
Mine had worked in the industry for less than 9 years. This was in sharp contrast to 
Thetford, where the average employee had worked more than 15 years. In addition to this, 
the bulk of Jeffrey Mine workers were between 15 and 40 years of age, while at Thetford, 
where the industry had experienced much more stable market fluctuations than Asbestos, 
the majority of employees were over 40 and there was no dusty factory to deal with.357 
This is vital information when placed within the context of asbestos-related disease, 
which typically took at least ten years of industrial exposure to be diagnosed by doctors in 
the 1930s.358  
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While Pedley acknowledged that these differences would show an increased rate 
of disability and disease in Thetford,359 he did not amend his examination methods to 
compensate for the differences between them and those employed at the Jeffrey Mine. 
This was especially significant when it came to the diseases asbestos was being linked to 
in Britain at the time. Pedley found no occurrences of “asbestos corns” on Jeffrey Mine 
employees, but admitted that he was uncertain of what these small, “pin head sized 
elevations of the skin, somewhat like minute warts,” caused by fibres being implanted 
like slivers, actually looked like.360 Twenty-seven men in Asbestos had infected tonsils, 
but Pedley failed to connect this to the dusty conditions in which they worked. Pedley 
was not an expert in the field of asbestos-related disease, but the fact that he was the only 
medical professional focusing on it in Canada suggested he was.  
Pedley’s lack of expertise became increasingly apparent when he focused on the 
lungs of the men at Asbestos. He did not examine any of the workers personally, but 
instead relied on already-diagnosed x-rays given to him by the company doctor. Of the 
101 x-rays he examined, Pedley found only 4 cases of “definite” asbestosis but 
immediately discounted them because of his “doubtful diagnosis.”361 Pedley was able to 
justify his cursory examination of the x-rays because he believed “[n]one of the cases of 
asbestosis appeared to suffer from disabling symptoms. Perhaps the most common 
symptom was shortness of breath, but less than half the cases complained of this,” and 
“very few of the men were coughing.”362 The workers were not complaining of disease, 
so there was no cause for alarm, but Pedley’s reasoning overlooks the fact that 
historically, miners have rarely complained about their poor health,363 and this certainly 
was the case in Asbestos. Furthermore, the technology Pedley used to test for asbestosis 
was rudimentary. Pedley augmented x-rays that were difficult to read with a test to 
measure chest expansion, using nothing but a tape measure and a sheet covering the 
employee’s torso. This test was soon given up because of its inaccuracy. Continuity in the 
examinations was not considered of prime importance. 
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In addition to the difficulty in establishing a firm diagnosis of asbestosis, Pedley 
wrote that, “[c]onversation with physicians and mine managers in the asbestos regions 
indicated that no hazard to health was suspected in connection with work in the asbestos 
mining and milling industry.”364 While he was the only medical professional in the 
country publishing on asbestos, Pedley trusted the expertise of company doctors enough 
not to refute them, and wrote that “it is the general impression both among miners and 
physicians that asbestos dust is not particularly harmful….From the public health 
standpoint…it seems hardly likely that asbestosis will become of importance either from 
the standpoint of morbidity or mortality.”365 According to Pedley, asbestosis was not a 
terribly painful affliction despite the British medical reports that suggested different, and 
furthermore, it was contained to the working class and did not present a risk to the general 
public. Pedley’s conclusions had profound effects on how health was viewed by workers, 
company doctors, and JM in the coming years, and remain part of the local cultural 
identity in Asbestos today. Medical historian Charles E. Rosenberg writes that disease is 
both biologically and socially constructed and “does not exist until we have agreed that it 
does, by perceiving, naming and responding to it.”366 In the professional opinion of 
Pedley, the workers, and JM, asbestos-related disease did not exist. 
“the less said about asbestos, the better off we are,” 1930-1940 
 While Pedley’s report on the workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines was not 
published in its entirety, it did give JM cause for concern. While many men at the Jeffrey 
Mine did not have severe cases of asbestosis in 1930, the fact that almost half those 
studied in Thetford did367 was a sign that it was only a matter of time before the same 
occurred in Asbestos. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, however, the mineral gained a 
global reputation for being synonymous with safety. It was used to line electrified oxygen 
bottles in airplanes, and as an additive to hospital and broadcasting stations ceiling tiles 
because it made them soundproof.368 With these uses came increased profits and 
reluctance on the part of JM to admit asbestos was dangerous.  
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In a 1931 letter from Metropolitan Life to JM attorneys, a Dr. McConnell wrote 
that Pedley’s unpublished report, “like the report on the American plants, will be given no 
publicity by us except with the consent of the firms concerned.”369 Although Pedley did 
not think the workers at Asbestos were suffering from any severe health issues, both the 
insurance company and JM were aware of the potential financial loss that would come 
from compensation claims if his full report was released. This awareness, combined with 
the results of a secret JM study at New York’s Saranac Laboratory that found asbestos 
dust caused asbestosis in mice after just sixty days of exposure,370 led the company to go 
on the offensive: the medical knowledge its doctors discovered would be kept secret 
while the evidence of others would be denied. No doctor outside of JM control examined 
Jeffrey Mine employees for decades. Because medical care by company doctors was 
provided as part of their contract, and because workers trusted JM, they did not seek 
second, independent opinions. This does not mean the workers were free of asbestos-
related disease, but rather that it was underreported and unacknowledged by both the 
company and the workers.  
After Pedley submitted his full report to JM, the company began a campaign 
against the conclusions made by British medical professionals about the health effects of 
the mineral. Because the asbestos-related deaths of British factory workers could not be 
ignored, JM claimed that it was South African blue asbestos that was dangerous, not 
Canadian,371 and Jeffrey Mine asbestos was completely safe. British doctors immediately 
refuted this claim, stating that 80% of the asbestos used in England came from Canada.372 
Although this discredited the company’s claim that Quebec asbestos was safe, JM 
maintained this argument for decades. The company was so committed to the false idea 
that Canadian asbestos was safe that it permeated the local cultural identity and convinced 
the community the mineral, and their land, was safe, which is an idea that many 
townspeople uphold today.373 
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While JM was not acknowledging publicly that asbestos caused severe health 
effects, internally the company was in a panic over the potential lawsuits that could be 
launched against it. In a letter from one JM vice president to another, E.M. Voorhees 
wrote S.A. Williams that “[e]ver since dust suits have been brought against us at Manville 
[New Jersey] we have considered, first, the possibility of installing the most modern and 
improved dust collecting systems.”374 Asbestos-related disease in the 1930s appeared to 
be contained to the factories that processed the mineral, so in mining and as an additive to 
consumer goods and industrial products it seemed relatively safe. This was good news for 
JM because if the disease could be contained to factories, it could be managed. 
The disease-prevention plan was carried out in Asbestos, but not to the extent it 
could have been. In a letter to S.A. Williams, Jeffrey Mine Vice President C.H. 
Shoemaker wrote, “since September 1931, no new dust collection equipment has been 
installed in the factory, chiefly because the equipment there meets ‘all practical 
requirements’ [and] [i]nspection by the medical officers of the Quebec Board of Health 
‘indicates a clear ticket.’”375 Shoemaker believed that the dust control measures already in 
place eliminated 80% of the dust in the factory and mill even though it was difficult to 
persuade workers to comply with the new requirements: “[they] do not find respirators 
practicable. The dust in the mills is evidently less irritating and is more fibrous than in 
[other] locations, resulting in less need for a respirator and more trouble with the filter 
clogging when a respirator is used.”376 Shoemaker’s sentiments reflected those of Pedley 
two years earlier: even though there was so much dust in the air at the Jeffrey Mine that it 
clogged respirator filters, the workers did not complain, so there was not a problem. The 
fact that the fibres clogged respirator filters should have been an indication to employees 
and JM officials that more safety precautions were necessary, not fewer, but the company 
did not make the use of protective devices at the Jeffrey Mine mandatory until 1975. 
Respirator technology was constantly improving, and JM would increasingly stress the 
importance of their use to employees in order to prevent litigation due to asbestos-related 
disease. Clogged filters remained a problem because of the amount of dust in the mills at 
                                                 
374
 E.M. Voorhees, Johns-Manville Co., to S.A. Williams, VP Johns-Manville Co., 28 July 1931. “Asbestos 
Chronology,” ACRF, p. 6. 
375
 C.H. Shoemaker, VP, CJM Co. Asbestos, to S.A. Williams, VP, JM, 24 December 1932. “Asbestos Chronology,” 
ACRF, p. 9. 
376
 Ibid, p. 9. 
 94
the Jeffrey Mine, however, and workers again and again chose not to wear respirators or 
lobby for better dust control measures. The lack of action of Jeffrey Mine workers reveals 
an acceptance of dust and an acceptance of risk in Asbestos, and illustrates an 
occupational culture that greatly influenced local identity. Workers did not complain of ill 
health and they chose not to take precautionary measures to prevent disease, even when 
JM acknowledged the risk by providing respirators.  
As health measures were carried out and contested in Asbestos, more work was 
done to discover what exactly the mineral did to the human body. Members of the British 
medical community wrote much of the literature emerging on asbestos-related disease at 
this time377 because they had witnessed the deaths of British factory workers and were 
convinced that the mineral was not safe. In 1933, British doctor E.R.A. Merewether 
stated, “[i]f only the slightest exposure to the dust results untimely in death, then the 
scope of the necessary preventive measures is summed up in one word—prohibition—for, 
practically speaking, it is impossible to prevent such exposure.”378 Coinciding with this 
was an article by Pedley, no longer under the censorship of JM, that claimed asbestosis 
worked twice as fast as, and with symptoms more severe than, silicosis, a similar 
industrial disease.379 Prohibition would ruin JM, as would statements about the severity of 
asbestos-related disease. The company had to go on the offensive in order to save itself. 
Aside from company doctors stationed in communities like Asbestos, JM had a 
whole band of medical professionals under its control in Saranac, New York, who were 
used to combat negative health reports on the mineral. Writing to Saranac Laboratory 
head Dr. A.J. Lanza, company doctor Leroy Gardner stated, “the fat seems to be in the 
fire,” because of leaked medical reports on JM factory workers in New Jersey that 
resulted in compensation claims.380 If successful, these claims had the potential to result 
in others and a growing awareness of the negative effects of asbestos. New health and 
safety measures were put in place at the factory in Manville, N.J., and Vice President 
Vandiver Brown wrote his brother, President Lewis H. Brown, that during the rest of 
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1933, they must “bring other operations, especially Waukegan, Alexandria, Lompoc, and 
Asbestos to Manville efficiency.”381 These places were of prime importance to the 
company, but the safety measures in these locations were not as strict as they could and 
should have been. The Jeffrey Mine was in definite need of improvement, but the people 
of Asbestos were more secluded than those who worked at JM’s American plants because 
of language barriers and a lack of concern for industrial disease within the Canadian 
medical community. This seclusion allowed the company a degree of freedom and 
patience when it came to dust control measures.  
While factories were slowly brought up to health standards, Saranac Laboratory 
doctors worked to dispel the idea that asbestos was a dangerous mineral. In an address to 
the Home Office Life Underwriters Association in November 1933, Dr. A.J. Lanza 
claimed, “I am going to make this a little bit dramatic. So far as we could ascertain, there 
is no dust hazard or asbestos hazard in connection with the actual mining or quarrying 
operations...in the open pit and quarry work there was no apparent pulmonary hazard.”382 
While this did not address factory work, it was a small victory for the company and for 
the town of Asbestos, where mining operations were crucial to economic survival. The 
following year, Lanza met with Metropolitan Life officials to discuss the elimination of 
dust in factories and stressed that knowledge of asbestos-related disease was still too 
rudimentary to say for sure that the mineral posed a serious health risk.383 JM was 
fortunate to have Lanza in its employ and the company knew it. 
The connection between asbestosis and silicosis was something many doctors and 
legislatures were exploring in the 1930s. Silicosis was a recognized, compensatable 
industrial disease in the United States and Canada,384 but asbestosis was not, although the 
diseases were similar. Silicosis was a recognized industrial disease because the hard rock 
mining industry was older than the asbestos industry, which resulted in increased 
occurrences and a stronger labour movement that could successfully lobby governments. 
Diseases are both physical and political, and Vandiver Brown called on Lanza to write a 
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report to be submitted to various government and union organizations denying the 
similarities between asbestosis and silicosis, but stressed, 
no one in our organization is suggesting for a moment that you alter by one 
jot or title any scientific facts or inevitable conclusions revealed or 
justified by your preliminary survey.  All we ask is that all of the favorable 
aspects of the survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be 
unintentionally pictured in darker tones than the circumstances justify. I 
feel confident we can depend upon you…to give us this ‘break.’385  
 
Brown did not ask Lanza to alter his medical report, but implied that the company was 
after a positive account of asbestos and its effects on the human body. While JM 
continued to raise health and safety standards in its operations with new dust control 
technology,386 Lanza released his report on the risk of asbestosis among American factory 
workers and Canadian miners and millers. The report concluded that asbestosis was 
milder than silicosis and caused only a “little,” occasionally fatal disability.387 
This gave JM the proof it needed to defend itself against compensation claims 
that, although only a few dozen at this time, were steadily rising in the United States and 
the company could play the injured party to “the shyster lawyer[s] and the quack 
doctor[s]”388 who were launching lawsuits against JM. Vandiver Brown was especially 
skilled at this, and continuously stated that the claims brought against the company were 
“not bona fide and…we are victims of the racket.”389 However, JM official Sumner 
Simpson cautioned Brown against this and warned, “the less said about asbestos, the 
better off we are.”390 Simpson’s statement shows just how much JM knew about asbestos-
related disease at this time and how much they were committed to covering it up. 
Simpson urged caution because in the middle of the 1930s, as unions in both 
America and l’Estrie were becoming more common and knowledgeable about asbestos-
related disease,391 the company had no definite idea of what the mineral could do to the 
human body. As a result JM asked Saranac’s Dr. Leroy Gardner to study the effects of 
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asbestos dust on mice so they could track the evolution of disease.392 Gardner was paid 
for the study on the condition that JM had the right to “determine whether, to what extent 
and in what manner [his conclusions] shall be made public.”393 JM officials were worried 
about the possible outcomes of the study and the potential effects, which Simpson made 
clear when he wrote, “[t]he reports may be so favorable to us that they would cause us no 
trouble, but they might be just the opposite; which could be very embarrassing.”394 
Throughout this period JM was concerned solely with its public image and financial 
success. The pain and suffering of its employees, including those in Asbestos, was not a 
problem on which the company focused. 
Gardner agreed to the conditions the company set for his study. Meanwhile, JM’s 
doctor in Asbestos became a spokesman for the industry. Dr. R.H. Stevenson had helped 
Pedley in his 1930 examination of Jeffrey Mine employees, but it was not until 1938, 
when Quebec officially recognized asbestosis as a compensatable industrial disease due 
to pressure from the Fédération nationale des employés de l’industrie minière,395 that JM 
asked him to take a more public role. In his 23 May 1938 address to Quebec’s asbestos 
producers, Stevenson defended the health record of the Canadian industry, and insisted 
that it was only South African asbestos that caused disease because of its high silica 
content, absent in the Jeffrey Mine. Stevenson believed that asbestosis was “a rare case 
among asbestos workers” in North America, and stated that this “has been experimentally 
proved by…Dr. L.U. Gardner of [the] Trudeau Laboratory at Saranac. There is very little 
clinical evidence of Asbestosis, and certainly not enough to even venture a diagnosis.”396 
Stevenson was referring to both Gardner’s past and current research on asbestos, which 
JM assumed would be favourable. 
Stevenson relied on his own experience in Asbestos to show that the mineral did 
no harm. He said that he had been studying asbestosis there for ten years, and “We have 
been highly pleased to note the extreme rarity of asbestosis among our men.…As is to be 
expected the cases discovered showing early Asbestosis were men who had worked a 
                                                 
392
 JM Memo of Agreement between the Company and Dr. Leroy Gardner, Saranac, 20 November 1936. “Doc. 7,” 
ACRF, p. 88. 
393
 Vandiver Brown, VP JM, to Dr. L. Gardner, Saranac Laboratory, 20 November 1936. “Doc. 7,” ACRF, p. 89. 
394
 Sumner Simpson, JM, to Schluter, 10 November 1936. “Doc. 7,” ACRF, p. 82. 
395
 Jean-Pierre Kesteman, Peter Southam, and Diane Saint-Pierre, Histoire des Cantons de l’est (Sainte-Foy: Les 
Presses de l’Université Laval, 1998), p. 563. 
396
 R.H. Stevenson, CJM Asbestos, “Talk by Dr. Stevenson to Quebec Asbestos Producers,” 23 May 1938, Turner & 
Newall Archives, p. 1. 
 98
long time in the company service.”397 To Stevenson asbestosis was not a deadly 
respiratory disease, but rather a part of getting old in the industry, like wrinkles or a bad 
back. Those who suffered from it at the Jeffrey Mine were mostly men who worked in the 
mill, which convinced Stevenson “that it is a good idea to transfer men away from the 
mill after ten to twelve years of service to other departments. You will see…that our 
position is very far from serious as far as actual damage to the men is concerned.”398 The 
idea of rotating mill workers every ten years or so illustrates just how little medical 
professionals understood the severity or pathology of asbestos-related disease at this time. 
It also demonstrates just how little doctors understood the suffering associated with 
diseases like asbestosis, which began with shortness of breath, but resulted in a slow and 
painful death due to suffocation. For Stevenson to say the men with asbestosis at the 
Jeffrey Mine were not “damaged” was grossly misleading, and his direct interaction with 
the workers influenced the way they understood what was happening to their bodies. 
According to Stevenson, the good health of Asbestos men, at least during their first 
decade on the job, proved that the mineral, and the industry, was safe.  
Despite Stevenson’s convictions, many of Quebec’s asbestos producers still had 
doubts. C.S. Bell, lawyer for the British asbestos manufacturing company Turner & 
Newall, which owned a mine in Thetford, forwarded a transcript of the speech to his 
employers and stated that while Stevenson “appears to consider that Rhodesian asbestos 
is more liable to promote Asbestosis than Canadian, by reason of the higher proportion of 
SiO2…as far as I can trace from the published analyses the Silica content of Canadian and 
Rhodesian fibre is almost identical, i.e. about 40%.”399 Experience dealing with health 
problems in British factories trumped Stevenson’s convictions, but Turner & Newall 
officials did not publicly refute his claims because it would damage the industry. The 
unwillingness of company officials to challenge Stevenson’s claim that Canadian asbestos 
was safe allowed many in the medical community to deem the doctor in Asbestos an 
expert on the subject and his theory on the relative safety of the Canadian mineral has had 
long lasting effects. 
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Although Stevenson did not believe asbestosis was a significant problem, the 
situation at Asbestos was worrisome. In 1938 the dust collection equipment in the mill 
was only 50% effective and resulted in mineral dust hovering like clouds over the 
community, being in general an “almost intolerable nuisance,” with complaints rising 
from both the town council and individuals.400 JM officials reported that “so heavy at 
times was the concentration of this dust in the mill area that it began to be regarded as a 
safety hazard, and the familiar grey colour in town and country-side constituted a very 
definite public nuisance.”401 Townspeople accepted high levels of dust at the Jeffrey 
Mine, but not in the streets of the community because of effects on aesthetics and 
visibility, not a great fear of what the dust was doing to their lungs. Townspeople did not 
realize that dust-related disease was becoming a community-wide issue, not one 
contained to the mine or mill. To solve the dust problem, JM spent $135,000 and five 
months to construct a new Cottrell Precipitation Plant designed to eliminate dust both in 
the factory and outside it. When the project was completed dust produced in the mill was 
reduced to just 20% of the previous levels. This sounded impressive, but still meant that 
ten tonnes of dust was released into the air of Asbestos each day.402 Dust was a fact of life 
in the community in the first half of the 20th century, and while it was a nuisance, it was 
not feared.  
Canadian JM President H.K. Sherry received letters from Asbestos town council 
thanking him for the improvements made in reducing the amount of fibre hovering over 
the community, and for his commitment to beautifying the town.403 There was a level of 
dust hovering over Asbestos that the community accepted, partly because they believed 
JM was taking care of them. This belief was linked to the installation of new 
technologically advanced equipment, such as state of the art x-ray machines, at the CJM 
Hospital in Asbestos, designed to “take hazards out of industry.”404 The hospital was for 
the entire community and JM officials stated that “Government authorities have 
expressed interest in the discovery that workers here show remarkable freedom from dust 
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diseases.”405 The people of Asbestos appeared to be the healthiest, most monitored 
resource community in the province, and the presence of doctors and new medical tests 
convinced workers yet again that the mineral would not seriously harm them. With this 
positive image surrounding the company and the community, JM once again asked Dr. 
Stevenson for a public assessment of his patients. 
Whereas Stevenson’s 1938 address was designed to convince industry leaders that 
Quebec asbestos was safe, he used little evidence from his own experiences working with 
Jeffrey Mine employees. In his 1940 report, by contrast, Stevenson provided a detailed 
account of the health of his patients. He began by once again stating that asbestosis was a 
misunderstood disease and “the victim of a great many reports.”406 Stevenson continued 
to assert that asbestosis was not serious, and even if it was, “in this country [it] is not the 
serious hazard to labor that it was a few years ago believed to be.”407 The aim of this 
report was for Stevenson to ease the growing concern over asbestosis by providing an 
expert opinion on the recognition of it in theory and in practice.  
Although the symptoms and significance of asbestosis was debated in the 
international medical community, Stevenson compiled a list of nine generally agreed-
upon indications of the disease:  
1. Dyspnoea [painful breathlessness], the most common, but cannot be 
noticed except following violent exercise, such as stepping up out a chair 
25 times in 30 seconds; 2. Cough; 3. Cyanosis (late) [unoxygenated blood, 
poor circulation, blue colouration of the skin]; 4. Clubbed finger nails 
(late); 5. Spitting of blood; 6. Loss of weight and emaciation; 7. Anorexia. 
When a man cannot eat it is time to stop work; 8. Poor chest expansion; 9. 
Substernal pain.408 
 
These symptoms show how superficial knowledge on asbestos-related disease was in 
1940 and the extent to which Stevenson could acknowledge, but not address, the pain that 
some of the workers at the Jeffrey Mine experienced. While not all of these symptoms 
occurred at once, and many could be signs of other diseases such as tuberculosis, or 
simply of poor physical fitness, this list demonstrated JM’s willingness to push 
employees to their bodily limits, a lack of compassion within the medical profession, and 
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a desire to serve the industry, not the sick. These symptoms also help advance our 
understanding of what some people in Asbestos experienced. Townspeople did not need a 
doctor to tell them that turning blue and coughing up blood meant that they were sick, and 
it did not take medical training to connect these often painful symptoms to the jobs these 
men performed at the Jeffrey Mine. That the people of Asbestos possessed this 
knowledge and chose not to wear respirators while at work or to lobby for better health 
measures at the mine shows their willingness to accept bodily risk if it meant a steady job 
and a prosperous community. The acceptance of risk was entrenched in the local cultural 
identity at this time, and influenced the actions of the townspeople in the years to come. 
Stevenson’s report changed focus halfway through when he wrote on the health of 
507 employees who had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for over ten years, the minimum 
amount of time believed to be required before asbestosis occurred. Of this cohort, 
Stevenson found 17 with early asbestosis, 5 with moderate asbestosis, and none with 
advanced asbestosis.409 While 22 incidents of asbestosis out of 507 men appeared 
relatively small compared to occurrences of silicosis in hard rock mining communities 
and suggested it was not a serious or widespread industrial disease, this was not good 
enough for Stevenson. He reported that these “figures are arrived at by taking results of 
Stereoscope examinations only. When these cases are studied from a case history and 
physical examination standpoint, our percentage of those suffering from Asbestosis is 
exactly zero. If we used all of our employees in making these figures, the percentages 
would be about three times smaller.”410 These conclusions suggested that asbestosis was 
not a problem at the Jeffrey Mine and medical experts outside the community that stated 
the mineral was dangerous were wrong. Stevenson’s lack of trust in medical equipment 
like the Stereoscope to properly assess disease illustrates his unwillingness to believe 
asbestosis was a problem in the community. By disregarding his own medical evidence, 
he denied the harmful health effects of the mineral and greatly influenced the opinions of 
the suffering workers he treated.  
While Stevenson gave a detailed review of the symptoms of asbestosis, he also 
highlighted some of the customs of the community. Like all JM towns, Asbestos had a 
Quarter Century Club to which every employee belonged once they had worked twenty-
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five years for the company. Stevenson wrote that “a good percentage of these oldsters are 
still doing as hard manual labor as they ever did, and with no more sign of fatigue than 
any other men of similar age.”411 Whether these men were working so late in life due to a 
dedication to the company or a need to support a family is unclear because the goal was 
to portray them as tough, healthy, and happy members of the club. Stevenson also 
mentioned the JM employees who had died since 1929: “I have investigated the cause of 
death in all these cases, and not one of them have died of a lung affection [sic]…Of those 
living, there is not one that displays the classical signs of Asbestosis.”412 Once again, 
Stevenson’s conclusions were misleading. He did not perform any autopsies on the dead 
workers of Asbestos, the exterior physical indicators he relied upon for diagnosis were 
similar to a number of other diseases, and as a JM spokesperson, he had a vested interest 
in denying any occurrence of serious health problems in Asbestos.  
At the beginning of his report, Stevenson attributed the confusion over asbestosis 
to the lack of human bodies to study,413 but he ignored the fact that he was the doctor in a 
community that was built around the asbestos industry and had bodies available. 
Although he admitted that autopsies were the one conclusive way to determine if an 
employee suffered from asbestosis, Stevenson reported, “we have never had reason to 
have autopsies on our men, owing to the absence of symptons [sic] suggesting 
Asbestosis.”414 This statement showed unwillingness on the part of Stevenson to fully 
investigate the diseases asbestos caused in favour of skimming the surface of signs and 
symptoms without questioning them. No mention was made as to whether families in 
Asbestos requested autopsies or if autopsies were seen as a violation of the body, but if 
asbestosis had been discovered in the lungs of dead Jeffrey Mine employees and families 
were told, JM would have been inundated with compensation claims. The people of 
Asbestos knew many of them were becoming painfully ill after working at the Jeffrey 
Mine but Stevenson’s assurances that they were healthy, or that their illnesses were 
caused by other factors, he was able to convince community members that the bodily 
knowledge they possessed through their own suffering was wrong. Because of 
Stevenson’s cursory methods of diagnosis it is likely that more than 22 Jeffrey Mine 
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workers had asbestosis in 1940,415 but no health-related protests or complaints were 
launched and JM employees did not lobby for a safer work environment, internalizing 
bodily risks as part of the local cultural identity.  
Many asbestos industry heads read Stevenson’s 1938 report. Officials at the 
British manufacturing firm Turner & Newall were unconvinced. Showing a lack of 
respect for his medical authority, company man F. Bussy wrote to Turner & Newall that 
“Dr. Stevenson has obviously had but little experience of post mortem examinations and 
we shall therefore have to be guided more by men who have the opportunity of many 
such examinations. I cannot but feel that with their experience of known cases if our 
Medical Board were to examine the 507 men mentioned there would be more cases to 
report.”416 Stevenson did not hold much authority within the global medical community 
because he was a company-funded doctor who did not perform the most basic 
examinations or autopsies to trace the progression of disease, which contrasted with the 
practices of British doctors who were particularly concerned with industrial diseases like 
asbestosis and devoted entire studies to autopsy results. He was more effective closer to 
home, however, and after his report was submitted to the Quebec government, asbestosis 
was removed from its list of compensatable industrial diseases; even the workers 
association accepted the decision.417 Because of his authoritative role when it came to the 
health of the workers at Asbestos, Stevenson was kept on retainer by JM after he retired 
in 1945, “due to the number of asbestosis cases that will come up for consideration in the 
next few years,”418 and he was elected mayor of the neighbouring community of Danville 
soon after. While the company publicly denied the ill health effects of the mineral, it was 
only a matter of time until the realities of asbestos-related disease became public 
knowledge. 
“A situation is developing with the miners in Quebec,” 1940-1949 
Stevenson’s 1940 report emerged as the medical scene in Quebec was becoming 
increasingly divided. English Canada’s medical association turned its attention towards 
industrial diseases, mostly in Ontario factories, because of their increased occurrence in 
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workers employed in the growing industry of war.419 L’Association des Médecins de 
Langue Française du Canada did the same, but separately, and focused on asbestos. While 
neither of these organizations had direct access to Jeffrey Mine workers because JM did 
not allow outside medical professionals access to employee files, it became increasingly 
difficult to hide the severity of asbestos-related disease. Doctors at l’Université Laval in 
Quebec City were beginning to investigate the bodies of employees at Thetford, where 
company restrictions were less severe. 
The medical reports on asbestos-related disease emerging from Laval in the 1940s 
were strong where Stevenson was weak: autopsies. These reports spoke of how quickly 
and painfully Thetford asbestos workers died once they arrived at the hospital 
complaining of difficulty breathing, and they included autopsy photos of diseased 
lungs.420 The Laval doctors provided proof of disease Stevenson had not searched out and 
reveal just how much the French Canadian medical community knew of asbestos-related 
disease at this time. In the first report on asbestos in Laval médical, doctors wrote, 
“l’amiantose est une affection dont le chapitre pathologique nous paraît encore incomplet. 
Nous espérons que certaines conditions favorables d’observation et de collaboration 
médicales nous permettront d’apporter une contribution intéressante à l’étude de cette 
maladie professionnelle.”421 Laval medical professionals were able to independently 
publish all of their findings and suspected those associated with JM were not.  
The doctors at Laval demonstrated this freedom when two patients suffering from 
asbestosis in their care died of lung cancer.422 While two cases were not enough to make a 
firm connection, “il nous paraît logique de la croire, comme d’autres l’ont cru pour la 
silicose, que l’amiantose peut être une cause prédisposant du cancer pulmonaire.”423 This 
was radically different from the type of reports JM doctors released, but it coincided with 
what Leroy Gardner was finding at Saranac. During his study on the effects of asbestos 
dust on mice, Gardner accidentally found that the mineral caused lung and organ cancer 
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81.8% of the time.424 Cancer was not something JM had thought to ask him to investigate, 
and in a letter to Vandiver Brown, Gardner wrote that the  
question of cancer susceptibility now seems more significant than I had 
previously imagined. I believe I can obtain support for repeating it from 
the cancer research group. As it will take 2 or 3 years to complete such a 
study, I believe that it better be omitted from the present report….The 
evidence is suggestive but not conclusive that asbestosis may precipitate 
the development of cancer in susceptible individuals.425  
 
If these results were released, repercussions for JM and the economy of Asbestos would 
be catastrophic, and cancer was not something the townspeople had considered when they 
accepted the bodily risks of the industry. Just as the company was making record profits 
because of the necessity of the fibre to the war effort,426 the fact that asbestos caused 
cancer had the potential to destroy the industry. Gardner’s findings were never released 
and JM claimed that there was no proof the mineral caused cancer. After Gardner’s death, 
Lanza thoroughly edited the report and published it as an effort to prove the relative 
harmlessness of the mineral. The effects of asbestos on the mice in Gardner’s lab were 
ignored, as were the effects of the mineral on the workers at the Jeffrey Mine.  
Whereas JM had the authority over the release of studies at the Saranac 
Laboratory, they had no control over the medical professionals at Laval. Francophone 
doctors in Quebec were somewhat isolated from the rest of the North American medical 
community because of linguistic boundaries,427 but were well aware of the studies on 
asbestos-related disease written in English. In 1943 Laval’s Dr. Louis Rousseau believed 
that asbestos was unique in the way it affected the human body: “[p]armi les maladies 
professionnelles causées par les divers types de poussières… donnant des maladies 
pulmonaires…il en est une qui mérite une place spéciale, tant par son étiologie, sa forme 
histo-pathologique, que par son apparition relativement récente, comme syndrome 
pulmonaire encore à l’étude.”428 The mineral fascinated these doctors because of their 
proximity to the asbestos-producing region and due to its unusual pathology, not because 
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they had a financial interest in the results of their studies like those at Saranac. Rousseau 
believed that these edited studies prevented proper legislation in Quebec and wrote,  
l’ouvrier lui-même n’est pas empressé de se prêter à l’étude de cette 
maladie et, s’il désire des modifications de la loi actuelle en sa faveur, il ne 
fera aucune revendication qui l’exposerait à un licenciement. Cette 
opposition des compagnies, favorisée par la méfiance des ouvriers qui ne 
se sentent pas protégés par une législation favorable est, dans notre 
opinion, le principal obstacle à l’étude de l’amiantose pure.429 
 
Rousseau believed that workers did not have the power to lobby for improved health 
standards in the Quebec asbestos industry and that they mistrusted the companies that 
owned the mines, but in the community of Asbestos, this was not the case. Workers at the 
Jeffrey Mine experienced the painful symptoms of asbestos-related disease, but though 
they went on strike six times, they never once chose to strike for improved working 
conditions before 1949. After seeing what the mineral could do to the human body, 
Rousseau could not understand how the people of Asbestos interpreted bodily risk as part 
of their local cultural identity.  
In a step towards improved occupational health legislation, in 1944 Liberal 
Premier Adélard Godbout attempted to enact a new Labour Code in the province that 
would help facilitate compensation claims and unemployment insurance. However, that 
same year he was replaced by Union nationale leader Maurice Duplessis, who had no 
intention of updating the province’s labour laws, especially if they infringed on corporate 
rights.430 As far as Duplessis was concerned, companies needed the freedom to act in 
ways they felt were best for business without worrying about government intervention. 
Disease legislation was stalled. 
The growing number of medical reports on asbestos-related disease in Laval 
medical,431 combined with Gardner’s accidental discovery of the mineral causing high 
rates of cancer in mice, meant that JM needed to know if the same was happening to its 
workers in Asbestos and those in the numerous and dusty manufacturing plants that relied 
on the Jeffrey Mine’s mineral throughout the world. In May 1944, Gardner wrote to 
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Stevenson asking to visit Asbestos to review the x-ray films of his patients because the 
population’s occurrence of asbestosis was so disproportionately low compared to JM 
factories in America.432 Although Gardner was given permission for the visit, CJM 
President H.K. Sherry made it clear to Stevenson that “[o]ur main interest should be in 
any favorable findings” that resulted from Gardner’s examination of the films.433 JM did 
not need another negative health report. 
Fortunately for the company, Gardner confirmed Stevenson’s findings. After 
examining between 200 and 300 x-rays with a New York State Department of Health 
official, Gardner found only two possible cases of “questionable first degree 
asbestosis.”434 This indicated to Gardner that Stevenson’s claims about the safety of the 
Quebec mineral were accurate and that factory workers were dying because the fibre was 
mixed with South African asbestos in the United States.435 Gardner failed to question why 
he was only given a selection of old films chosen by Stevenson to study. The two cases of 
questionable asbestosis may have been from many years prior and could have turned into 
lung cancer or premature death by 1944, but Gardner did not follow up on them. The 
workers at the Jeffrey Mine were not disease-free, but Stevenson’s selective method for 
choosing films for Gardner to study made it appear as though they were. 
Soon after Gardner’s 1944 visit, JM and its workers signed a new collective 
agreement. The union demanded that a “dust clause” be included in the contract that 
stated, “the Company will take necessary steps to eliminate as much as possible the dust 
in its operations.”436 The workers were not as content about the effects of asbestos dust on 
their bodies as Stevenson was, and this was the first time they expressed their concerns 
through the union. CJM official G.K. Foster insisted that the dust clause was to be 
accepted only if absolutely necessary and only if rephrased to read: “the Company 
recognizes the desirability of progressive improvement in the alleviation of any nuisance 
arising from the existence of dust in its operations, and will continue to pursue its policy 
of adopting such measures as it may from time to time deem to be practical, having in 
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view the accomplishment of that objective.”437 Altering the statement resulted in vague 
allusions to dust control rather than an actual dust clause. JM’s ability to alter the clause 
demonstrates that although the workers were concerned with the presence of dust, they 
were not so worried that they would fight for the firmer version of the clause, again 
showing their willingness to accept the risks associated with working at the Jeffrey Mine. 
As the dust clause in the new contract was being negotiated in 1944, JM funded a 
report on a forgotten segment of the Jeffrey Mine workforce: women. While company 
doctors acknowledged that most cases of asbestosis were limited to those who worked in 
the mill,438 they never mentioned the women who made up 25% of the workforce during 
the war.439 In August 1944, JM official Joan Ross examined the female workers at the 
Jeffrey Mine and noted that the Textile Department had the worst dust problem and the 
highest absentee rate in the entire factory, so it should have been studied in the past.440 
The reasons Ross gave as to why female employees at Asbestos were absent so often 
were “dust and bad ventilation, fatigue, and higher absentee rate among women in 
general.”441 Ross also noted that the “situation has become a topic of conversation 
throughout the entire community and is a serious detriment to the reputation of the 
company.”442 The local population’s understanding of risk was that it was something 
contained to male Jeffrey Mine employees. Women were still to be protected from the 
adverse effects of industrializing the land.  
Gendered perceptions of who was allowed to be exposed to industrial risk and 
disease were common in the 19th and early 20th century, especially in the textile factories 
of Montreal and New England, but JM officials and doctors had previously ignored the 
health of female employees in the asbestos industry, partly because mining was perceived 
to be male-dominated and this overshadowed the women who worked in the industry. 
Stevenson felt it was acceptable to move a sick male employee from the mill to another 
part of JM operations. Women, on the other hand, could not be sacrificed to the industrial 
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machine and asbestos dust could not be allowed to harm wives and daughters, which was 
why townspeople complained. Later that year the province recommended that 
improvements be made to control dust at the mill,443 but these suggestions were not 
mandatory because of the Duplessis government’s unwillingness to infringe on the rights 
of companies operating in Quebec. The care of female employees at the Jeffrey Mine had 
to be negotiated between the workers and JM, and the company would not admit to any 
hazard.  
Although the Duplessis government was not worried about asbestos dust, the 
doctors at Laval made it a primary concern. In 1946, Dr. Louis Rousseau once again 
expressed his frustration over the lack of commitment to researching asbestos-related 
disease: “si la silicose peut être étudiée dans tous les pays, il n’en est pas de même de 
l’amiantose. Comme la région…produit environ 75% de l’amiante mondiale, l’on 
comprendre facilement qu’une étude clinique approfondie n’a pu être faite par des 
médecins ne vivant pas dans l’entourage immédiat de ces ouvriers exposés à ces 
poussières particulières.”444 Rousseau believed asbestosis was a unique disease that 
required further study because of its severity. He wrote, “[u]ne solution satisfaissante à ce 
problème industriel ne m’apparait pas devoir être obtenue, tant qu’une commission 
d’étude, indépendante de la politique et des compagnies intéressées, n’aura pas la liberté 
de les ouvriers avant leur admission dans cette industrie et de faire des contrôles fréquents 
de leur état pulmonaire par la suite.”445  
Rousseau referred not only to Stevenson’s work, but also to Leroy Gardner’s 
unreleased report, which had been greatly anticipated by the medical community. 
Gardner, the “famed director of the Saranac Laboratory,”446 died in 1946 without 
completing his study of the effects of asbestos dust but JM released an edited portion of 
his unfinished report that stated the mineral was relatively benign, which Rousseau found 
impossible to believe.447 In 1947, Vandiver Brown went even further with Gardner’s 
                                                 
443
 27 October 1944. “Asbestos Chronology,” ACRF, p. 35. 
444
 Louis Rousseau, “Quelque considérations sur l’amiantose,” Laval médical (1946), p. 57. 
445
 Ibid, p. 66. 
446
 Time Magazine, 4 November 1946. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,777256,00.html. Accessed 
11 February 2008. 
447
 Rousseau, “Quelque considérations,” p. 58. 
 110
study and requested that any reference to cancer be deleted,448 and wrote to company 
attorney J.P. Woodard that the discovery of cancer “looks like dynamite.”449 
Because the threat of cancer had the potential to counter JM’s claim that Quebec 
asbestos was safe, the company went on the offensive to overpower reports emerging 
from Laval with findings of their own, believing there was “a need to complete Gardner’s 
report before French Canadian researchers elect to write something themselves.”450 While 
the doctors at Laval were convinced that asbestos dust raised death rates in the mining 
towns of l’Estrie, workers at the Jeffrey Mine were not included in their studies and they 
found no traces of cancer during their autopsies of Thetford employees.451 It appeared that 
the results of Gardner’s study had been successfully contained, but to be sure it stayed 
this way, JM installed a new doctor at Asbestos after Stevenson retired. 
Dr. Kenneth Smith had worked for JM prior to being relocated to Asbestos and 
knew what was expected of him, although he was not always comfortable with this role. 
One of the first actions he took in 1947 was to remove mill employee Alexandre Bourassa 
to a “non-dusty operation.”452 Although Bourassa was only 35 years old and did not 
appear sick, he had worked in the mill for 20 years and “[s]hould he continue to work in 
the dust much longer, I feel that we might have another case with a typical x-ray film and 
typical physical findings of asbestosis.”453 Smith was a different kind of doctor than 
Stevenson. He took the risks of Jeffrey Mine asbestos much more seriously than his 
predecessor, and often became conflicted with his role in putting workers at risk. It is not 
clear what an employee was told or not told when they were transferred from one part of 
the Jeffrey Mine’s operations to another after visiting the doctor, or if they worried about 
what the move might mean. What is clear, however, is that Smith believed the people at 
Asbestos were at a much greater risk of disease than they had previously been told. 
Despite this, Smith helped calm JM’s fears over what might be discovered by 
Laval medical professionals studying Thetford workers. Although they worked for 
different companies, he befriended Dr. Paul Cartier at Thetford and scheduled monthly 
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meetings with him to ensure a “uniformity of procedure and results in the two clinics.”454 
Smith was able to convince Cartier to keep Thetford health records from outsiders and 
between 1947 and 1949 doctors at Laval had no subjects on which to study the health 
effects of asbestos. Their studies were stalled.455 The two doctors became friends and 
after the medical records at Thetford were closed, Cartier became Smith’s ally and 
confidant. Smith felt free to express his frustration to Cartier over not having the freedom 
to study only one aspect of asbestos-related disease. Instead, Smith had to address every 
medical ailment in Asbestos and complained to Cartier, “I cannot do as good a job as you 
are doing, but that is what J-M wants.”456 Despite his complaints Smith was in a position 
of power at the Jeffrey Mine and JM did ask him to focus on only one thing there: 
preventing knowledge and evidence of asbestos-related disease from spreading.  
In March 1948, this duty became clear when JM allowed two independent doctors 
from New York to visit Asbestos and assess a series of employee x-rays. Although the 
selection of x-rays was supposed to be done by the Quebec Compensation Board to 
ensure a fair report, Smith managed to bypass the restrictions and supply the visiting 
doctors with slides taken of employees he had already deemed healthy: “we never have 
let anyone know that this company (JM) had anything to do with the scheme; we are 
merely co-operating with…the Board to the best of our ability….Even the head of the 
union here thinks that…all I did was…help.”457 This deliberate deception of medical 
boards, local union heads, and Jeffrey Mine workers was never uncovered.  
It was particularly important to JM that Smith hide the effects of asbestos dust on 
its employees at this time because the Congress of Asbestos Miners, a workers group 
based in East Broughton, Quebec met each year to lobby for asbestosis awareness and 
prevention.458 The general public was still ignorant of the adverse health effects of the 
mineral, but the workers were becoming increasingly aware of the threats. Vandiver 
Brown believed that a “situation is developing with the miners in Quebec that urgently 
requires that a report based on Dr. Gardner’s experiments be made available as a counter 
agent to opinions being expressed and conclusions arrived at by Quebec physicians and 
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officials upon the basis of surmise, social ideology, and inadequate information. Time 
therefore is of the essence.”459 Brown wanted a severely edited version of Gardner’s 
report with every mention of cancer—in mice or men—removed.460 
At the end of 1948, when another contract was being negotiated between JM and 
the union at Asbestos, the company opened a new hospital supplied with the most 
advanced x-ray technology.461 Government officials, company heads, and union leaders 
celebrated the new CJM Hôpital et Clinic, but Kenneth Smith was not happy. Having 
asked the company to do something about the dust problem in the mill,462 Smith advised, 
“if any dust is raised, I believe that the men should wear respirators.”463 While he was 
willing to hide x-ray results from employees and the public, Smith was not content to see 
Jeffrey Mine workers continuously exposed to a severe health hazard. Employees were 
each issued two respirators to use, but they again refused to wear them because they were 
uncomfortable. Even though their knowledge of asbestos-related disease was growing, 
Jeffrey Mine workers continued to accept the risks associated with the mineral and their 
labour. Company officials believed the health issue was better addressed by new 
technologies designed to eliminate rather than screen dust.464 The continued rejection of 
respirators by employees even while they were advocating for better dust control in the 
factory suggested that they felt the same way. 
Smith was caught in the middle. It upset him that JM employees refused to protect 
themselves, and he warned the company that his work had the potential to damage the 
industry. And yet he wrote CJM President G.K. Foster that he did not want to increase the 
number of autopsies performed on Jeffrey Mine employees who had passed away to learn 
more about asbestosis, because he was sure this would automatically lead to successful 
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compensation claims.465 Smith was committed to protecting JM even though he worried 
for the health of his patients.  
Smith’s dedication became crucial to the company at the beginning of 1949 when 
a report from Burton LeDoux, an American investigative journalist of French origin, 
brought the Quebec asbestos industry into a period of crisis. LeDoux published his exposé 
on asbestos-related disease, L’amiantose à East Broughton: un village de trois mille âmes 
étouffé dans la poussière, in pamphlet form and in Montreal’s Le Devoir in January 1949, 
at the very moment that contract negotiations between JM and the workers at the Jeffrey 
Mine had reached a deadlock. Because his report was published in a newspaper, not a 
medical journal, it reached a much wider audience than anything that had come before 
and the bodily knowledge of the people of Asbestos was suddenly confirmed. Although 
LeDoux focused his analysis on the asbestos-mining community of East Broughton, about 
120km from Asbestos, the first section of the report was a more general account of the 
industry and the diseases the mineral gave to the workers of Quebec.  
LeDoux wrote that a much more sophisticated understanding of asbestos-related 
disease in the workers of l’Estrie was needed because demand for the mineral continued 
to increase and Quebec had a monopoly on its supply. LeDoux stated that asbestos 
companies in Quebec made millions of dollars while their workers died of terrible 
diseases. He claimed that “[l]’argent a aussi ses camps de concentration,”466 and that 
these were in the asbestos mining towns of l’Estrie: “l’exploitation des dépôts d’amiante a 
surtout apporté à ce peuple des misères imméritées, de graves maladies qui auraient pu 
être évitées, et des morts prématurées. Aujourd’hui, 30,000 personnes à peu près habitent 
la région québécoise de l’amiante. Un quart d’entre elles environ sont exposées à 
contracter une maladie mortelle, l’amiantose.”467 Equating communities like Asbestos to 
concentration camps following the horror of the Second World War was shocking and 
effective, especially because the “administration autoritaire” of JM was well known.468 
Another of LeDoux’s goals was to educate asbestos workers on what the mineral 
was doing to their bodies, which is why he wrote the pamphlet in French and in an 
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accessible style. He claimed it only took two to three years for asbestosis to develop in 
the lungs of workers both young and old, and that every part of the industry, not just the 
mill, created dust that was too small for the eye to see. Anyone who “respire cette 
poussière durant un certain temps est condamné à la mort.”469 While LeDoux was not a 
medical professional, he was convincing and he put names to the symptoms generations 
of people in Asbestos suffered from. 
LeDoux devoted several pages to explaining, in a way everyone could understand, 
what asbestosis was and how it affected the human body:  
Cela ressemble à l’araignée qui tisse sa toile. La poussière d’amiante, une 
fois qu’elle a pénétré en grande quantité dans les poumons, agit comme si 
elle était sous la direction d’une araignée; elle se dépose par endroits où 
elle forme de longs filaments de tissus fibreux vaguement reliés entre eux 
en un dessin mal défini et irrégulier.470 
 
Comparing the disease to a spider spinning a web tighter and tighter around the lungs was 
easy to comprehend and terrifying. LeDoux wanted to get a reaction, to shake workers out 
of their acceptance of risk so they would fight for their lives, and he was successful in this 
pursuit, partly because he did not hide any of the frightening effects of asbestosis: 
à mesure que la poussière envahit les poumons des lignes de destruction de 
plus en plus nombreuses s’y forment. Conséquemment, le malade devient 
de moins en moins capable d’aspirer assez d’oxygène pour répondre aux 
besoins de son corps...très lentement et à travers les pires angoisses, ses 
poumons sont progressivement détruits. Il finit par mourir étouffé.471 
 
The graphic language LeDoux used in describing the type of death he believed was 
awaiting the asbestos workers of Quebec countered the assurances company doctors had 
given over the years to patients who knew they were not physically well, and who saw 
their friends and family members slowly suffocating to death.  
Company doctors were able to pacify employees in the past, LeDoux wrote, 
because of the basic human desire to deny death as being imminent and inevitable. 
Another reason was that asbestosis develops slowly in the body, so the victim develops 
other ailments such as pneumonia, tuberculosis, and heart disease.472 This explained why 
cases of asbestosis had not been reported in the past even though it was such a rampant 
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disease. LeDoux also argued that the relative absence of asbestosis diagnoses was due to 
companies and their doctors lying to workers. He provided a list of symptoms so 
employees could self-diagnose without relying on the suspect motives of medical 
professionals. These included irritation of the nose, throat, and the upper respiratory 
tubes, shortness of breath, a wet or dry cough, loss of weight and appetite, physical 
weakness, and chest pain.473 LeDoux also explained that when these symptoms became 
noticeable, it was already too late to stop the progression of disease. 
Despite the morbid tone of his report, LeDoux attempted to end on a positive note, 
writing in all capital letters: “L’AMIANTOSE EST INCURABLE, MAIS ON PEUT LA 
PREVENIR.”474 This statement placed responsibility not in the hands of the companies or 
doctors, but the workers themselves. If equating asbestosis to a deadly spider spinning a 
web inside them until they suffocated to death did not scare employees into action, if the 
idea that just breathing near any of the Jeffrey Mine’s operations would condemn them to 
death did not outrage them, and if the thought that companies had been lying about the 
state of their health did not inspire workers to organize against them, it was their own 
fault if they became fatally sick. The local newspaper in Asbestos urged townspeople to 
read LeDoux’s piece and the union distributed copies of it.475 The community understood 
the report’s implications and it had a direct effect on the local cultural identity, so used to 
accepting the risks of the industry. Already confident because of their role in the global 
reach the Jeffrey Mine had through trade networks, the workers at the Jeffrey Mine 
believed it was time they took ownership of their bodies, and at the start of 1949, they 
went on strike to do just that. 
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Chapter 4: Essential Characteristics: The Body Politic, 1918-1949 
In the past twenty years the population of Asbestos has declined about fifty 
percent, and in 2006 the community was named one of ten towns in Quebec that would 
disappear within a decade.476 This is what happens when a single-industry town suffers a 
collapse. In 2006, the mayor of Asbestos, Jean-Philippe Bachand, attempted to change the 
name of the community to Trois Lacs or Phoenix, in order to attract new industry because 
he believed that “Asbestos as a name doesn’t sell.”477 The majority of townspeople 
disagreed with Bachand and the name remains, while the mayor does not. Town 
councillor Serge Boislard, whose father died of asbestos-related disease, explained that 
changing the name would only “tell the world that we are ashamed of our product…[and 
it would] be one more nail in our coffin.”478 Asbestos is part of the community’s identity; 
the town by any other name would still be home to the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in 
the world, which will not disappear. 
 As much as the mineral can be derided throughout the world and as much as the 
townspeople of Asbestos can accept that it makes people—themselves in particular—
sick, the Jeffrey Mine remains fundamental to their identity. Over two kilometres wide 
and deeper than the Eiffel Tower is high, the pit is where the town’s cultural identity 
takes root, connecting the land and the people. By exploring how the people of Asbestos 
oriented their lives, politics, economy, and faith around the Jeffrey Mine, this chapter will 
track the development of the local body politic to more fully understand how the 
community negotiated a longstanding, strong cultural identity by interacting with the pit 
between 1918 and 1949. Identities and duties were formed alongside the mine as it grew 
and changed the community. How this tradition took root in Asbestos contextualizes this 
tradition and gives foundation to how the community envisions itself today.  
Getting Acquainted, 1918-1923 
In Working People, historian Desmond Morton writes that the “essential 
characteristic of a worker was dependence. A worker is a hired person,”479 but this was 
not the essential characteristic of those who worked the Jeffrey Mine. As soon as JM took 
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ownership of the mine in 1918, the people of Asbestos went on strike to prove they too 
had power and that the company would be dependent on them.480 Although the miners at 
Thetford unionized in 1915,481 those at Asbestos acted independently and did not need a 
union to give them bargaining strength following the war, when industry was booming 
and there was a severe shortage of manpower to meet the rising global demand for 
asbestos. Companies were suddenly dependent on the workers,482 and JM was in need of 
more employees.483 The fifty men who went on strike were the dynamite handlers inside 
the Jeffrey Mine and made $3.15 each day, but believed that in the post-war economy 
they should be making 35 cents more. The 1918 strike was peaceful and the company met 
the demands of the workers. Through the dispute the workers showed JM that they had 
authority in the community and were fundamental to the success of the Jeffrey Mine. The 
company could own the mine, but it could not own the workers.  
The asbestos industry following the First World War was extremely profitable and 
all signs pointed to it becoming even more so. Industry leaders declared the men who 
chose to work at the Jeffrey Mine rather than enlisting in the army to be heroes, and 
likened them to the soldiers who had performed so well in the war.484 This sentiment 
affected the development of a cultural identity in Asbestos and gave JM’s employees the 
confidence that was seen in 1918 and will be seen again and again in this chapter, leading 
up to the 1949 strike.  
JM went to Asbestos not because it believed Jeffrey Mine workers were heroes, 
but because it was a good business decision and the Quebec government actively 
recruited British and American investment in the natural resource industries of the 
province.485 Company officials knew that Asbestos was a single-industry and single-
company town, and JM immediately began a system of paternalistic company-community 
relations that made the town indebted to JM. Even though the workers did not believe 
they were dependent on the company, the town would be.  
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On 4 June 1919, town council passed Règlement 81, allowing JM to pay for the 
installation and maintenance of electricity at the mine and in the community. The town 
would buy electricity the company bought from the Shawinigan Water and Power Co., 
taking the amount this would cost out of what JM owed in property taxes.486 Mayor 
Victor Dubois was the first in the community to have his house equipped with JM’s 
electricity. With this agreement, the town of Asbestos paid the company a percentage of 
the cost it took to run the electricity and a percentage of the profits gained from it until 
1929.487 JM also received a reduction in the amount the company had to pay to improve 
the roads they used to ship asbestos out of the community. While the workers of Asbestos 
greeted JM with a strike, town council sought a close working relationship with the 
company, making deals and sacrificing the value of the land. In addition to the electricity 
agreement, town council allowed JM Vice President and Treasurer J.P. Pearson and JM 
Vice President C.H. Shoemaker to be voting members of the relatively small council.488 
This solidified the close relationship between council and the company. 
It was important for town council and JM to become allies because of the growing 
worker unrest throughout Quebec and Canada in 1919. During this year there were at 
least 68 strikes in Montreal489 and 210 throughout Canada, which was a steep increase in 
the number of labour conflicts the country had seen before.490 The Winnipeg General 
Strike of that year lasted over a month and brought worry to companies all across the 
country. Furthermore, the Communist Party of Quebec was formed on May Day 1919 in 
Montreal.491 JM needed allies in Asbestos if it was to maintain control over its workforce 
at the Jeffrey Mine, and town council fit this need well before 1949.  
The workers at the Jeffrey Mine made it clear to both JM and town council that 
they were a force to be reckoned with in the community with their 1918 strike, and again 
in October 1919, when they chose to form their first union. Although the majority of 
unionized workers in Quebec, much like the rest of Canada, belonged to American 
unions, the miners at Asbestos chose an alternative option: l’Union ouvrière Catholique 
                                                 
486
 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 4 June 1919, p. 189-197. 
487
 Ibid, p. 189. 
488
 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 23 July 1919, p. 200. 
489
 Geoffrey Ewen, “The International Unions and the Workers’ Revolt in Quebec, 1914-1925,” (Toronto: York 
University, 1998), p. 127. 
490
 Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement, A Brief History, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Lorimer, 1996), p. 53.  
491
 Ewen, p. 257. 
 119
du Québec. Sherbrooke’s LaTribune reported that Jeffrey Mine employees joined the 
union because there was strength in numbers and it could improve wages and working 
conditions.492 The miners in Asbestos differed from the communists in Montreal and the 
radicals in Winnipeg: a Catholic union, headed by priests, meant that they had God on 
their side in labour disputes. L’Union ouvrière Catholique du Québec was making 
advances in the province due to post-war economic success and the aversion those outside 
Montreal felt towards the radicalism of the international unions seen with the strike in 
Winnipeg.493 Having the miners of Asbestos join was a coup for the union because by 
1919 the mineral was making significant contributions to Quebec’s economy.494 The 
industry was of great importance to the province and its workers were valuable to unions. 
The Catholic union did not allow those of others faiths to join, but this was not a 
major issue in Asbestos at this time, when only 15% of the town’s population was not 
French Catholic, and most of those were JM officials and their families. This was in sharp 
contrast to other areas in l’Estrie, including Shipton Township as a whole, which was 
38% Anglophone, and Sherbrooke, the major city in the region, which was 29% 
Anglophone.495 The community of Asbestos was divided along linguistic and class lines, 
with the Francophone population making up the bulk of the workers and the smaller 
Anglophone faction running JM. This put an extra communication barrier between the 
workers and the company, which was solidified when JM refused to recognize the union 
for decades after its establishment.496 JM did not want outside union officials changing 
the dynamics of the community.  
The workers tolerated this because they were united with JM in their commitment 
to the asbestos industry. By the end of 1920, the major cities of Europe were rebuilding 
after the First World War and asbestos was crucial to this reconstruction. For Asbestos, 
this meant that operations at the Jeffrey Mine would grow despite the new tariff imposed 
by the United States on all manufactured asbestos goods. The tariff meant that Quebec, 
which supplied 89% of the world’s asbestos in 1921, would not profit fully from 
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exporting manufactured products to the United States, one of the largest markets for the 
fibre. In response, Quebec imposed its own 5% tax on asbestos exports.497 JM was 
undeterred by the U.S. tariff and the Quebec tax, and in June 1921 announced that it 
would open a manufacturing plant in Asbestos.  
While building the plant was good for the town, international demand began to 
decline after the post-war boom flooded the market with the mineral. Wages and shifts 
were reduced throughout the mining communities of Quebec, a quarter of unionized 
workers in the province were out of work,498 and the Canadian Mining Journal’s hopes 
that “a brilliant page of History is about to be unrolled in this Dominion,” brought about 
by industrial development, seemed to deflate.499  
Despite the economic downturn, the Catholic union movement in Quebec had by 
1921 grown to six times its size in 1914, and was united under the Confédération des 
travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC).500 By 1922 the CTCC represented 96 unions 
and 26,000 workers, and both the Church and the provincial government approved of the 
organization.501 This gave the CTCC strength, but its leaders were not interested in using 
it. At its inception the CTCC was a conservative body committed to French Canadian and 
Pan-Canadian nationalism through a celebration of both founding nations, a distancing 
from the British Empire, and an adherence to the social doctrine of the Church.502 The 
CTCC operated with a spirit of cooperation between workers and employers and on the 
belief that labour issues were moral issues.503 While it was optimistic that both sides in a 
labour dispute would do what was morally right as dictated by the Church, the idea was 
based on the Rerum Novarum, an encyclical released by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 that 
encouraged the formation of doctrine-abiding unions.504 It relied on the belief that 
workers would accept their lower position on the class scale because the meek would 
inherit the earth. The existence, and indeed the strength of the CTCC, the largest labour 
organization in Canada based on cultural and religious values, indicates how deeply the 
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Catholic Church permeated the lives of the Québécois in the 1920s.505 Because of its 
exclusive membership requirements, the CTCC tended to pit French Canadian workers 
against foreign, Anglophone, and Protestant officials operating companies in Quebec.  
But during the economic crisis of 1921, employment was more important to 
Jeffrey Mine workers than unions were, especially after their wages were cut and they 
knew others would take their place if given the chance. Jeffrey Mine workers chose not to 
fight for union recognition. Industrial relations in Quebec’s asbestos industry had changed 
since 1918, and when Thetford workers went on strike in 1921, new employees replaced 
the miners who attempted to hold out for a raise.506 Despite the economic situation, 
geologist John A. Dresser continued to believe that “[w]hen one speaks of mining in 
Quebec he is supposed to refer to asbestos, unless he specifies otherwise.”507 The asbestos 
industry would survive. 
While the workers at Asbestos were prepared to sacrifice wages and unions at this 
difficult time, the miners at Thetford believed the industry’s importance meant that they 
were important and at the end of April 1923 they went on strike again. While short, the 
strike illustrated how militant the 500 workers at Thetford were when it came to their 
economic value. Thetford had an older workforce than the Jeffrey Mine because of its 
immediate success in the 19th century, and the stability of the community, combined with 
five or six mines and companies in the town, created a local identity that differed from the 
more moderate one found in Asbestos at this time. They demanded higher wages and that 
the Assistant Manager of the Asbestos Corporation, Colonel MacNutt, be removed from 
his post.508 The strike was not sanctioned by any union and quickly turned violent when 
the workers raided a local hardware store for guns and dynamite and threatened to blow 
up part of the town if their demands were not met.509 The strike was broken soon after and 
the workers returned to the mines without any changes in management or wages. They 
went on strike again in the middle of May, but were once again unsuccessful.510 The 
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workers who acted outside the doctrine of the Catholic unions were more radical than 
those who acted in accordance with the CTCC.  
Growing Pains, 1923-1937 
As Thetford miners were striking at the beginning of the 1920s, workers at the 
Jeffrey Mine were content not disrupting the order of industry or community. This 
allowed JM to construct its new manufacturing plant, hire more employees, and make a 
new partnership with the Phillip Carey Manufacturing Co., another U.S.-based company 
that manufactured asbestos-based products. In 1924, the two companies bought a factory 
in Lennoxville, a small university community just outside Sherbrooke, in order to produce 
asbestos paper with fibre extracted from the Jeffrey Mine.511  
Aware that partnerships like this would help bring Asbestos out of its economic 
downturn, town council further solidified its relationship with JM. Echoing the doctrine 
of the CTCC, council agreed that “il est de l’intérêt de ce conseil de marcher en 
coopération avec la dite compagnie minière en autant que justice soit rendue aux deux 
parties concernées en ce qui concerne toute transaction qui sera faite entre les deux 
parties.”512 There seemed to be only two factions in Asbestos—the company and 
everyone else—and council wanted relations to be harmonious. Jeffrey Mine employees 
were willing to make sacrifices for the good of the industry, but this did not mean that 
they were in full cooperation with JM or council. The workers knew that the industry was 
rebounding from an economic downturn by 1927513 and the town was growing alongside 
JM operations. The J.P. Morgan Co. aided this rebound when it bought over half the 
company’s shares and financially supported JM’s industrial ambitions.514  
JM then constructed a Canadian headquarters in Montreal in 1927 and town 
council extended their electricity contract for 10 more years. The new contract explained 
that JM would receive “annuellement en taxes municipales, sur toutes ses propriétés 
industrielles, terrains minières, moulins, manufactures, un montant d’argent égal à 45% 
per cent des recettes totales provenant des taxes municipales.”515 Council sacrificed a 
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significant portion of its tax revenue to maintain good relations: the company paid just 
over $500 in taxes in 1927, much less than it owed as the largest landholder in town.516  
Despite the good relationship being nurtured between town council and JM, the 
community was wary of the changes it was experiencing so quickly due to the growing 
industry. In particular, the local population was suspicious of newcomers that arrived in 
Asbestos because of the growing demand for labour at the Jeffrey Mine. Council moved 
to charge residents who had lived in Asbestos for less than a year extra municipal taxes 
and defined them in Règlement 163 as “strangers.”517 This meant that council was able to 
compensate somewhat for the reduced taxes paid by JM. It also showed how adverse to 
outsiders the community had become. This aversion grew to be a strong part of the local 
cultural identity in Asbestos. 
By the end of the 1920s, the Quebec asbestos industry was extracting 300,000 
tonnes of the fibrous mineral each year, a sharp rise from the 30,000 tonnes it produced at 
the end of the 19th century.518 The seven asbestos producers around Thetford united under 
the Asbestos Corporation in an act of “patriotic self-preservation” to control wages and 
prices,519 but much like William H. Jeffrey and the Asbestos Club, JM officials chose not 
to join the organization. Although it had to abide by U.S. anti-trust laws, JM instead 
joined an international cartel that would be an asbestos “League of Nations,” with Phillip 
Carey, Britain’s Turner & Newall, and Austria’s Eternit.520 The Asbestos Corporation had 
power in Quebec, but because of this global alliance, JM had international influence and 
was quickly informed of the latest mining technologies and new markets, which further 
added to the success of the Jeffrey Mine. This influence permeated the local cultural 
identity, but was soon put on hold with the onslaught of the Great Depression.  
While the community had suffered hard economic times in the past, most recently 
in 1921, the early 1930s were devastating, as they were to the entire nation. French 
Canadian organizations formed throughout Quebec and demanded the government and 
economists fix the situation.521 These organizations, such as L’Action française and Les 
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Canadiens français, believed that if people from the province rather than international 
firms had managed Quebec’s industries, the economy would not be suffering. Les Jeunes-
Canada, a youth-based organization headed by future Le Devoir editor André 
Laurendeau, agreed, and in 1933 articulated it with the phrase, “maîtres chez nous.”522 
The sentiment behind this phrase was in accordance with Asbestos town council passing a 
regulation that made those who had lived in the community for less than a year pay an 
extra “newcomers tax,” as well as its refusal to allow Jewish families to live or work in 
the community because they were not Christian and many were believed to be communist 
radicals.523  
Despite the good relationship fostered between the company and town council, 
even JM was not exempt from the changes the Depression brought to the community. 
With an increasing number of citizens unable to afford electricity, the town’s contract 
with JM was suspended and the company was required to pay the full tax on its land. To 
go from paying just over $500 in taxes in 1927 to $16,689.86 in 1932524 was a financial 
blow to the company already suffering from the global economic downturn, and officials 
cited it as one of the reasons they were forced to close the Jeffrey Mine from May 1932 to 
April 1933.525  
The closing of the Jeffrey Mine made life difficult for the community. Many 
residents had few savings and a great deal of humility was needed when they turned to 
town council for aid. Municipalities throughout Canada became responsible for 
supporting their citizens during the Depression526 and Asbestos was no exception. At the 
end of 1933 council applied to the provincially managed Secours-Direct for $800 to help 
feed 30 local families and clothe and shelter 41 more.527 That 71 families were in need of 
aid even after JM resumed operations demonstrates the extent to which a year’s worth of 
lost wages affected the people of Asbestos. Requests for provincial money continued 
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throughout the Depression, with the town asking for $950 on 9 May 1934 and $900 more 
one week later.528  
The process of distributing aid was entirely open: anyone who asked for financial 
help from the town was listed in the minutes, their apparent need was discussed and voted 
on by council, and if they received aid, the amount was made public.529 A single person in 
Asbestos during the Depression who would have made over $3.00 a day in the 1920s 
received $1.25 in aid each week and a married couple would get $1.60 per week.530 The 
rate of aid increased according to the number of children a couple had. If they had one 
child they would get $2.00, two children would grant them $2.20, and the amount would 
increase all the way up to fourteen children, which would grant the family $7.20 in aid 
each week.531 This was not a great amount of money for any family in Asbestos that had 
experienced the wages of an industrial boom only a few years earlier.  
JM paid its full amount of municipal tax throughout the Depression, making it the 
largest contributor to municipal revenue by supplying 70% of the town’s income.532 
While it hired many townspeople back after the closure, the company could not afford a 
full workforce and operated shortened shifts with Sundays off.533 The lack of productivity 
of the Jeffrey Mine frightened the people of Asbestos and in July 1934 the town voted to 
try to get other industries to come to the community. The town argued that, “nous avons 
une seule industrie dont tout le monde ne peut y travailler pour differentes raisons…[et] il 
est de l’intérêt de tous les propriétaires, s’il y avait d’autres industries, pouvant employer 
jeunes filles, jeunes hommes et hommes agés, ne pouvait travailler à la mine.”534 This 
was the first of many times the town expressed its concern over being completely reliant 
on one industry, but despite this resolution, and those still to come, no other major 
industry ever came to Asbestos. 
As council and JM developed their relationship with each other, Jeffrey Mine 
workers were also changing. Although the Catholic union movement attempted to recruit 
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more members in the early 1930s,535 the economic climate prevented much progress, 
especially in Asbestos, where people were more concerned about the future of the 
industry than wages. Understanding the aversion to unions at this time, Taschereau’s 
provincial government passed a law in 1934 that was in accordance with the CTCC’s 
doctrine of cooperation and dictated that the government would enforce agreements 
established between workers and employers, whether a union was involved or not.536 
Although it did not help membership, the law illustrated the CTCC’s continued belief that 
all parties involved in labour issues should be willing to compromise. 
Despite Taschereau’s willingness to reform labour laws, the Liberal hold on 
Quebec was slipping and the CTCC began to change its policies in response to a 
conservative movement sweeping the province in the middle of the Depression. Maurice 
Duplessis, leader of the Union nationale, was elected Premier of Quebec in 1936, just as 
Taschereau’s successor, Adélard Godbout, attempted to put an unemployment insurance 
program in place.537 Duplessis was ultra-conservative and immediately put an end to any 
program that distributed provincial money to the unemployed. He believed Quebec was, 
and should remain, a primarily agricultural province and was prepared to intervene in 
order to support this ideal.538 Duplessis was a sharp turn away from the longstanding 
policies of the Liberals, which had held office since 1897. The Duplessis government 
turned its back on suffering industrial communities like Asbestos. 
The Depression and the aid distributed during it, combined with Duplessis’ new 
policies, helped illustrate the benefits of collectives to those in industrial towns. Slowly, 
left-wing idealists began to infiltrate the Catholic union movement and leaders lobbied 
workers in the industries of the greatest importance to the province.539 The union in 
Asbestos, still ignored by JM, suddenly became energized under the activist leadership of 
Sherbrooke’s abbé Aubert in 1936.  
The workers had allowed JM to disregard their union because of the industry’s 
instability. Furthermore, the company built and owned the houses many of them lived in, 
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supplied medical care to the town, and was the main source of revenue and employment 
in the community: the workers had become dependent on JM. While Jeffrey Mine 
employees did not want to enter into an antagonistic relationship with the company, the 
Depression and its subsequent relief in 1937, combined with the recent urging of the 
Catholic union movement, convinced the workers to do as they had done when JM first 
came to Asbestos and go on strike to regain some control over operations at the Jeffrey 
Mine. The workers demanded a wage increase of 33% and recognition of their Catholic 
union.540 These demands were given to the company two weeks before the strike with the 
promise from JM’s Shoemaker that they would have a response by 22 January. When no 
response was given, the workers in the manufacturing plant walked out and were soon 
followed by the men in the Jeffrey Mine.541 In total, 1,100 men and 50 women went on 
strike for eight days.542 
The Toronto Clarion called this “one of the most important strikes in the 
province” in recent memory because of the financial value of the asbestos industry,543 but 
the dispute had an even greater significance in the minds of the strikers: their labour was 
pulling JM out of the Depression and their role in the company’s success had to be 
acknowledged. Despite the economic significance the industry had in the province, the 
workers believed this was a local issue and they wanted it to stay that way. This belief 
was articulated when they refused Duplessis’ demand that negotiations take place in 
Quebec City under government supervision.544  
The workers picketed the gates to the mine in such great numbers that JM staff 
could not enter the buildings.545 The workers did not own the mine, but their picketing 
showed the belief that their labour gave them some authority over how the Jeffrey Mine 
was run. When P.P. Bartleman, the official in charge of JM’s employment office, rode his 
horse around the striking workers on the morning of the 26th, the picketing crowd forced 
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him back home. Later that afternoon, Bartleman once again rode around the strikers on 
his horse, this time pointing his revolver at the crowd and “displaying a spirit of 
bravado.”546 He was quickly disarmed and taken to the mayor’s office where a committee 
that included three JM heads publicly judged his conduct. The committee found 
Bartleman guilty and banished him from Asbestos. He was put on a train bound for 
Cornwall, Ontario that night.547 
This was not an example of mob rule, but rather an upholding of certain values the 
entire town held dear. Bartleman had worked in Asbestos for almost a decade548 and for 
an impromptu court made up of JM officials and a portion of the striking employees to 
order him out of town was a sign of the strength of the workers and the company’s 
commitment to a cooperative spirit within the community. This stood in stark contrast to 
the failed attempts of the Thetford miners in 1923 to have their assistant manager fired. 
Two days following Bartleman’s banishment, C.H. Shoemaker returned to Asbestos to 
participate in strike negotiations. After a day of not coming to any resolution on increased 
wages, a group of 500 striking workers entered the Hotel Iroquois where negotiations 
were taking place, grabbed Shoemaker, and led him to city hall where they ordered him to 
leave Asbestos.549 He left town the next morning.  
Although the Sherbrooke Record claimed, “the vice-president was severely beaten 
up by a crowd of hoodlums,” several other newspapers reported that neither official was 
harmed and Mayor Philippe Roy denied that any violence occurred.550 A reason for the 
Record’s conservative take on the events in Asbestos was that Sherbrooke was becoming 
increasingly powerful within the region and the province, as a local bourgeoisie rose with 
the increased industrial development along the river system. These new bourgeois elite 
were not sympathetic to an unruly working class, especially when it negatively impacted 
industry. H.K. Sherry took over Shoemaker’s job and a settlement was soon reached. The 
employees received the wage increase they had asked for, as well as recognition of their 
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union. President of JM, Lewis H. Brown, wrote to union head Olive Cyr, “we depend 
upon you and your organization to keep the peace and maintain order and preserve 
property at Asbestos and with the understanding that our employees will return to work as 
rapidly as arrangements can be made by our local manager.”551 Brown also published his 
letter in the major newspapers that covered the labour dispute. The strike was over, the 
workers had succeeded in getting rid of two upper level officials, and JM entered into its 
first collective agreement with its Canadian employees and their union.552 The people of 
Asbestos had yet to experience an unsuccessful strike, and these victories contributed to 
the confidence they felt and helped further develop the local cultural identity. While 
claims to mob rule in Shoemaker’s removal were made, the company’s willingness to 
cooperate with the workers, as well as its unwillingness to hold those who accosted 
Shoemaker accountable, demonstrates JM’s understanding of the need to share its 
authority with the workers in Asbestos. 
Newspaper reports detailing the workers’ success in redefining industrial relations 
in Asbestos spread throughout the country. On 24 March 1937, the Duplessis government 
enacted la loi du cadenas, also known as the “Loi protégeant la province contre la 
propagande communiste,” which forbade groups of people meeting to discuss or publish 
pro-communist ideas and actions.553 This law heavily restricted union operations and 
actions because the government saw labour organizations as communist entities 
committed to overthrowing capitalism. Labour relations were changing in the province 
almost as fast as they were in Asbestos. 
The Tug of War, 1938-1949 
The post-strike environment in Asbestos was a cautious one, with attempts made 
on both sides to improve the relationship between the company and the workers. In 
February 1938, CJM Director A.O. Dufresne wrote,  
We have received a letter…informing us of complaints made by French-
speaking workmen of their inability to get employment in the mines 
because they could not make themselves understood by the employment 
agents…who spoke only English. The suggestion is made that the mine 
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companies make it a requisite in the choice of their employment agents 
that they speak sufficiently well French and English.554 
 
Although it did not mention him by name, this letter indicates that one of the problems 
the workers had with P.P. Bartleman, aside from his antics during the strike, was that he 
was in charge of the employment office at the Jeffrey Mine yet did not speak French, the 
only language the majority of employees spoke. The communication problems that arose 
from this situation were frustrating on both sides and this change of policy was an attempt 
by JM to build a better relationship with its workers. The company also wrote to the 
province asking if any of “our local boys” would be eligible for a government-sponsored 
program that helped French Canadians qualify for executive positions by getting 
university degrees in Mining Engineering.555 
Attempts to improve company-worker relations addressed one of the key points of 
conflict between the two groups: JM management was exclusively Anglophone while 
almost all Jeffrey Mine employees were Francophone and had no opportunity to rise 
within the company ranks. The company hoped that this difference, and the animosity 
that arose because of it, would be minimized by these changes. On 20 September 1938, 
JM president Lewis H. Brown stated in the company’s Creed of Management, “business 
in this country has never been what it could be and never what it yet will be,” and by 
bringing Francophones into the upper ranks of the company, JM would attempt to change 
the almost-exclusively Anglophone business landscape of Quebec.556 Despite this goal, 
there is no evidence of JM actually instituting any such changes in Asbestos.   
JM did attempt to bridge the Anglophone-Francophone divide in Asbestos with 
the 1938 introduction of the bilingual Johns-Manville Photo, a monthly newspaper that 
featured photographs of employees and their families at work and in the home. The first 
issue explained that while newspapers from outside the community were helpful, “there 
are always a lot of things going on in the Canadian Johns-Manville organization which 
are of particular interest to the people here…which are not carried by the daily 
                                                 
554
 A.O. Dufresne, CJM Director, to “Gentlemen,” 14 February 1938. BANQ, P182 3A 017 03-01-003B-01; 2000-10-
013\3. 
555
 C.M. McGaw, CJM Department of Industrial Relations, to the Department of Labour, Quebec, 26 February 1938. 
BANQ, P182 3A 017 03-01-003B-01; 2000-10-013\3. 
556
 Lewis H. Brown, “La Grève d’Asbestos: Rapport sur le fond de la Question et sur la Position de Canadian Johns-
Manville Company, Ltd.” (Canadian Johns-Manville Company, Ltd., 1949), p. 16. 
 131
newspapers because they are not of general interest outside this community.”557 The 
company was not only a contributing member of Asbestos; it was a friendly one as well. 
JM used the newspaper to boost its image and encourage subtle changes in the behaviour 
of its employees. When company officials noticed that some of its workers were wasting 
material in the mining and milling process, they explained the problem as a household 
issue via the Johns-Manville Photo:  
If your wife…were to burn the meat and spill half the potatoes on the 
floor, you probably would charge it up to bad luck…But, if this continued 
to happen every few days and you had to spend a lot more money for 
supplies just to make sure that there would be enough…then you’d try to 
do something to cut down on the waste...Of course, you could “Fire” your 
wife. But good wives are hard to find these days and, besides if you did 
that, there wouldn’t be ANYTHING to eat.558 
 
The company went on to explain that the same was true for wasting material at the Jeffrey 
Mine, which cost the company—the head of the household—a significant amount of 
money that could have been spent on higher wages.559  
By comparing the operations at the Jeffrey Mine to how the average Asbestos 
household was run, JM wanted to foster an image of the company being one large family. 
In 1940, JM hosted the first “open house” at the Jeffrey Mine, where townspeople could 
see “how their husbands, fathers, brothers and sisters turned out the products which have 
made the name Johns-Manville world famous.”560 The absence of mothers from this list is 
significant. While married women in Asbestos did work at the Jeffrey Mine’s Textile 
Department, this was discouraged because of the belief that a married woman’s place was 
in the home raising children. The Jeffrey Mine was often celebrated as the location where 
young “Asbestos Beauties” would find husbands, but they were expected to stop working 
once they did.561 The reality of this quickly changed with the labour demands of the 
Second World War. 
Although the outbreak of the Second World War once again closed European 
markets to asbestos imports, the demand for the mineral rose exponentially because of the 
North American market. The government of Canada contracted JM to equip the Canadian 
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Army with fireproof material. In 1940, this included over $50,000 for firefighting 
equipment, building supplies, and asbestos fabric to make fireproof uniforms.562 The 
United States Army and Navy Munitions Board also had asbestos on its “critical 
minerals” list and was prepared to protect its Canadian suppliers via invasion if enemy 
powers took control of the mines.563 Canada was rapidly becoming a fully industrialized 
nation and the asbestos industry was a major part of this change. The people of Asbestos 
were not aware that the United States planned to invade their community if the Germans 
seized control of the Jeffrey Mine, but they were overtaken by a sense of importance 
because the mineral was so vital to the war effort. During the First World War, industry 
leaders deemed Jeffrey Mine workers “heroes,” and the community was excited to take 
on this role once again, especially because most of the eligible men in Asbestos chose not 
to enlist in the Canadian Forces.564 
The mass industrialization and urbanization that took place in Quebec during the 
Second World War worried the Catholic clergy, who feared that social problems like 
class conflict and communist ideals would come with the shift.565 This concern was partly 
because the Church’s hold on the union movement in Quebec was slipping, as more 
secular labour leaders emerged. Union membership grew across Canada during the war 
and by 1943 one in three unionists was on strike. In Quebec, where the wartime economy 
was booming, there were 135 strikes in 1942 alone.566 While this was worrisome to the 
clergy and their union representatives, there was no unrest in Asbestos. The most socialist 
activity that occurred was when a group of local citizens founded the “Chez Nous Ideal” 
in 1942. The aim of the group was to have community members, not JM, construct houses 
for townspeople so that home ownership would increase and workers would not be 
dependent on the company for rented accommodation.567 Although JM attempted to 
strengthen its relationship with employees after the 1937 strike, the Chez Nous Ideal 
indicated that the people of Asbestos did not fully trust the company as a landlord and 
wanted to own their property, and adhered to the “maître chez nous” philosophy 
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encouraged by a burgeoning group of nationalists. By applying this provincial “chez 
nous” movement—committed to getting French Canadians in charge of the economic 
destiny of the province—to their local situation, this group began to subtly change how 
the community functioned. The workers did not have to be dependent on the American 
company that owned the mine; they could rely on themselves. 
Although the clergy, JM, and the Quebec government feared that strikes and “chez 
nous” housing organizations meant that the people were becoming increasingly radical, 
conservatism still reigned in Asbestos. In 1938 the community once again voted to 
continue the prohibition of alcohol within town boundaries.568 The workers, who were 
affectionately described by JM as an “industrial army,”569 successfully lobbied to cancel 
shifts on Sundays, a major coup considering the rising demand for the mineral during the 
war.570 Furthermore, the local newspaper preached the importance of women staying at 
home with their children rather than working in the “industry of war” because it believed 
mothers working industrial jobs led to a sharp rise in juvenile crime throughout the 
province.571 This maintenance of conservative values was not limited to Asbestos, and in 
1944 Duplessis and his Union nationale government were elected once again. Asbestos 
voted in favour of the conservative leader, and the shift back to Duplessis’ conservative 
policies worried leaders of the province’s labour movement, because his government was 
fervently anti-union and attracted foreign investors by advertising Quebec’s docile 
working class.572 In 1944, Duplessis enacted the Labour Relations Act, which gave the 
government the power to recognize or discredit unions and to supervise collective 
bargaining procedures.  
Union sympathizers believed the Labour Relations Act was a result of the 
government’s denial of how much the province was changing during the Second World 
War. Journalist and politician Gérard Pelletier wrote, “[a]près la guerre, au moment où la 
révolution industrielle s’était accélérée ici à un rythme effarant précisément à cause de la 
guerre, [Duplessis] tenait dur comme fer à l’agriculturisme, il était l’ennemi juré d’un 
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syndicalisme libre, ouvert et militant.”573 Despite the vast wealth the industrialization of 
land brought the province, Duplessis continued to believe Quebec should be an 
agricultural province. In response to Duplessis’s labour policies and the changes it had 
experienced during the war, the CTCC elected social activist Gérard Picard as the 
organization’s new president. This coincided with the gradual abandonment of the 
union’s policy of cooperation with employers, focusing instead on economic 
democracy.574 No longer concerned with the good faith of companies, the post-war CTCC 
became focused on how industry was run in the province.  
The war transformed Quebec industrial society and how workers organized, and 
further encouraged Jeffrey Mine workers. In the June 1942 issue of the Johns-Manville 
News Pictorial, an editorial cartoon explained that the “four ways to hang Hitler” were to 
avoid accidents, smash sabotage, eliminate waste and increase production.575 By doing 
 
Editorial cartoon distributed to Jeffrey Mine workers, June 1942.576 
 
these things during the war, JM led Jeffrey Mine workers to believe they were partly 
responsible for defeating Hitler. Heroes once again, the workers began to assert their 
confidence and began a trend of short labour disputes in Asbestos that would last for 
years. This was first seen even before the end of the war on 22 March 1945 when the men 
who had been hired to sink the shaft mines beside rue Bourbeau went on strike.577 
Eighteen of the 34 shaft sinkers struck, but they were subcontracted workers and were not 
represented by the union. They demanded higher wages and more reasonable expectations 
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for production, claiming that the footage expected of them each day was “almost 
impossible to reach.”578 Jeffrey Mine workers believed they had a right to influence 
production levels because of their primary role in the process, but JM disagreed and the 
demands were refused. Only two of the striking shaft sinkers returned to the job, with 
local men replacing the other 16, “as fast as they [could] be located.”579  
While this strike was unsuccessful, more labour disputes erupted, although never 
again without a union. These strikes create the context for the lengthy strike at the start of 
1949 that changed so much in the community. They also advance our understanding of 
the increasingly militant cultural identity in Asbestos that drastically changed in the years 
following the 1949 strike. Going over the major issues of these earlier strikes establishes 
a foundation of working class agitation and the willingness of JM to accommodate the 
demands of their employees to ensure the smooth functioning of operations at the Jeffrey 
Mine and in the community.  
In November 1945, 300 men and 60 women, all union members working the 
midnight to 8am shift at the manufacturing plant, went on a short wildcat strike.580 In this 
case, the conflict was not between employees and JM, but rather between unionized and 
non-unionized workers. Union members complained that non-unionized employees 
reaped the benefits won from their labour disputes without paying into the union or 
standing alongside their fellow workers. Non-unionized Jeffrey Mine employees felt 
unionized workers slowed production by going on strike with outrageous demands. This 
was a problem solved in Ontario in 1945 with Justice Ivan Rand’s ruling on a strike at 
Ford. The resulting Rand Formula declared that all employees had to pay union dues, 
although they would not be forced to join the union.581 This formula was initially enacted 
only in Ontario, but its adoption was one of the major demands made by the striking 
Jeffrey Mine workers in 1949.  
                                                 
578
 R.L. Bruneau, Manager, Unemployment Insurance Commission, to Mr. MacLean, Director of Industrial Relations, 
Department of Labour, Ottawa, 22 March 1945. Ibid, p. 4. 
579
 Strike Report, 27 March 1945, Ibid, p. 1. 
580
 C.M. McGaw, CJM, Strike Report, 28 November 1945. “Strike 197, November 1945,” Department of Labour, 
Strikes and Lockouts, RG 27, Vol. 443, Reel T-4076, LAC, p. 1-2. 
581
 Morton, p. 186. 
 136
The November 1945 dispute was followed by a 4 hour strike on 14 January 1946 
that involved 150 Jeffrey Mine railway employees.582 Reminiscent of the 1937 strike, the 
men objected to the way they were treated by a JM foreman currently up for promotion. 
They claimed that he was prone to “swearing when giving orders to his men, being 
unnecessarily rough at work, expecting too much to be done, [and was] unqualified for 
the job.”583 The foreman was refused promotion when the accusations were investigated 
by JM and found to be true.584 During the 1949 strike, JM would accuse union officials of 
wanting to have a say in company promotions and operations, but the strikes in 1937 and 
1946 clearly demonstrate that this was something the workers had a history of demanding 
and receiving from JM. 
Generally, the union was wary of pushing JM too far in this period. When 36 
diggers working inside the Jeffrey Mine went on a wildcat strike in May 1946 that 
prevented 175 pit employees from working because they depended on the striking men, 
the union ordered them back to work.585 The dispute only lasted one hour and the wage 
increase employees were demanding was refused because JM and the union agreed they 
were “making actually enough money.”586 Having the strike stymied by their own union 
was a blow to Jeffrey Mine workers and demonstrated that even with the social activist 
Picard as the new president, the CTCC was still less militant than other unions in the 
province and the workers they represented. As a result, their membership dropped to 
24.2% of Quebec’s union members, down from 37% in 1936587 when the economy was 
not doing half as well as it was following the Second World War. This was frustrating for 
the workers of Asbestos, who knew that the mineral they mined and processed was in 
great international demand, and should be giving them lobbying power, especially as 
JM’s annual report for 1948 acknowledged, “there is almost no field of human endeavour 
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in which, at some stage or another, some JM product does not play a part.”588 Workers 
were growing convinced that the company depended on them, not the other way around. 
With the asbestos industry thriving, it seemed to workers that it was an ideal time 
to negotiate with JM. By the end of 1947, the workers at Asbestos and Thetford 
successfully lobbied their respective companies to establish uniform contract and 
negotiation procedures throughout the entire Quebec asbestos industry.589 Despite this 
agreement, 2,650 workers at Thetford acted independently from those in Asbestos and 
went on strike in January 1948 in order to gain union security, a raise in wages, and the 
adoption of the Rand Formula.590 The strike lasted almost three days and workers 
returned to the pits without a resolution.  
As Jeffrey Mine workers and JM grew more confident, tension in company-
community relations rose. In April 1948 JM officials from New York visited the town to 
discuss improving public relations through a weekly company radio show, better 
circulation of information pamphlets, and closer ties with the local newspaper.591 The 
company wanted to avoid a major confrontation with its workers, but following the visit, 
Quebec Minister of Labour, Antonio Barrette, wrote to the Commission des relations 
ouvrières and the provincial arbitrator that there was “a problem brewing” in Asbestos.592 
Seventy-two Jeffrey Mine employees were upset with JM for introducing new shovels in 
the pit that required fewer men to work them.593 This was a major issue that was directly 
connected to the increasing industrialization of the Jeffrey Mine, which the workers did 
not support. 
Highlighting signs of growing worker frustration, the local newspaper reported 
that there had been incidents of sabotage at the Jeffrey Mine, with foreign objects being 
placed in the raw asbestos that broke processing machines and damaged JM’s reputation 
when tainted bags of the mineral were sold.594 The company responded that these 
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incidents constituted negligence, not malicious sabotage, but townspeople were shocked 
that workers had been accused.595 Relations between JM and its employees were 
crumbling. From January to April 1948, there were 92 suggestions for workplace reform 
made by Jeffrey Mine workers, more than the entire number given in 1947.596 Despite 
letters sent to JM by Barrette asking that there be no worker reductions at the Jeffrey 
Mine, the company refused and employees became even more agitated. 
The company wanted to reduce three people from every shift at the manufacturing 
plant and two people from every shovel working in the Jeffrey Mine. The new shovels 
reduced the need for employees in the pit by 40%,597 and this was attractive to JM 
because the machines would increase extraction levels and profits while decreasing the 
company’s reliance on an increasingly disgruntled and demanding workforce. The 
reduction would not be severe, but the provincial arbitration board reported that there was 
a “serious threat of strike” if it were to happen.598 The warning went unheeded by JM and 
the company held its ground at the arbitration table. Officials were aware that the union 
wanted fixed salaries included in the new collective agreement that would ensure a steady 
wage if new technologies that made employees redundant were introduced.599 This goal 
became even more important when JM announced that the Wool Rock Department at the 
factory would be closed in July and moved to Toronto where furnace products could be 
manufactured at a reduced cost.600 Workers were angry and their response to these 
changes suggests that they believed that JM had a responsibility to employ the people of 
Asbestos and not replace them with machines or cheaper labour in other provinces. Local 
union leader Armand Larivée wrote to the community’s MNA Albert Goudreau that if the 
company did not agree to fixed wages for its employees and no reduction in staff, the 
workers would lose faith in JM and would remember the trouble the company has caused 
when the next collective agreement was being negotiated.601 
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As tension rose in Asbestos, a provincial election took place. In January 1948, 
Duplessis unveiled a new flag for Quebec and this, combined with his repeated speeches 
on provincial autonomy and promises to protect French Canadians from “outsiders,” won 
his Union nationale government another record majority.602 The people of Asbestos again 
supported the Duplessis government, and Mayor Adélard Godbout ran as the Union 
nationale representative for the county of Richmond and won.603  
The townspeople’s support of the Union nationale was shaken, however, with the 
introduction of the draft provincial labour code Bill 5 in November 1948. This bill was 
supposed to bring recommendations and suggestions from employers and employees to 
the provincial government, but the CTCC rejected it completely, not trusting that 
Duplessis would acknowledge the concerns of workers.604 This was a sharp departure 
from the spirit of cooperation preached by the Catholic unions before the Second World 
War and showed just how much the organization, and the people it represented, had 
changed. Because of the CTCC’s public and hostile rejection of Bill 5, it was withdrawn 
from the Quebec legislature, making it appear as though the government had retreated 
under union pressure.605  
The defeat of Bill 5 was a significant victory for the union movement in Quebec. 
In January 1949, when CTCC President Gérard Picard arrived in Asbestos with newly 
appointed Secretary Jean Marchand, the community greeted them with a parade as though 
they were war heroes returning from the front. Picard and Marchand gave the local union 
its own flag and every worker at the Jeffrey Mine and their families were required to 
attend a meeting with them on 14 January in the basement of l’Église St-Aimé.606 CTCC 
officials went to Asbestos to negotiate a new collective agreement with JM that, in the 
wake of the introduction of the new shovels in the pit and the closing of the Wool Rock 
Department, would include salary and job security.607 
Of JM’s 2,083 employees at the Jeffrey Mine, 1,733 would be directly affected by 
the negotiations; this number excluded only those who had worked for the company for 
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less than 16 years, employees under 16 years old, and office staff.608 While a percentage 
of JM’s workforce came from outside Asbestos, the majority of employees came directly 
from the community itself, and as the main source of employment for the town, the 
majority of the local population was directly invested in Jeffrey Mine operations. Despite 
the faith the workers had in Picard and Marchand, negotiations broke down after only two 
weeks of meeting with JM officials.609 At the start of February 1949, the community was 
uncertain over what would happen next during the standoff between the fundamental 
factions of the community: the working class Francophone majority, the town council 
now allied with the Union nationale, and the elite Anglophone minority running the 
Jeffrey Mine. As the strike of 1949 began, the local cultural identity in Asbestos was 
challenged by internal and external forces and it would be radically changed during the 
five months of the dispute. The community of Asbestos would never be the same. 
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Chapter 5: Bodies Collide, The Strike of 1949 
 Just before midnight on 13 February 1949, Jeffrey Mine workers met in l’église 
St-Aimé and, against the advice of their union leaders, voted to strike. A few days later, 
every other asbestos mining community in l’Estrie except East Broughton followed.610 
Because they did not wait for an arbitration board to be established, this violated 
Quebec’s Loi des Relations ouvrières and the strike was illegal,611 but this did not 
concern the workers. The 1949 strike was not the first time the workers had challenged 
JM, and they had a history of short, successful strikes. The workers hoped that after the 
dispute was resolved, Asbestos would be fundamentally changed, but they had no idea 
how much this would be true.  
Although the 1949 strike had provincial, national, and international repercussions, 
the strike was a profoundly local affair, with land, people, and the community all being 
radically redefined. The 1949 strike was primarily a battle over bodies and an articulation 
of the local cultural identity. The workers went on strike to reform their collective 
agreement with JM, but their demands can be placed on three main pillars: how land was 
used in Asbestos, how issues of occupational health were addressed, and how community 
decisions and dynamics were negotiated among the working class, town council, and JM. 
Operations at the Jeffrey Mine were frozen for five months as workers demanded to have 
a say over how the company industrialized the land. After Bruno LeDoux’s exposé on 
asbestosis, JM employees no longer trusted the company and refused to return to work 
until the health hazards the mineral posed were properly addressed and toxic dust was 
eliminated. Furthermore, the strike revealed a broader struggle in Asbestos, and Quebec, 
over who would dictate the development of communities and industry in the province: the 
French Canadian working class majority or the Anglophone managing elite. The striking 
workers and JM fought over who had the authority to dictate how people and place were 
understood in the community, and their battle focused on the Jeffrey Mine, which had 
brought them “un progrès aussi rapide et si constant.”612 Using a combination of local and 
company accounts, such as the town’s newspaper and JM correspondence, which have 
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never been used before, this chapter will offer a renewed analysis of the dispute, 
dispelling myths of revolution and victimization, and focusing on the community directly 
involved in the conflict. The people of Asbestos knew the strike had implications beyond 
the limits of the town,613 but it was their own, local concerns that shaped their actions and 
reactions during the strike.  
“Cette grève ne durera pas 48 heures,” February to March 1949 
February 1949 began unexceptionally. Town council appealed to the province for 
a grant to attract new industry and annexed more land on which to build new houses.614 
JM paid over $8,000 in municipal taxes and Dr. Kenneth Smith wrote a report on the need 
for better dust control measures at the mill.615 JM also announced to its employees that 
1948 was “BIG NEWS!” as the company prospered from a postwar boom that led to 
record profits.616 The people of Asbestos were partly responsible for these profits, as the 
Jeffrey Mine provided JM with the vast majority of the company’s supply of mineral. 
One hundred and thirty one of these local workers had been employed by JM for over 25 
years, longer than many of the company’s officials, which gave them a unique 
understanding of how the Jeffrey Mine had been run in the past, and how it could be run 
in the future. Goods were purchased, bills were paid, but a sense of uneasiness reigned: 
the workers had been without a contract for over a month, and they had recently read 
Burton LeDoux’s exposé on how asbestos dust affected the human body.  
It was amid this atmosphere that union members met in the basement of l’église 
St-Aimé at 11pm on 13 February. Despite CTCC Secretary Jean Marchand’s request that 
they wait for contract negotiations to address their concerns, workers overwhelmingly 
voted to strike. The local role they had played in bringing global economic success to the 
community via international trade networks gave the workers confidence in their own 
abilities to achieve contract reform without being dependent on their union. JM officials 
knew something was wrong when the Jeffrey Mine went silent at midnight as the evening 
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shift ended.617 This silence would have been noticed throughout the community, too, 
which was used to sleeping with the noise of production. The 2,100 striking workers set 
up headquarters at city hall after local police chief Albert Bell willingly gave them the 
keys.618 
The strike eventually involved 5,000 workers throughout l’Estrie, but newspaper 
accounts of the dispute made it clear that those at Asbestos were the ones to watch 
because of the size of JM, its workforce, and the Jeffrey Mine, “l’une des plus 
importantes mines d’amiante du monde.”619 Because the workers at Asbestos were the 
first to strike, they also dictated the terms on which the conflict would end. Their major 
demands were a raise of 15 cents to bring wages to $1.00 an hour, plus 5 cents more for 
night shifts (which would cost JM an additional $120,000 each year), job security so 
machines would not replace workers, better dust control to prevent asbestosis, more time 
off, and union input in promotions. The workers also wanted the adoption of the Rand 
Formula, requiring 3% of the wages of all employees, even nonunionized ones, to be paid 
as union dues.620 These were all types of demands the workers had made in previous 
strikes, but had yet to achieve. 
JM in response refused to accept the Rand Formula, to allow unions to have a say 
in promotions,621 or to admit to a health problem at the Jeffrey Mine, but the workers 
believed they could force the company into submission because by being on strike, 
workers stopped the flow of asbestos to the company’s 20 manufacturing plants across 
North America and forced the 300 non-unionized employees at the Jeffrey Mine to stop 
work because of a lack of raw mineral.622 At the start of the strike, the company was 
dependent on them. 
Chief Bell reported that the workers were acting calmly and quietly. When not 
picketing at the gates to the Jeffrey Mine, strikers held meetings in which only union 
members were allowed except for one reporter, Gérard Pelletier, who worked for Le 
Devoir. Pelletier was friends with CTCC Secretary Jean Marchand and when he was sent 
to Asbestos at the start of the conflict, Marchand told him, “[s]i tu as ta brosse à dents, ca 
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suffit. Tu n’as même pas besoin d’un pyjama; cette grève ne durera pas 48 heures.”623 
Pelletier remained in Asbestos for five months. Although he was the only member of the 
press who stayed in the community for the duration of the conflict and the only reporter 
whom workers allowed into their homes, Pelletier’s reports have never been studied in 
depth. This is possibly because his criticism of Duplessis and his later career as a federal 
Liberal cabinet minister led scholars to interpret his reports as simply yet another young 
intellectual attack on the government’s conservative hold of the province,624 when they 
actually offer valuable insight into the thoughts and experiences of those on strike.  
Pelletier spent months getting to know the people involved in the strike and how 
they interpreted and coped with the changes it brought to their community. The regional 
newspaper, Sherbrooke’s La Tribune, supported JM and promoted the belief that the 
workers were bitterly divided over whether to stay on strike or not, and had enough 
money and health benefits already.625 On the other side of the spectrum, according to 
Pelletier, Le Devoir “not only took the side of the striking workers, but conducted a 
systematic campaign on their behalf throughout the course of the conflict.”626 Pelletier’s 
experiences in Asbestos and those of other reporters who were allowed temporary access 
reveal the townspeople to be strongly conservative and religious, not the left-wing, 
secular idealists Trudeau’s 1956 collection on the conflict implied.627 At least once a day 
strikers celebrated mass at St-Aimé and when outsiders arrived with alcohol to raise the 
spirits of the workers they were chased out of the dry community.628 Showing just how 
non-confrontational the conflict was, picketers even let some JM employees pass the 
gates to the Jeffrey Mine so they could pump out the groundwater filling the pit, ensuring 
equipment would not be damaged.629  
Despite the initially peaceful nature of the dispute, on 18 February, just after the 
local paper published a message from JM stating that the demands of the workers were 
unreasonable,630 200 strikers broke through the gates at the Jeffrey Mine and forced the 
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factory manager and two female office staff members off JM property, while taking their 
pay cheques from the week before.631 The company wrote frantic telegrams to Quebec 
Minister of Labour Antonio Barrette and Premier Maurice Duplessis requesting the 
assistance of the Sûreté provinciale.632 JM officials described the community as being in a 
state of anarchy and “[w]hen the municipal council is silent can we not count at least on 
the immediate assistance of the police force of this province….We have been here more 
than a half century operating and maintain that our record and our rights call for a 
measure of protection.…If you ignore further request we feel that any consequence from 
violence will be your responsibility.”633 The fact that town council was not intervening in 
the strike at this time shows that the community did not believe the labour dispute would 
be long enough to significantly impact local affairs. The longest Jeffrey Mine workers 
had been on strike in the past was eight days, and this was only day four. Neither Chief 
Bell nor town council were alarmed by the situation, although four more officers were 
hired to bring the local police force to 11 men. Bell himself went into the Jeffrey Mine to 
make sure the pumps were running.634 The workers and the local police were neighbours 
and even played cards together at the beginning of the strike; there was little evidence of 
anarchy.635 
After strikers forcibly entered company property, JM sued the union for $500,000 
worth of damages, and filed an injunction to prevent picketing outside the Jeffrey Mine. 
At 2am on 20 February, at the request of JM and on Duplessis’ orders, 60 provincial 
policemen arrived in Asbestos. The presence of the provincial police was unnecessarily 
heavy-handed based on the patterns established over the past decade of labour conflicts in 
Asbestos, and immediately changed the character of the strike. Company-community, 
upper class-working class, Anglophone-Francophone relations had radically shifted away 
from the established spirit of negotiation and would never be the same again. While JM 
and Duplessis may have believed this was a necessary force in order to control the 
workers, the people of Asbestos saw it as an invasion of their community and an insult to 
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striking workers. Bell reacted to the provincial police in Asbestos by telling La Tribune 
that “S’ils viennent, c’est alors que cela va aller mal…Les grévistes sont paisibles et ils 
n’ont fait aucun dommage à la propriété,”636 and Pelletier reported that the arrival of the 
police was “considérée à Asbestos comme un geste de méfiance que rien ne justifie.”637 
The company and the government deeming the strike illegal and sending provincial police 
to the town suggested that striking workers were criminals, an idea offensive to the local 
population, so proud of the labour they had done to make the Jeffrey Mine so successful. 
Once the provincial police had arrived, seven young strikers followed one of their patrol 
cars through the streets and were apprehended after one said, “[n]ous sommes des 
grévistes et nous voulons savoir ce que vous faites.”638 This again expressed the 
confidence of the workers, bold enough to demand information from the provincial 
police, but following several hours of interrogation—which ended in the strikers crying 
and apologizing—they were released with their confidence shaken.  
While council attempted to remain neutral, it had to address the new police 
presence, especially because the policemen were each paid $50 a week by JM639 and 
brought alcohol into Asbestos to drink between patrols. The minutes of the 21 February 
council meeting show how badly the force was received. Council believed there were 
now 150 officers in the community who had arrived in a state of inebriation, and, “un 
certain nombre se sont même rendu coupables d’actes indécents dans les rues de la ville 
et aussi d’avoir été des causes de désordre dans les places publiques...dans certains cas les 
polices provinciales ont usé de violence…[et] ces actes ont été accomplis sans 
avertissement et dans le but évident de provoquer des troubles.”640 The presence of the 
provincial police immediately changed town dynamics and the way the community 
related to JM. Understanding the threat the police posed to community-company 
relations, council voted unanimously to request the immediate removal of the force. The 
entire country was suddenly acquainted with the “indecent acts” of Quebec’s provincial 
police through the press.641 Mayor Albert Goudreau, a member of the Union nationale 
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government, brought the resolution to Duplessis himself in hopes that the premier would 
recall the force. 
In response to council’s resolution, the director of the Sûreté provinciale, Hilaire 
Beauregard, issued a statement saying that there were only 60 provincial police in 
Asbestos and while some had beer with their dinner, none had time to become drunk.642 
Pelletier contradicted this, saying that many provincial policemen were seen bringing 
supplies of beer into Asbestos from Danville and Richmond to store it at their new 
barracks, JM’s Hotel Iroquois,643 which was where single male Jeffrey Mine workers 
usually lived. Duplessis denied town council’s request and the police remained. 
The continued presence of the provincial police changed the character of the strike 
and the town. They escorted office staff through the gates of the Jeffrey Mine and 
patrolled the streets, telling anyone who was outside at night to return home. At a union 
meeting at St-Aimé on 22 February, strikers expressed their outrage but renewed their 
commitment to a non-violent strike. This inspired parish priest and union head curé 
Louis-Philippe Camirand to poke fun at reports that said the people of Asbestos were 
uncivilized, stating he was “très heureux de vivre avec de tels sauvages,” much to the 
delight of the crowd.644 Camirand’s support convinced workers that their strike was 
morally just, and encouraged them to remain committed to achieving their demands.  
JM reacted to the arrival of the police in a different manner. The company wrote 
in the local paper that council’s resolution against the police ignored the real violence of 
the dispute, which included an illegal strike and the invasion of JM property.645 Local 
opinion did not agree with the company, and Pelletier’s description of JM as being “la 
plus coriace des companies,”646 was deemed apt at the beginning of March when rumours 
began to spread of JM looking for replacement employees from outside Asbestos.647 
No replacement workers were seen at this time to confirm the rumour, which JM 
denied, but the company warned that a long strike would have wide-ranging effects far 
beyond the community and region.648 The company also sent strikers weekly letters 
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urging them to return to work so negotiations could begin. The letter of 28 February 
claimed that the union was concealing facts from strikers, and focused on the illegality of 
the conflict and the claim that Jeffrey Mine equipment had been damaged because of it.649 
To bypass the union in this manner and appeal directly to the workers’ sense of law, order 
and duty was an attempt by JM to weaken the connection between strikers and their 
union, and to work within the closed framework of Asbestos without relying on outsiders. 
The company’s attempt to convince strikers not to rely on their union demonstrated JM’s 
mistaken belief that its employees were not as militant as their outside union leaders. This 
was certainly not the case, as demonstrated by the workers’ vote to strike without the 
consent of the CTCC. It also showed that the company underestimated the intelligence of 
the community: if the workers should not rely on outside union aid, why was it okay for 
JM to call in the provincial police? Summing up the collective response to the company 
letter, Pelletier wrote, “les résultats sont nuls.”650  
As the strike continued, and the injunction against picketing at the Jeffrey Mine 
was extended to April, Mayor Goudreau began to express his fears for the future of 
Asbestos:  
le commerce commence à souffrir de cette grève et partant, toute notre 
ville, car il ne faut pas oublier que la “Johns-Manville” est à peu près la 
seule industrie d’Asbestos et qu’elle emploie 2,100 ouvriers. L’activité 
municipale est aussi paralysée; la ville a suspendu des travaux en cours et 
elle a remis à une date ultérieure et indéterminée la mise à exécution de 
nombreux projets dont l’urgence était pourtant incontestable.651 
 
The strike had already deeply affected the town. Council could not proceed with its plans 
for development and, with 2,100 citizens not receiving wages, commercial businesses 
began to struggle for lack of customers.  
Asbestos was caught in a state of uncertainty as rumours of a lengthy strike 
plagued the community. It was clear that this was not going to be another short and 
simple strike. In order to ease these worries, Marchand and local union head Roldolphe 
Hamel held a meeting on 6 March solely for the wives of the men on strike. This was 
highly unusual for a labour dispute in Canada at this time, but the CTCC wanted to make 
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sure that workers had the support of their families, many of whom were worried about the 
length of the strike.652 Pelletier was the only member of the press allowed to attend the 
meeting and the only one to report on it. He wrote that the hall at St-Aimé was full of 
“jeunes femmes, de vielles mamans, quelques enfants pour lesquels on n’avait pas trouvé 
de gardiennes (ou de gardien, puisque la plupart des papas étaient restés pour une fois à 
prendre soin de la maison).”653 The role reversal of wives and mothers at a union meeting 
while the striking men of Asbestos remained at home shows how much the conflict, and 
the issues it raised, had affected the entire community. The women listened to union 
representatives speak about the goals of the strike for two hours and then had the chance 
to ask questions, which they did with enthusiasm, revealing their prime concerns. Their 
questions addressed worries over the union having its certification revoked by the 
government, concerns about the illegality of the strike, fears of what asbestos did to 
human health, and how their families were to be supported without any wages.654 The 
inclusion of health-related questions reveals just how much LeDoux’s exposé on 
asbestosis had permeated the community.  
After their questions were answered the women left the hall and strikers, both 
male and female, entered, “plus graves, moins légers, après ces trois semaines de 
grève.”655 Pelletier reported that morale remained high, however, especially as the 
meeting turned into a rally for Marchand, whom JM had named the “biggest obstacle” to 
a resolution and who had been banned from negotiations by the Quebec government.656 
The meeting provides insight into how deeply families were involved in the dispute. 
Having a “wives meeting” showed that the union understood its members and the 
questions they asked indicate that women were not passive bystanders in the strike.  
JM attempted to follow this example of inclusivity when it sent a second letter to 
its employees, which again stressed the illegality of the strike and stated, “[n]e tenant pas 
compte de ce qui peut avoir été écrit avant ou pendant la grève, vous devriez comprendre 
de plus en plus que votre échelle de salaire et vos conditions de travail sont parmi les 
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meilleures au Canada?” 657 The letter suggested that strikers should return to the Jeffrey 
Mine, proud of what they had already accomplished in past negotiations. JM again failed 
to understand that what the workers were proud of was the international role they played 
in the industry, extracting fibre that went around the world, helping armies achieve peace, 
keeping people safe from fire, and making the company an incredible amount of money. 
These accomplishments gave strikers the confidence to insist their salaries and working 
conditions, although among the best in Canada, still were not good enough for them. 
They operated on a different scale and wanted more. This feeling was seen in the 
workers’ response to the ballot JM included with the letter, asking, “Désirez-vous, oui ou 
non, reprendre le travail?”658 Each employee was to return the ballot to JM offices, but 
Pelletier claimed that none of the striking men he talked to intended to do so. A lack of 
trust in the company, disbelief that the vote had any validity, and fear of betraying the 
union by being seen entering JM offices were all reasons for this reluctance.  
The company also published a full-page advertisement in the local newspaper 
reinforcing its belief that strikers wanted to return to work, adding that each employee 
lost $7.90 in wages every day and Asbestos lost $90,000 each week because of it.659 This 
was a significant amount of money and speaks not only to the severity of the situation, 
but also the resolve of those on strike. The newspaper ad was an attempt by JM to bring 
the community around to its way of thinking, showing how the company understood the 
labour dispute affected the entire town while still failing to appreciate how the 
community’s cultural identity gave the workers support and the confidence to strike.  
The loss of wages and JM’s continued focus on the strike’s illegality did not 
convince the people of Asbestos to push for an end to the conflict. Instead, it angered the 
community, and townspeople expressed their anger by accusing the editor of the local 
paper of being against strikers because of how often he published the opinions of JM.660 
Although the editor claimed union heads ignored his requests for information, the 
accusation demonstrates that the letters and ads from the company were changing the 
dynamics of the entire community. 
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JM’s attempts to win the opinion of the public were counteracted by the fact that it 
was lodging the provincial police on company property. The police narrowly defined 
“order” in Asbestos and at the slightest offence, such as driving without a license, citizens 
were immediately sent to a Sherbrooke jail.661 This created a deep divide between JM and 
the community, with townspeople believing they were being treated as criminals by an 
outside police force funded and housed by the company. Town council attempted to 
mediate this issue, as well as the strike, when it met with JM on 11 March to determine 
the company’s terms for negotiations to begin and for the police to leave, then reported 
these demands to strikers.662 Although the company stopped emphasizing the illegality of 
the strike, workers continued to distrust JM officials, and these talks had little effect. 
Tension finally erupted in the community just after 11pm on 14 March, when 
twenty feet of railway line running between the Jeffrey Mine and the Grand Trunk station 
at Danville was blown up.663 The attack was a response to rumours of outside 
strikebreakers being brought in to work the Jeffrey Mine. Blowing up the tracks was a 
dramatic articulation of the local cultural identity: even though JM owned the mine and a 
small percentage of the company’s workforce came from the surrounding area, the Jeffrey 
Mine belonged to the people of Asbestos, through their labour, their sacrifices, and their 
history. The mine, and its valuable fibre, became hostages in Asbestos. The strike had 
been peaceful up to this point, but as soon as the local connection to the Jeffrey Mine was 
threatened, strikers reacted with force. 
With the rising tension in the community came a tightening of the definition of 
“local.” The night following the explosion on the train tracks, a group of strikers attacked 
a non-unionized worker, Paul Beauchemin, outside city hall. Beauchemin had worked at 
the Jeffrey Mine for only three months and was not on strike. The thought that this 
relative newcomer continued to earn wages and helped keep the mill running angered 
strikers, and he was beaten until the provincial police arrived and took him to the JM 
hospital.664 This stood in stark contrast to when striker Edmond Delorme broke his leg 
attacking a company truck the evening after the Beauchemin attack. Delorme was taken 
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to a hospital in Sherbrooke, not the local one run by JM,665 reminding workers how 
dependent they were on the company’s health facilities in the community. A local Jeffrey 
Mine employee who did not strike or belong to the union was now someone who did not 
abide by the cultural identity of the town: in the new Asbestos that the labour dispute was 
creating, people like Beauchemin were betraying the community, and their “local” status 
was questioned. Although tension between unionized and nonunionized employees was 
not new, Asbestos was changing and neighbours, buildings, and streets were taking on 
new characteristics. 
The union excused this violence as being a reaction to provocations of the 
provincial police and encouraged by JM so that workers would lose the support of the 
public.666 The union’s claim was more self-serving than likely. The constant threat of 
strikebreakers led union heads to request that town council refuse to allow “scabs” into 
the community.667 Despite the history of labour disputes in Asbestos, strikebreakers had 
never been used at the Jeffrey Mine before, and the request expressed the genuine fear 
strikers had of outside workers threatening their place at the mine and their role in the 
international markets it fed. To have outsiders filling these jobs would drastically affect 
the local cultural identity and company-community dynamics. Council did not have the 
power to restrict who JM could hire, but the violence showed that the workers were 
prepared to protect their connection with the Jeffrey Mine any way they could.  
“Notre grève est juste et morale,” March to April 1949 
JM responded to the violence by placing advertisements in the local newspaper’s 
18 March edition, attacking CTCC officials for lying about the issues of the strike. The 
ads accused the union—not the strikers—of breaking the law, in another attempt to put a 
wedge between the workers and the CTCC, and to suggest that JM understood the anger 
felt by those on strike when told that the dispute was illegal.668 The ads stressed that the 
company would protect the rights of its employees with whom JM had worked in 
harmony for over 12 years, conveniently forgetting the 6 other strikes that had occurred in 
Asbestos over that time period. JM claimed that the ballots it sent out the week before 
showed that 97% of strikers wanted to return to work, but as Pelletier pointed out, “[l]a 
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statistique fantastique de la compagnie a fourni aux ouvriers une des meilleures rigolades 
depuis le début de la grève.”669 The people of Asbestos did not believe the company’s 
claims, and workers had begun to laugh at JM’s efforts to bring the community over to its 
way of thinking. The company had no chance of gaining the support of workers until it 
addressed issues of land, health, and community. Even JM doctor Kenneth Smith 
believed JM could not ignore these issues and wrote to company officials to try to 
convince them to stop their denial of the negative health claims and concerns being 
voiced by workers. 670 Doing this would have been an official acknowledgement of the 
threat asbestos posed to human health, an acknowledgement the company could not 
afford to make.   
Although attempts to swing the opinion of strikers and other community members 
in favour of JM were constant, the increased presence of provincial policemen since the 
train tracks were dynamited prevented progress. The arrival of a truckload of provisions 
donated by the people of Sherbrooke on 18 March boosted the spirits of those on strike 
and made them even more determined to continue the dispute. An estimated $1,500 worth 
of food filled the truck and strikers greeted it with cheers and gratitude.671 The company 
could not starve them back to work, and strikers’ worries over how to support their 
families were eased.  
Although the donated food boosted community spirit, Asbestos remained bitterly 
divided along linguistic, class, and religious lines, and this divide reached the town’s 
churches. The largely-Catholic provincial police heard mass and took communion at JM’s 
Hotel Iroquois, so they were fully removed from the townspeople when not on patrol. The 
majority of JM officials were protestant, but which of the two Catholic Churches in 
Asbestos a citizen chose to attend during the conflict revealed who sided with the 
company and who sympathized with the workers. Local union official curé Louis-
Phillippe Camirand gave mass each day at St-Aimé and publicly defended the workers. 
By contrast, curé Alphonse Deslandes at St-Isaac-Joques spoke against the strike as being 
bad for the families of Asbestos, of whom 50 to 60 would be unable to pay rent by the 
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end of March.672 In response to Deslandes’ opinion, people stopped donating during mass 
and several citizens expressed their desire to “casser le gueule au curé.”673 The threat to 
kick a priest’s teeth in showed just how deeply the striking workers had internalized the 
conflict, making their cause more important than respecting a church official. The 
differences between Camirand and Deslandes indicates how divided the opinion of the 
Catholic Church was when it came to labour issues at the time, but Camirand’s support 
was enough to convince the workers that the strike was morally justified.  
Tension was especially high in Asbestos because JM had begun employing 
strikebreakers to process what fibre remained. Anyone who threatened one of these 
strikebreakers was arrested. On the night of 22 March, over 30 policemen arrived at 
Roger Beauchemin’s674 home on rue Albert to arrest Émilien Richer. The charge was 
intimidation against a strikebreaker and when Beauchemin refused to allow the police 
into his home, they stormed in and dragged him, Roland Paradis, Rosario Bernier, Richer, 
and his screaming, pregnant wife out into the street.675 The group was then sent to a 
Sherbrooke jail.  
This was not how order was usually preserved in Asbestos and the community 
was outraged. A local policeman commented that “[j]’aurais pas cru qu’on trouvait des 
hommes pour des ouvrages sales comme celui-là,” and Pelletier reported that “[n]on 
seulement les grévistes, mais aussi bien toute la population d’Asbestos est dégoûtée de 
ces procédés.”676 The entire community was disgusted by the “dirty work” of the 
provincial police and this disgust extended to JM. Community-company relations in 
Asbestos were rapidly deteriorating. Curé Camirand spoke out against the actions of the 
police and told La Presse that “si j’étais mineur, je serais moi-même en grève et dans les 
circonstances, j’aurais la conscience parfaitement tranquille. D’ailleurs, sans être mineur, 
je suis avec eux jusqu’au bout et ils le savent.”677 Camirand’s support continued to 
encourage the strikers and helped them maintain the belief that their actions were just.  
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The company responded to the situation by sending yet another letter to its 
employees on 24 March and printing it in the local newspaper for the entire community to 
read. This letter was different from the others in how it presented the dispute: it stated that 
the strike was not going well, that negotiations had not taken place since early February, 
that the company was not going to give in to demands, and that it would not fire 
strikebreakers when the dispute was over.678 Tired with not getting a positive response by 
projecting a friendly image, JM officials took on a more unforgiving nature to frighten 
employees back to work. Although the post-strike situation the company presented was 
terrifying, JM again underestimated the militancy and the confidence of its employees, 
which had developed over years of industrial contribution and success.  
The length of the strike had already far exceeded predictions and people were 
becoming alarmed. Two more truckloads of food from Sherbrooke and Montreal arriving 
in Asbestos on 24 March helped alleviate some of these worries, however, as did the 
financial donations from union members in Shawinigan and the local comité de secours 
paying the grocery accounts of the striking workers.679 This was the committee 
established during the Great Depression and the strike had made it necessary once again. 
The loss of wages and the truckloads of food from outside the community meant that 
local merchants suffered greatly during the strike, and this group tried to take matters into 
their own hands. These citizens believed the strike was lasting so long because of a lack 
of an intermediary, which they thought they could be. They attempted to meet with JM 
and union heads, but were unsuccessful.680  
On 27 March the striking workers held a parade in Asbestos in honour of two 
more truckloads of food arriving from Montreal. Although the provincial police walked 
through the streets singing songs of their own during the parade, there was no reaction 
from the strikers and the attempt to provoke trouble failed.681 The lack of violence 
inspired the editor of the local paper to report that calm had settled on Asbestos and that 
an end to the strike would come soon,682 but tension remained between those on strike 
and non-unionized JM employees who did not join them. On 29 March, Gérard “Tiny” 
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Newcombe was assaulted outside a company-owned club in Danville by a group of 
strikers, one of which was Jean-Noël Hamel, son of local union leader Rodolphe Hamel. 
Newcombe was taken to JM’s hospital in Asbestos and Hamel was arrested.683 This attack 
was revenge against Newcombe because he had allegedly beaten a striker outside a club 
in Richmond the night before. Animosity reigned on both sides of the dispute and 
Rodolphe Hamel accused JM of planting spies in the town, further showing just how 
much the community was changing during the strike.684  
While this suspicion inspired some townspeople to stay indoors, those on strike 
used the idea of spies to send a message of defiance to the company and the provincial 
government that had sent the police to the community. When three more trucks of food 
arrived in Asbestos from St-Hyacinthe on 3 April, strikers carried signs in the welcome 
parade that depicted those whom they considered were the key antagonists of the dispute: 
CJM President G.K. Foster, CJM lawyer Yvan Sabourin, and Minister of Labour Antonio 
Barrette. Signs bore the slogans “Ils ne l’auront pas, notre syndicat,” “Pas de contrat, pas 
de travail,” “Notre grève est juste et morale,” as well as the mocking, “Vive la police 
provinciale,” and “Qui a fait sauter les rails?”685 The workers also handed out fliers to the 
crowd depicting the eight wives of Tommy Manville, the “multimillionaire d’amiante,” 
whose seventh marriage had lasted less than 8 hours.686 The emphasis the strikers placed 
on the morality of their cause shows just how important faith was to the local cultural 
identity in Asbestos. The idea that the strike was morally just was an attack on the 
illegality of the conflict and shows that the strikers chose to adhere to the laws of the 
Catholic Church rather than the provincial government.  
The humour that strikers displayed on their signs also reveals an important 
characteristic of the community and shows that even when a significant portion of the 
population could not afford to feed their families, a local camaraderie remained. This 
spirit was also seen when strikers produced a board game resembling Snakes and Ladders 
that dealt with the major issues of the labour dispute. At the top of the ladders were 
positive things like a growing union membership or a happy family because of affair 
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wage. At the bottom, were the negative aspects of the industry: company heads paying for 
tropical vacations with the money workers earned them, and deaths due to asbestosis.687  
 
“L’amiante-jeu,” dealing with the issues of the 1949 strike688 
 
Proceeds from the sale of the board game went directly to the union. The people of 
Asbestos found humour and camaraderie in delivering powerful messages about which 
group involved in the dispute was morally just. This was especially important at the start 
of April, when 17 people from Asbestos were brought before a magistrate in Sherbrooke 
and found guilty of intimidation and resisting arrest.689 In the opinion of those who 
supported the strikers, these citizens were innocent and it was JM and the provincial 
government who were breaking moral laws. 
Regardless of who was in the right, Asbestos town council had to ensure the 
community would survive the conflict. JM paid over $8,000 in municipal taxes in April, 
but because of the social assistance the town was providing for the workers and their 
families—$24,729.34 in March alone—Asbestos was falling into debt.690 Each week 
council paid for 2,000 to 2,500 bottles of milk and 4,000 loaves of bread in addition to the 
200 sacks of potatoes already handed out during the strike so far.691 While this was 
helpful, the families in Asbestos often included more than 10 children, and were capable 
of consuming “half a peck of potatoes at one meal and ten loaves of bread a day.”692 The 
fact that council continued to annex land from Shipton Township to accommodate the 
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growing community further added to the financial burden. Even though the strikers did 
not want to admit it, the community was dependent on JM.  
The financial troubles of Asbestos were severe despite the continued donations of 
food from Quebec communities. By 8 April, the 2,100 employees on strike had passed 
their seventh week without a paycheque. Despite the $100,000 in aid donated by the 
CTCC, Mayor Goudreau stated that “the loss in wages in Asbestos alone [was] about 
$800,000…The town has been hard-hit by this…[and] there is a danger of some 
merchants going bankrupt.”693 The entire community was in full crisis mode and this 
shook the local cultural identity, so confident and proud.  
For its part, JM was just beginning to feel the effects of the strike on its profits. La 
Tribune reported that many of the company’s American processing plants had “fermer 
leurs portes ou soit congédier un grand nombre d’employés. À Manville, N-J…[l]es chefs 
ouvriers de l’endroit prévoient que l’usine fermera complétement ses portes si la grève 
dure un tant soit peu.”694 The article also indicated that the American auto industry was 
suffering because of the lack of supply coming from the Jeffrey Mine and prices for 
asbestos were higher than they were during the Second World War because of the 
shortage, which explained why the company’s profits were only beginning to suffer. The 
local labour at the Jeffrey Mine was connected to a vast international trade network that 
was weakening because of the strike. The damage the conflict was causing demonstrated 
just how central to the global asbestos industry the people of Asbestos were, and this 
knowledge convinced JM that it had to compromise with its workers.  
Because of the threat to profits, JM recruited more strikebreakers to process the 
raw fibre remaining in the mills at the Jeffrey Mine. Officials also stated that they would 
be willing to give its workers a 10 cent raise, rather than 15 cents, and 4 paid holidays. 
Although the strikers were suffering, the offer was refused, showing that the financial 
crisis the strike inflicted on the community and the humility required to accept food 
donations had not shaken the striking workers too fundamentally. If anything, JM’s 
sudden willingness to compromise gave the strikers more confidence and made the more 
dedicated to their goals. This dedication was seen when one worker responded to the 
increased presence of strikebreakers by telling Pelletier that maybe “ils réussissent à faire 
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un peu de poussière.”695 JM had yet to mention the health issues raised by the workers 
during the conflict in its letters and newspaper ads, but the threat of asbestosis remained a 
major concern and the strike would not end until issues of dust and risk were addressed. 
The threat of strikebreakers was not yet great enough to seriously worry employees on 
strike and JM’s offer was a sign that the company was weakening.  
Aside from lost profits, occupational health may also have been a reason behind 
the company’s sudden willingness to compromise.  In a letter from JM lawyer J.P. 
Woodard to CJM president G.K. Foster on 15 April, Woodard detailed Leroy Gardiner’s 
study, which showed that even a small exposure to asbestos dust caused serious lung 
damage. Woodard encouraged Foster to investigate the levels of dust at the Jeffrey Mine 
to see how dangerous working conditions were.696 If the mineral affected workers the 
same way it affected Gardiner’s mice, the company would be inundated with 
compensation claims and bad publicity that could seriously damage the industry. Even 
though this had not yet happened, it did not mean that asbestos-related disease was not 
progressing in Jeffrey Mine workers and their new heightened awareness of the 
symptoms associated with asbestosis, combined with the recent media coverage of the 
community, put the company at risk. The issue of dust raised by the strikers was 
connected to a much larger health problem within the asbestos industry and JM needed to 
determine how to address the issue of dust without damaging the safe image of the 
mineral. Gardiner’s study would not be publicized, but the longer that employees were on 
strike and publicizing the effects of “un peu de poussière,” in Le Devoir, the more likely it 
was for additional studies to be done that would not be subject to JM privacy agreements, 
such as those produced by doctors at Laval. Even though the mineral was not being 
mined, bags of fibre were still being processed throughout North America and the lungs 
of asbestos workers would surely show signs of damage. The strike needed to end before 
this issue was made even more public. 
After the workers rejected JM’s offer, the editor of the local newspaper felt it was 
necessary to intervene in the strike. In an editorial published on 15 April, J. Osias Poirier 
wrote that Asbestos was one of the most important communities in the region, poised to 
become even greater. He believed the key to this was not relying on a single-industry for 
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success, but warned that no new industry would come to the community if it gained a 
reputation for having unruly workers.697 He urged the strikers to accept the compromises 
made by JM for the future success of the entire town. 
Poirier’s argument had little impact, even though he was correct in emphasizing 
the necessity of bringing new industry to the community. What he failed to consider, 
however, was that Asbestos had become such an important community in l’Estrie because 
of the Jeffrey Mine, and no new industry could possibly compete. Furthermore, workers 
were not interested in the different types of jobs new industries could offer; they showed 
this in their dedication to their employment at the Jeffrey Mine despite the fact that they 
knew the mineral was negatively affecting their health. That strikers remained committed 
to the toxic industry immediately following LeDoux’s warnings illustrates the strength of 
the connection between people and land in the community, built over generations of work 
at the Jeffrey Mine. This connection was also demonstrated in the frustration strikers felt 
towards the people in Asbestos who threatened their ties to the mine by continuing to 
work for JM. With the police presence in the community reduced, on the night of 17 April 
strikers threw rocks through the windows of the homes of nine nonunionized Jeffrey 
Mine workers, allegedly hitting Adélard Fortin and the head of Ernest Dionne’s sleeping 
baby.698 As seen earlier when Paul Beauchemin was attacked, this violence indicated that 
the community was rapidly changing and neighbours were becoming enemies.  
More provincial policemen arrived in Asbestos to enforce order against, as 
director of the Sûreté provinciale Hilaire Beauregard saw it, “le terreur qui régne”—
which Pelletier believed was a gross exaggeration.699 The following day the strikers sent a 
telegram to provincial Minister of Labour Antonio Barrette demanding his resignation 
because he had termed the strike illegal and said the community was in a state of anarchy 
that went against the doctrine of the Church. The telegram stated that the “mineurs 
d’Asbestos considèrent que vous agissez comme ministre du Capital,” not Minister of 
Labour.700 This telegram shows that strikers were not afraid to challenge the provincial 
government when their motives or morals were questioned, especially when confronted 
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by the increased number of police patrolling their streets. The confidence of the local 
population remained three months into the strike. 
In response to this violence, JM went on the offensive once again. To combat the 
growing press coverage of the workers’ concern over asbestosis, on 20 April the company 
had Dr. Kenneth Smith issue a statement to the press that claimed the population of 
Asbestos was a healthy one. He, not Burton LeDoux or Le Devoir, was the expert on the 
bodies of those who worked at the Jeffrey Mine, and he stated that only two cases of 
asbestosis had been found in the community in the past 50 years.701 He claimed that 
studies showed that the air quality in Asbestos was similar to any other industrial city in 
Canada. He also falsely stated that each JM employee was given yearly x-rays that were 
available for anyone to see, when, in fact, annual exams were running years behind and 
nobody outside the company was allowed to see the workers’ medical files. Smith’s 
statement contradicted everything he had confidentially reported to JM and it showed the 
degree to which he was involved in covering up the health risks of the mineral. 
JM also informed its striking employees that they and their families would be 
removed from their company-owned homes. Because rent was taken directly out of 
wages, the company had not been paid since the strike began,702 and JM wanted the 
houses for the strikebreakers it had hired from outside the community. G.K. Foster wrote 
to Barrette that the company needed to house its employees where,  
we have been operating for more than half a century and which has been 
experiencing in recent years an acute housing shortage. More than three 
hundred employees are now lawfully at work…[and] we have felt duty 
bound to inform the occupants of our dwellings that they must consider 
resumption of work and understand that we must sooner or later make 
room for actually working employees so that we respect the objective for 
which these houses have been built.703 
 
Foster’s letter portrayed JM as a victim to a negligent working class, which was the only 
way the company could not appear to be a villain forcing families out of their homes. 
Evictions would cause problems in Asbestos, where the population was concerned over 
providing food for local families. Now they had to worry about housing them, too.  
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The workers took this especially badly. Not only were their houses and families 
threatened, the fact that it was inspired by the need to accommodate strikebreakers from 
outside the community filled them with anger and worry. Responding to this threat, “une 
gréviste d’Asbestos” wrote to Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent asking him why he was 
not intervening in the crisis of the strike and wondering if he cared more for the lies of 
Duplessis than the plight of the workers who shaped the economy of Quebec and perhaps 
even Canada.704 This letter shows how vital the workers rightly believed they were to the 
success of the industry and its economic impact on the province and the country. It also 
shows how much the strikers distrusted Duplessis, who was in full support of JM and the 
company’s decision to evict workers. Local union official curé Camirand,705 who 
represented one side of the Catholic Church’s divided opinion on the conflict, declared 
that the company and its “scabs” would have to trample over his body to evict the striking 
workers,706 and Marchand stated that “la Canadian J-Manville n’exécutera pas sa menace 
parce que les Canadiens français se sont pas prêts ç’accepter l’esclavage surtout d’une 
compagnie qui explicite l’une de nos meilleures richesses naturelles.”707 The French 
Canadian majority in Asbestos was no longer going to be slaves to a foreign company 
which exploited them and their land. Camirand assured them they had God on their side 
and Marchand encouraged them to think of the asbestos found in the Jeffrey Mine as 
theirs, which strengthened the local cultural identity, based on the connection between the 
workers and the land. 
That evening a group of strikers went to the neighbouring community of Stoke, 
where several strikebreakers lived. Once there, they cut the community’s telephone wires 
and assaulted strikebreaker Gaston Malenfant. The men then invaded the homes of other 
strikebreakers, “pour faire le désordre, battre les occupants et casser des vitres.”708 The 
2,100 workers on strike in Asbestos would not allow the threat of homelessness to defeat 
them, and made it known that outsiders were not welcome in their community. 
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“Such Explosive Possibilities,” April to May 1949 
The following day the striking population of Asbestos threw insults and rocks at 
strikebreakers on their way into the community.709 JM was pressured by Barrette to hold 
off evictions, but the severity of the local situation was increasing. To counteract this, JM 
President Lewis H. Brown published a report on the strike to stockholders in every major 
newspaper in Canada and the United States, revealing his belief that the main issue of the 
conflict was union control over the Jeffrey Mine. Blaming the CTCC rather than the 
workers, Brown wrote that the “crux of the strike is the insistence by the union leaders 
that they secure for themselves certain controls over managerial policy. It is the 
revolutionary doctrine that the right of owners hitherto unchallenged to select 
management to operate the property must be subjected to the veto power of union 
leadership.”710 Since the 1937 strike, when workers succeeded in getting both P.P. 
Bartleman and C.H. Shoemaker removed from their positions with JM and banished from 
the community, Jeffrey Mine employees had shown their desire to have a say in how 
promotions were granted. JM had also to some degree acquiesced by dismissing 
Bartleman and Shoemaker and establishing programs that would help local Francophone 
workers attain managerial positions at the Jeffrey Mine. The workers had yet to see any 
real advancement on this front and Brown’s suggestion that the CTCC, not the strikers, 
was responsible for the demand, angered the people of Asbestos. It was unusual for 
workers to have a say in company promotions, but that did not make it any less deserved 
in the opinion of the strikers.   
While Brown’s report rallied the support of stockholders, it did little to appease 
the population of Asbestos, frustrated by how the presence of strikebreakers and 
provincial police was affecting their community. Strikers continued their attacks on the 
houses of non-unionized JM employees and they also threw rocks through the windows 
of Mayor Goudreau’s house on 24 April.711 Goudreau had let strikers down by allowing 
the police to remain and Jeffrey Mine mills to be run, as well as by being a member of the 
Union nationale government, supporting the anti-union views of Duplessis. Lines of 
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loyalty were being drawn and in the opinion of the workers, those on strike, not 
Goudreau, represented Asbestos.  
In response to the attack on Goudreau’s house, at the 26 April meeting of council, 
“il est résolu comme suit: 1: …le couvre-feu aura lieu à 1 heure de matin pour se terminer 
à 5 heures; 2: Que la salle municipale de l’Hotel-de-Ville à l’avenir soit fermée à minuit 
et trente du matin.”712 Council unanimously passed the imposition of a curfew in 
Asbestos and restricted the use of city hall at night. Anyone found on the streets of the 
community between 1am and 5am would be arrested, and workers moved strike 
headquarters to the basement of St-Aimé after being locked out of city hall. Council 
hoped that this would prevent further violence from happening in the town, but it did little 
to alleviate the growing frustration of the striking workers and their families. 
Following the resolution, over 500 wives of strikers went to St-Aimé to pray the 
rosary. Although this was hardly a radical act, provincial policemen apprehended many of 
the women on their way out of the church and took them to the Hotel Iroquois where they 
were interrogated about curé Camirand.713 The women refused to give any information—
if there was indeed any to give—and were released, but this was a sign that JM believed 
Camirand was a radical who negatively influenced workers with socialist thoughts. It also 
showed how the entire community was now involved in the dispute—not even praying 
women were exempt from suspicion. 
The townspeople were incensed when they heard that police had harassed the 
women. Local union leaders went to council to demand that the provincial police be 
controlled, that the curfew be lifted, and that the union be allowed to pay for any damages 
the striking workers caused.714 The council agreed to consider this at its next meeting, but 
in response to the union’s request that it forbid any outsider from entering the town to 
work at the Jeffrey Mine, council replied that it “ne croit pas qu’il possède les pouvoirs 
nécessaires pour passer un règlement empêchant les gens de l’extérieur de venir travailler 
à Asbestos.”715 Council’s reluctance to act on behalf of the union led the strikers to 
believe they would have to take control of the town by force. 
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May began and the strike entered its 13th week. Production numbers for February 
were released and showed that, although half the month had been strike-free, the month 
showed only half of the asbestos production of the previous year, falling from 48,873 
tonnes to 26,148 tonnes.716 To combat how its stockholders would react to these numbers 
JM used an article in the Johns-Manville News Pictorial to calm worries by stating that 
750 Asbestos employees had returned to work. Conscious that the magazine was sent to 
its employees throughout Canada and the United States, the article also stated that if the 
strike continued, “a number of plants…will be forced to shut down [and]…as many as 
100,000 employees will be thrown out of jobs, resulting in suffering and hardships not 
only to themselves but also to their families numbering perhaps 400,000 more human 
beings.”717 Highlighting the wider effects of the strike and the potential victims beyond 
the boundaries of the town took focus away from Asbestos and the local struggles 
occurring there. The article also emphasized how important the community was to the 
global success of the industry: while strikers did not want 400,000 people to suffer, the 
international reach of their labour gave them bargaining strength.     
Although JM was skilled at rallying outside support for its side in the dispute, the 
strikers in Asbestos had their allies outside the town as well. Archbishop of Montreal 
Joseph Charbonneau instructed every Catholic Church in the city to raise monetary 
donations for the victims of the strike throughout May, and Archbishop of Quebec City 
Maurice Roy followed suit. These efforts showed that Camirand was not the only Church 
official supporting the strikers, and in addition to money, the archbishops provided 
valuable moral encouragement. Charbonneau asked the people of Montreal to think of the 
mothers of Asbestos, “qui se demandent ce qu’elles donneront demain comme nourriture 
à leurs enfants,” and stated that “[q]uand on conspire à écraser l’ouvrier, l’Église a le 
devoir d’intervenir.”718 Making the strike a community issue, rather than simply an 
industrial dispute was effective, but while this meant that money would be sent to the 
families of Asbestos, the community needed more to stop the sharp increase in anxiety 
the town felt after JM announced that the 700 strikebreakers working at the Jeffrey Mine 
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would not only keep their jobs when the conflict was over, but also threaten the seniority 
of strikers when it came to promotions.719  
The local population was enraged by the idea that strikebreakers would remain at 
the Jeffrey Mine after the labour dispute was over. Anticipating violence, town council 
resolved that it would “demande instamment à la Canadian Johns-Manville Co. Ltd. 
d’engager ses anciens employés de préférence à toute personne venant de l’extérieur, ceci 
afin que la situation économique d’Asbestos soit affectée le moins possible.”720 It did not 
have the power to prevent strikebreakers from entering the town, but council could try to 
reason with JM in a way angry workers could not. The retention of strikebreakers at the 
Jeffrey Mine was a major problem because it suggested that 700 of the 2,100 strikers 
would not have jobs when the dispute was over because new employees would have taken 
their place. The single-industry town could not support that great a number of 
unemployed people. 
Council’s request was as close as it had ever come to dictating how JM should run 
the Jeffrey Mine, but it also showed the tradition of cooperation and negotiation that had 
been established in the community. This was not good enough for those directly affected 
by the strike, however, as they struggled to feed their families. Pelletier wrote that the 
workers wondered if they could replace JM management as easily as the company 
seemed to be able to replace them, but despite this humour, the presence of the 
strikebreakers, “met en rage les ouvriers réguliers fidèles à la grève et qui voient leurs 
emplois confiés à des inconnus.”721 Frantic with worry over losing their jobs and homes 
to outsiders, the workers on strike were compelled to assert their authority in Asbestos. 
At 5am on the rainy morning of 5 May, about 800 of the Asbestos strikers began 
to barricade the roads leading into the community. Loading pickup trucks and station 
wagons with lumber and other heavy materials, and parking them across the width of the 
roads, all the entrances to Asbestos and the Jeffrey Mine were blocked by 7am when the 
strikers were joined by some fellow union members from Thetford.722 Their goal was to 
prevent any outside strikebreakers from entering the town and any locals from entering 
JM property. Asbestos was closed. Positioned at the entrance to the mill just before 8am, 
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Pelletier saw 30 provincial policemen armed with machine guns, revolvers, and grenade 
launchers approach a large group of men picketing outside the Jeffrey Mine in defiance of 
the injunction placed against them. The community had become a battleground, but 
before any violence happened, “[p]lusieurs centaines de femmes, défilant en bon ordre, 
arrivèrent d’une rue adjacente en récitant le chapelet. Lentement, sans le moindre signe de 
nervosité, elles passèrent devant les barrières et l’arsenal de la police.”723  
The image of a large group of women reciting the rosary in the rain between 
picketing strikers and heavily armed provincial police is haunting. It conveys the 
Catholicism of the people of Asbestos and the determination of women to be a part of the 
conflict. It also shows the belief amongst those on strike that although they were breaking 
the laws of Quebec, they were justified by the laws of God. Five minutes after the women 
proceeded down the road to pray with other groups of strikers, the police launched tear-
gas bombs into the picketing crowd, allegedly hitting Rodolphe Hamel’s 12 year old son 
Jacques in the face.724 The gas was effective in clearing the gates to the Jeffrey Mine, but 
did little to disperse the gathering crowds at the road barriers, where any strikebreaker 
who ventured too close was beaten, and three cars were turned over and lit on fire. 
Danville soon filled with those who were unable to enter Asbestos.725 The community 
remained closed and firmly under the control of those on strike. JM and strikebreakers 
had threatened the local cultural identity, so rooted to employment at the Jeffrey Mine, for 
too long. It was time to retaliate.  
The barricades were maintained for the entire day and the group of praying 
women continued to walk the streets of Asbestos, bringing food to those guarding the 
town as other strikers smashed the windows at the homes of local strikebreakers.726 
Although no JM official was harmed, provincial policemen were. Targeting them as 
invaders of their community, the strikers attacked and disarmed any policeman who came 
close to the barricades, overturned a patrol car and broke the arm of Lieutenant Émile 
Contant as his vehicle drove away from the “wet, determined” strikers.727 CTCC 
Secretary Jean Marchand was not present on 5 May and the union did not sanction the 
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barricades or the violence: this was something, much like the call to strike, that came 
directly from the people of Asbestos. 
The policemen who did not retreat in the face of the barricades were taken by the 
strikers and forced to march through the streets of Asbestos with their hands up until they 
arrived in the basement of St-Aimé. Police later reported to the Globe and Mail that eight 
of them were led to the platform where they were booed and ridiculed by a crowd of 400 
strikers. According to Detective Quevillon, “[t]hey called us everything you can say…All 
had clubs. The women especially screamed and kept yelling ‘Beat them, beat them.’” 
Detective Therrien claimed that he was kicked in the stomach several times and that 
“[y]ou couldn’t talk to them. They just don’t understand anything.”728 Curé Camirand was 
present, but told the policemen that the matter was between them and the striking 
workers, not him. The willingness of Camirand to witness these actions without reproach, 
combined with the noted enthusiasm of the women of Asbestos to inflict violence on the 
policemen, demonstrates how deeply the strikers and those who supported their cause 
resented them in the community. It also shows how violent the people of Asbestos had 
become through the duration of the strike. They were not innocent victims of an 
oppressive corporation and the strikers, their families, and their priest believed that these 
actions were sometimes necessary in the pursuit of victory. 
After these confrontations Pelletier reported that “[t]out le monde est sur la rue et 
rares les citoyens qui ont eu le temps de se raser. La tension nerveuse, grande au début de 
la matinée, diminue d’heure en heure.”729 Press helicopters circled overhead and 32 press 
envoys waited for more drama beyond the barricades, further adding to the war zone 
atmosphere that had settled on the community. Although few members of the press were 
allowed into Asbestos that day, those that were already there were not allowed out. 
Pelletier was a friend of the strikers, able to move throughout the community; he had no 
intention of leaving. Financial Post reporter Ron Williams, however, was terrified and 
tried to leave town. While he got past one barricade, he was forced back by the second 
after he was pulled from the car and told, “too bad and I’m sorry, but if we know you, 
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fine; otherwise you stay.”730 Phoning the Globe and Mail, Williams described the 
community as a beleaguered citadel under a reign of terror and said that he was being  
guarded by provincial police, armed with shotguns…There is a mass 
meeting going on in the basement of St. Aimé Church and everyone in the 
room is fearful that when it breaks up, violence will break out. As I speak, 
church bells are ringing. This is the first time in two months they have 
been heard…I can see strikers patrolling the streets…The streets, apart 
from the strikers’ cars, are deserted…I’ve never been in a situation before 
which has such explosive possibilities.731 
 
Williams was terrified of what the striking workers would do next and his description of 
Asbestos illustrates just how drastically the community had changed during the labour 
dispute. Church bells were now signs of danger and citizens on the street were assumed to 
be violent aggressors. Nevertheless, when the church bells stopped around 2:30am, the 
meeting at St. Aimé dispersed and the strikers “vanished into thin air.”732 
The strikers had been “maîtres de la situation”733 throughout the day and intended 
to continue the barricades until Camirand warned them against it after mass, saying, 
“[a]llez-vous en chez vous et restez là jusqu’à nouvel ordre. Il est inutile d’offrir une 
résistance physique devant une force policière armée. Allez-vous coucher maintenant 
parce que vous avez fais une grosse journée d’ouvrage et vous méritez du repos.”734 As 
militant as the priest’s support for local workers was, he did not want them to be involved 
in a violent confrontation with the provincial police who were surely on their way to the 
community. Camirand was wise to warn them. Hilaire Beauregard had requested more 
policemen from Sherbrooke and Montreal: “[n]ous avons atteint la limite de la patience. 
Nous nous sommes retenus depuis quelque temps mais à la suite de ce qui se produit 
aujourd’hui, nous répondrons à la violence par la violence.”735 Beauregard’s open 
admission that the provincial police would be bringing violence to Asbestos because they 
had lost patience with the strikers foreshadowed what was to come. The workers listened 
to Camirand and while leaving, one told a reporter, “[t]here will be no fight tonight.”736 
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The barricades were abandoned and the Thetford strikers who had come to 
Asbestos to help barricade the community slept in the basement of St-Aimé, while local 
strikers went home. They were not surrendering, but rather regrouping to see what would 
come during the next day of battle. They were unprepared. By 3am a contingent of 291 
provincial police broke through the barriers to Asbestos and after seeing only a few 
journalists wandering the streets,737 decided to reinstate their definition of order in 
Asbestos by taking back sections of the town. Their first target was St-Aimé. 
Arriving at the church at 4am when the men—almost 40 in number—were just 
waking up, the police stormed into the basement led by Detective Daniel Nadeau, who 
had been injured by picketers the day before. Bursting into the church, Nadeau was struck 
with a wooden club.738 Heavily outnumbered, the strikers ran towards the stairs to the 
chapel where they felt they would be safe. Thetford worker Laurent Bernatchez was hit 
from behind on the stairs by an officer and punched until he lost consciousness. The press 
photographed him as he was led from the church asking if he could go to the hospital, but 
he was taken to the Hotel Iroquois instead.739 Maurice Kirouac, also a Thetford worker at 
the church, was beaten on the way to the Hotel Iroquois because he told police, 
“Duplessis, il est fort; il vient chercher le monde dans les églises.”740 Kirouac’s mention 
of Duplessis reveals the political consciousness of the strikers and how much they 
believed the premier was aligned with JM, against the plight of the workers.  
The church, so important to the citizens of Asbestos, had been violently invaded. 
Pelletier reported that while in the church, “la police a saisi 15 haches dont plusieurs 
étaient tachées de sang ainsi qu’un bon nombre de bâtons également entachés de sang.”741 
Violence and blood in their church was shocking to the people of Asbestos, but more was 
to come. After the police had rounded up 40 men, Justice of the Peace Hertel O’Bready 
read the Riot Act on the front steps of St-Aimé, forbidding anyone to gather in groups of 
more than two. O’Bready added to the small crowd before him, “[r]etournez à vos 
occupations régulières. Ceux qui n’obéiront pas sont passibles d’emprisonnement à 
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vie.”742 What occurred at the church was described by the Globe and Mail as “an action 
without parallel in Canadian history.”743 If reporters were horrified by the actions of the 
provincial police from a national perspective, the people of Asbestos were even more so 
because it happened in their place of worship. Outsiders had invaded the community and 
church, and the people of Asbestos were now prisoners in their own homes.  
Before townspeople had time to react, provincial policemen escorted 
strikebreakers into the community and through the gates of the Jeffrey Mine. They then 
raided the homes of strikers and the local businesses where they gathered, arresting 125 
citizens and taking them to the Hotel Iroquois. Pelletier described the scene of Asbestos 
following the raids: “[l]es trottoirs d’Asbestos sont aussi déserts, ce matin, qu’ils étaient 
encombrés dans la matinée d’hier. Mais dans la rue, le va-et-vient des voitures de la 
police provinciale a remplacé ce-lui des piqueteurs.”744 The war zone atmosphere in 
Asbestos had continued, but this time, outside invaders were in control. The local paper 
took this eerie calm to mean that the strike was over and everything would soon return to 
normal.745 This was not the case.  
The provincial police’s treatment of strikers after they were arrested that morning 
was later revealed to be ordered by JM officials who were present at the Hotel Iroquois, 
and court records taken when these men sued the police for brutality give an account of 
what they experienced. These records have not been used in previous studies of the strike, 
because of their inherent bias and because the experience of the workers has been of less 
interest to scholars than that of the notable public figures involved in the conflict. 
Although testimonies may have been exaggerated, they convey how the strikers felt they 
were treated under the supervision of JM officials. The company later claimed that the 
violence of 5 May was the fault of Thetford miners, but these accounts prove that the 
barricades and violence came from the local population, an important distinction that 
shows the militancy and agency of the strikers in Asbestos.746  
After the Riot Act was read the morning of 6 May, police raided Rodolphe 
Lassond’s restaurant for local strikers. Among others, they took Joseph Beaudoin, Bruno 
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Champagne, and Alfred Blanchette, all JM employees on strike who were taken to the 
Hotel Iroquois for questioning before they were sent to jail in Sherbrooke or Montreal. 
Beaudoin was taken to a bathroom in the hotel where he would later claim two provincial 
policemen beat him until he lost consciousness. When he revived, his eyes were swollen 
shut and he could not hear out of his right ear, but the policemen allegedly continued to 
berate him, saying, “que j’étais un maudit lâche, que j’étais en grève depuis trois mois et 
que j’étais trop lâche pour travailler mais qu’avec eux autres.”747 Beaudoin claimed that 
he was not even present at the barricades and that he was 55 years old and had worked at 
the Jeffrey Mine for 27 years. This distinction now meant nothing to company officials or 
the provincial police under their control and Beaudoin was sent to Montreal along with 
many others, where he was questioned for the rest of the night. 
The strikers believed that what had happened in the basement of the Hotel 
Iroquois was indicative of how JM attempted to reassert its authority in Asbestos. They 
believed this because the company paid the salaries of the policemen sent to the 
community and, even if officials did not call for physical harm themselves, CJM 
President G.K. Foster and others supervised many of these interrogations without 
intervening when violence began.748 The workers interpreted the lack of company 
intervention to stop the violence as approval, and Foster’s presence reveals just how 
connected the JM was to the police and to Duplessis. Bruno Champagne claimed to have 
had an experience similar to Beaudoin’s after he was taken from the restaurant. He stated 
that he also was beaten at the Hotel Iroquois, with policemen focusing their efforts on his 
face and ears while saying, “[p]arle, ou bien tu vas mourir.”749 Champagne expressed his 
offence at the language the policemen used, especially religious curses and assaults on the 
priest at St-Aimé, such as, “[v]otre Christ de Curé Camirand, ses hosties s’il les avait 
icitte, on lui ferait ravaler.”750 This language was especially offensive to the religious 
strikers and an attack on Camirand was an attack on their faith, their union, and the idea 
that the strike was moral.  
The police appeared to take pleasure in assaulting the strikers, but not all of the 
people under JM control agreed with what was happening. After Alfred Blanchette was 
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allegedly beaten by police in a second floor washroom until his dentures no longer fit his 
mouth, he was taken to Dr. Kenneth Smith, who secretly fed him two eggs, tomato juice, 
and baloney.751 Smith’s actions reveal how conflicted he was in his role with JM at 
Asbestos. He actively downplayed the risks associated with the mineral, but was deeply 
concerned with the wellbeing of community members. Although Blanchette admitted to 
being at the barricades, he was told at 9pm that, “[o]n va te lâcher sur ta parole d’honneur 
de ne pas te montrer la face à Asbestos d’ici la fin de la grève; sans ça ma job est en jeu. 
Tu n’iras pas à la messe dimanche.”752 Blanchette’s banishment from Asbestos and from 
Camirand’s mass revealed how important the community and the priest were in 
maintaining the spirit of the strikers.  
While the police did not arrest Camirand, they did take reporter Jacqueline Sirois 
to the hotel after she was seen talking to the priest in his car.753 To the provincial police, 
Camirand was a dangerous influence in the community, but they could not accuse him 
publicly. Both Willie Champagne and Gérard Chamberland of Thetford claimed that 
police insulted the priest while they beat them, with Chamberland testifying, “[i]ls nous 
feront mettre à genoux on disant: ‘Le curé Camirand les fait mettre à genoux, nous autres 
aussi on va les faire mettre à genoux.’”754 Part of the reason Camirand was ridiculed and 
mentioned so often while the workers were allegedly being beaten was that he had 
allowed them to meet in his church and encouraged them to remain strong during the 
labour dispute. The strikers emphasized this in their testimonies against the police 
because it supported the idea that they were morally justified: the priest supported the 
workers while company-paid provincial police defied the laws of the church by treating 
Camirand with such disrespect. In 1949 Catholic Quebec, this was a serious offense with 
the power to sway public opinion in favour of the workers. 
Striker Jean-Paul Houle’s account of what happened to him at the hotel reinforces 
this idea. Detective Émile Contant, who had his arm broken the day before, singled Houle 
out of the crowd, allegedly saying that someone had to pay for hurting him. He told 
another detective in English that Houle should have special attention placed on him. 
Houle claimed that before he was beaten until he lost consciousness, a policeman told 
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him, “[v]ot’ C…. de grève on va la casser! Vot’ curé en tant que curé il est bon, mais en 
tant que Camirand il est écoeurant.”755 The police spoke in English both because they 
believed the working class in Asbestos could not understand it, and because the JM 
officials who were present were unilingual Anglophone. Although he did not recognize 
Foster, Houle was allegedly told that “[c]e gars là c’est Monsieur Foster, le gérant général 
de la Compagnie. Il t’a vu. Tu vas retourner travailler et il va te donner des 
chances…Quand tu auras du temps, sors et cherche nous des tuyaux. Si tu entends parler 
des gars qui ont battu les polices, viens à l’hôtel et dis-moi ça.”756 The direct inclusion of 
Foster in Houle’s violent interrogation proved to strikers the involvement of JM officials 
in the brutal actions of the police. The alleged attempt to use Foster’s presence to bribe 
Houle into betraying his fellow strikers also suggests that JM continued to underestimate 
how loyal Jeffrey Mine workers were to each other, not the company.  
Houle was released and told that if anyone asked about his battered body, he was 
to use the ridiculous excuse that it was nothing but a sunburn, even though it was only 
early May and the sun did not cause bruising. The release of local strikers suggests that 
JM was reluctant to arrest them because it would go against the company’s public 
statement that the violence was the action of Thetford workers, not the people of 
Asbestos. Furthermore, Foster’s direct supervision indicates that he wanted workers to 
fear what JM could do while continuing to portray the strike as being an attack on, “la loi, 
l’ordre, et l’édifice social tout entier,”757 notwithstanding the physical proof of the 
beatings.   
Although the majority of local strikers taken by the police on 6 May were released 
that night on various conditions, Émile Grimard and Jean-Noël Hamel were sent to a 
Sherbrooke jail. Their experiences being interrogated by the police were similar to the 
others, which Time and Life Magazine photographer Mike Rougler said made him “sick 
to watch.”758 Although Rougler was present in the main holding area at Hotel Iroquois, it 
is unclear as to why JM or the police allowed him to be, and no photographs were ever 
released of the events that occurred that night. The police took particular joy in beating 
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Hamel, who had already been charged with intimidation and whose involvement in the 
violence would discredit his father, Rodolphe Hamel, the local union leader. Hamel was 
taken to JM’s hospital rather than the hotel, and once there, Hamel was allegedly told by 
his interrogator, “je viens de Montréal. Ça fait deux que je tue et si tu ne parles pas tu vas 
être le troisième.”759 The animosity that had grown between the strikers and the 
policemen being paid by JM had reached terrifying levels.  
Both Hamel and Grimard were beaten severely, and required stitches on their 
limbs, torsos, and heads. Kenneth Smith took x-rays of both of their heads to make sure 
their skulls had not been fractured, gave them food, and according to Grimard, 
confidentially told them, “qu’il était 100% avec nous autres et qu’il désapprouvait ce qui 
se faisait là.”760 While we cannot be sure Smith actually told Grimard this, his efforts to 
convince JM to reduce the amount of dust at the Jeffrey Mine suggests that he did 
sympathize, at least somewhat, with the workers. Smith then offered the injured strikers 
beds in the infirmary while he guarded the door as they slept before being transported to 
Sherbrooke. Because of this alleged support, Smith was the only JM employee not on 
strike that emerged from the conflict with a positive reputation in the community. Of 
course, the town did not know the extent to which Smith had helped JM cover up the 
damage the mineral was doing to their bodies.  
The families and friends of the men taken by police the morning of 6 May had no 
idea what was happening to them at the Hotel Iroquois. The Globe and Mail described 
Asbestos that afternoon as being a deserted city with blood-spattered streets761 and 
Pelletier reported that “[u]n grand nombre d’épouses d’Asbestos sont extrêmement 
inquiètes…Certaines de ces femmes n’ont pas eu de nouvelles de leurs maris depuis 
qu’ils ont quitté le foyer le 6 au matin.”762 Uncertainty reigned in the once so confident 
community and Camirand spent the day going from home to home comforting families 
and becoming, “a pillar round which the strikers and their friends have rallied.”763 No one 
knew how the police used his name to justify their violence. In total, 150 men were sent 
                                                 
759
 “Testimony of Jean-Noel Hamel,” Declarations sur la Brutalité, p. 3. 
760
 “Testimony of Emile Grimard,” Declarations sur la Brutalité, p. 11. 
761
 The Globe and Mail, 7 May 1949, pp. 1-2. 
762
 Le Devoir, 7 May 1949, p. 2. 
763
 The Globe and Mail, 7 May 1949, p. 2. 
 176
from Asbestos to Sherbrooke and 53 of them were sent onto a Montreal jail because there 
was not enough room. 
“Malaise et l’Amertume,” May to June 1949 
The events of 5 and 6 May changed the community of Asbestos in ways that the 
first few months of the strike had not. La Tribune reported that “malaise et l’amertume 
règnent dans la ville…où la grève interminable a irrité les caractères et les nerfs,”764 
which stood in stark contrast with the jovial spirit the strikers showed months before. The 
town was on edge and because of JM’s connection to the provincial police and the violent 
interrogations of local workers, the people of Asbestos turned against the company in a 
way that showed that the strike was not just a labour dispute: it was personal.  
The personal element of the strike was reinforced when the imprisoned men were 
released from the Hotel Iroquois and the Sherbrooke jail. These men were husbands, 
fathers, and friends, and they remained in their homes for days to hide their injuries, as 
instructed by the police, but the community still saw their swollen faces, and La Presse 
reported that “[l]es mesures de rigueur ont naturellement soulevé à la fois l’ire et le 
dégoût, non seulement des grévistes, qui devaient en être les premières victimes, mais 
tout aussi bien des autres citoyens qui rageaient littéralement à la vue des contingents de 
policiers arrêtant à vue tous ceux qui leur semblaient un peu suspects.”765 The image of 
JM in Asbestos had been damaged throughout the strike, but it worsened as townspeople 
became aware of the violence Foster sanctioned at the Hotel Iroquois. Since 1918, the 
company had been an important influence on the local cultural identity, often making the 
community proud because of global economic success, but after these events company-
community relations were no longer so harmonious.   
JM continued to blame radical union leaders and Thetford miners for putting up 
the barricades to Asbestos,766 and G.K. Foster, who had seen local workers admit to their 
involvement at the Hotel Iroquois, refused to admit it and stated that the “radicaux qui 
dirigent cette grève refusent ainsi de fait à des ouvriers le droit de travailler et de faire 
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vivre leur famille. Dans leur lutte pour le pouvoir ces meneurs de désordre restent froids 
aux misères qu’ils infligent à nos employés, à notre ville et au public.”767 By referring to 
local strikers as “our employees” and to Asbestos as “our town,” Foster attempted to 
create the image that company-community relations had not been damaged by the strike 
or police violence, but this was certainly not the case. JM workers began the strike on 13 
February, they had clear goals they wanted to achieve with the conflict, and they fought 
against the presence of the provincial police and strikebreakers on 5 May. They did these 
things of their own accord, often against the wishes and advice of their union leaders and 
Foster’s attempt to take these actions away from local strikers illustrated how much JM 
had failed to understand its workforce and the militant, confident cultural identity of the 
community surrounding the Jeffrey Mine. 
On Sunday, 8 May, 350 provincial policemen watched the people of Asbestos go 
to mass at St-Aimé, which was a significant presence in the community of 6,000. After 
mass had finished, the crowd did not react when they were told the Riot Act had been 
lifted and they were now free to meet as they pleased.768 Camirand became a spokesman 
for the people of Asbestos, and told the press that locals were appalled by the “profane 
acts” committed by the police in their church, which was now “battle-scarred as well as 
hallowed ground.”769 He also reported that the police had raided and eaten the donated 
food organized by Archbishops Charbonneau and Roy, which turned the opinion of the 
community even more against them. Rodolphe Hamel had not seen his son Jean-Noël 
since he was taken from his home and did not know that he was in a Montreal jail with 
almost 60 others awaiting charges. These men were unable to see their lawyer, Jean 
Drapeau, who sent letters of protest to Duplessis on their behalf.770 A sense of the 
unknown settled on Asbestos. 
The members of the press allowed into the community once the barricades had 
come down believed they knew what was to come. On Monday, 9 May at 8am, in the 
words of Pelletier,  
un grand nombre de journalistes ont guetté à toutes les entrées de l’usine, 
de la mine et des moulins, pour suivre le mouvement des ouvriers qui 
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rentraient au travail. Après toute la violence et les menaces de ces derniers 
jours, plusieurs s’attendaient à voir des centaines de mineurs reprendre 
leurs emplois. Mais ceux-là ont été déçus. Il ne s’est rien passé ce matin à 
Asbestos qui ressemble même de loin, à une rentrée en masse. Sans doute 
quelques ouvriers qui avaient tenu bon jusqu’ici ont-ils cédé aux terribles 
pressions de ces derniers jours.771 
 
The violence had not broken the strike, nor the spirit of the workers, and Pelletier wrote 
that reporters from Ontario and the United States “à Asbestos depuis les troubles de jeudi 
n’en croient pas leurs yeux” when the strikers did not return to work at the Jeffrey Mine 
that morning.772 He knew the character of the people of Asbestos better than these 
newcomers and was not at all surprised when Hamel stated that the workers were 
prepared to remain on strike for at least five more months.773 To ensure this would be 
possible, Hamel placed an ad in Le Devoir asking Montrealers to “adopt” a family in 
Asbestos by donating $5 each week for every married couple in the community and $1 
more for each child they had.774 While it is unclear if the people of Montreal chose to 
adopt Asbestos families, Hamel’s confidence was remarkable following the violence that 
had occurred just days earlier and the suffering of the community after 4 months of strike. 
The 28 local men jailed in Sherbrooke were released on 9 May after the union 
paid their $800 fines. That night, the strikers met in the basement of St-Aimé to discuss 
the brutality of the provincial police. Local union head Armand Larivée opened the 
meeting with humour when he said, “le ‘panier à salade’ si actif qu’il ait été en fin de 
semaine, n’avait quand même pas tout ramassé et qu’il restait quelques grévistes.”775 
Larivée’s tone lightened the atmosphere as he highlighted the dedication of the strikers, 
and after both he and Marchand spoke, Camirand told the crowd that their commitment to 
the strike was upholding the social doctrine of the church and that “[i]l a souligné surtout 
que les grands responsables des récents troubles, ce sont ceux qui importent à Asbestos 
des ouvriers étrangers pour voler leurs emplois aux ouvriers en grève.”776 That the 
Asbestos workers continued to believe they were doing God’s work by striking is 
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significant, as is the blame Camirand placed on strikebreakers from outside the 
community. Both of these ideas removed any blame that could be placed on the strikers 
without denying that they began the labour dispute and reacted violently on 5 May.  
To combat this attitude, JM president Lewis H. Brown distributed a pamphlet on 
the strike to employees as well as the press because, “[i]t is our hope that every leader of 
every group in the Province of Quebec will read this report and from it obtain a clear 
understanding of the revolution that has been attempted by the leaders of the Asbestos 
Syndicate.”777 This pamphlet has not been studied in examinations of the strike due to an 
apparent lack of interest in the local dynamics of Asbestos, but it is an important piece of 
evidence in assessing community-company relations during the strike. Brown correctly 
assessed the main issues of the conflict except that he gave agency to the CTCC, not 
Jeffrey Mine workers. Brown wrote that the demands to have a say in how land was used, 
how health issues were managed, and how promotions were awarded were what the union 
wanted, not the workers. He also stated that this was not a conflict over health or wages, 
but rather ownership. Quoting Pope Pius XI, Brown stated that “in the application of 
natural resources to human use the law of nature demands that right order should be 
observed. This order consists of this; that each thing have its proper owner.”778 JM owned 
the Jeffrey Mine and had the right to dictate how it was run, but the striking workers were 
the majority in this situation, and the company was dependent on them. This, as well as 
their history of sacrificing community land to pit expansion, gave them the 
“revolutionary” belief that they had the authority to decide how the Jeffrey Mine was 
developed. Brown did not understand this reasoning. He believed that the people of 
Asbestos should be grateful to JM. The company had spent over a million dollars on dust-
control equipment in the mills and another million on hospitals and recreation centres in 
the community.779 The townspeople were appreciative, but Brown could not understand 
that they could want more: that was just not how single-industry working class 
communities were run.  
Brown blamed the violence entirely on a group of outsiders who terrorized the 
police and the people of Asbestos, especially the wives and children of JM officials, 
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although no reports of officials or their families being targeted exist. Brown also subtly 
attacked Camirand when he wrote, “[w]e are appreciative of many years of help from the 
late Father Castonguay, Asbestos parish priest for nearly half a century, with whom we 
cooperated in trying to improve the home and community life of the town of 
Asbestos.”780 Camirand now ran Castonguay’s parish and this statement shows JM’s 
conviction that the priest was agitating his congregation into rebelling against the 
established order of the community. 
Brown’s reasoning was ineffective in turning the opinion of Asbestos in the 
company’s favour. The provincial policemen in the town were reduced to 50 on the day 
the pamphlet was released and while this brought the population “un soupir de 
soulagement,”781 the knowledge that Foster and other officials had been present at the 
Hotel Iroquois while workers were being beaten weighed heavy on their minds. Pelletier 
explained that “jamais l’appui des gens aux grévistes n’a été plus complet que depuis la 
fin de semaine…[la violence] a ouvert les yeux à nombre de personnes qui n’avaient 
jamais manifesté clairement leur sympathie pour les ouvriers. Des professionnels et des 
marchands, qui avaient gardé jusqu’ici une prudente réserve se prononcent désormais en 
faveur des mineurs.”782 Even friends of JM officials, he wrote, had become disgusted with 
the company. The general sympathy the public had towards the workers, combined with 
disgust felt towards the company for sanctioning the violence of the police, ensured that 
community dynamics in Asbestos had radically changed.  
For once, the local paper supported Pelletier’s assessment of the town. While it 
still did not completely side with the strikers, L’Asbestos acknowledged the atmosphere 
of despair that had taken over the community. In its 13 May edition the headline read, 
“Désolation règne à Asbestos,” and stated that the first half of 1949 had brought a degree 
of suffering the town had never experienced before.783 There was no chance of alleviating 
this sadness, in the paper’s opinion, because aside from the majority of the population not 
receiving wages for 13 weeks, JM announced it would have to cut back on its workers 
due to global economic conditions. This was a serious threat to the community, which 
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based its entire economy on the success of the industry,784 but the article concluded on a 
positive note, suggesting that the violence had ended the strike, an opinion held by many 
in Asbestos even though the workers had not yet returned to the Jeffrey Mine.  
CTCC officials did not believe the workers were giving up hope and demanded a 
federal inquest into the role JM played in the violence of 6 May, which had been 
committed in “les chambres de tortures” owned by the company and, in the opinion of the 
union, scarred some workers for life.785 These claims were based on the testimonies of the 
arrested strikers, whose allegations against the police were believed by those who had 
seen their bruised faces. Jean-Noël Hamel, Gérard Chamberland, Alfred Blanchette, and 
Jean-Paul Houle sued JM for $25,000 each because they were “savagely beaten” on 
company property and they had the bruises to prove it.786 Adding to JM’s worries over a 
public lawsuit damaging company finances and reputation was a confidential report given 
to W.H. Soutar, CJM Assistant Mine Manager, which stated that cancer rates were rising 
in both Thetford and Asbestos, with 22 workers at the Jeffrey Mine having died of it 
between 1943 and 1947.787 The company could deal with a few lawsuits launched by men 
who had been arrested, but if workers and the general public found out the mineral caused 
cancer, JM would be ruined. This concern was heightened in the middle of June when 
British doctor E.R.A. Merewether suggested a link between asbestos and cancer in an 
address he gave to the Canadian Medical Association.788 Why Merewether did not spread 
this information to the asbestos mining communities in Quebec is unclear, but JM 
officials were fortunate he did not and they knew the company needed to resolve the 
strike in order to get the attention of the press off the industry before the threat of cancer 
was exposed.   
Unaware of the connection between the mineral and cancer, the people of 
Asbestos continued the pattern of life that had been in place since mid-February. On 26 
May, 800 books sent by Ligue ouvrière catholique arrived in Asbestos along with eight 
tonnes of food donated by the streetcar workers of Montreal.789 Although it was a rainy 
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day, the townspeople organized a parade of cars to welcome them. The joy felt by the 
community was quickly lost three days later when a street dance on the highway linking 
Asbestos and Danville suddenly turned into a brawl between strikers and strikebreakers, 
demonstrating just how much tension remained in the community.790  
Tension increased as strikers in the neighbouring community of St-Remi de 
Tingwick returned to work.791 While many took this to mean that all strikers in the 
asbestos region of Quebec would return to their mines and mills, JM was uncertain. In its 
June issue of the Johns-Manville News Pictorial, the company stated that the people who 
worked the Jeffrey Mine, “have lost more than $1 1/2 million in wages as a result of the 
strike. An increase in wages amounting to $5 a week would have been granted without 
any strike. With such an increase, it would take each employee over three years to get 
back what he has lost [but the] losses to the Company are much greater.”792 The expense 
of the strike had been great for the company, but few strikers in Asbestos could believe 
JM’s suffering was greater than theirs.  
The magazine also made it seem as though nothing was happening to bring an end 
to the strike, when in fact negotiations were constantly going on even though the workers 
turned down a JM offer to raise their hourly wage by 10 cents on 2 June.793 On 19 June 
the workers held a vote in St-Aimé on another proposed contract; 976 of them rejected it 
and only 37 supported. Pelletier explained that less than half the strikers voted because 
“plusieurs grévistes ont été placés ici et là par le syndicat et bon nombre d’entre eux 
travaillent maintenant en dehors d’Asbestos.”794 The fact that the majority of the 2,100 
workers now lived or worked outside the town demonstrates just how much their lives 
and community had been shattered by the strike. The new faces of strikebreakers in 
Asbestos made this sad reality even more disturbing to the local population. 
Adding to the worries of the community and the desire to leave town was JM’s 
announcement that it had discovered a new asbestos deposit near Munro, Ontario and was 
shipping equipment and $10,000,000 in development funds from Asbestos to this 
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location.795 This was terrifying even to those who relied only indirectly on the Jeffrey 
Mine for their income. The entire community was connected to the mine, and even if 
JM’s image had been damaged during the strike, the people still needed it to survive. 
Town council was hopeful the conflict would soon end, but the strike and the 
Munro development soured relations between them and the company. No longer 
comfortable with relying so much on JM, council negotiated a deal with the Shawinigan 
Water and Power Co. to supply Asbestos with electricity.796 Although this was an indirect 
way to articulate the new distance between council and company, it was clear that the 
way the community would function after the strike ended would be much different from 
how it did before the conflict. 
Changes to the community would also be great because of JM’s demands in the 
negotiation room. Although JM claimed it had always treated its employees fairly,797 
behind closed doors the company refused to rehire at least 20 of its striking workers who 
had been present at the barricades at the start of May and insisted on its right to retain 
over 100 strikebreakers from outside Asbestos.798 This would change both the community 
and the spirit of camaraderie and authority the workers had at the Jeffrey Mine. When the 
Thetford strikers voted to return to work on 24 June due to desperation and a slightly 
improved contract, the people of Asbestos knew their strike would not last much longer; 
they were losing valuable allies and bargaining power for contract negotiations.  
Although their list of demands was long in February, by the end of June all the 
strikers at Asbestos wanted was for JM to promise that they would be able to return to 
work at the Jeffrey Mine. JM did not want to rehire employees who had been arrested and 
warned that global economic conditions would prevent them from hiring everyone back. 
The strike ended on 30 June after lasting 137 days and an arbitration board was 
established to negotiate the details of the new collective agreement, which was a risky yet 
necessary move for the workers to make after suffering for almost 5 months without any 
income. Le Devoir reported that following the vote to accept the new contract in the 
basement of St-Aimé at 1:30am, “les ouvriers sont sortis de la salle et ont manifesté leur 
joie par les rues d’Asbestos. Fanfare en tête les grévistes ont paradé. Les femmes ont 
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rejoint le groupe pour démontrer qu’elles étaient tout aussi contentes que leurs époux de 
la fin de la grève.”799 The entire community was relieved and celebrated long into the 
early morning with a street dance in the town square. The morning of 1 July saw a 
continuance of celebrations, with the church bells at St-Aimé ringing between 7:30 and 
8am to summon a full-capacity crowd to Camirand’s mass. Afterwards Camirand 
expressed his hope, “que tous, ouvriers, professionnels et dirigeants de la compagnie 
s’uniraient pour rétablir la prospérité de la ville d’Asbestos,”800 which was quite 
optimistic considering how much the community had changed since February.  
The townspeople were jubilant, but this was not the resolution for which the 
workers had sacrificed almost five months of salary and security. JM promised to rehire 
all of its striking employees without discrimination and they were allowed to keep their 
seniority rights over the strikebreakers who would remain at the Jeffrey Mine. In addition 
to this, the workers received what JM offered at the start of April: a 10 cent wage 
increase, four paid holidays a year, and no promises on dust elimination at the Jeffrey 
Mine or a say in company promotions. The residual financial losses suffered by JM, the 
strikers, and the other businesses and people in the community would take years to 
overcome. The local newspaper illustrated the conflict between joy and sorrow when it 
announced the end of the labour dispute only in a small corner at the bottom of its front 
page.801 While it may have seemed as though the workers were forced to end the strike 
for financial reasons without making major gains on the issues the conflict highlighted, 
Asbestos had undergone radical changes in land management, human health awareness, 
and community power during the 5 months of the dispute. These changes were dramatic 
and were revealed in the months and years that followed the strike of 1949. 
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Chapter 6: “Une ville qui se deplace”: Bodies of Land, 1949-1983 
As I stood on the observation platform overlooking the Jeffrey Mine on one of my 
first research trips to Asbestos, I was distracted from the pit by the sounds of children 
playing below me. On each side of the platform are piles of raw asbestos still embedded 
in rock taken from the Jeffrey Mine. Two young boys had leaned their bicycles against 
the chain-link fence that guards the mine and were playing in and with these piles of 
asbestos, throwing the rocks up into the sky and taking much delight when they came 
back down and exploded in clouds of dust. When I drove away from Asbestos that day, 
foolishly holding my breath and trying not to rub my suddenly itchy eyes, the children 
remained, laughing and holding pieces of the mineral up to the sun so it would sparkle 
and shine. These are not the first children in Asbestos who saw the mineral as a source of 
entertainment, and they will not be the last. To write them off as uninformed or their 
parents as irresponsible is to ignore the rich history of Asbestos that has been shaped by 
the interconnection of people and the natural world. 
 The town of Asbestos offers an in-depth look at Quebec’s second industrial 
revolution, when the entire province, not just its major cities, experienced massive 
technological transformation. A major reason for the 1949 strike was that the local 
interconnectedness of people and land had become threatened as giant electric shovels 
began to replace workers in the Jeffrey Mine. These shovels took away not only jobs, but 
also the traditional ways a significant portion of the community had interacted with the 
land for generations. In the years following the strike the struggle over how the land 
would be used continued. This chapter will examine the efforts the working class majority 
made to expand and maintain their connection to the land, the methods JM used to make 
land in Asbestos more industrialized and “efficient,” and town council’s attempts to 
mediate the two opposing philosophies to ensure the continued development of the 
community. The way land use was managed in Asbestos from 1949 to 1983 sharply 
contrasts the pattern of sacrifice the community had accepted in the years since JM took 
ownership of the Jeffrey Mine. This chapter will show that the changed attitude towards 
land use during this period was a direct result of how the strike altered the local cultural 
identity in Asbestos, inspiring townspeople to become even more independent from JM 
and develop a “chez nous philosophy.” 
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“Chez nous philosophy” refers to how the people of Asbestos became increasingly 
focused on their personal attachment to, and authority over, the land in the community. At 
the heart of this process was the townspeople’s commitment to no longer rely on JM for 
community development and support, inspired by the animosity that arose during the 
strike of 1949. They used the local Chez Nous Ideal, the cooperative home-building 
group formed during the Second World War, in new, more sophisticated ways to achieve 
this independence. Townspeople bought shares in the group and pledged material and five 
hours of labour towards the building of a new house for every member.802 This was to 
construct homes independent of JM so that residents of the community could control their 
own land and prevent pit expansion into the town if they did not believe it necessary. The 
strike demonstrated the importance of this when JM threatened to evict those living in 
company houses so that strikebreakers could inhabit them. The Chez Nous Ideal became 
more active after the strike, and dealt not only with housing, but also with how the land of 
the entire community, including the Jeffrey Mine, was understood and used. Although 
they had enjoyed the perks of living in a company town, such as health care and 
electricity, the 1949 strike made the people of Asbestos more fully aware of how 
vulnerable this made them and they needed to protect themselves.  
 The chez nous philosophy is similar to the “Maîtres chez nous” campaign slogan 
of the Quebec Liberal Party that defeated the Union nationale in 1960. That phrase, 
coined by André Laurendeau long before Liberal Minister of the Environment René 
Lévesque adopted it, expressed a new type of Québécois reform nationalism:803 in order 
to control their own destiny, French Canadians had to control their natural resources. 
Following the end of the strike in July 1949, Asbestos was turned into a historical event, 
people and place forgotten. Pierre Trudeau’s 1956 interpretation of the strike’s 
importance to Quebec ensured the dispute, not the community, would be remembered in 
historical texts on the province, the country, and the working class movement.804 This 
does Asbestos a disservice. The strike of 1949 was a profoundly local crisis that was first 
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and foremost about the increased industrialization of the land and its effects on human 
health. As the land in Asbestos became increasingly industrialized between 1949 and 
1983, we can see how fervently townspeople understood this idea and how determined 
they were to gain control over the mine and the land surrounding it by rejecting the 
traditional patterns of community life that had been negotiated since JM bought the 
Jeffrey Mine in 1918. In the process, they distanced themselves from JM and redefined 
how their local cultural identity was rooted in their interaction with the land through 
labour still present in Asbestos today. 
Struggle for Ownership, 1949-1959 
The people of Asbestos knew that land held great value in the community because 
of its rich mineral deposits and a booming industry, and everyone wanted a piece of it. As 
much land as possible was purchased by townspeople, JM, and town council after the 
1949 strike, and because of the ever-expanding nature of the Jeffrey Mine, the land and 
the people who owned it continuously changed as the pit grew and local understandings 
of land use changed. Although the strike damaged the finances of the workers and the 
town as a whole, it had been good for the industry, which was suddenly confronted with a 
shortage of approximately a quarter million tonnes of asbestos because no fibre was 
extracted during the conflict.805 Although JM’s image was tarnished by the labour 
dispute, the global asbestos demand and price rose dramatically and production rapidly 
increased at the Jeffrey Mine, benefiting the company. Although the community had 
suffered during the strike, the land remained valuable and in high demand. 
The land in Asbestos was valuable before the strike, but it became even more so 
afterward and issues of use quickly arose. Town council anticipated the effects of the 
boom market by annexing over 7,000 cubic metres of land from Shipton Township in 
August 1949 and prepared for the town’s population to grow along with the Jeffrey 
Mine.806 Council purchased land from Shipton and individual property owners throughout 
1949 so that the roads and boundaries of Asbestos could be expanded, while pulling away 
from JM and the close working relationship they had shared prior to the strike.  
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When the company asked council to repair the sewers close to the Jeffrey Mine in 
September 1949, JM was told that the issue would have to be put to a community 
referendum.807 This response was in sharp contrast to town dynamics before the strike, 
when council agreed to almost everything JM requested. It also differed with how council 
reacted to a request made by the members of the Chez Nous Ideal in March 1950, which 
asked for land at a reduced price to build 20 family homes and 1,000 feet of new road and 
sewers.808 In June 1950 council purchased 99.27 acres for the Chez Nous Ideal.809 
Community funds were no longer going to go towards the company and decisions on land 
use in Asbestos would be made by the townspeople. Accommodating the needs of the 
working class majority over those of the company in charge of the industry that was so 
vital to the community showed just how much Asbestos had changed since the strike of 
1949. The people were taking control of the land.  
Besides purchasing more land in 1950, council refused to pave JM-owned rue 
Webb with the rest of the town’s roads and community members demanded that the 
company reopen rue St-Georges near the Jeffrey Mine.810 Prior to the strike, council not 
only allowed road closures whenever JM requested them, they also relied on the company 
to modernize community roads by laying gravel on them, but the local situation had 
changed. The townspeople were rapidly developing an independent cultural identity and 
the continuous industrial boom the community experienced returned some of the 
confidence that had been lost during the final weeks of the strike. Although Russia was 
emerging as a major source of asbestos, Canada continued to provide 61% of the world’s 
supply, worth over $64 million.811 While Asbestos was not the only Quebec community 
mining the fibre, because of how it was deposited in the land it was by far the most 
productive source, extracting on average three times as much as the mines at Thetford.812  
The community’s confidence did not make sense to JM because it went against 
the basic foundations of how business worked in a capitalist society and how single-
industry towns were managed. In many ways, the strike should have reminded 
townspeople that they completely relied on the company for the success of the 
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community, and should not resist JM’s ideas for proper land use. The people of Asbestos 
were aware of this dependence, but their confidence was tied to the local role they played 
in the success of the global industry, which was something the company could not deny. 
Asbestos was featured in JM’s monthly employee magazine in October 1950 because of 
its remarkable production and value. Entitled “Asbestos, PQ, Canada: Where We Live 
and Work,” the article explained that because of this production and the usefulness of the 
mineral, “asbestos serves nearly every man, woman and child at least once a day in our 
modern civilization.”813 The land was global, modern, and internationally vital. Jeffrey 
Mine employees were the ones who facilitated this international reach and this role gave 
them a close attachment to the land they worked and the community they lived in.  
Despite the connection Jeffrey Mine workers felt to the land, and their rebellion 
against its increased industrialization as seen in their protest of new electric shovels prior 
to the 1949 strike, JM introduced more machinery into its operations. In 1951 the 
company stopped using trains to carry loads of fibre from the bottom of the pit. Instead, it 
adapted the spiral benches of the Jeffrey Mine to accommodate giant 35-tonne trucks that 
would continuously travel from the bottom to the top of the pit, loading and unloading 
fibre.814 These trucks would grow in size as the years went on, eventually reaching a 
capacity load of 200 tonnes in the 1970s. JM also altered how shifts were run at the 
Jeffrey Mine, explaining in February 1951 that now “one shift of miners leaves for the 
washroom for a shower and change to street clothes before heading home as another shift 
waits to enter the cage” that would take them down into the pit.815 The Jeffrey Mine had 
indeed become a giant factory without a roof, its workers were the tiny gears that kept it 
running, and the land was constantly changing because of it. 
While the company continued to industrialize the land and its workers, in an 
attempt to appease its Francophone employees, JM produced a bilingual local magazine 
for the people of Asbestos called Entre Nous, which replaced the Johns-Manville News 
Pictorial that had ceased publication in 1949. The name of the new magazine was an 
attempt by the company to include itself in the community’s understanding of “us.” In 
one of its earliest issues, JM furthered this sentiment when it featured the Chez Nous 
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Ideal, jovially calling it “typical” of the way things were done in Asbestos.816 While the 
company did not mind its workers building their own homes, it did mind the trouble this 
would cause in later years when the Jeffrey Mine needed to expand onto the land where 
these houses were located. Home ownership meant land ownership and this changed how 
land was used in the community. If the people of Asbestos lived in JM housing, they were 
easy to move and the land could be sacrificed to the Jeffrey Mine, as it had been for 
decades. Private property would prove to be a problem. 
The town continued to purchase more land for expansion throughout 1951 and 
granted the Chez Nous Ideal more acreage, providing it with sewers, roads, and 
electricity.817 These land acquisitions became routine in Asbestos well into 1952, but JM 
was removed from it, having further developed its “block caving” underground system at 
the Jeffrey Mine that required little additional land. Each block was now 200 square feet, 
had crushing plants 816 feet below ground, and loading facilities 950 feet down.818 Johns-
Manville was a leading international asbestos company at this time and new methods and 
techniques introduced at the Jeffrey Mine were quickly adopted by other companies. The 
industrialization of the land was massive and yet subtle, occurring throughout JM 
property but deep enough that townspeople were not confronted by it as they were with 
the open pit. This subtlety also prevented the community from seeing the progress of 
extraction operations. Not seeing how the Jeffrey Mine was growing closer and closer to 
community land meant that when JM needed to expand the pit, the people of Asbestos 
would be unprepared.  
By 1952 Canada supplied the world with 1,000,000 tonnes of asbestos each year, 
70% of the global supply.819 The Jeffrey Mine remained the largest chrysotile mine in the 
world and JM capitalized on this accomplishment by spending $14,000,000 on a new 
mill. This would be the world’s largest, most modern asbestos mill, 14 storeys high and 
75,000 square feet, or 3 football fields in size.820 These were all signs of progress in the 
community and again contributed pride and confidence to the local cultural identity, as 
the labour of Jeffrey Mine workers was responsible for this success. While it would only 
                                                 
816
 Ibid, p. 8. 
817
 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 16 June 1951, 25 July 1951, 1 August 1951, and 5 September 1951. 
818
 United States Geological Survey 1952 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1953), pp. III-2. 
819
 Canadian Mining Journal, February 1952, p. 106. 
820
 Johns-Manville News Pictorial, July 1953, p. 3. 
 191
require 200 feet of new land for an entranceway, the mill would be built on JM property 
and would be an imposing presence in the community, seen from every location. By 1953 
the global market price for the mineral exceeded that of gold, making the land at Asbestos 
even more valuable.821 By building a new mill, the company anticipated further profits 
and put its idea of proper land use on display.  
Although Jeffrey Mine workers were connected to the natural world in Asbestos 
through their labour, and other community members through their everyday lives, JM also 
possessed a close understanding of the land. When town council and the Chez Nous Ideal 
attempted to build 100 homes on newly annexed land, JM warned against it, stating that 
they had already considered building on the land, but it was an unstable mixture of sand 
and gravel and there were several large, deep holes that the company had created while 
determining if it had any value.822 The project was suspended on this advice and JM 
proved itself to be an expert on land use in Asbestos. It also proved that through rapid 
industrialization the land in the community was becoming scarred and valueless. The fact 
that there were giant holes on land surrounding the town because of JM prospecting 
efforts advances our understanding of land use in Asbestos: the land was to be used to the 
advantage of industry, not community.  
JM’s expertise and ideas of land use were seen in both local and global ways. 
Locally, it allowed JM to dominate the land and the community, preventing townspeople 
from becoming too independent from them. Globally, JM reaped the commercial benefits 
of business and became known as the company in control of the Jeffrey Mine, 2,000 feet 
wide and 405 feet deep in 1954, extracting between 4,000 and 6,000 tonnes each day.823 
While 60% of the fibre at the Jeffrey Mine was taken from underground caves, heavy 
investments continued to make the pit more factory-like. The giant trucks that hauled the 
fibre out of the Jeffrey Mine via 15 foot high spiralling benches were now 22.5 tonne 
diesels that made 22 trips to the surface during each of the three daily shifts, five days a 
week.824 The land facilitated its own increased industrialization. In 1954, JM developed a 
new form of blasting that used dynamite without wires so the Jeffrey Mine’s fibre would 
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remain pure and clear from foreign materials. These technologies replaced employees 
who gathered asbestos by hand at the bottom of the pit and those who picked through the 
rock for blasting debris. The relationship the workers had with the land was changing. 
Further industrialization of the land dramatically increased Quebec’s asbestos 
production in 1954, which had reached 914,864 tonnes worth almost $80,000,000. These 
numbers led the Canadian Mining Journal to state that the technological advancements 
that allowed for the Jeffrey Mine to provide 1/3rd of the world’s supply of the fibre in 
1954 would “ensure asbestos mining as a principal industry in Quebec for at least another 
century.”825 Wealth and stability came from the land at Asbestos and it seemed 
unfathomable that something could prevent this future success. Believing in the continued 
prosperity of land and community, everyone in town tried to capitalize on it.  
There were almost 10,000 people living in Asbestos in 1955 and anticipating a 
further population growth because of the prosperity of the Jeffrey Mine, town council 
bought massive quantities of land from Shipton Township on which to expand.826 Council 
paid for this expansion in part from the $900,000 in fees collected from construction 
permits, a portion of which came from JM to build 61 company houses and 78 garages.827 
Even though the Chez Nous Ideal was working towards local home ownership, Johns-
Manville continued to encourage its employees to rent more affordable housing from it, 
ensuring JM would have the power to move them when the Jeffrey Mine needed to be 
expanded. The company also built 70-foot long tunnels that ran underneath the 
community in order to transport the large trucks full of fibre without disrupting traffic. 
This was a way for JM to alter the land outside the limits of its property at the Jeffrey 
Mine while being considerate of community comfort.  
The Chez Nous Ideal remained active in the years following the strike, and 
constructed 124 homes during 1956, which made it, not JM, the largest provider of 
housing in Asbestos.828 While these were signs of prosperity, the editor of the local paper 
was worried. Knowing the wealth of Asbestos came from the land, J. Osias Poirier 
questioned the longevity of these developments because of the ever-expanding nature of 
the Jeffrey Mine. New homes were good, but not if they would be torn down in order for 
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the mine to grow, and Poirier suggested that one day the pit would be so large that the 
people of Asbestos would have to live in Danville.829 Homes built by the Chez Nous Ideal 
were signs that community land was meant for the community, not the industry, but 
although JM had not greatly expanded the mine in many years, Poirier’s concern suggests 
that JM’s idea land use in Asbestos would overpower that of townspeople. If what the 
Canadian Mining Journal claimed was true, and the industry would boom for the next 
hundred years, homeowners would be constantly forced to sacrifice their land to the 
Jeffrey Mine until they no longer lived in Asbestos. In fact, Asbestos would cease to exist 
as a community.   
JM was unconcerned with community disruption or dissolution as long as it 
continued to profit in Asbestos. Termed the “giant of the industry” because the Jeffrey 
Mine provided 60% of the country’s exported fibre,830 the late 1950s were years of 
record-breaking profits for JM, which made more than $100,000,000 in 1957.831 Because 
of this, the company decided to close down its difficult underground operations in 
Asbestos and focus solely on the Jeffrey Mine. Officials saw this as a good business 
strategy because the open pit could be industrialized much more easily than underground 
mines and new technology could be applied that required less manpower. The reason the 
company began to mine underground in the 1940s was to minimize the expansion of the 
pit into the town, which had angered residents, but soaring profits and changed company-
community dynamics meant that comfort was no longer a main concern for officials. JM 
presented plans to expand the Jeffrey Mine to town council in January 1958.832  
The expansion would be gradual, but massive. One of the problems with the 
subtle nature of mining asbestos underground was that when open cast methods were 
reintroduced, extraction had to begin beyond the unseen limits of the block caves, which 
meant that a good portion of “buffer land” between the pit and community was actually 
barren and would immediately be destroyed. The company would give the town some of 
its own unused land further away from the pit in exchange, but another problem with this 
expansion was that one of the roads it would partially destroy was rue St-Aimé. This was 
a central road and the location of the church so important during the 1949 strike. Council 
                                                 
829
 Le Citoyen, 26 July 1956, p. 2. 
830
 Canadian Mining Journal, February 1957, p. 107. 
831
 Le Citoyen, 20 December 1957, p. 1. 
832
 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 2 January 1958, p. 138. 
 194
agreed to the extension because JM “donne de l’emploi à un grand nombre de résidants 
d’Asbestos,” and the development of the mine was good for the community.833 The 
company appreciated this compliance, but made it clear that they were enlarging the 
Jeffrey Mine for the benefit of JM, not the town, by cautioning council against purchasing 
any more new land, stating that they had no intention of hiring more workers in the 
future.834 The church was destroyed in 1967 and the land quickly became part of the 
Jeffrey Mine.  
The fact that the company did not intend to hire more workers during the 
expansion of the Jeffrey Mine was a dramatic break in the pattern previously seen in 
town-community relations and showed that the land in Asbestos was to be used for 
mining purposes, not for community development. The town would grow only if the 
company decided it should and technological advancements in the Jeffrey Mine gave JM 
the ability to increase production without increasing its workforce. To illustrate this point 
the company laid off 80 of its underground miners in July 1958 and 40 more in April 
1959.835 To lay off 120 of its workers during a time of unprecedented profits and demand 
was a sign that JM was becoming less involved in the community in the years following 
the strike, as the land and the local connection to it in Asbestos rapidly changed.  
The townspeople were worried. Lost jobs, annexations, and the increased use of 
new technology in the Jeffrey Mine challenged the connection the local population had to 
the land and shook their confident local cultural identity. In an attempt to regain some 
control over land use, townspeople voted against a proposed annexation of more land 
from Shipton Township in a community-wide referendum and waited to see how JM 
would alter the land next.836 The changes made by JM to the land in Asbestos were quick 
and dramatic. The Jeffrey Mine soon began to eat away at rue Notre Dame, which 
required the relocation of a number of families and businesses on both it and rue 
Bourbeau.837 The first stage of expansion would soon affect all those living on rue 
Laurier, Panneton, Lafrance, St-Jacques, St-Dominique, St-Aimé, Legendre, St-George, 
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and Amyot.838 While JM would provide the infrastructure for the roads that would have to 
be constructed to accommodate these displaced families, it was clear that while its local 
power had diminished in the years following the strike, the economic success and 
determination of the company ensured that JM dominated land use in Asbestos and there 
was nothing townspeople could do to stop it. 
“Asbestos doit produire plus d’amiante,” 1960-1971 
By 1960, the Quebec asbestos industry was worth more than $100 million 
annually as global demand continued to increase. JM cleared 12 million cubic yards of 
useless overburden from the land in order to achieve the company’s goal of extracting a 
massive 30,000 tonnes of fibre and 12,000 tonnes of waste each day from the Jeffrey 
Mine.839 The expansion was not only in response to increased global markets for the raw 
mineral. JM was experimenting with adding the fibre to asphalt to increase the durability 
of roads, and anticipating that the new product would create another boom in the industry, 
the company added more shifts at the Jeffrey Mine. These developments inspired the 
local newspaper to declare, “Asbestos doit produire plus d’amiante,”840 and town council 
asked JM if it would pave the Asbestos-Danville Road with the new asphalt as the 
community grew to 10,709 people with the addition of new shifts at the pit.841 The 
Quebec government also asked JM for enough asbestos asphalt to pave the roads and 
highways of the province.842 The reach of the Jeffrey Mine was growing as new 
applications increased market demand for its mineral and made the industry in Quebec 
worth over $130 million in 1961.843 
Although they knew the mine had to expand for the continued prosperity of the 
community, people resented the company demolishing the town. The major problem the 
local population had with JM’s expansion was that it destroyed the religious and 
commercial centres of the community. Asbestos had already sacrificed the original core 
of the town, which included both a church and a commercial district, during the 
expansions in the 1930s, and they were reluctant to do so again. Home and business 
owners refused to sell their property and a standoff began between company and 
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community over how land in Asbestos was to be used. The townspeople revealed their 
confident local identity with this standoff, as well as their belief that land use in Asbestos 
could be balanced much like their daily lives: between liveable and workable space. 
Because 1964 saw record profits for JM yet again, however, and the industry was vitally 
important to the province’s economy, the company appealed to the Quebec government 
and despite his government’s Maîtres chez nous slogan, Minister of Natural Resources 
René Lévesque declared that he would pass a bill of expropriation mandating the 
expansion of the Jeffrey Mine if the town agreed to it.844  
Lévesque’s decision gave some control back to the people of Asbestos, but his 
support of JM revealed that the government also believed the industry was more 
important than the community. Business owners on rue Bourbeau wanted assurances from 
JM that their profits would not be affected by the expansion and other citizens worried 
that the growth of the mine would create massive amounts of “mort-terrains.” The land 
that was so closely connected to the people in Asbestos could not be allowed to suffer an 
industrial death. Le Citoyen, the local newspaper had a different opinion, however, and it 
stressed that if JM was not allowed to expand when and where it needed to, the company 
would leave and Asbestos would become a “ville fantôme.”845 Townspeople had the 
choice between living on dead land or in a ghost town.  
 
Showing the past and future expansions of the Jeffrey Mine, 1967846 
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Because their livelihoods depended on JM’s continued use of the land, 
townspeople allowed the expansion to proceed, and the company purchased St-Aimé 
from the community for $1.2 million in February 1964 to ease local resentment.847 JM 
also provided land for two new churches to be built, one of which would be named St-
Aimé, to maintain as much continuity as possible. The local newspaper paid tribute to the 
church when the sale was announced and stated that Asbestos had witnessed so much 
destruction over the past years so that the pit could grow and the people could prosper. 
The loss of the church was simply another addition to the history of the community.848 
Although the townspeople seemed ready to give up their religious foundation and the bad 
memories of provincial police invading their place of worship in 1949, the business 
owners on rue Bourbeau were less compliant.  
The merchants of Asbestos did not want their businesses sacrificed to the Jeffrey 
Mine. Many believed that the town would do better if the bill failed, and the business 
owners of Asbestos went to Quebec City to protest it.849 Their appeals were considered, 
but the Quebec government knew that the land in Asbestos could only maintain its value 
if it was used for mineral extraction. Although the town was beginning to be seen as the 
“bouge au Québec”850 because of its landscape, this was a hellhole that was too important 
to the financial gains of the province to prevent JM from expanding the Jeffrey Mine. Bill 
192 authorizing the expropriation was passed in June 1964. 
JM had more authority over land use than local business owners in Asbestos did, 
but the government stated that the company had to wait three years before it began its 
expansion plan and it was to use this time to negotiate fair land sales.851 While this 
sounded reasonable, especially after the town gave up St-Aimé, Asbestos residents who 
owned their homes because of the Chez Nous Ideal refused to sell their property and JM 
had to appeal to council to forcibly buy the land and sell it to the company.852 Both 
council and the local newspaper supported JM and the editor of Le Citoyen urged people 
to think of the gains that would come from the expansion, not the losses. Asbestos was 
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founded on a tradition of building and rebuilding to accommodate the needs of the Jeffrey 
Mine, and because of this, it had become “[u]ne ville qui se deplace.”853  
Although the global demand for the mineral doubled between 1955 and 1965 and 
the industry was worth over $148 million to the province, the townspeople were 
dissatisfied with JM treating the community as though it was of little importance 
compared to the Jeffrey Mine.854 Giant rocks were blasted out of the pit and into the 
homes of the people living in the west end of the town in April and May 1965.855 The 
company stated that it had invited the people living in at-risk areas to leave their homes 
when dynamite was being set off and it was not JM’s fault if they refused.856 This was an 
effective, although unintentional, way to get the people of Asbestos to sell their property 
to JM, but it was ineffective in making the community content with the company. It also 
distanced the people from the land, with the Jeffrey Mine becoming a dangerous and 
invasive presence in the community, rather than their main source of pride and cultural 
identity. 
By 1967, after having 54% of town land consumed by mine expansion and 250 
buildings destroyed, Asbestos was without a central district and its people had to adapt to 
a new sense of place and community.857 Because of technological advancements, the 
workforce at the mine had only grown by 200 since 1949, even though operations had 
increased exponentially. The town did not look upon this favourably, but JM saw cutting 
labour costs while increasing profits as a real indication of success. The Canadian Mining 
Journal dedicated an article in 1967 to “The Free World’s Largest Asbestos Producer,” 
contrasting it with Russia’s growing production because JM had turned the community 
into an “industrial complex” producing over 600,000 tonnes of the mineral annually.858 
The article praised the technological advancements JM had introduced, and attributed the 
industrialization of the pit to a combination of the rising cost of labour, the increasing size 
of haulage equipment, and the nature of the land, which demanded greater extraction rates 
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because the quality of the mineral was decreasing.859 What the Canadian Mining Journal 
failed to mention, however, was the local response to becoming an industrial complex. 
The people of Asbestos remained proud of their local connection to the global industry, 
but they also valued community and JM had drastically reorganized the town to 
accommodate its industrial commitment to how land and labour should be used. 
Rather than consider community needs and opinions, the journal stated that the 
future of Asbestos depended on further industrialization of the Jeffrey Mine, and trucks 
that could carry 100 tonnes of fibre from the bottom of the pit were soon introduced. 
Despite this industrialization, and despite the danger of huge rocks blasting through the 
community, the people of Asbestos managed to maintain their connection to the land. 
This connection was illustrated during the 1967 St-Jean Baptiste Day parade in Asbestos 
when the community cheered for a float with a sign that read, “Amiante: Notre 
Patrimoine.”860 The float demonstrated that the people of Asbestos believed that the 
mineral, and therefore the land, was their cultural heritage. While JM looked at the land 
 
The float made by Jeffrey Mine workers, 1967861 
 
for profit, the townspeople looked at it for pride and identity. While they did not want to 
sell their homes, they continuously lobbied town council to introduce more asbestos 
products into the infrastructure of the community, including the new city hall and new 
roads.862 Furthermore, they were proud that their land was used in the construction of 
Montreal’s Expo ’67 buildings and was featured in the 4,000 square foot plaza sponsored 
by the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association at the exhibition.863  
JM came to the community for business, but the workers at the Jeffrey Mine went 
there to live. When business got in the way of life, the people confidently and strongly 
objected, believing there could be a balance between the two. They did not do this prior to 
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the strike, however, and their new reluctance to sacrifice the community to the mine 
reveals a change in how they believed land should be used in Asbestos. In April 1968, the 
effects of the Jeffrey Mine’s expansion on the community became unbearable and led to 
the belief that “[n]ous en avons soupé de la poussière et du bruit.”864 Living in Asbestos 
had become like living in a soup of noise and dust that no longer resembled the 
community people were so attached to: the town was quickly becoming an inappropriate 
place for families to live as the new machinery used in the Jeffrey Mine’s expansion 
produced more dust than had previously been seen in the community. Citizens went to 
council to urge them either to reroute JM’s expansion plans so they would not come so 
close to local neighbourhoods, or establish a 1,000-foot buffer zone between the pit and 
the town. The new technology JM introduced to the Jeffrey Mine was louder, noisier, 
smokier, and more disruptive to the land than any other previous extraction method the 
community had experienced before and they believed that “la vie normale est intenable 
dans les conditions actuelles.”865 For townspeople to find life in Asbestos unbearable 
because of the Jeffrey Mine is a remarkable change in how they related to the pit for 
much of their history, and has much to do with increased industrialization distancing the 
people from the land.  
The 1,000-foot buffer zone between the Jeffrey Mine and the community was 
established in September 1968, while JM destroyed more roads and houses, and gave 
$20,000 to town council to help with urban development.866 This buffer was reinforced in 
July 1969 when a 200 foot long wall was constructed between boulevard St-Luc and the 
Jeffrey Mine.867 The wall marked a drastic change in the relationship between the people 
of Asbestos and the land. Once a place without a fence and where children would play on 
weekends, the Jeffrey Mine had become closed off to the community at the request of the 
people. The visible removal of the pit was a way for townspeople to have some control 
over land and identity in Asbestos.  
In September 1969, the Government of Quebec ruled that the people of Asbestos 
had to agree to the relocation of boulevard St-Luc before it became official.868 That the 
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company was not granted automatic permission to use the land as it saw fit is remarkable, 
especially because its management of the Jeffrey Mine was largely responsible for the 
industry being worth $196.8 million in 1969 and the unobstructed expansion of the pit 
was supposed to raise local production levels to 100,000 tonnes of fibre a year.869 The 
needs of the people of Asbestos were recognized as being just as significant as those of 
the company and this validated the community’s cultural identity, which was confident in 
knowing the important local role it played in the profitable global industry. Although the 
town extended almost all of its roads in 1970 in preparation for the Jeffrey Mine 
destroying parts of current neighbourhoods, because of this ruling JM turned its attention 
to the massive piles of pit tailings that had been part of the landscape since before the 
1930s.870 Advanced technology at the Jeffrey Mine was now able to sift through the waste 
gathered before 1930 and extract the smaller asbestic fibres that were overlooked in the 
past. This mirrored the efforts Feodor Boas made after Jeffrey and Webb sold the mine 
and discovered the value of the land at Asbestos, which contained very little waste rock. 
Focusing on the tailings would also slow down expansion plans and hopefully improve 
company-community relations. JM needed to stop expanding the mine temporarily 
because the town could not keep up and there were not enough new homes for displaced 
citizens to move to once the company took their land.  
Housing was a major issue in Asbestos at the start of the 1970s because while the 
town’s population was not significantly growing, residents who were being forced to 
move because of the expanding Jeffrey Mine had nowhere to go. Both the Chez Nous 
Ideal and the company had stopped purchasing new land and building houses because the 
increased industrialization of the pit had capped employment numbers. When JM told the 
Quebec government that the 1971 housing shortage was not the company’s fault, 
however, town council lashed out and called company officials Pontius Pilates, showing 
just how severely land use issues had altered community relations.871 Many families lived 
in dangerous proximity to the Jeffrey Mine without any alternative place to go, but the 
company believed this was not its concern. JM was turning its back on Asbestos, as new 
technology made its human workforce less and less fundamental to industrial success, and 
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as officials began to understand that because of the negative health effects of the mineral, 
the future of the community—and that of the industry—was limited. Although it was still 
a single industry and single company town, JM began to focus solely on the land as it let 
go of its past responsibilities in Asbestos.  
Replacing the local Chez Nous Ideal, the provincially-run Société d’Habitation du 
Québec united with town council in 1971 to construct 151 new houses in Asbestos that 
JM promised would be safe from the expanding Jeffrey Mine for at least 50 years.872 The 
fact that the Chez Nous Ideal had disappeared in favour of government control is 
significant. While the need for new housing had diminished in previous years, when it 
suddenly became an issue in the 1970s, the townspeople and the province changed with 
the establishment of government organizations concerned with social issues and needs. 
The political landscape of Quebec had transformed since the Duplessis years, and as seen 
with the case of housing in Asbestos, so had the people. The new homes built by the 
Société d’Habitation du Québec would be for families displaced by the growing pit as 
well as those living in the petit Nicolet sector of town because the expansion cut them off 
from all amenities.873 The housing crisis showed the growing authority of the 
townspeople and the province in deciding how to balance land and people in Asbestos.  
Change in Command, Change in Direction, 1972-1983 
The new authority the townspeople had in Asbestos became more apparent as the 
1970s progressed. Signs of local confidence grew and differed from the protests of the 
first major expropriation in the 1930s because it involved the entire community, not 
simply the merchants. One-third of fibre production at the Jeffrey Mine was now from 
pre-1930s tailings, but JM wanted to increase the amount of asbestos it extracted. 
Although the industry was worth over $210 million in 1972 and the Jeffrey Mine 
produced 30,000 tonnes of fibre annually, well ahead of its closest competitor near 
Thetford producing around 12,000 tonnes, the company wanted to raise its yearly tonnage 
to an astonishing 700,000 by 1975.874 The desired tonnage was outrageous because it 
would flood the market with a mineral the western world was beginning to reject due to 
an increased awareness of its negative health effects. Publicity surrounding the health 
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risks of asbestos meant that the Jeffrey Mine had a limited future, and JM extracted as 
much mineral as it could before the industry collapsed. Increasing production to this 
extent would require the Jeffrey Mine to be rapidly and exponentially expanded to the 
point where the town of Asbestos would be completely overtaken by the growing pit and 
the historical balance between liveable land and workable land would be destroyed. 
The people of Asbestos refused to allow JM to follow through with its plans. By 
1975, yearly extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine had risen to only 35,000 tonnes and the 
townspeople continued to resist the company’s development plans. The local newspaper 
became critical of JM and termed the pit a “mauvaise mine” while reporting on the forced 
evacuations of citizens from their homes, which were falling into the pit.875 This was not 
difficult, as the company was always forthcoming with its intentions for community land. 
Sections of boulevard St-Luc were soon closed for safety reasons and JM announced that 
160 people had to move in order for the pit to incorporate part of the road, despite the 
paper asking, “Mais, pour aller où?”876 The local cultural identity in Asbestos was rooted 
in a fine balance between people and land, and the community would not compromise 
this coexistence to satisfy the ambitions of JM. All 160 people refused to move. 
By this point, the community was aware it would not share in the profits increased 
extraction would bring the company. Due to technological advancements and a 
diminished global market, JM laid off 154 of its workers in 1975.877 Although 
townspeople rallied behind the expansion of the Jeffrey Mine in the 1930s with the hope 
of getting out of economic depression, JM’s plans of the 1970s had a completely different 
feel and purpose. The industry continued to be worth millions of dollars, but as global 
opinion of asbestos changed with an increased awareness of the health risks associated 
with it, the Jeffrey Mine’s importance changed as well. 
The rapid expansion of the pit and the refusal of families on boulevard St-Luc to 
move their homes led to more accidents caused by rocks flying into the community 
during blasting.878 The mine itself was also being adversely affected because of its rapid 
development. Landslides occurred throughout 1975 that destroyed large portions of the 
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pit’s southeast spiral benches.879 In response, town council launched a claim against JM 
forcing the company to restrict its expansion plans to protect the community.880  
The town of Asbestos had become increasingly dangerous as rocks continued to 
fly through neighbourhoods at all hours. In 1976, projectiles from the Jeffrey Mine 
crashed into one of the few remaining stores on rue Bourbeau and hit the son of the 
owner. Months later, a flying rock went through the roof of M. Hyppolyte’s home on rue 
St-Barnabé and landed in his baby’s empty bassinette.881 The provincial government 
ordered JM to be more careful with blasting in the pit, but the company instead decided to 
invest $77 million dollars in a new factory and new equipment that would decrease a 
reliance on manpower and increase production levels by enabling more blasting each 
day.882 Nothing would get in JM’s way, especially the community, as the company 
frantically extracted as much fibre as it could while the industry was still viable. 
The townspeople had radically different views than JM on how the land in 
Asbestos should be used. The community believed that both it and the Jeffrey Mine 
needed to coexist in a relationship balanced between progress and stability. This balance 
was the identity and heritage they would defend against JM’s notions of success. In 1977, 
council articulated this belief when it described flying rocks as “actes de vandalisme” and 
complained of rising “rafales de poussière” that were so thick that “la situation présente 
est inacceptable et intolérable pour les résidents de la Ville.”883 The town was not against 
progress and even purchased more land on which to expand in June 1977, but it was 
becoming increasingly frustrated with the way JM treated the people of Asbestos as 
though they were of little importance. Thick clouds of toxic dust, flying rocks, and the 
constant noise of new machines had transformed the community into an industrial horror. 
This was not how land and people were supposed to interact in Asbestos.  
As a corporation with shareholders to answer to, JM was principally concerned 
with getting as much fibre out of the Jeffrey Mine as quickly as possible, and the 
company was able to spin the damage it was doing to Asbestos and turn it into something 
positive. A 1977 Canadian Mining Journal article on the Jeffrey Mine highlighted the 
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fact that in the next three years, JM “will have purchased 40 multifamily buildings, 93 
duplexes, 49 houses and 41 commercial buildings. Another 29 houses, a hotel, company 
office building and some vacant lots owned by the company will also disappear.”884 The 
article excused these actions when it stated that “Asbestos is after all, a fairly old town 
and…[this is] a form of forced urban renewal that has so far been to the benefit of 
Asbestos, turning it into a pretty well-planned town that boasts the latest and best in 
community facilities.”885 The article misunderstood Asbestos. The historical pattern of 
Jeffrey Mine expansion and community relocation meant that new buildings and town 
infrastructure were constantly constructed. 
These changes may have brought Asbestos new facilities, but the fact that they 
were forced suggests that it went against what the community wanted. The Jeffrey Mine 
had grown to 6,500 feet east to west, 6,000 feet north to south, and 1,000 feet deep, and 
its immense size was making life in the community difficult. No longer caring much for 
community-company relations if it got in the way of production, JM continued to 
industrialize the land and the people who worked it. By introducing the “hot shift 
change,” the company ensured the Jeffrey Mine would be constantly worked, with one 
shift ending only when the men starting the next shift were dropped off at the bottom of 
the pit by a small truck that would then deliver those done for the day to the top of the 
mine, avoiding the usual brief stop in production between crews.886 JM also planned to 
introduce “autonomous working crews” that would be stationed in “mini mines” all 
around the pit. These crews would only work with each other and would not have contact 
with other Jeffrey Mine employees, which seriously affected workplace camaraderie.  
Technological and organizational changes to the land in Asbestos in the late 1970s 
brought JM their largest profits in company history, but also required fewer men; 60 
employees were laid off in 1977.887 This pattern of increased profits and layoffs was 
common in industry during the second half of the 20th century, but to add to the problems 
arising in Asbestos, in January 1978, three large rocks were blasted into the town. One 
crashed into the home of Adrien Sirois on rue St-Jacques, another, weighing 23 pounds 
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broke through the exterior wall of Yvette Boucher’s house on rue Notre-Dame, 1,800 feet 
away from the pit, and the final rock destroyed the kitchen of another citizen.888  
The residents reported JM to the police and the Quebec government. In their eyes, 
this was not business nor resource development, it was assault and vandalism, and the 
people of Asbestos asked the company to establish set blasting times so they could 
evacuate their homes for fear of further damage or injury.889 Although not intentional, 
these accidents allowed the company to successfully expropriate the homes closest to the 
Jeffrey Mine even though the owners did not want to sell. Marie Fortin-Drouin was 
informed in September 1979 that her house on boulevard St-Luc was no longer safe.890 
Although she got an injunction against the expropriation, Fortin-Drouin was forced to 
vacate her home with JM employees helping her move furniture. A week following the 
expropriation of Fortin-Drouin’s house, a rock blasted through the roof of the Desrochers 
funeral home and destroyed a ceramic figure of a praying Jesus. Cars and windows along 
boulevard St-Luc and rue Roi were also damaged.891  
These accidents allowed JM to expropriate the houses and businesses located near 
the Jeffrey Mine and relocate boulevard St-Luc in May 1980,892 but the people of 
Asbestos were becoming increasingly resentful of how the company treated their land and 
community. Townspeople maintained their rigid position against further expropriations 
and sought new ways to gain control of the land in Asbestos as council enforced 
restrictions on the company when it agreed to the expropriations for safety reasons. In 
September 1980 council agreed to the relocation of boulevard St-Luc, rue St-Dominique, 
and rue Laurier, but told JM that the current plans could not be altered in any way, that 
officials would have to negotiate with every property owner individually for the sale of 
the land, and that the company would have to pave the newly relocated roads at their own 
expense.893 The community was finally taking control. 
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Because the slow collapse of the global market for the mineral sped up during the 
early 1980s due to increased awareness of asbestos-related disease,894 JM was losing its 
authority in the town, in the province, and in the industry. The people of Asbestos showed 
this loss of authority when council heard from citizens concerned with how the 
development of the Jeffrey Mine affected their lives in January 1981. Frustrated with the 
constant noise and dust emerging from the pit, they asked, “[e]xiste-t-il une loi 
provinciale ou municipale fixant une limite entre un cratère d’explotation et une 
résidence?”895 Although this appeared to be a simple request for a new buffer zone 
between the pit and the community, the language used is telling. It was only as the 1980s 
began that the people of Asbestos started to look at the Jeffrey Mine as a “crater:” 
something that happened to their land, not something they did to it. The people of 
Asbestos had always lived in close proximity to the Jeffrey Mine, but this relationship 
changed during the 1970s and 1980s because of new technology that decreased the 
interaction between workers and the pit, turning the land into something mechanical and 
foreign. The people wanted the reestablishment of the balance between mine expansion 
and town expansion that this new technology had destroyed.  
JM had not lost all its power with the provincial government, however, and when 
council asked for a minimum buffer zone of 150 feet separating the edges of the Jeffrey 
Mine and the community, the Minister of Natural Resources replied that doing so was 
unthinkable.896 This sharply contrasted the accommodating process of establishing a 
1,000-foot buffer zone in Asbestos in 1968, which had disappeared by 1981: keeping the 
industry afloat had become more important than maintaining the community. The 
economic strength of the industry was weakening, but JM continued to be a financial 
powerhouse in the eyes of the government and it would not restrict its development. The 
company continued to purchase individual plots of land along rue Noel, St-Jean-Baptiste, 
Chassé, St-Edmond, St-Hubert, and du Roi, and yet JM announced that it would reduce 
its workforce from 2,200 to 1,500 people.897 The global industry continued to collapse 
and the machines the company used in the Jeffrey Mine required fewer employees.  
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Not only did the people of Asbestos have nowhere to live because the Jeffrey 
Mine was expanding faster than new homes could be built, they also had nowhere to work 
as machines replaced them. Town council acknowledged this new reality in June 1982 
when it discussed a plan for the Société d’Habitation du Québec to build 10 new houses 
to accommodate citizens displaced by the Jeffrey Mine. Council refused this opportunity 
because “suite aux mises à pied à la Johns-Manville Canada Inc., il y a eu une baisse dans 
la population...et l’exode de la population d’Asbestos vers d’autres villes a libéré 
plusieurs logements.”898 People were leaving the community because the industry was 
collapsing and the land was turning toxic. The proud local identity was seriously 
threatened by the international downturn of the industry and many had given up. 
Asbestos had suffered through economic collapse and depopulation in the past, 
when William H. Jeffrey declared bankruptcy in 1892 and JM closing the mine during the 
Great Depression. But the 1980s were different. Townspeople were not ignorant of the 
negative light in which the mineral the community was named for was now seen 
throughout the world; they knew the industry was suffering. Local fears were confirmed 
when JM filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States in August 1982. 
International markets had been shying away from the mineral because of the increased 
knowledge of its potential health risks since the early 1970s, and the industry was no 
longer profitable. Although the local newspaper claimed that without JM, Asbestos would 
collapse,899 the people of the town refused to believe this because of their faith in the land 
and their fears of what would become of the community if the mine failed.  
Although JM’s future was unstable, it continued to purchase land to expand the 
Jeffrey Mine. Daily extraction levels remained at 30,000 tonnes of fibre, but global prices 
and demand for the mineral had dropped 26% in the past year and a change in this trend 
did not seem possible.900 Suspecting abandonment was coming, town council demanded 
an immediate billing system for sales in 1983 so the people of Asbestos would not lose 
their land without compensation if JM left.901 It was time for the community to take 
control of its land and its future. Insisting on immediate financial compensation was one 
way people did this, but the town also participated in the creation of the Municipalité 
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Régionale de Comté du Québec (MRC) de l’Or Blanc,902 a new name for the region of 
l’Estrie of which Asbestos was a part.903  
Renaming the town’s geographical region “white gold” at the height of the global 
rejection of the mineral was a defiant act by the people of Asbestos and the provincial 
government. It shows just how willing they were to stand behind the mineral despite 
international opinion turning strongly against it. Townspeople balanced their memories of 
profitable glory days with their fears for the future. They refused to accept that the land 
was dangerous and became determined to continue working the Jeffrey Mine because it 
was their proud heritage and their hopeful future. Council approved $45,000 to create the 
Musée Minéralogique in Asbestos, which featured samples of the fibre that came from the 
Jeffrey Mine in its raw, milled, and manufactured forms.904 Establishing the MRC d’Or 
Blanc and the new museum put the town into deficit, but these expenses were justified 
because they were to celebrate the land that was back under their control.905  
Local control was made official at the end of 1983 when JM sold its property in 
Asbestos for $117 million to 12 former company officials who felt that they could 
manage the land, the community, and the industry better than the massive corporation, 
even though market demand for the mineral continued to decline rapidly.906 The negative 
feelings townspeople had towards the Jeffrey Mine during JM’s recent expansion of it 
disappeared when the company left the community and locals had more control over 
issues of land use. Profits were down, but the mine was still producing 30,000 tonnes of 
fibre a day and the people of Asbestos had faith in their ability to work with the land to 
obtain a steady future.  
The community demonstrated this optimism at the end of 1983 when it declared 
that 1984 would be the “Année de l’Amiante.” Town council justified this when it stated 
that it was because of “les décisions arbitraires de l’EPA concernant les produits de 
l’amiante…[et] les effets néfastes de cette décision; [et] l’importance que revêt ce marché 
de l’amiante pour le Canada, le Québec et notre région; [et] que des milliers de 
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travailleurs vivent de cette richesse naturelle.”907 The people of Asbestos decided that it 
was their duty to defend the mineral and the land from the attacks the American 
Environmental Protection Agency had been launching against the fibre due to its harmful 
health effects; the townspeople felt that this negative publicity was what was causing the 
industry, and their community, so much damage.  
The community was able to overlook the health threats and the industry’s lack of 
future in 1983 for the same reason it continues to do so today: a psychological and 
physical attachment to the land and the industry that defines it. In a federal-provincial 
study on Canadian mining towns in decline during the 1980s, researchers concluded that 
locals developed an emotional attachment to these communities and with this, “comes a 
sense of spirit and purpose, and commitment to a place…[M]ajor layoffs or a closure may 
have a more severe impact than where such spirit is lacking. Another psychological factor 
is the uncertainty of being dependent on one major employer, and the probable lack of 
alternatives for employment in the immediate vicinity.”908 The people in Asbestos dealt 
with the collapse of their industry in ways that showed how deeply they were attached to 
the mine. Although money was a factor, this was more than a simple desire for a 
paycheque: this was a deep sense of home and tradition rooted in the community’s 
cultural identity, which connected them to the Jeffrey Mine through the work they did and 
the lives they led. It was founded in the late 19th century when the mine was first carved 
out of the land, and for over a hundred years, it has permeated the cultural identity of the 
people who chose to live and work in Asbestos. This can further be seen in the ways the 
community knowingly put their bodies, and the bodies of their children, at risk, which 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Useful Tools: Human Bodies, 1949-1983 
In April 1997, four men from Asbestos ran in the Paris marathon wearing t-shirts 
that read, “on peut vivre en vainqueur.” Eudore Lemay, Michel Champagne, Pierre 
Laliberté, and Guy Guerette ran to prove to the world that the mineral was not dangerous 
and should not be banned from global markets. France had come out against the fibre and 
their run was an attempt by the people of Asbestos to enter the political debate on the 
issue. Champagne stated that “[m]y house is 800 metres from the mine and I am in great 
shape….We want to prove to France that we live here and are not affected by disease.”909 
When the men held a press conference at the Eiffel Tower, however, only four journalists 
showed up: three from Quebec and one from a French scientific journal.910  
While the men did not change international opinion on the mineral, Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien applauded their efforts at the time and responded positively when 
busloads from Asbestos and Thetford Mines arrived in Ottawa in September 2003 to 
demand Parliament continue financially and publicly supporting the industry. The 
government agreed and has not withdrawn this support despite a provincial study released 
in 2004 that stated rates of mesothelioma, a particularly deadly asbestos-caused cancer, 
had increased in Quebec since 1982.911  
This chapter will examine the health issues of Asbestos from the1949 strike to 
when JM left the community in 1983. During this period, as in Paris in 1997, the workers 
at the Jeffrey Mine used their own bodies as increasingly important tools to combat 
overwhelming medical evidence that proved asbestos was dangerous. As long as the 
people of Asbestos were healthy, the mineral—and the industry—was safe. The health of 
the people of Asbestos has not been examined by historians, aside from brief mentions of 
the issue being a complaint during the 1949 strike. By using a combination of medical 
literature and confidential JM documents, this study will advance our understanding of 
why the industry remains sacred to the province even today. 
In Danger, Death and Disaster in the Crowsnest Pass Mines, 1902-1928, historian 
Karen Buckley writes that miners develop a cultural identity founded on the acceptance 
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of risk and danger.912 This chapter will trace how this cultural identity and acceptance of 
risk was also present in Asbestos, growing militant in the years following the 1949 strike. 
JM helped begin this tradition by having company-paid medical professionals like Dr. 
R.H. Stevenson and Dr. Kenneth Smith falsely inform Jeffrey Mine workers that they 
were healthy during annual medical checkups and union-supervised contract negotiations. 
The company also promoted the idea that the mineral was synonymous with safety and 
that the community was supplying health to the world. Furthermore, JM sent the medical 
reports it approved for public distribution—those that showed that Jeffrey Mine workers 
were healthy—to both the provincial and federal governments,913 strategically building a 
defence before any other party was alerted to a problem. When JM began to pull away 
from the health debate because of overwhelming evidence that showed asbestos was 
dangerous, however, Jeffrey Mine workers took over and used the methods they learned 
from the company to prove they were healthy. 
From 1949 to 1983 there was a steady role reversal in Asbestos, with the local 
community taking the lead role from JM in defending the mineral’s safety by using their 
own bodies to prove the fibre was safe, even when they knew it was not. The people of 
Asbestos were not ignorant of what was happening to their bodies and it was not an easy 
decision to sacrifice their health for their livelihood. This chapter will show how the 
community’s acceptance of risk prior to 1949 discussed in Chapter 3, became even more 
ingrained into the local cultural identity of Asbestos after the strike, as the industry 
collapsed and the land they worked was revealed to be toxic. 
“Another Storm is Brewing in Quebec,” 1949-1955 
A firm understanding of what the mineral does to the human body was one of the 
major reasons the workers in Asbestos went on strike in February 1949. They understood 
Bruno LeDoux’s frightening exposé on asbestosis and because of it, they knew better than 
to trust JM doctors, who were instructed to deny occurrences of disease in local workers. 
In agreeing to end the strike and return to work without any clear changes in dust 
elimination at the Jeffrey Mine, however, the workers showed a renewed acceptance of 
risk that remains in the community today. The people of Asbestos have never complained 
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about the negative health effects of the mineral since 1949, making risk a fundamental 
element of their local cultural identity.  
Not being able to predict the local acceptance of risk, the company was worried 
about the health of its employees at the Jeffrey Mine. As the strike of 1949 ended, 
company Vice President Vandiver Brown was warned by officials at the Gatke 
Corporation, JM customers and manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation, that 
“unless [asbestos producers] do something about [the health effects of asbestos] these 
little cases will breed like rabbits and they may grow as big as hares…”914 This was 
particularly threatening to the company because the strike had brought international 
attention to the hazards associated with the mineral. Arbitration meetings continued 
throughout the second half of 1949 to settle the dispute and come to a resolution on the 
dust-elimination demands made by the workers. A contract clause dealing with the 
dangers of dust at the Jeffrey Mine would be disastrous for JM, which had always 
maintained that dust was not a problem. In order to support this position, Dr. Kenneth 
Smith was once again asked to study the bodies of the workers in Asbestos and prove 
they were healthy.  
Although he had sympathized with the plight of the men on strike just months 
before, Smith did as he was instructed and protected JM by reporting falsified study 
results that showed the mineral did not harm Jeffrey Mine workers. The actual results of 
his study were top-secret and have never been examined in the historiography of 
Asbestos. Of the 708 employee x-rays he studied in 1949, Smith found that 89% of them 
had been in dusty areas for over 20 years and only 4 Jeffrey Mine workers had “normal” 
lungs. Of the remaining 704, 468 were in the early stages of asbestosis and 7 had full-
blown cases.915 Although JM knew its employees were getting sick, these were 
shockingly high numbers, especially during contract negotiations to settle a labour dispute 
that had focused on the issue of health. However, the union heads negotiating the terms of 
the new collective agreement in Asbestos would never hear of this report. 
Smith justified his policy of not informing the union or employees of their 
illnesses, which were permanent and irreversible, when he stated, “[a]s long as the man is 
not disabled it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can live and 
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work in peace and the Company can benefit by his many years of experience. Should the 
man be told of his condition today there is a very definite possibility that he would 
become mentally and physically ill, simply through the knowledge that he has 
asbestosis.”916 Smith continued to believe that he was on the side of the workers, but his 
statement also reveals that he thought the symptoms of asbestosis were so subtle, the 
people suffering from them would not notice. Smith seriously underestimated what the 
people of Asbestos knew about their own bodies as he helped protect JM from a scandal 
that could ruin it. The Jeffrey Mine was the major source of the world’s supply of 
asbestos and the industry would collapse if the mineral caused its workers to become sick: 
the bodies of the people of Asbestos had to be viewed as healthy. 
In order to ensure this, Smith suggested continuing to transfer employees to less-
dusty areas of the Jeffrey Mine when their x-rays became alarming and “before there is 
any possibility of a claim for compensation being submitted and accepted,” although the 
cases were too numerous for everyone to be transferred.917 The workers would not be told 
that they were being transferred because they were sick, but it is unlikely that they did not 
link sudden job changes with their decreased ability to breathe. Smith’s medical authority 
held weight in the community, despite his affiliation with JM, and workers accepted these 
relocations as part of their interaction with the Jeffrey Mine. As he ordered employee 
transfers, Smith urged the company to invest more money in better dust control because 
he had noticed significant exposure in the community down-wind of the mine and mill, 
showing that he understood that the entire town of Asbestos was at risk.  
JM officials absorbed Smith’s report with their usual combination of worry for 
their financial future and confidence in their ability to contain the situation. Company 
attorney J.P. Woodard casually warned, “dust is causing significant lung changes in many 
cases, it largely being a matter of time” before serious health effects occur,918 but C.M. 
McGaw, an official at the Jeffrey Mine, was a little more concerned. In the middle of 
contract negotiations he forwarded Smith’s report to JM’s head office and stated that it 
“shows our tremendous potential liability on exposure. Hope you can help speed approval 
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of the dust control appropriation.”919 Although JM President Lewis H. Brown claimed 
during the strike that the $1 million already spent on dust-elimination technology at the 
Jeffrey Mine was sufficient, Smith’s study frightened the company enough that it 
approved an additional $5.5 million for better dust control. Woodard wrote to McGaw 
that he hoped “this will make a real improvement in your working condition situation, 
both within and without the plant,”920 which acknowledges how much dust had become a 
community issue because of the strike: health reforms needed to be visible both at the 
Jeffrey Mine and throughout the town of Asbestos.  
Despite Woodard’s belief that the new funds for dust control would help ease 
tension in the community following the strike, JM kept both Smith’s findings and the plan 
for improved dust-elimination technology secret during contract negotiations. Admitting 
there was a dust problem would prove that the company knew the mineral adversely 
affected its workers, and union heads would use this to their fullest advantage. The 
company’s reputation had suffered during the strike and would only worsen if 
townspeople who did not work at the Jeffrey Mine knew they were getting sick due to 
clouds of dust. JM instead relied on the testimony of Dr. John Vorwald during contract 
negotiations, who had helped hide the stolen lungs of Asbestos workers earlier that year.  
In the arbitration meetings of 1949 Vorwald downplayed the severity of asbestosis 
and testified, “I would like to compare lungs with our two arms, two legs and our two 
eyes. When one goes bad we can use the other one, and we have two lungs in case of 
disease.”921 When pressed by union lawyers who suggested that this logic meant that if a 
man without an arm was impaired, a man with asbestosis was as well, Vorwald replied, 
“No, I don’t think so. He has an impairment of his lung tissue but he is not suffering from 
it.” Vorwald’s nonchalant attitude is especially shocking considering he had just 
instructed Smith to commission a confidential inquest into the link between asbestos and 
cancer because of the presence of it in the stolen lungs from Asbestos at Saranac.922 
Vorwald’s testimony helped convince the arbitration board to rule in favour of JM and 
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better dust control was not made part of the new collective agreement in 1949, something 
the workers would never have accepted at the beginning of the strike.  
Health issues took up 10 of the 57 pages of the arbitration ruling, far more than 
any other topic, and while JM had to publicly admit that asbestos was harmful, it was 
granted full control over how it dealt with this fact both within the barriers of the Jeffrey 
Mine and throughout the community of Asbestos.923 There was some debate over how 
long a worker had to be exposed to the mineral’s dust before he or she began to show 
signs of disease, and uncertainty was expressed over how much dust was too much. 
Neither the company nor the union leaders were inclined to think asbestos could be mined 
or processed without dust, and total elimination was never a consideration, which 
reflected the local cultural identity in Asbestos, the community’s acceptance of risk, and a 
widespread, longstanding societal belief that mining was dirty and no amount of reforms 
would change that. The willingness to live and work surrounded by dust they knew to be 
harmful indicates the extent to which the people of Asbestos had already decided to 
sacrifice their bodies in favour of a continued tradition of working at the Jeffrey Mine.  
As far as asbestosis was concerned, JM medical professionals convinced the 
arbitration board that Smith’s policy of removing workers from dusty areas when their x-
rays showed signs of fibrosis was effective in stopping the progression of the disease, 
while also allowing the bodies of employees time to heal themselves, falsely suggesting 
asbestosis was not permanent. JM manipulated medical evidence to maintain the image 
that the Jeffrey Mine did not give the people of Asbestos an incurable disease. The 
company did so because if they admitted to the severity of asbestos-related disease, the 
industry would be seriously threatened. JM was confident that it could contain the 
problem in the mine and mill. 
The 1949 strike was settled at the height of community concern over asbestos-
related disease and the potential toxicity of their land. While townspeople attempted to 
return to a pre-strike way of life at the start of 1950, JM was busy preparing its defences 
against another health threat caused by asbestos: cancer. While “asbestosis” was a 
confusing term to the general public, “cancer” was something everyone understood. 
Although Smith had not yet seen evidence of asbestos-related cancer in Jeffrey Mine 
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employees, he was worried about the increasing number of international medical reports 
on the topic.924 Whether he knew of the cancer cases discovered in the stolen lungs at 
Saranac is unclear. Smith re-studied all the x-rays he had on file in Asbestos and told Karl 
V. Lindell, the new president of CJM, that “[i]f we are to defend ourselves in the 
compensation courts we must have proof.”925 Smith also instructed Lindell to ignore 
Quebec’s new health regulation requiring occupational diseases to be reported because, 
“[w]e would not want to have this industry unjustly penalized.”926 JM was lucky to have 
resolved the strike without the full health risks of asbestos being made public, but the 
company needed to be prepared in case the dangers were exposed. It was necessary to 
deceive its workers and the government to ensure industry stability. The fact that Smith 
warned that JM would be “unjustly” penalized if the occupational illnesses in Asbestos 
were reported suggests that even though he appeared to sympathize with the workers and 
advocated for better dust control, Smith wanted to protect the company. 
It was crucial that the employees at the Jeffrey Mine had healthy bodies. Asbestos 
was the main source of the world’s supply of the mineral and because very little 
processing occurred, JM maintained that the fibre was in its purest form there. If medical 
studies of workers in other locations found a link between asbestos and disease, JM stated 
that it was because other materials or chemicals had been added after it left the Jeffrey 
Mine, which meant there was a problem with the processing, not the fibre. This was a 
wise defence because manufacturers, especially those in Great Britain where many of the 
damning medical reports originated, usually mixed Canadian chrysotile with South 
African crocidolite asbestos, seen as a more hazardous fibre.927 Smith had to show that 
the asbestos in the Jeffrey Mine did not make people sick, and he had to use the bodies of 
the workers in Asbestos as proof. As long as the workers were healthy, the company and 
the industry would be as well.  
  From the private correspondence of JM officials it is clear that they were not 
convinced of their own argument. At the beginning of 1950, Canadian lobby groups were 
pushing to have lung cancer recognized as an industrial disease, and Dr. Paul Cartier at 
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Thetford Mines confidentially reported 9 cases of lung cancer in his patients.928 Smith 
acknowledged the potential threat of cancer when he told Woodard in February 1950 that 
while he had not seen any evidence of the disease in Jeffrey Mine employees, this did not 
mean it was not there.929 Woodard replied that Smith should publish a report on what his 
x-rays showed as long as he was “sure” it would be favourable to the industry.930 A letter 
from Vorwald to Smith soon followed, urging him to quickly use the healthy bodies of 
Jeffrey Mine employees as a defence against damning medical reports because “another 
storm is brewing in Quebec, this time concerning a case of asbestosis with cancer.”931 
Vorwald did not expand on who or where this case referred to, but he did not need to: the 
presence of asbestos-related cancer in humans, rather than Gardner’s mice, was 
worrisome enough. The people of Asbestos could not be told of this new threat. 
JM had narrowly escaped catastrophe over the issue of asbestosis in 1949 and 
wanted to avoid any suggestion that asbestos was carcinogenic. The company was not 
alone in this endeavour, as the Quebec government had its own interests to defend. 
Asbestos was one of the most profitable industries in Quebec and Premier Maurice 
Duplessis wanted to keep it that way. In May 1950 he eased JM’s fears with an assurance 
that asbestos-related disease was not something with which his government was 
concerned. Duplessis wrote, “[l]es companies ayant fait tout ce qui était humainement 
possible de faire pour éliminer la poussière, et l’amiantose étant presque inexistante dans 
la province de Québec, il ne convenait pas d’imposer des clauses impératives à ce 
sujet.”932 Duplessis did not sympathize with the workers who had gone on an illegal strike 
for almost five months only a year before, and he left their occupational health in the 
trusted hands of JM. 
The Quebec government was committed to the promotion of the asbestos industry 
and used its citizens’ health as proof that the mineral was safe. In fact, the idea that 
asbestos was not only safe, but helped ensure the safety of the entire population, was a 
common mantra during the 1950s. One of the most extreme examples of this came at the 
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beginning of the decade when asbestos paste was used in heart surgeries to glue the heart 
and left lung together to promote new, healthy tissue and blood channels.933 
JM was not comfortable relying on these assurances, however, and in July 1950 
the company considered shipping raw asbestos from the Jeffrey Mine in paper rather than 
burlap bags to prevent dust from escaping during transport.934 CJM attorney Yvan 
Sabourin and president G.K. Foster also met with QAMA, the lobby group made up the 
province’s asbestos producing companies, to urge them to fund a study on the link 
between the mineral and cancer.935 JM was confident that by indirectly funding a study on 
the workers at the Jeffrey Mine, the company would continue to control the information 
discovered and released. Vandiver Brown wrote to Woodard to justify this and stated, 
“[w]e, of course, have never intended to suppress information obtained as a result of 
experiments financed by us, and on the occasions when we insisted that there be no 
publication without our advance ‘approval,’ we have had in mind that we might possibly 
wish to defer release until we could make such defensive moves as might be appropriate 
and available to us.”936 What Brown failed to mention was that if a study was particularly 
damning, its release date would be indefinitely deferred. 
JM had established a pattern of indefinite deferment over its history in Asbestos, 
and it was seen again when Smith notified JM of a new test for asbestosis developed by 
Dr. Wright while visiting operations at the Jeffrey Mine in 1950. By measuring the 
oxygen absorption in the blood of JM employees, Wright was able to determine the level 
of pulmonary fibrosis without relying on x-rays. A degree of interpretation remained with 
this new test, however, and Wright had the authority to determine the “normal” level of 
oxygen in blood and all other doctors had to follow his standards. Smith recommended 
that the release of Wright’s study be deferred because it “might change our whole 
examination program and seriously affect the field of compensation.”937 Wright had 
found at least 8 workers with definite signs of asbestosis in their blood who Smith had 
previously give a clean bill of health.938 Before this discovery, Smith was the ultimate 
authority on the bodies of the workers at the Jeffrey Mine because of how he chose to 
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interpret shaded x-ray films, but a simple, non-interpretive blood test could destroy his 
reputation and result in an onslaught of compensation claims.  
Not only did the company agree to delay releasing this new study, it also chose to 
keep Gardiner’s old report on asbestos-related disease secret. Smith whole-heartedly 
agreed to this policy, especially after he discovered a case of asbestos-related skin cancer 
on Margaret Wolfe, an employee in the Jeffrey Mine’s Textile Department.939 The 
presence of cancer showed how serious the threat of dust was at the mine and mill. Wolfe 
was not informed of her illness and in 1951, JM erased all references to asbestos and 
cancer from their Industrial Hygiene Meeting Minutes.940  
Although these studies were suppressed, the people of Asbestos knew that they 
were of interest to the medical community. Job transfers and visiting doctors were not 
signs of a healthy workforce, but those employed at the Jeffrey Mine did not want to go 
on another strike over dust issues so soon after the one in 1949 destroyed their savings 
and failed to significantly improve conditions. They confronted the risks they suspected 
by continuing to work the Jeffrey Mine and by relying more on the opinion of JM doctors 
than their own bodily knowledge. The company had been good to Asbestos since it 
arrived in the community in 1918, bringing the first x-ray machines in the 1920s and 
funding a new hospital in 1948, even though examinations were running 3 to 4 years 
behind schedule because of the thoroughness with which their bodies were now 
studied.941 
JM used this trust to its fullest advantage. In 1952 Illinois ruled that all asbestos 
products entering the state must carry a warning label that read: “‘CAUTION—
ASBESTOS FIBER’ Inhalation of asbestos fiber over long periods may be harmful. The 
material should be so used as not to create dust or, if this is not possible, employees 
should be equipped with adequate protective devices.”942 Jeffrey Mine officials defied the 
ruling and refused to put the warning on their shipping bags so as not to alarm their 
employees or customers. What people did not know about the dangers of the asbestos 
industry was security for the company. 
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The 1952 interim report of QAMA’s study on asbestos and cancer indicated that 
tumours were starting to develop in mice exposed to high quantities of the mineral’s 
dust.943 By this time, Smith had retired and left Asbestos, although he continued to 
consult with JM. Dr. Anthony J. Lanza at Saranac Laboratories stepped into Smith’s role 
as the medical authority on the health of Jeffrey Mine employees. Although he privately 
told the company that Canada, not England, had the first cases of asbestos-related disease 
fifty years ago,944 he publicly stated that the cancer and asbestosis rates being reported by 
E.R.A. Merewether in Britain were strikingly different from the Canadian and American 
experience with the mineral. In Lanza’s public opinion, however, neither of these diseases 
were particularly problematic when only Canadian chrysotile asbestos was used.945  
British medical professionals did not enjoy being told their research results were 
questionable and Turner & Newall’s Dr. John Knox was granted permission to visit 
Asbestos and Thetford Mines in 1952 to see for himself. Knox found that there “has been 
a serious attempt to improve conditions in the mill here…but as it is made to deal with 
more material than originally designed for, it is practically ineffective on that account.”946 
Because of the large asbestos manufacturing industry in Britain, Knox was aware of the 
most modern methods used to prevent workers from being exposed to toxic dust, which 
included a limit on the amount of fibre processed each day and a sophisticated wetting 
and ventilation system that prevented dry particles from floating in the air. The great 
amount of fibre being processed in Asbestos, however, meant that JM operations there 
could not possibly accommodate these new methods.  
The safety standards in Asbestos were appallingly low to Knox, who was unable 
to take a dust-count measurement because the mill was too dusty for his equipment to 
work. He also stated that the “[w]eaving [department] was to me really shocking…Good 
dust counting would have revealed a disturbing state here. There was no wetting...and no 
exhaust used.”947 The alarming state of the area where a number of local women worked 
was worrisome, but not especially embarrassing for JM because the company had medical 
evidence to disprove Knox’s comments. Since 1918, only 8% of their total workforce had 
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ever filed claims for compensation due to occupational disease, and this was considered 
to be an insignificant number compared to medical reports confirming the extreme 
toxicity of the mineral.948 In the opinion of JM officials this meant that 92% of their 
employees had been unaffected by asbestos. Rather than indicating a lack of under-
reporting of medical evidence, this was used as proof that the Canadian chrysotile 
contained within the Jeffrey Mine was relatively benign.  
Statistics like this maintained the image that asbestos was not as harmful as some 
believed, but Knox’s appraisal of operations at the Jeffrey Mine was taken seriously. 
Because dust levels could not be further reduced without great expense to the company, 
officials began to renew their efforts to get employees to wear respirators. Many did not 
want to wear these protective devices because they continued to clogged easily and 
restricted breathing. It also challenged their concept of how to work in a dangerous 
profession and workers rejected these artificial extensions of their bodies. Employees 
refused to wear respirators that were re-used from shift to shift, and when personal 
devices were introduced, the company found that workers had to be watched at all times 
to ensure they were being worn.949 The fact that Jeffrey Mine employees continued their 
tradition of refusing to wear respirators even after LeDoux’s exposé had made them fully 
aware of the risk of asbestosis reveals how deeply an understanding of risk had permeated 
the local cultural identity. This action does not mean that workers intentionally made 
themselves sick, but rather that they did not, or could not, believe that their bodies would 
be adversely affected by the mineral. If the people of Asbestos only worked at the Jeffrey 
Mine because it was the largest employer in the community and it provided them with a 
steady paycheque, they would have worn the respirators while lobbying for even more 
dust control measures. Their refusal to do so advances our understanding of how 
community members understood the risks associated with the mineral while maintaining 
their local identity, rooted in their connection to the land and the steady income it 
provided. 
The fact that workers refused safety measures to protect them from dust they 
knew to be dangerous only five years following the 1949 strike puzzled JM officials, who 
knew that the image that Jeffrey Mine employees were healthy had to be maintained. The 
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image of a healthy workforce was especially important in 1955 because of a report by Dr. 
W.C. Hueper that claimed asbestosis led directly to lung cancer and had already done so 
in 21 cases in the United States, 6 in Canada, 88 in Great Britain, and 12 in Germany.950 
Although JM restrictions on visiting doctors ensured that none of the 6 Canadian cases 
were Jeffrey Mine employees, Hueper’s report was dangerous. In response, the company 
authorized the publication of a thoroughly edited version of Smith’s 1949 assessment of 
the health of Jeffrey Mine employees. 
Whereas Smith’s original report stated that only 4 had “normal” x-rays, his 
published work claimed that 91% of the men he studied had no signs of asbestosis.951 It 
continued to state that of the 52 employees who showed signs of pulmonary fibrosis, none 
had signs of asbestosis and many of them had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for 20 to 40 
years. Smith’s published report only admitted to there being 7 employees who had 
definite asbestosis, but none of them were impaired in any way and continued to work 
without trouble. He concluded by stating that few employees exposed to chrysotile 
asbestos develop any signs of fibrosis, and those that do have asbestosis, “have been 
known to carry on their usual work and live fairly comfortable lives for several years.”952 
Smith did not say whether the 7 men he admitted to having asbestosis had been informed 
of their disease or not, and if the reason they lived “fairly” comfortable lives was because 
he reassured them their painful symptoms were nothing to worry about.  
That Smith did not publish his 1949 study without JM’s approval of his altered 
conclusions shows how much control over medical evidence the company had. The 
workers at the Jeffrey Mine were relatively isolated and no doctors from outside the 
community or the company could examine their medical files without JM consent. While 
closed files may not sound unusual, within the context of the international medical 
community’s interest in the mineral, it was, as visiting doctors were common in industry 
towns throughout the 20th century. The health of Jeffrey Mine employees appeared to 
remain—at least publicly—and this strength would become increasingly important as the 
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years passed and the amount of medical evidence contradicting Smith’s altered 
conclusions grew. 
“‘ignorance is bliss’ has been expensively disproved,” 1955-1972 
Smith’s work was taken seriously within the Canadian medical community, which 
had difficulty making inroads in Quebec because of linguistic differences.953 His study 
convinced Canadian doctors that asbestosis was a rare, non-fatal disease,954 but JM 
remained concerned over QAMA’s study on the links between asbestos and cancer led by 
Drs. Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan. Because he was employed by the asbestos 
producers of Quebec, Braun tried to make the study’s findings positive when he wrote to 
H.M. Jackson in 1957 that of the 99 cases of asbestosis and lung cancer studied, only 19 
of them were miners, which suggested that “the possibility of an association between lung 
cancer and asbestosis is much more likely to exist in asbestos factories than in mining 
operations.”955 The Jeffrey Mine could still be perceived as safe, even if the mineral was 
continuously shown to be toxic. Although operations at Asbestos included a mill, the size 
and repute of the pit meant that the dustier mills were often overlooked.  
The belief that milling was more dangerous than mining was not reassurance 
enough for JM, and this information was taken out of the final report, termed the “Braun-
Truan Report,” before it was released. In the confidential draft submitted to JM in 1957, 
Braun and Truan stated that they believed incidences of asbestosis were considerably 
under-reported by company doctors, which directly led to an increase in asbestos-related 
lung cancer.956 The underreporting of asbestos-related disease certainly existed at the 
Jeffrey Mine, but there was no way JM would sanction the publication of this 
information. Braun and Truan concluded in their draft that independent medical 
professionals, not company-paid doctors, should evaluate all x-rays of asbestos 
workers,957 which suggested that company doctors were partly responsible for the 
increased occurrence in asbestos-related cancer because they had been instructed by their 
companies to not report the first signs of illness. This was a serious accusation and 
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highlighted the very real problems of medical care in Asbestos. If the company was 
seriously concerned about preventing occupational disease to save the industry from 
potential collapse and itself from certain litigation, officials would have to reform the way 
JM handled the issue of health at the Jeffrey Mine.  
As correct as Braun and Truan were in their assessment of health in asbestos 
mining communities, their statements on the dangers of working in processing factories 
and the irresponsibility of company doctors resulting in more numerous and more severe 
cases of asbestos-related disease were deleted from the publish report. JM wanted to 
know what was happening to the bodies of Jeffrey Mine employees, but officials needed 
this knowledge to be kept contained and confidential. The sanitized copy of this report 
was released by JM in 1958 and emphasized the smoking habits, rather than dust 
exposure or negligent medical professionals.  
The perspective Braun and Truan were allowed to take in the eventual publication 
became clear when they stated that the lung cancer rates of the workers they studied at the 
Jeffrey Mine were actually slightly below the provincial average. Braun and Truan 
studied 2,273 workers in Asbestos who were alive in 1950, the majority of whom were 
under 44 years old and smoked more than five cigarettes a day.958 Over the five years of 
the study, three of the 49 Asbestos workers who passed away died of lung cancer. Braun 
and Truan reported that of these three, “A.J.” was a 66 year old smoker who worked for 
26 years in a moderately dusty environment, “N.O.” was a 65 year old smoker who spent 
34 years in a mildly dust area, and “R.M.” was a 65 year old smoker who worked 37 
years in the same mild section of the Jeffrey Mine as “N.O.”959 These numbers allowed 
them to conclude that while they found a greater chance of those with asbestosis getting 
cancer, “the mortality rate from lung cancer does not appear to increase with length of 
exposure or with degree of exposure, a fact which presents strong evidence against the 
carcinogenicity of asbestos. On the other hand, the study indicates that cigarette smoking 
is a very important factor in the incidence of cancer of the lung.”960 The study also stated 
that none of the 1,265 non-smokers at the Jeffrey Mine developed lung cancer. Braun and 
Truan’s emphasis on smoking rather than on toxic dust shows just how much JM was in 
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control of medical literature on asbestos-related disease at this time. Jeffrey Mine 
employees did smoke, but lung cancer caused by cigarettes manifests differently in the 
body than cancer caused by asbestos, which stores tiny fibres of the mineral in tumours.  
Braun and Truan would have seen the unique type of lung cancer asbestos causes, 
but they were hired to boost the image of the industry, not expose its risks. The tobacco 
industry became a convenient scapegoat for asbestos companies looking to preserve the 
mineral’s image of being safe. Although Smith did not agree with this strategy, he 
believed that “[t]his publication should form the basis for future surveys and reports,” and 
would be a great tool to refute the studies of other medical professionals who did not have 
such a concentrated cohort of bodies to study.961 The people of Asbestos were the human 
equivalent of mice in a laboratory and they were constantly monitored to determine the 
progression of the diseases the mineral inflicted on the human body.  
The Journal of the American Medical Association accepted the Braun-Truan 
report for publication and editor Herbert E. Stokinger wrote, “I, myself, was particularly 
pleased to learn the main conclusion of the paper was against the association of lung 
cancer with asbestos, for I had come to a similar conclusion on obviously far less 
information but was afraid to say so for this reason.”962 The bodies of the workers at the 
Jeffrey Mine remained useful tools to ensure the legitimacy of the asbestos industry. 
Braun and Truan knew nothing of the post-retirement cases being secretly studied at 
Saranac Laboratories, which had discovered over 70 cases of unreported lung cancer in 
Asbestos by 1958.963 
This information is crucial to understanding how the people of Asbestos viewed 
their bodies at this time. They knew they had respiratory problems because of their work 
at the Jeffrey Mine, and they had not forgotten LeDoux’s 1949 exposé on the industry, 
but they did not know about the risk of cancer, and they chose to accept the threat of 
asbestosis. The Braun-Truan Report bought the industry time, and was effective in 
refuting international medical studies that proved the mineral caused cancer. Capitalizing 
on this, JM launched a series of print advertisements supporting the idea that asbestos was 
safe. One ad featured a baby sitting on a floor and saying, “What do you mean I’ll catch 
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cold on the floor? Our house is insulated with Johns-Manville Spintex!” The late 1950s 
also saw the launch of “Jim Asbestos,” a JM mascot in a lifeguard uniform that instructed 
consumers on how the mineral helped make everyday products safer.964 The message was 
clear: asbestos saved lives, it did not take them away.  
These medical reports and advertisements worked to maintain the safe image of 
the mineral and the continued economic success of the industry: Despite this outward 
sense of calm, JM was having difficulties in Asbestos. In a letter to company 
headquarters, Jeffrey Mine official J.R.M. Hutcheson wrote, “a possible health hazard is 
only part of the problem. We have the ever-present, and increasingly onerous problem of 
public and industrial relations. This facet of the problem is serious enough, the mere 
suggestion of a health hazard on top of the present problem would make the necessity that 
much more urgent.”965 Hutcheson’s letter reveals that workers knew their bodies were 
getting sick and they did not believe JM was particularly concerned with their health. 
Company-community relations had not improved since the 1949 strike and while workers 
were willing to accept some risk, it was because it was part of the local cultural identity 
they had developed over generations of working with the Jeffrey Mine, not because of 
affection for the company.  
By 1960, the link between asbestos and cancer was beginning to be understood by 
the general public966 and studies on asbestos factory workers began to show that lung 
cancer was only the start of what the mineral could do to the human body. For 
generations the literature on the health effects of asbestos centred on the respiratory 
system, but the 1960s brought a new challenge to JM’s assertions that the mineral was 
safe. In an article published in the Lancet’s 3 December 1960 issue, E.E. Keal provided a 
table listing the deaths of men and women suffering from asbestosis in British processing 
and manufacturing plants over a prolonged period of time. While the majority of male 
subjects with asbestosis died of carcinoma of the lung, the bulk of the female asbestos-
related deaths were caused by carcinoma of the ovary and breast, suggesting that the 
interaction between asbestos and the female body was unique.967  
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Aside from the confidential study Joan Ross performed in 1944,968 none of the 
JM-sanctioned articles mentioned the female employees at the Jeffrey Mine who worked 
in the dusty Textile Department, which Braun and Truan reported to be one of the most 
dangerous places at the Jeffrey Mine. There was an understanding among male asbestos 
workers that by belonging to a masculine industry, it was acceptable that their bodies 
were at risk. Women were a different story altogether, and if the people of Asbestos were 
alerted to this report they would be horrified. A British medical journal was not 
something the Francophone workers at the Jeffrey Mine had access to, however, and 
neither the English nor the French medical communities in Canada were concerned with 
the link between asbestos and cancer before 1965. The mineral was only mentioned once 
between 1955 and 1965 in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, and that 
occurrence dealt again with asbestosis, not cancer. Two mentions of mesothelioma occur 
in 1957 and 1959, but the link between the mineral and the specific cancer it causes was 
not acknowledged.969 Asbestos and the Canadian public were isolated from the discovery.  
JM knew this and wanted to maintain the idea that the pure asbestos taken from 
the Jeffrey Mine was not carcinogenic. JM President C.B. Burnett believed this could be 
done through more medical studies on the bodies of Jeffrey Mine workers, continuing the 
practice of not informing workers of their disease and treating them like mice in a lab. He 
explained that by simply saying, “‘no one has been hurt’ is to ignore a basic management 
responsibility of getting the facts upon which to make a decision. The old adage 
‘ignorance is bliss’ has been expensively disproved.”970 Burnett was referring to the 
compensation litigation brought on by American factory workers against the company in 
the late 1950s. JM could not afford people knowing that Jeffrey Mine fibre was toxic, and 
officials needed to know the complete progression of asbestos-related disease in order to 
prevent it from continuing and to keep the industry alive. The following year, Dr. 
Kenneth Smith went further than Burnett and asked if JM was comfortable continuing “to 
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impair the health of men and women [and] to shorten their lives by our actions.”971 Smith 
was losing interest in protecting the company as his sympathy for Jeffrey Mine workers 
continued to grow even after he retired and left the community because he knew the 
severity of the diseases they were suffering from. 
Smith also knew that it was only a matter of time before a full exposé on the 
health effects of the mineral was released with results even more dramatic than LeDoux’s 
1949 pamphlet on asbestosis. Dr. Irving J. Selikoff at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York 
was working on just such an exposé. Selikoff published a report in 1964 on 632 American 
asbestos insulation workers and found that consistent exposure to asbestos led to 
increased rates of cancer of the lung, pleura, stomach, colon, and rectum, further 
suggesting that asbestos-related disease went beyond the respiratory system. It also noted 
that the “incidence of more than 1% of deaths from pleural mesothelioma is strikingly 
high for a tumor which is generally considered to be extremely rare.” 972 Mesothelioma is 
a fast-acting cancer of the lining of major organs, such as the lung, heart, and abdomen, 
and this study implied that asbestos was making it common. Selikoff also directly refuted 
the conclusions Braun and Truan made in 1957 when he wrote that “the smoking habits 
of the asbestos workers cannot account for the fact that their lung-cancer death rate was 
6.8 times as high as that of white males in the general population.”973 With this study, 
Selikoff changed how asbestos and asbestos-related disease would be studied 
internationally in the future. Selikoff’s findings discredited JM and QAMA reports that 
claimed cigarettes, not asbestos, harmed workers, and his study received a lot of press 
because of it. Medical professionals with ties to the industry would no longer be trusted, 
and by extension, neither would companies.974  
This was a serious threat to JM’s health propaganda, which had used the 
connection between cigarettes and cancer to maintain the image that the mineral was safe. 
The company had even used a picture of a smoking Jeffrey Mine worker on the cover of 
its newsletter to shareholders in 1950. Of all those connected to JM, however, Smith took 
Selikoff’s study the worst. Condemning Selikoff as being someone who is “ambitious and 
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unscrupulous and is out to make a name for himself at the expense of the asbestos 
industry,” Smith reiterated that Jeffrey Mine employees were healthy and had none of the 
malignancies Selikoff claimed were common. He then related how Selikoff acted when 
JM allowed him to visit Asbestos years before: “he told Dr. Grainger in a rather pompous 
manner that Grainger didn’t know anything about reading [x-ray] films and that he, 
Selikoff, in that short period of time had seen much more disease than he imagined 
existed.”975 Smith’s contradictions illustrate the difficult situation he was in. He did feel 
sorry that Jeffrey Mine workers were put at risk, but he did not want his medical authority 
questioned any more than he wanted JM’s reputation to be tainted by health-related 
revelations.   
Selikoff’s study of American factory workers challenged Smith’s authority and 
suggested that the rate of disease at Asbestos was significantly higher than reported. 
Smith claimed that the men Selikoff studied had been exposed to chemical additives in 
the asbestos and pleaded with JM to make the medical records of its employees open to 
outside studies to prove Selikoff wrong.976 Fearful of what other medical professionals 
could discover, JM refused Smith’s request, knowing how dangerous it would be for 
someone like Selikoff to examine Jeffrey Mine workers. Despite this refusal, however, 
the company acknowledged that the mineral did pose some risk to human health when, in 
1965, the United States mandated that shipments of asbestos had to have warning labels 
placed on them and JM complied. The regulation showed that Selikoff was not alone in 
suspecting the dangers of asbestos, but the situation in Canada was different. Although 
the CMAJ finally published an international study on the link between asbestos and 
cancer in 1965,977 the federal government did not regulate the industry. Because of this, 
company official W. Hodgson wrote to JM’s head office and stated, “[w]e have been 
assured by Dr. K.W. Smith that it is not necessary to use the caution label in Canada, and 
therefore, we obviously do not want it on any of our cartons.”978 Placing stickers over the 
warnings on empty cartons sent to Asbestos was discussed, but the company decided it 
was too risky and chose to sand off the labels before they entered Canada instead. JM did 
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not want to risk their employees and other Canadians seeing the warnings and turning 
against the mineral. The company needed Jeffrey Mine workers, as well as Canadians in 
general, to continue believing the mineral was relatively benign in order to maintain 
production levels, industrial relations, and the idea that Canadian chrysotile was safe. 
JM also initiated a new QAMA study of Quebec asbestos workers in 1965. The 
company provided over half the funds for this organization and exercised a great deal of 
control over its actions.979 McGill University’s Dr. John Corbett McDonald was chosen to 
head this study. McGill had first allied itself with JM in the 1930s with the establishment 
of the university’s Industrial Hygiene Department, so this seemed a natural partnership. 
JM’s aim for the study was to “preserve the industry on which their business 
depends…[and] avoid any undesirable publicity or any precipitate action by the USA or 
Canadian Federal Government which might be detrimental to the industry.”980 Statements 
like this continue to show that JM was more concerned with bad publicity affecting 
profits than the health of its employees. The company had dozens of confidential medical 
reports supporting the fact that Jeffrey Mine employees were at serious risk by working 
with such a dangerous mineral. Rather than fund better dust elimination equipment in 
Asbestos, the company chose to pay for false medical reports to use as propaganda. 
JM hoped that McDonald’s study would eclipse Selikoff’s and assure employees, 
shareholders, and the general public that pure chrysotile asbestos was safe. This was 
especially important within Canada because of a 1965 study of 100 randomly chosen 
autopsies at 4 Montreal hospitals that showed the large presence of asbestos fibres in 57% 
of the men examined and 34% of the women.981 The air in all major Canadian and 
American cities at this time was full of asbestos fibres because of the mineral’s use in 
brake linings, pavement, and construction, all of which created toxic dust. That the 
Canadian medical community had finally become interested in the mineral was 
significant in itself, but the fact that airborne fibres could contaminate people not directly 
involved with the industry was a new discovery that could potentially ruin the company if 
anyone developed asbestos-related disease. The Francophone medical community in 
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Quebec also began to publish on incidences of mesothelioma in asbestos workers who 
had worked in the industry for over 20 years.982 The company had to protect its interests 
in the province by proving that the people who worked at the Jeffrey Mine were healthy. 
The need for McDonald’s study increased as Selikoff continued to publish on the 
negative health effects of asbestos, and public opinion turned against the mineral. 
Although QAMA admitted in their confidential meeting minutes that there was a direct 
link between asbestos and cancer, and described Selikoff as “a healthy nemesis,” 
members worried that “[w]e continue to receive an extremely bad press concerning the 
question of asbestos and health…the time has come for us to produce some rebuttal 
ourselves, either in a general way or medically substantiated to the extent possible at this 
time.”983 The industry was panicking, and it looked for any evidence to prove asbestos 
was not as bad as it seemed. Such panic was not only due to bad press. In July 1967, 
dockworkers in England refused to unload shipments of the mineral unless it was packed 
in dust-proof containers, and in March 1968 crocodolite asbestos was banned completely 
in Britain.984  
Adding to these difficulties was the realization that if asbestos products were not 
shipped with warning labels, JM could be liable for any damaging health effects the 
mineral caused. Worried over potential lawsuits, the company informed QAMA in 1968 
that even if the rest of the industry voted against placing warning labels on their 
shipments, JM would. The multilingual labels would read, “This product contains 
asbestos. Inhalation of asbestos dust over long periods of time may be harmful. 
Employees exposed to dust during use in application should be equipped with adequate 
personal protective devices.”985 Jeffrey Mine workers read these labels, but they 
continued to refuse to wear respirators and they did not lobby JM for better working 
conditions.986 The lack of fear shown by workers in 1968 sharply contrasts how they 
reacted in 1949 when LeDoux’s report on asbestosis was released, and shows how fully 
they accepted the risks associated with the mineral. Risk had become such a fundamental 
part of the local cultural identity that by the late 1960s, it had become habit. 
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Manufacturers all over the world objected to JM’s labels and believed the 
warnings would cause unnecessary concern within their workforce. A tile manufacturing 
company in Connecticut suggested that JM distribute an information pamphlet instead of 
the warning labels987 and the Asbestos Fibre Importers Committee in England stated that 
“[l]abour might refuse to handle asbestos unless packed in an impervious bag and 
probably insist on metal containers or fibre board drums,” if the labels were visible to 
those in the shipping industry.988 Complaints arrived from manufacturers in the 
Netherlands and Belgium, which explained that that the labels caused financial trouble 
and emotional trauma so JM should avoid the mistake of putting warnings on their 
shipments again.989 These reactions show how uniquely the people of Asbestos were 
internalizing the risks associated with the mineral their town was named after and that 
they were unafraid of. Workers in Belgium were experiencing emotional trauma, but 
those living next to the world’s largest chrysotile asbestos mine were calm. This put JM 
in a difficult position. Increased lawsuits against the company made the labels necessary 
so they would not be responsible for any additional illnesses, but warnings angered 
customers. In 1972, JM removed all warning labels from its Canadian products, on the 
basis that they were exempt from U.S. regulations.990 With an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 
Canadian jobs at risk if the industry collapsed, the company continued the “ignorance is 
bliss” policy even officials admitted was no longer working. 
In 1968, the mills in Asbestos were finally refurbished with new dust-collecting 
technology. Only two years later, however, after learning that 175 of its Jeffrey Mine 
workers suffered from asbestosis, company officials notified JM head office that the mill 
was too old to fix and that “we will have to live with the conditions until our new 
complex is in operation. We will encourage use of the Dustfoe 77 mask despite its 
practical and personal comfort limitations [but] [d]isciplinary action to the point of layoff 
will be avoided.”991 JM needed to invest even more money in updating its operations in 
Asbestos than it did in 1968. The fact that employees continued to refuse to wear 
respirators did not help the situation, but once again expressed how the people of 
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Asbestos internalized the risks associated with the mineral despite being informed of the 
dangers it posed to their health. Yes, respirators were uncomfortable, but the workers had 
seen family members and friends die of asbestos-related disease and many were 
experiencing the painful symptoms of asbestosis and cancer. The reluctance to admit they 
were sick furthers our understanding of local cultural identity and risk. 
“Poussière à Vendre: Rue Bourbeau,” 1971-1983 
JM did a study of asbestos-related cancers in community members not directly 
involved in the industry in 1971. The study found that not only was there a higher 
occurrence of bronchial cancer in Jeffrey Mine employees compared to JM’s American 
factory workers, but the people living in Asbestos also had a heightened risk of 
developing similar diseases because of their proximity to the mine and the clouds of 
mineral dust that hovered over the town.992 This threatened JM’s claim that Canadian 
chrysotile was relatively benign and it needed to fix the situation before the community or 
the press discovered it. Workers accepted risk while they were at the Jeffrey Mine, but the 
company was unsure if the community would mirror that acceptance. 
Fortunately for JM, the occupational culture that led Jeffrey Mine workers to 
confront risks with their bodies had extended into the community of Asbestos. Those who 
did not work at the Jeffrey Mine were not ignorant of the dangers the mineral posed 
through press coverage of LeDoux’s exposé, the demands of the workers during the 1949 
strike, and more recent warning labels that had been placed on shipments leaving the 
Jeffrey Mine. It was clear that dust was dangerous at the mine and in the mill. The clouds 
of dust that hovered over the community were just as dangerous and the local population 
was able to make this connection. Despite this, no mention of community concern for 
health appeared in the local newspaper or town council minutes during this period.993 By 
the 1970s, JM doctors were informing employees of many of their asbestos dust-related 
illnesses,994 including cancers, so the workers and their families were even more aware of 
what was happening to their bodies than they had been years before, but children 
continued to play in the dust that hovered over the community, writing their names in it as 
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it settled on local parked cars.995 Even with this information, the workers did not strike to 
ensure better dust control measures were taken at the Jeffrey Mine so that they, and the 
broader community, would not be exposed to it. Dust and risk had become part of the 
local cultural identity, and as we will see when the industry collapses in the early 1980s, 
without this risk, the community struggled to maintain this identity.  
An indication of this communal acceptance of risk was seen on 13 July 1971, 
when the headline of the local paper read, “Poussière à Vendre, Rue Bourbeau,” and an 
editorial cartoon depicted a woman crossing the road covering her face against the 
blowing dust while her dog exclaimed, “If I had known that she wanted to cross the desert 
today, I wouldn’t have gone out with her!”996 The air in Asbestos was thick with toxic 
dust, but while community complaints suggested that townspeople were frustrated with its 
presence, the spirit of the editorial cartoon was playful and accepting rather than angry 
and frightened: the people of Asbestos were not afraid of the dust. 
 
Editorial cartoon illustrating the streets of Asbestos, 1971997 
 
The company took this as a good sign. It did not want its employees or their 
family members to become sick, but until they discovered a way to eliminate the risk they 
appreciated the faith their workforce placed in the mineral. Before 1972 it had generally 
been accepted that the “safe” level for dust exposure in asbestos workers, known as the 
Threshold Limit Value (TLV), was five fibres per cubic centimetre. A survey of the dust 
levels in Jeffrey Mine operations at this time showed that the mills had over 100 fibres of 
asbestos dust per cubic centimetre,998 but the company disregarded the report because of 
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its plans to build a new factory. At the suggestion that JM reach only 2 fibres per cubic 
centimetres at the new plant, officials replied that this goal would be economically 
unfeasible and that it would lay off its employees rather than achieve it.999 Reducing the 
level of dust would mean reducing the amount of fibre processed, which would affect 
profits. Furthermore, the employees at the Jeffrey Mine were used to working with dust 
and even though the company failed to significantly lower dust levels, the workers did not 
notify the union and demand JM do so, as they had done during the 1949 strike. 
The acceptance of dust was partly due to the local cultural identity in Asbestos 
that included a certain level of bodily risk. Because of this, Jeffrey Mine workers were the 
ideal cohort for the McGill study JM and QAMA had been funding since 1965, and 
although Dr. John C. McDonald found that there were incidences of pleural thickening in 
the lungs of his subjects at Asbestos, he did not believe this was caused by the mineral. 
He stated that high levels of dust did lead directly to the development of mesothelioma, 
but believed that cigarettes caused more lung damage than asbestos.1000 McDonald also 
studied 428 female employees but found that while they worked in extremely dusty areas, 
few of them exceeded over 10 years of employment at the Jeffrey Mine, which resulted in 
fewer cases of disease.1001 McDonald did not mention whether he looked for cancer of the 
breast or ovary when he examined these women, which may have had an impact on his 
results. 
McDonald’s conclusions were well received by JM because they followed Braun 
and Truan’s lead and blamed the tobacco industry for heightened cancer rates rather than 
asbestos. The fact that McDonald was employed by McGill initially suggested that his 
was an independent study of Quebec’s asbestos workers and even Irving J. Selikoff was 
hesitant to attack his conclusions. While he disagreed with the results, Selikoff was only 
able to state that the level of dust a Canadian asbestos miner was exposed to was 
apparently less than that of an American insulation worker. Selikoff also accepted the 
idea that pure Canadian chrysotile may be less toxic than other types of asbestos, 
especially in its raw form.1002 Again favouring good publicity over the health of its 
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employees, this was a real victory for JM and the company used McDonald’s report to its 
fullest advantage. 
In its 1973 newsletter to shareholders, JM claimed, “Much adverse, inaccurate 
publicity has surrounded the discussion of asbestos and human health. The mineral 
asbestos is unique and too valuable to do without…As with many materials, asbestos can 
be harmful if not used properly.”1003 The company relied on McDonald’s study and the 
fact that it had spent over $20 million on improvements since 1962 to support its claims 
that the way JM handled asbestos made the mineral completely safe and that dust counts 
in its manufacturing plants were below 5 fibres per cubic centimetre. This statement was 
misleading and focused solely on JM factories in the United States. It avoided any 
specific mention of the mill at the Jeffrey Mine, which still had not been replaced and 
continued to have dust counts above 100 fibres per cubic centimetres.   
McDonald further aided JM’s claims that the mineral was safe when he published 
his study in the Canadian Medical Association Journal in 1973. He stated that there was 
no significant occurrence of mesothelioma in asbestos workers compared to the entire 
province between 1960 and 1970. Although he conceded that some victims of 
mesothelioma were domestically exposed to asbestos through interaction with family 
members who worked in the industry, McDonald emphasized that this did not mean the 
mineral was especially deadly, nor was it the only cause of the disease.1004 The report 
suggested that the asbestos industry had been victim to faulty medical reports that blamed 
the mineral for any disease that occurred in those who worked with it.  
Following McDonald’s publication, company officials hosted a QAMA meeting 
with other international asbestos manufacturing companies. Confidential minutes from 
the meeting suggest that although McDonald’s report had bought the industry some time 
to regroup after being so thoroughly attacked in the medical community and press, 
officials knew this calm would not last long. One official stated that the “all important 
problem…is how to deal with Selikoff…Within the Industry, Johns-Manville is the only 
Company with sound acknowledged expertise…The battle is still continuing and Industry 
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needs help.”1005 JM was so important to industry heads because of its control over the 
world’s largest and “safest” chrysotile mine and its international reach through trade and 
manufacturing networks.  
Another advantage JM had, according to QAMA, was that “the question of 
asbestos & health was not as big a problem in Canada as in the USA. Besides, the 
audience is mostly confined to Quebec and more in the English than in the French Press. 
It seems that the French media have never tackle[d] too strongly the asbestos & health 
problem. It should be pointed out, however, that the release of the McDonald report 
received excellent press coverage.”1006 Because JM’s workforce was mainly unilingual 
Francophone, the industry felt that there was a safe buffer between them and damning 
reports on the health effects of asbestos. Furthermore, aside from LeDoux’s 1949 exposé 
and Pelletier’s coverage of the resulting strike in Asbestos, QAMA’s observations were 
correct and the Francophone press in Quebec did not concern itself with health issues 
affecting the workers in one of the province’s most lucrative industries. Both LeDoux and 
Pelletier moved on to other issues and nobody took their place. English Canada did not 
care about it because it was in small-town Quebec, and French Canada, already lacking a 
critical mass sufficient to make an impact, was distracted at this time with issues of 
Québécois nationalism and independence, which dominated the Francophone media and 
medical community.1007 For the time being, at least, the industry was safe in Quebec, and 
JM established a Health, Safety and Environment department in 1974 to address concerns 
over occupational health and to prepare defences should their fortune in the province run 
out.  
The larger problem JM had to deal with at this time was the English media, which 
listened to Selikoff’s speeches and reports on the damaging effects of the asbestos 
industry. In 1974, CBC radio interviewed McDonald and repeatedly asked him if his 
study was funded by the asbestos industry. Although he stated that McGill supplied his 
funds, McDonald eventually admitted that QAMA had donated a significant amount of 
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research money to the university.1008 Coinciding with this revelation, the New York Times 
ran an article condemning McDonald’s study because of its links to the asbestos industry. 
McDonald threatened to sue the newspaper’s editor for libel and claimed that while 
QAMA had provided funds for the study, he was acting on the request of the Canadian 
government, not the industry.1009 Adding to the situation was the sudden resurgence of the 
Francophone medical community’s interest in asbestos-related disease because of the 
continued international focus on the province’s mines, with one report indicating that 
while mesothelioma occurrences were 1 in 10,000 for the general population, they were 1 
in 10 for those working in the Quebec asbestos industry.1010 
These numbers were alarming and JM’s reliance on the Jeffrey Mine as the 
perfect example of health and profits was weakening. In May 1975, JM’s Health, Safety 
and Environment Vice President Paul Kotkin sent filmmaker Walter Cooper to Asbestos 
to make a pro-industry documentary called “Asbestos and Health.” Upon his arrival, 
Cooper immediately wrote back to Kotkin, “the bagging operation on the main floor was 
shocking. There were accumulations of dust everywhere. It took more than an hour to 
clean up one bagging unit of visible dust before filming. At another bag unit, I noticed an 
ankle-high accumulation of fiber, which was being shovelled into an open cart for 
disposal by a worker, who was not wearing a respirator.”1011 Cooper’s observations 
echoed those of John Knox, the British doctor who had inspected operations at the Jeffrey 
Mine in 1952. The fact that dust levels remained high after more than 20 years 
demonstrates how ineffectual JM’s efforts were to reduce dust in the mill, despite its 
awareness of the severe health risks associated with it. It also reveals the extent to which 
employees had grown comfortable being surrounded by dust they knew to be dangerous. 
Cooper’s observations in Asbestos offer a rare perspective on what it was like to 
work at the Jeffrey Mine in 1975 because of the lack of oral histories and diaries from 
now-deceased workers. He explained, “Fiber continued to spill from the bags onto the 
floor, where other workers tracked through it...I saw a QC man at the bagging operation 
open at least four bags, grab a handful of fiber, throw it into an open plate, and then break 
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it apart and swish it around. He did not wear a respirator.”1012 The emphasis placed on 
employees at the Jeffrey Mine working in dusty areas of the mill without respirators is 
telling. Protective devices were provided by JM, but the workers continued to refuse to 
wear them even though they knew breathing in the dust was dangerous. Employees also 
showed their willingness to confront the risks of the asbestos industry by continuing to 
work at the Jeffrey Mine rather than organizing another strike over health issues or 
moving their families elsewhere and retraining for another occupation. These were 
options available to Jeffrey Mine employees, but the fact that conditions had not 
significantly changed in the mill since Knox’s 1952 visit suggests that over decades of 
working with dust, risk acceptance had become a permanent feature of the local cultural 
identity. Not understanding the historical context of this identity, Cooper was astounded 
at the amount of dust in the air at the Jeffrey Mine and had to stop filming three times to 
clean his equipment. He noted that the mill he was filming in had been closed for repairs 
and had just completed its weekly 2-hour cleaning session, done mostly with brooms, 
which did a better job of stirring up clouds of dust than eliminating them. When the 
filming was over, Cooper and his cameramen found that along with their clothes, bodies, 
and hair, their cars in the parking lot were covered with dust.1013 
Cooper showed how the people of Asbestos lived and worked with the mineral 
and that dust was something that affected and covered the entire community. Soon after 
his visit, Health and Welfare Canada released its first study on asbestos-related disease 
and reported that Ontario, which had a large manufacturing industry that relied on the 
mineral, had 69 cases of mesothelioma between 1960 and 1970, while Quebec had at least 
102. It concluded that while chrysotile was safer than other types of asbestos fibre, 
“[d]efinite health hazards exist in the Canadian workplace due to high levels of 
occupational exposures to asbestos together with inadequate health surveillance and 
protection.”1014 This statement shows that by 1975 at the latest, the Canadian government 
knew asbestos workers were at risk because of the harmful effects of the mineral, and that 
companies like JM were not adequately addressing the issue. The company proved Health 
and Welfare Canada correct when it told its shareholders in 1975 that occupational and 
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community exposure to asbestos dust was not a significant issue.1015 Nevertheless, the 
Canadian government did not insist that companies reform their approach to occupational 
health and safety. Despite this lack of action, and although there was little JM could do 
until the new mill in Asbestos was constructed, the company finally made the use of 
respirators mandatory if exposure was above 2 fibres per cubic centimetre.1016 The 
respirators designed for this type of filtration, however, were useless in environments like 
the Jeffrey Mine, where the concentration of dust was so high that the filters clogged 
immediately, making it even harder to breathe.  
This was yet another sign that working conditions at the Jeffrey Mine were 
dangerous, but when Thetford workers went on strike in 1975 because of heath concerns, 
the employees at Asbestos followed them but kept their dispute to wages.1017 By choosing 
to leave health issues out of the strike, the people of Asbestos showed their conviction 
that the adverse bodily effects of the mineral were not an issue for them. While they did 
not fully trust JM, they accepted the health risks associated with the industry and enjoyed 
the rewards of working jobs their fathers and grandfathers had before them. Furthermore, 
the people of Asbestos were aware of the growing negative publicity surrounding the 
mineral their community was named for and they understood that it needed to be 
supported if the industry—and the town—was to survive.   
Although workers continued to support the Jeffrey Mine, publicity on the negative 
health effects of asbestos was rapidly increasing and the Environmental Protection 
Agency became involved as American mothers began to fear for the safety of their 
children who attended schools insulated with the mineral. In order to gain some control 
over the situation, in 1976 JM funded a program designed by Selikoff to research ways to 
detect mesothelioma cases early enough to cure them. In addition to this, in 1977 the 
company introduced a “no smoking” policy for its workers in all JM operations because 
“Research shows that asbestos workers who do not smoke cigarettes have no greater 
incidence of lung cancer than is found in the general population. Asbestos workers who 
do smoke, however, have an incidence of lung cancer that is 92 times greater than 
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asbestos workers who don’t smoke.”1018 The tobacco industry was once again a 
convenient scapegoat, but the policy had little effect on how outsiders would perceive 
operations at the Jeffrey Mine. The federal-provincial Beaudry Inquiry of 1976 looked 
into the health of the province’s asbestos workers after the Thetford strike, and reported 
that it was appalled at the levels of dust workers were exposed to each day.1019 
Governments were beginning to take notice of the health problem in the asbestos 
industry, but loose regulations were blamed, not the inherent toxicity of the mineral.  
JM’s Health, Safety and Environment Vice President Paul Kotkin actually echoed 
this sentiment, writing, “[i]f the division cannot complete the environmental clean-up of 
this textile operation, then serious consideration should be given to shutting down the 
operation [in Asbestos]. The Jeffrey Textile Plant is an embarrassment as it does not meet 
J-M’s standards and has not met them for a good number of years.”1020 Jeffrey Mine 
operations could not be shut down because it was the main source of JM’s raw mineral 
and the foundation of its defence against reports that claimed asbestos was dangerous. 
The company introduced a policy that made the wearing of protective clothing and 
respirators mandatory in areas that had a higher fibre count than 1.2 per cubic 
centimetre.1021 This was well within the new limits set by the Quebec government in 
1976, which dictated a maximum TLV of 2 fibres per cubic centimetre.1022 JM also 
effectively closed Asbestos off to outside media and medical professionals until the new 
mill was completed. As a result, a 1978 CBC radio report on Quebec’s asbestos industry 
left the Jeffrey Mine out and instead spawned headlines such as, “Véritable génocide à 
Thetford.”1023 The press could not say the same about Asbestos, however, as the local 
population did not make health an issue. 
The lack of agitation for health reform at the Jeffrey Mine allowed JM to pose as 
an industry leader in occupational safety. In its 1980 edition of JM Today, the company 
provided a “Special Asbestos Update,” which stated that JM would refuse to sell its 
products to countries and places that would not uphold the strict health regulations placed 
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on the American asbestos industry. It denied that the company had ever withheld damning 
medical reports from their employees and emphasized that asbestos did more good than 
harm. JM products were essential in developing countries that required both shelter and 
reliable water and sewer systems because “[p]roviding these with asbestos cement 
products does not require sophisticated technology. It requires for the most part simply 
the importation of asbestos fiber—a material much less costly than substitute building 
materials such as steel, imported wood or petroleum-based products.”1024 Despite its 
negative health effects, according to JM, the mineral still saved and improved lives.  
The town of Asbestos was featured in the update as the source of all the potential 
good that could come from JM products. The magazine profiled Norman Chartier, who 
had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for four decades and was now a mill supervisor. Although 
we need to remember that his statements were made with the intention of boosting the 
image of JM and the mineral, Chartier hinted at the local cultural identity in Asbestos 
when he stated that no job was 100% safe, but “if a man uses common sense on the job 
and follows the rules set down for his protection, he’s more apt to get into trouble when 
he’s not working.”1025 In Chartier’s opinion, workers were so fully protected at the Jeffrey 
Mine that the only time anything bad could happen to them was when they were at home 
or socializing in town, unsupervised by JM.  
This was the type of information the company wanted its employees to believe 
and publicize. Chartier also dismissed the negative reports the industry had received 
recently as meaningless “propaganda” that more accurately described the situation 20 to 
40 years before. He stated that the “enormous effort and energy devoted by the company 
over the past several years in protecting workers’ health is beginning to pay off....If you 
believe everything you read in the newspapers or watch on television about asbestos, then 
there’s no future for our industry.”1026 The idea of there being no future for the industry, 
and therefore for Asbestos, was more terrifying to Chartier than the potential health 
threats the mineral caused, and it is likely other Jeffrey Mine workers felt the same.  
In Chartier’s opinion, he had lived “the good life” in Asbestos thanks to the 
mineral and that “[u]nder today’s conditions, I’d encourage people to work in this 
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industry. As a matter of fact, if I were starting all over again, I wouldn’t hesitate—I’d 
apply for the same job again.”1027 Chartier was not worried about his health despite the 
fact that he had worked in one of the dustiest areas of the Jeffrey Mine since 1936. His 
life, and the risks he faced, was what was expected and accepted in Asbestos as part of a 
local cultural identity developed over generations. The company knew the strength of this 
identity and while JM now informed its employees of their illnesses when they were 
discovered, officials still believed the company had done no wrong by keeping reports 
secret in the past. JM justified this belief because Asbestos was a company town and if 
the population could not work at the Jeffrey Mine, no alternative jobs were available and 
the community would collapse.1028 The company also released a pamphlet in 1981 
entitled, “Asbestos, Health and Johns-Manville” which stated that the asbestos-related 
diseases of today were due to a lack of knowledge 20 to 40 years before and that no new 
cases would develop now that the company was aware of the risk.1029 This dissertation 
has shown that JM 1981 statement was false: the company had known of the health risks 
associated with the mineral since the early 1920s when the first asbestos-related death 
was reported, but chose not to act because of fears of bad publicity and litigation. The 
Canadian medical community supported JM’s claim that while carcinogenic, chrysotile 
was not as dangerous as other types of asbestos and working with the mineral was 
equivalent to smoking only 3 to 4 cigarettes a week.1030  
The support of the Canadian medical community was important because it 
legitimized JM’s claim of past ignorance and drew public attention away from the issue. 
The Canadian medical community—both Anglophone and Francophone—was exposed to 
international reports detailing the epidemiology of asbestos-related disease, but chose not 
to investigate further, as seen with the lack of publications on the mineral during the 
1980s, possibly because industrial diseases were no longer as funding-attracting or as 
interesting to medical researchers as “newer” disease such as AIDS were. While national 
and international focus on the health effects of the mineral came and went, the people of 
Asbestos were constantly aware of them. Dealing with risk at the Jeffrey Mine and in the 
community had become habit for the local population, but not because they did not know 
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or feel how the mineral was affecting their bodies. This chapter has shown that Jeffrey 
Mine workers were aware of the health issues surrounding their industry and their land 
not because of the Canadian medical community, French Canadian journalists, or 
government officials, but rather shockingly because of JM’s increased willingness to 
finally inform employees of their illnesses when they were detected and introduce 
mandatory occupational health and safety measures at the Jeffrey Mine. The fact that 
local knowledge of the risks associated with asbestos came from the company meant that 
the community’s understanding of the mineral’s dangers was shaped by JM officials. It 
was difficult to deny that the health effects of the mineral were bad, but the way the 
people of Asbestos rooted their local identity in their connection to the land, combined 
with how they were made aware of the mineral’s risk, meant that they remained 
committed to JM, and the belief that the health of their bodies was tied to the health of the 
industry.  
Despite local support, JM continued to be plagued by litigation in the United 
States, where workers compensation laws made the company liable for multi-million 
dollar class-action suits, and bad press around the world. Relying on the supposed 
healthiness of Jeffrey Mine employees was no longer enough. In 1982, unable to 
financially support itself due to the rising costs of litigation, and anticipating 52,000 new 
lawsuits averaging $40,000 each to appear in the future, the company filed for 
bankruptcy.1031 JM left the Jeffrey Mine in 1983 after having been such an important, 
although controversial, presence in Asbestos for more than half a century. Despite JM’s 
bankruptcy and abandonment of the Jeffrey Mine, the people of Asbestos remained 
committed to the industry. Some citizens left town to seek more stable, healthy 
employment, but most remained. 
The Quebec government under the control of René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois 
nationalized the industry and eventually subsidized the town as a new public company 
named JM Asbestos took over the Jeffrey Mine. Nationalization effectively blocked any 
outside inquiries into the health of the workers in Asbestos1032 and began a trend in which 
the provincial and federal governments would support the industry by doing what JM 
could no longer do: denying damning medical reports, overlooking the welfare of 
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community members, refusing to properly label shipments of asbestos to other countries, 
and agreeing to sell the mineral to developing nations that would not uphold the strict 
health regulations needed to make the industry safer. These are actions JM could not 
continue, and while the government did not resort to the most severe of JM’s cover-up 
methods—altering and suppressing medical reports, stealing lungs from dead miners and 
sanding off its own warning labels—its continued support of the toxic industry remain 
shocking.  
Although government subsidies often gain coverage in the national and 
international press, the more significant aspect of this issue is the continued acceptance of 
risk in Asbestos. Generations of citizens have worked at the Jeffrey Mine surrounded by 
dust they knew to be dangerous, and they continue to do so today despite the widespread 
knowledge of how the mineral can affect human health. JM employees consistently 
refused to wear respirators when they were provided and chose not to push the company 
for better workplace safety in the years following the 1949 strike. This chapter has shown 
that the 1949 strike changed the way the people of Asbestos understood and accepted risk 
as part of their local cultural identity. In order for their community to survive, the mineral 
had to be safe. Because they interacted with asbestos in its purest form, right from the 
Jeffrey Mine, it was crucial that they did not fear the dust or what they knew it was 
capable of doing to their bodies. JM manipulated medical evidence and human bodies in 
Asbestos, but this chapter has also shown that the community played an active role in the 
local understanding of bodies and management of risk after the 1949 strike.   
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Chapter 8: Altered Authority: The Body Politic, 1949-1983 
In 2004 Asbestos and Canada made international headlines at the United Nation’s 
Rotterdam Convention when government officials prevented chrysotile asbestos from 
being placed on the Prior Informed Consent list of dangerous minerals, which would 
hinder trade of the fibre. The government justified this manoeuvre by stating that asbestos 
is safe, “provided it is manufactured, handled with care, and exposures to dust are 
stringently prevented or controlled to low levels.”1033 No mention was made of the 
dangers the mineral posed in its raw form. Furthermore, just because it could be used 
safely does not mean it would, and the government has never ensured that proper health 
and safety regulations are upheld in the developing countries to whom it sells the mineral. 
Canada mainly competes with Russia for asbestos markets in developing nations, which 
makes American environmental consultant Barry Castleman believe, “If the only people 
saying it’s good are the Russians, we can deal with that. Canada saying it’s good makes it 
more complicated.”1034 Castleman’s reasoning is based on the idea that Canada is often 
seen as an “international Boy Scout”1035 when it comes to human rights and safety, which 
makes its support of the industry shocking.    
This chapter will argue that Canada’s ongoing support of the industry is rooted in 
the local cultural identity in Asbestos, which gives the community the confidence to 
successfully lobby for its survival. Global asbestos trade historians Jock McCulloch and 
Geoffrey Tweedale believe that one of the major constants in the history of the industry is 
“the malevolent role played by Canada in promoting asbestos use in the developing 
world. Canada is a member of the G8 and it carries some influence on the global stage. Its 
industry and government, backed by a sophisticated scientific community, have used their 
access to elite forums, including the WHO [World Health Organization] and the WTO 
[World Trade Organization], to promote asbestos.”1036 When examining how the people 
of Asbestos understood their community and their industry following the 1949 strike, 
however, we can see that the selling of the mineral today is based on a desperate local 
attempt to preserve the cultural identity formed in Asbestos through generations of 
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confronting risks to community, health, and finances working the Jeffrey Mine posed. 
Asbestos has a past that far exceeds the 1949 strike. By examining the community from 
1949 to 1983, this chapter will show how the people of Asbestos developed new ways to 
articulate their cultural identity to influence both industry and politics, and how they 
continue to do so by looking to their past.  
“Le travail, c’est la lutte pour la vie,” 1949-1952 
After people celebrated the end of the strike on the streets of Asbestos in July 
1949, the local paper printed the agreement so that everyone would be aware of the terms. 
Although some issues would be reserved for continued arbitration, the union was to be 
recertified and JM would bring the striking workers back to their jobs as quickly as 
production rates allowed.1037 The company would also expand its underground mining 
operations to allow for 100 more employees.  
Despite the efforts of the union and the local paper, JM president Lewis H. Brown 
did not trust that the finer details of the agreement were being related to the workers, 
which made them mistakenly believe that they had won the five-month battle that had just 
taken place. Brown sent a letter to each JM employee in Asbestos detailing the terms of 
the agreement and making it clear that the company, not the working class of the 
community, was victorious.1038 The letter emphasized that many of the striking workers 
would not be taken back at the Jeffrey Mine due to a global recession. Brown explained 
to lead arbitrator Quebec Archbishop Maurice Roy that the “reduction in employment 
would have taken place even had there been no strike at all. This fundamental fact of the 
recession in business as the basic cause of unemployment which will exist in Asbestos, is 
still the heart of the problem and everyone there must be made to understand the 
facts.”1039  
While there was a global recession that had impacted the asbestos industry before 
the strike, the five months of the conflict, which saw no fibre extracted from the vital 
Quebec mines, in truth meant there was now an increase rather than a drop in demand for 
the mineral.1040 Brown was misleading in more than this one instance. He explained that 
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all the workers except those facing criminal charges would be “put back to their 
occupation” at their 1948 wages, but this meant any job at the Jeffrey Mine, not their 
former placement, which was a significant difference, especially because their original 
positions had been taken by strikebreakers, who, Brown explained, would not be affected 
by employee cutbacks due to the recession.1041 The message was clear: Brown wanted the 
people of Asbestos to understand and accept their defeat. 
The thought that strikebreakers would keep their jobs while unionized workers 
who had not earned wages for the past five months had to face the uncertainty of 
unemployment angered the people of Asbestos. While Brown misled employees in his 
letter to demonstrate the degree of JM’s power over the community, and replacement 
workers hired by the company after 1 May were let go once the conflict was settled, only 
260 strikers were taken back at the Jeffrey Mine in July. Over the duration of the strike, 
workers had each lost an average of $1,066 in wages1042 and they were outraged that they 
would continue to earn nothing while strikebreakers from outside Asbestos worked their 
jobs. After receiving Brown’s letter, groups of men who had been on strike and who were 
now unemployed roamed the streets late into the night, throwing rocks through the 
windows of homes where strikebreakers or JM sympathizers lived, violently attacking 
any “scab” they encountered, and burning down a garage in Tingwick, home of many of 
the strikebreakers keeping their new jobs at the Jeffrey Mine.1043 Local police received 15 
calls in one night from townspeople afraid of the mob of workers who were expressing 
their anger with the current situation and their fear for the future. Although the strike was 
over, the ways in which it had affected the dynamics of the entire community were just 
beginning to be revealed.  
JM responded to the threat of angry, unemployed workers by having more 
policemen patrol the Jeffrey Mine 24 hours a day to ensure that the disgruntled men 
would not attack company operations.1044 The Jeffrey Mine was once again firmly under 
the control of JM, but remained a potential battleground. The local newspaper continued 
to deny its bias in favour of the company and decided to do its part to calm the people of 
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Asbestos by reporting that enough had been written on the conflict and that it needed to 
be forgotten,1045 which the local population could not do with so many Jeffrey Mine 
employees still out of work. Furthermore, the strike was continuously discussed in 
Quebec, with new labour disputes that arose being compared to the one in Asbestos. The 
strike was over, but the years that followed would show that the pain it caused the town 
would not go away. The blend of local pain and province-wide celebrity directly affected 
how people saw their community in the years following the strike. 
The post-strike community in Asbestos grew to be radically different than its pre-
strike manifestation. While still confident that the Jeffrey Mine would provide for them 
despite their hardships, the townspeople were worried about how the strike would be 
settled outside of contract negotiations: they were concerned about how poor relations 
and power struggles between JM and the workers would continue to harm the community. 
In August 1949, local resident Bertrand McNeil wrote to Quebec Minister of Labour 
Antonio Barrette and expressed the uncertainty that reigned in Asbestos in the months 
following the strike: “[j]’ai 20 ans, j’avais 1 ans et demi de service et j’ai besoin de 
travailler. Je n’ai pas de mauvais raports avec la compagnie. Je voudrais savoir s’ils vont 
tous nous reprende où s’ils nous font attendre pour rien. Mon père a une grosse famille et 
une maison à payer et je suis seul pour l’aider. Je payais pour mon frère de 16 ans qui fait 
des études pour devenir religieux.”1046 McNeil’s letter offers insight into the post-strike 
atmosphere of uncertainty in Asbestos, expressed in his desire to know if he and his 
fellow workers would actually be taken back at the Jeffrey Mine. His concern for his 
father and the rest of his family demonstrates how much townspeople depended on JM for 
employment and how hard it must have been for these large families to survive during the 
strike. McNeil’s case was brought to the attention of the arbitration board and he was told 
that unemployment in Asbestos would end soon, but was given no definite date to ease 
his worries.1047 
McNeil was indicative of the type of people who lived in Asbestos in 1949. His 
letter showed that he aspired to nothing more than a life of stable employment at the 
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Jeffrey Mine. He was not a left-wing radical who wanted to overthrow the socio-political 
system of the province. The humble nature of McNeil’s letter was echoed in September 
1949 by Madame Eugène Tourigny, who also wrote to Barrette. Tourigny asked the 
minister why strikebreakers remained at the Jeffrey Mine while locals were unemployed 
indefinitely. She wrote, “[v]ous allez peut-être me trouver exigeant mais vous savez j’ai 
un coeur de maman et lorsque je vois mes enfants sans ouvrage cela me peine beaucoup 
de voir les briseurs de grève pour la plus part faire souffrir des femmes et enfants des 
grévistes… c’est un grand malheur pour Asbestos que cette triste grève.”1048 The sorrow 
she expressed over seeing strikebreakers taking the jobs of her children gave her the 
authority to be heard. Her letter also claimed that the strikebreakers were not simply 
victims of mob violence but rather they had developed a hubris that led them to intimidate 
local women and children. Whether true or not, this idea contrasted the idea that 
replacement workers were simply victims of unruly mobs of unemployed men. 
Tourigny’s letter was also sent to the arbitration board1049 and showed that the 
involvement of the community’s female population in Jeffrey Mine affairs seen during 
the strike was not unusual. Although the people of Asbestos had turned against Maurice 
Duplessis and his Union Nationale government during the strike, Tourigny’s letter 
showed that some townspeople were still willing to ask them for help. Re-employment 
was a slow process, however, and the community would become increasingly self-reliant 
in the years to come.  
The self-reliance of the community was seen in October 1949, when town council 
began negotiations with the Shawinigan Water & Power Co. to install power lines in the 
newer sections of town.1050 The establishment of new power lines was normally 
something JM would have facilitated, especially considering streetlights were needed for 
Jeffrey Mine employees working nightshifts. The situation in Asbestos had changed since 
the strike and the way town council distanced itself from JM was simply one indication of 
this.  
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The town officially took control of its electricity on 12 December 1949 and 
purchased trucks to help transport and install the poles required for the new lines.1051 The 
year ended with JM and the local newspaper hoping for peaceful company-community 
relations in the future,1052 but many former strikers remained unemployed and everyone 
worried about future contract negotiations. As 1950 began, however, it became clear that 
a new era had as well. JM sent American Karl V. Lindell to replace G.K. Foster as 
president of CJM. Foster had become wildly unpopular in Asbestos since his involvement 
in the brutality of the provincial police at the Hotel Iroquois during strike, and JM was 
wise to replace him. In an attempt to improve company-community relations, Lindell 
spoke to townspeople of his hopes for the future and his commitment to learn French. The 
town remembers Lindell fondly even today as being someone who brought a new attitude 
of cooperation and consideration to Asbestos.1053  
Lindell’s attitude complemented the approach town council now took with 
community affairs. In February 1950, “le conseil demande instament à la Canadian Johns-
Manville Co. Ltd., de faire tout en son pouvoir pour trouver dans son industrie de 
l’emploi pour les personnes sans ouvrage qui demeurent à Asbestos.”1054 Council was 
frustrated with the company’s handling of re-employment and made it clear that JM’s 
priority should be the citizens of Asbestos, not strikebreakers. If Lindell was sincere in his 
commitment to the community, he needed to return the formerly striking workers to their 
jobs at the Jeffrey Mine. The majority of these workers were taken back by April.  
A week following this demand, the collective agreement between the workers and 
JM that had been pending since December 1948 was finally signed. The workers received 
a 10-cent per hour raise, one additional paid holiday, and two weeks of vacation after 
being employed at the Jeffrey Mine for three years.1055 These terms failed to address the 
major issues of land use, dust control, and the desire for employees to have a say in 
company promotions the strikers had fought for at the beginning of 1949. Their 
acceptance of the terms shows us how desperate workers were to return to their jobs at the 
Jeffrey Mine. These were battles the workers could fight in the future. 
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The community saw the new contract as an achievement because it officially 
ended the strike, but many worried about how the conflict had affected the town’s image. 
New labour disputes in Quebec were still being compared to the one in Asbestos, which 
prevented the town from moving past the painful memories it caused.1056 Furthermore, 
Duplessis used the violence of the strike to reinforce his anti-communist loi du cadenas 
and limit the power of unions in Quebec.1057 When Archbishop of Montreal Joseph 
Charbonneau was removed from his position and forced into a west-coast retirement in 
February 1950, the international press believed it was because of the role he played in the 
strike.1058 Many also speculated that Sherbrooke’s bishop, Philippe Desranleau, would 
soon follow Charbonneau for similar reasons, but his untimely death prevented it. The 
strike was becoming part of Quebec’s political culture and the people of Asbestos were 
awarded a power they neither sought nor fully understood. 
Although they heard through newspaper reports how the strike was transformed 
into legend outside the community, townspeople remained removed from it and continued 
to focus on their work at the Jeffrey Mine. Despite Brown’s previous recession claims, in 
April 1950 the company announced that it had a $70,000 surplus from 1949 that it would 
share with its employees, almost all of whom had been hired back.1059 Part of Lindell’s 
approach to industrial relations in Asbestos, JM’s profit sharing fed the cultural identity 
because it acknowledged the important local role employees had in the global industry. 
Despite the positive feelings this bonus brought, Asbestos held a referendum in May and 
the town voted to spend $100,000 to attract new industries to the community.1060 The 
unemployment problem following the strike reinforced a lesson the people of Asbestos 
already knew: relying on a single industry and employer was dangerous. A new industry 
has never come to Asbestos, however, which has influenced the development of the local 
cultural identity and forced townspeople to accept that without the asbestos industry, the 
community would not survive. This knowledge is part of the reason why the people of 
Asbestos continue to fight for the survival of their industry today.  
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Despite the referendum, company-community relations continued to improve 
under Lindell’s management. In 1950 the company celebrated both St-Jean-Baptiste Day 
in June and Labour Day in September with its employees and their families for the first 
time.1061 Union heads were present and the militant curé Camirand gave a picnic mass. 
Unheard of just a year before, the workers and the company had come to terms with the 
power each held in the community and were able to coexist because of their 
understanding. Twenty-nine new members of the Quarter-Century Club were inducted in 
1950, bringing the total number of employees who had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for at 
least 25 years up to 205, which was longer than many JM officials in Asbestos.1062 By 
October, almost half the town’s population worked at the Jeffrey Mine, matching the pre-
strike employment rate.1063 Authority in Asbestos was shared between the workers, JM, 
and town officials because they knew they depended on each other for survival. Town 
council did not suddenly renew its close ties with JM when it came to infrastructure, 
however, and council purchased its own snowplows to clear the winter streets so it would 
not have to rely on JM as it had in the past.1064  
A balance between dependence and independence was maintained in Asbestos 
into 1951 when a new collective agreement was signed with little dispute between the 
company and union representatives.1065 The workers received a 15% wage increase, a 
bonus for those on night shifts, one more paid holiday, and a social security plan that both 
JM and its employees paid into equally, which were significant accomplishments. The 
company also promised to rehire all of the remaining workers who had been unemployed 
since the strike within three months. These harmonious relations led the local paper to 
write that there was no news report because “C’est tranquille, dit-on, à Asbestos”1066 
There was no conflict in the community just two years after the most bitter strike the town 
had experienced, a sign of the new spirit of cooperation and cohabitation in Asbestos.  
The new spirit was further illustrated in May 1951 when JM opened Jeffrey Mine 
operations to the community to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the pit. This contrasted 
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the heavily guarded property during the strike of 1949, and over 3,500 people visited.1067 
JM also acknowledged the importance of working at the mine to the people of Asbestos 
when Lindell stated in his Labour Day message that “Le travail, c’est la lutte pour la vie. 
Le Créateur nous a entourés de richesses qu’Il veut que nous exploitions à notre 
profit.”1068 Work, religion, and the Jeffrey Mine were interwoven for the townspeople 
who built their lives and cultural identity around them. 
These good relations occurred independently of how others were beginning to see 
the community and what it could represent. In the summer of 1951, 75 union heads 
representing miners throughout Quebec held their annual meeting in Asbestos.1069 The 
town had maintained its reputation for being a place of importance for the labour 
movement in the province. Because industrial relations had improved remarkably, local 
workers continued their belief in the strength of unions, as it was the CTCC that had JM 
drop the charges against labour leaders Rodolphe Hamel and Armande Larivée, along 
with 19 others, for their roles in the riot of May 1949 as part of contract negotiations at 
the end of 1951. The union also convinced the company to finally rehire the last 
remaining worker who had not been taken back at the Jeffrey Mine since the strike and to 
return all its workers to their original positions.1070 JM and its employees were on 
excellent terms in the early 1950s, but this was largely due to Lindell. The people of 
Asbestos continued to remember the pain the strike caused the community, and expressed 
it by directing anger towards Premier Duplessis.  
Asbestos had previously voted in favour of the Union nationale by electing Mayor 
Albert Goudreau as their provincial representative, but his popularity had disappeared in 
1949 and he was defeated in the next municipal election. Goudreau remained committed 
to Duplessis and to representing the people of Asbestos despite this loss, but when he 
campaigned in the 1952 provincial election, he was harassed by townspeople.1071 They 
had not forgotten how the government sent provincial police to the community and 
Goudreau’s ineffectiveness in sending them away.  
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Local support for candidates in the Quebec election of 1952 was shown much in 
the same way support for the strike of 1949 was in Asbestos: through church alliances. 
On 3 July, Goudreau held a Union nationale rally with Minister of Industry and 
Commerce Paul Beaulieu in St-Isaac Jogues, the church that was boycotted during the 
strike because its priest was against the conflict. Hundreds of disgruntled local residents 
attended, but only one was brave enough to yell, “Parlez-nous de la grève!” Beaulieu 
condescendingly replied, “La grève, c’est une affaire réglée, mon garçon,” which only 
further angered the crowd.1072 Despite harmonious company-community relations, the 
strike was not a settled affair and Liberal candidate Émilien Lafrance would not make the 
same mistake. The Liberals held their rally at St-Aimé, the church of choice for the 
workers during the strike and still a politically charged place because of the police 
violence in May 1949.  
Lafrance dared Duplessis to come to Asbestos and say that he sympathized with 
the workers. Carrier Fortin, a CTCC lawyer, also spoke and said, “Duplessis a plus que 
prouvé son aversion pour la classe ouvrière...Si vous, travailleurs, le reportez au pouvoir, 
vous serez en lutte ouverte avec le gouvernement...Mais il y a un jour par 4 ou 5 ans où 
les ouvriers sont les maîtres, où ils sont les plus forts. Ce jour-là, c’est à eux de se 
prononcer.”1073 Calling the workers “masters” and inviting them to engage in battle with 
the Duplessis government through their votes was an effective election strategy for the 
Liberals, who knew that Asbestos was theirs to lose. That Goudreau had asked the crowd 
at St-Isaac Jogues if they thought things would be better if the community returned to a 
time before Duplessis showed that he did not understand his constituents at all. They did 
not want to go back in time: the people of Asbestos were looking to the future. 
The Duplessis government was re-elected in almost every riding in Quebec, but 
Asbestos was one of the few places outside of Montreal where the Liberals won.1074 The 
Union nationale dropped 17% in the popular vote and the Liberals increased their 
presence in the legislature from eight seats to 23. The people of Asbestos celebrated the 
results in the streets of the town and in the basement of St-Aimé, happy to have won this 
battle.  
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“Une personnalité remarquable se révèle,” 1953-1972 
The town of Asbestos continued to vote Liberal until 1970. Although Duplessis 
visited the town in 1954 to open a new mill at the Jeffrey Mine,1075 townspeople would 
not forgive him as they seemed to forgive JM. Company-community relations in Asbestos 
continued to be good, with JM now providing a minimum pension of $110 per month for 
its retired employees.1076 The company and its workers had come to an understanding 
about the important roles both played in the success of the community and the industry. 
JM continued to run PR campaigns in Asbestos and in May 1955, its employee newsletter 
emphasized the importance of JM workers in an article in which a son questioned his 
father on the value of his job. The father replied, “Mon fils, il est vrais que je porte des 
habits de travail, et que je me souille les mains. Mais, n’aies pas honte de dire bien haut à 
tes compagnons que la fibre d’amiante, que j’aide à usiner et à manufacturer, joue un rôle 
dans l’industrie nationale et mondiale.”1077 While it was a fictional conversation, this 
article highlighted some major characteristics of the cultural identity in Asbestos. Jeffrey 
Mine workers were proud of the role they played in the global industry, and it was 
common in the community for sons to follow fathers into employment at the mine.  
Articles like this spoke to the issues that concerned the community, supporting the 
idea that their labour, while dirty, was valuable and should be appealing to their children 
for future careers. A group of intellectuals from outside Asbestos, however, overlooked 
these local issues and attempted to assign the community different priorities. Pierre 
Trudeau’s La grève de l’amiante was released in 1956 and detailed how the 1949 strike in 
Asbestos radically changed Quebec society and politics. Trudeau was especially effective 
at using the strike to shape the Quebec he envisioned, which was one where French 
Canadians rebelled against their foreign employers and claimed their natural resource 
industries for themselves.1078 Maurice Sauvé wrote the only chapter in the collection that 
actually studied the community in detail and acknowledged the harmonious industrial 
relations in Asbestos since the conflict. Sauvé also showed that many of the demands 
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made by the workers in 1949 had been implemented, making JM employees the best paid 
miners in the country.1079 
Despite this perspective, Sauvé’s chapter was overshadowed by Trudeau’s 
introduction and conclusion. These pieces announced a radical change in Quebec’s socio-
political culture and, according to Trudeau biographer John English, “immediately set off 
intellectual explosions,”1080 discussed in newspapers, journals, and academic and 
religious circles throughout the province.1081 While not everyone agreed with Trudeau, 
his personality and convictions gave first the collection, then the town of Asbestos, a 
degree of power the community did not appreciate. No mention of the collection was 
made in either the local paper or town council minutes, which was unusual because these 
were the venues in which the community’s wider reputation was often discussed. This 
absence was explained in the 1999 local history of the town, which stated that the 
collection “n’est pas sur les résultats de la grève que le débat entre chercheurs va se 
faire…Nous souhaitons plutôt apporter une attention particulière au débat local, voir en 
quoi ce conflit va modeler la conscience collective des gens d’Asbestos.”1082 The 
townspeople were not concerned with what a group of intellectuals read into their local 
conflict: they knew what it meant to the community and that was what mattered. While 
Trudeau’s collection did not anger the people of Asbestos, it did not concern them. 
The strike was deeply personal for the community and taking it out of its local 
context put their painful memories on display. Quebec labour historian Jacques Rouillard 
writes that Trudeau’s book, not the strike, affected how the province viewed its working-
class in the decades to come,1083 which was a reflection of how the community viewed the 
strike and the publication. The people of Asbestos did not see themselves as being at the 
forefront of radical political change and they did not want the notoriety that came with 
this new reputation. Instead, the community remained focused on working the Jeffrey 
Mine, which brought their attention to the fact that a small portion of JM’s workforce 
came from the communities surrounding Asbestos.  
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Although this had always been the case, the strikebreakers the company had hired 
in 1949 came from these neighbouring towns and turned the local population against 
anyone at the Jeffrey Mine who was not from Asbestos. Although it had no authority to 
do so, council lobbied JM to stop hiring workers from outside the community and tried to 
encourage non-local employees to move into Asbestos by offering free rent for a year and 
a special discount at certain local stores.1084 Council attempting to attract new residents by 
reducing living expenses directly defied their own Règlement 163, which was passed in 
1927 and levied an extra tax on all residents who had not lived in the town for at least a 
year.1085 Following the 1949 strike, if people were going to profit from the community, 
they had to be contributing members of it, not outsiders who took what they wanted and 
left. The changed attitude towards non-locals helps illuminate the cultural identity of the 
post-strike community in Asbestos, showing us how the presence of strikebreakers during 
the dispute solidified the connection between townspeople and the Jeffrey Mine. They did 
not want people who were not part of the community to disrupt this connection.  
Because of Trudeau’s collection, the people of Asbestos could not keep their 
history free from the political discourse of the province.1086 This became even more 
apparent 10 years later when Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) member Pierre 
Vallières wrote White Niggers of America from jail and rooted the terrorist movement in 
the 1949 strike. Vallières argued that the workers took control of Asbestos and, “refused 
to obey their leaders, including Jean Marchand, and even their curé. Duplessis’ police 
crushed their revolt, and this action aroused the people against the monarch of ‘the great 
darkness.’”1087 Vallières’ gross misrepresentation of the strike and the people of Asbestos 
exceeded the claims in Trudeau’s 1956 collection. In reality, townspeople continued to 
have warm feelings towards Marchand because of his role in the strike and they 
remembered the support Laporte gave them while reporting for Le Devoir. Despite the 
sentiments of the local population, these books influenced the way Asbestos would be 
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treated in the coming years within Quebec’s political realm. This was first seen with how 
Trudeau’s collection impacted the provincial election of 1960, which saw Liberal leader 
Jean Lesage running against the Union nationale’s Antonio Barrette, Minister of Labour 
during the 1949 strike. Asbestos was used as political capital during the campaign. 
Lesage attacked Barrette’s image by invoking the strike and continuously stating, 
“pendant la grève sanglante de l’amiante, Barrette était aux Bermudes” with JM 
officials.1088 Although there had been relatively little blood spilled in the 1949 strike, it 
was now seen as “bloody” in the collective memory of Quebec. Lesage’s accusation was 
reported throughout the province and Barrette had to address the newly symbolic nature 
of Asbestos and its strike.  
J-Osias Poirier was the Union nationale’s candidate for the town’s riding and 
Barrette spoke in Asbestos to try to convince them he had always looked after their 
interests.1089 What Barrette failed to understand was that the people of Asbestos still had 
not forgotten that he and Poirier, the editor of the local newspaper, had taken JM’s side 
during the strike; the people were not ready to forgive either of them for this betrayal. 
With their new campaign slogan, “C’est le temps que ça change,” the Liberals were 
victorious in the election of 1960. The people of Asbestos were happy knowing that the 
Union nationale was out of power, but they were also fully involved in the new political 
reality of the province. Because of the government’s interest in natural resources and the 
province’s interest in Asbestos, Minister of Natural Resources René Lévesque visited the 
community in 1961 to talk about the importance of the Jeffrey Mine to Quebec.1090 Jean 
Lesage followed Lévesque, and announced the plan to nationalize the hydroelectric 
industry there as part of his “Maîtres chez nous” election campaign. 
Nationalization of hydroelectricity would see the province take control of the 
industry from individual companies to make it a government corporation. Lesage told 
Asbestos that this was the time to take Quebec’s economic destiny in hand and that it was 
necessary for French Canadians to control the province’s profitable resource 
industries.1091 Lesage believed this message would be well received in the community 
because an American company owned the Jeffrey Mine. Lévesque followed Lesage in 
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October, speaking for two hours to the townspeople of his plans for the nationalization of 
Quebec’s natural resources.  
Although the bitterness between JM and its employees had diminished in the years 
following the strike, the people of Asbestos rallied behind the “Maîtres chez nous” plan. 
The Liberals won a majority government in 1962 and the local newspaper proudly 
displayed Lesage’s victory statement about the people of Quebec finally becoming 
masters in the province.1092 Despite this rhetoric, JM was not concerned with the election 
because officials had a larger issue to deal with: health. The growing international 
awareness of asbestos-related disease had become a main focus for the company, and 
upon Lindell’s insistence, QAMA aligned itself more fully with the federal government in 
hopes that it would prevent any new regulations being passed that would hinder 
production.1093 Lindell also spoke to the people of Asbestos and urged them to work with 
the company to fight against the mineral’s tarnished image.1094 
JM did not suspect Lesage’s message would have a great impact on its employees, 
but it did. In May 1967, sixty-eight men who were a part of the bagging crew at the mine 
walked off the job.1095 This was the first labour dispute in the community since 1949—a 
remarkable fact, given Asbestos’ history—but it shows the degree to which the 
population had grown averse to strikes. The men walked out because of a disciplinary 
problem in the mill, but the union instructed them to return to work and they did. The 
walkout, while short, demonstrated that Jeffrey Mine workers remained confident in their 
important roles at the mine and would take action whenever they were challenged.  
The 1967 strike also showed the power the union still had in Asbestos, which was 
worrisome for JM. The federal election of 1968 saw Trudeau, Marchand, and Gérard 
Pelletier run for office. All three had been present in Asbestos during the 1949 strike and, 
with Trudeau’s 1956 collection, had a hand in turning the conflict into a political symbol, 
although Marchand did not contribute a chapter. JM worried that new Quebec Premier 
Daniel Johnson “might try to be more friendly with labour, should Trudeau and Marchand 
become the leaders in Ottawa; as a result industry could be affected.”1096 Trudeau, 
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Pelletier, and especially former CTCC secretary Marchand, knew of the health risks of 
asbestos and of the history foreign companies like JM had of treating their French 
Canadian employees poorly. If there was an industry in Quebec primed for 
nationalization as hydroelectricity had been, it was asbestos, and these federal politicians 
had the power to influence Daniel Johnson into making it happen. 
The three men were elected in April 1968 with Trudeau as Prime Minister and 
Marchand and Pelletier serving in his cabinet. JM reacted to their victory by going on the 
offensive and meeting with union leaders and town council to negotiate the rebuilding of 
a factory that was being destroyed because of health violations.1097 Despite their 
continued reliance on their union and their aversion to the Union nationale, the people of 
Asbestos were not full participants in the socio-political revolution sweeping Quebec in 
the 1960s. They supported the CTCC becoming the Confédération des syndicats 
nationaux (CSN) and breaking away from the Catholic Church in 1960, and they were 
comfortable with the CSN demanding that the provincial government make French the 
official workplace language in order to change the socio-economic structure of 
Quebec.1098 When the CSN supported striking Montreal postal workers launching a 
political war against the federal government in the Lapalme Affair of 1970,1099 however, 
the community was shocked.1100 Later that year, when the CSN criticized the Trudeau 
government for invoking the War Measures Act that sent the Canadian military into 
Montreal to combat the FLQ, which had kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James 
Cross and murdered Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte, the people of Asbestos 
felt that the union had become too radical and no longer represented the interests of 
Jeffrey Mine workers. The town protested the radical actions of the CSN when Jeffrey 
Mine employees voted to break with the union in 1972 because they believed “le statue 
quo [of the CSN] étant inacceptable et le nettoyage impossible.”1101 Workers did not want 
the union representing them and longer, nor did they like their painful history being a 
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political tool for any organization. A few weeks later, the local union joined the more 
moderate Centrale des syndicates démocratiques (CSD). 
“un tel conflit devient quelque chose de spectaculaire,” 1973-1983 
Content with their new, more moderate union, at the end of 1972 the workers at 
the Jeffrey Mine produced 13% of the global supply of asbestos and shipped 94% of it to 
over 70 countries.1102 Because asbestos companies were increasingly worried about the 
health effects of the mineral negatively affecting trade, they formed the Asbestos 
Information Committee, an international association between Canada, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom that would promote the industry.1103 Although QAMA did not 
think the Canadian industry was as threatened as those in other countries, it joined the 
new organization because the CSN came out against the ways in which companies had 
diminished the health effects of the mineral.1104 
Fortunately for JM, its Asbestos employees were no longer members of the CSN 
and were proud of their local contribution to the global industry. Relations between the 
company and the workers were no longer as harmonious as before, however, because of 
the land expropriations that were taking place throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The 
community discord was expressed in the local newspaper’s special edition on the 75th 
anniversary of the town in 1974. The paper not only memorialized all the neighbourhoods 
that had been destroyed by the expanding Jeffrey Mine, but also dedicated three pages to 
the 1949 strike. In these pages, the paper stated, “on ne peut ignorer que ce souvenir est 
tellement bien buriné dans le coeur et l’esprit de bien des gens que, pour plusieurs, il 
serait presque vain de rappeler cet événement important,” and described it as “l’épisode le 
plus dramatique du syndicalisme au Quebec.”1105 While they disagreed with those outside 
the community appropriating their past for political ends, the people of Asbestos had 
grown accustomed to its symbolic value. The paper explained that because of the major 
political and religious figures involved in the strike “on peut dire qu’un tel conflit devient 
quelque chose de spectaculaire.”1106 The continued use of the conflict by major political 
figures in Quebec suggests that the spectacular nature of the conflict, and thus of the 
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people of Asbestos, remained in the 1970s and began to influence the local political 
culture, suggesting that the community had a significance that surpassed the industry. 
The special edition also featured letters from Pierre Trudeau congratulating the 
town on its anniversary and Gérard Pelletier reflecting on his experience during the strike. 
Trudeau remained convinced of his 1956 interpretation of the strike and claimed that the 
townspeople always had a remarkable faith in the future and possessed a courage and a 
determination that the entire country admired,1107 which further supported the idea that 
the community possessed an importance beyond its role in the asbestos industry. Pictures 
of Trudeau, Pelletier, and Marchand in Asbestos were displayed throughout the special 
edition, although there remained no mention of Trudeau’s collection on the strike, as an 
English translation was released. 
As head of the new sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ), René Lévesque was also 
featured in the special edition. Lévesque held his party’s regional convention in Asbestos 
in 1974 and the local newspaper further encouraged the idea that the town had a 
significance unrelated to the industry by claiming that any politician who wanted votes in 
Quebec had to visit the community and sympathize with its working class.1108 Although it 
helped solidify this idea as part of the local cultural identity, this was a daring claim to 
make as the industry began to suffer global collapse because of increased awareness of 
the mineral’s health risks.  
The political attention Asbestos received in the 1970s gave townspeople the 
impression that the industry and the community were not as threatened by negative global 
opinion as first believed. Driven by the confidence, from 19-21 February 1975, 2,000 
Jeffrey Mine workers went on strike to gain a wage increase, health insurance, and shifts 
that were at least 8 hours long each day.1109 The dispute was quickly resolved with both 
sides compromising for the sake of production.   
With the slow global collapse of the industry, workers in Asbestos did not strike 
again. To push the company too far with labour issues would be to tip the balance needed 
to maintain the success of the Jeffrey Mine. The history of Asbestos had shown 
townspeople that when JM suffered, the community suffered in turn. Coinciding with the 
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balanced approach to industrial relations in Asbestos was the election of Lévesque’s PQ 
government in 1976, which marked an official passing of the early 20th century pan-
Canadian nationalism espoused by politician and journalist Henri Bourassa in favour of a 
pro-Québécois nationalism. While not all PQ supporters were sovereignists, they did 
share an awareness of the need for French Canada to assert its authority over its own 
destiny, and Lévesque was the spokesman for the “maîtres chez nous” movement in 
Quebec. Asbestos articulated this awareness when it supported the Association des Gens 
de l’Air du Québec’s struggle for language rights. Town council justified this support 
when it declared, “l’enjeu de cette lutte, c’est la reconnaissance de la langue française sur 
notre propre terriotoire.…[Qui] nous échappe au profit des anglophones des provinces 
voisines...[et] cela influera grandement sur notre avenir économique.”1110 This was an 
important stance for the people of Asbestos to take because of their bicultural heritage 
and reliance on an Anglophone company for their success.  
This dependence was subject to change, however, as Lévesque targeted asbestos 
as the next resource industry to become nationalized and made a government corporation 
as he had promised the townspeople when campaigning for Lesage in 1960. Although the 
industry was suffering, it continued to be profitable and the 1949 strike had become such 
a powerful symbol of modernity and Québécois strength in the political discourse of the 
province that the PQ found the industry especially desirable. The Quebec government 
created the Bureau de l’amiante in 1977 to study the economic potential and health risks 
of the mineral.1111 Believing the benefits outweighed the risks, the PQ began the process 
of nationalization, which worried JM. The company admitted that nationalization would 
create 7,000 to 8,000 new jobs due to government capital used to increase the 
manufacture of asbestos products,1112 but officials were wary it threatened their position 
in Asbestos. Nevertheless, JM’s 2,500 workers voted in favour of nationalization because 
government officials told them it would rescue the community from the industry’s 
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problems.1113 Furthermore, because the town housed the largest chrysotile mine in the 
world, Asbestos was sure to have a leading role in the new organization of the industry.  
Nationalization was going to be the salvation of Asbestos, and Lévesque would 
bring it to the town. The new Premier of Quebec had already proven himself to the 
townspeople by rewriting many of the province’s labour laws and passing Bill 45 in July 
1977, which forbade the employment of strikebreakers during a legal strike, guaranteed 
the reemployment of striking workers once disputes were resolved, and implemented the 
mandatory contribution of union dues from all workers, unionized or not.1114 These 
reforms made Quebec a leader in North American labour legislation1115 and were things 
the workers in Asbestos had been fighting for since 1949.  
The PQ was more concerned with the interests of Quebec’s working class than the 
success of the multinational companies that owned many of the province’s natural 
resources, and this worried JM officials. Still believing in the profits the Jeffrey Mine 
could bring them, JM objected to government control of the industry. When this objection 
was leaked to the press in 1977, however, company president J.A. McKinney attempted 
to spin it in a positive way. Not wanting to offend the provincial government during a 
time of industrial uncertainty, McKinney wrote to Lévesque, “[o]ur attitude from the 
beginning has been one of cooperation and not confrontation…Our statements have 
consistently reflected our belief that your actions…will be responsible and constructive. 
We will continue to support your efforts to improve the economic well being of Quebec 
through betterment of the asbestos industry.”1116 JM did not want to antagonize the 
government, but officials were not sure how to survive during the nationalization of the 
industry.  
The government passed Bill 70 in 1978 to form the Société nationale de l’amiante 
to promote the production and trade of the mineral. In order to make the industry a crown 
corporation under Quebec’s Minister of Natural Resources, the government spent $200 
million buying the rights to the Thetford mines from the Asbestos Corporation and $50 
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million on plans for expansion and promotion.1117 JM officials refused to sell the rights to 
the Jeffrey Mine, which they believed was still profitable and worth more than the 
province was offering. Not being able to force JM to sell the Jeffrey Mine, the Quebec 
government became the company’s leading competitor in the country.  
Not being included in the nationalization of the industry frustrated the people of 
Asbestos, who remained under the control of an Anglophone American company. Not 
being part of the new plan to revolutionize the industry and save it from collapse was 
worrisome, especially when the government held the first Fête de l’amiante to promote 
and bring positive attention to Thetford in 1978.1118 The town and the Jeffrey Mine were 
left out of provincial efforts to restore the industry.  
Community members attempted to boost the image of Asbestos themselves by 
requesting that JM repaint the exteriors of the factory buildings at the Jeffrey Mine to 
beautify the town,1119 but the company had a different strategy. In 1979, JM official 
J.R.M. Hutcheson wrote Yves Bérubé, Quebec’s Minister of the Environment, 
complaining that the company was paying 71% of its profits in taxes.1120 Hutcheson said 
that if the province continued to tax the company this much, the company would be 
forced to reconsider its future in Asbestos. The attempt by local residents to beautify the 
town reveals their commitment to the community and its future success. Hutcheson’s 
complaints and threats show how unattached JM was to Asbestos: as soon as business 
became too difficult, the company would leave. The lack of attachment or responsibility 
JM felt towards Asbestos was demonstrated again in June 1980 when the company 
protested the new fixed price for the mineral that the Société nationale de l’amiante 
established and informed the government that it expected Jeffrey Mine shipments to 
decrease in the coming years.1121 
The government had begun to realize the industry was not as profitable or stable 
as it seemed, and was no longer looking to expand its nationalization plans, so JM’s 
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threats were well timed.1122 JM was not only prepared to act on these threats, it was 
forced to do so because of the rapidly declining market for asbestos. In September 1980, 
the company reduced the working days for 150 of its employees at the Jeffrey Mine from 
six to five,1123 and in January 1981, 400 workers were laid off. The fact that so many 
employees worked six days a week until the end of 1980 shows that JM was trying to 
extract as much raw asbestos as it could before the industry collapsed. Shift reductions 
and layoffs worried the people of Asbestos, who knew that the market showed no signs of 
a rebound. Town council sought the advice of the Société nationale de l’amiante and 
formed a committee composed of the local union, the company, and both the federal and 
provincial Ministries of Labour to solve the unemployment problem in Asbestos.1124 
Because of the rising amount of litigation the company was facing in the United States, 
the continued collapse of the global industry, and the price-fixing and taxation policies of 
the Quebec government, JM would soon opt out of trying to solve the problem.  
Although JM remained in charge of the Jeffrey Mine until 1983, by 1981 it was no 
longer financially sustainable. The community would have to ensure it survived the 
industrial crisis itself. The population of Asbestos had already dropped from 10,254 in 
1971 to 7,967 in 1981 and this exodus had to be stopped.1125 No longer considering JM a 
vital part of the community, council and unemployed workers held meetings throughout 
the year to try to solve the crisis of a collapsed industry. In a major policy shift, the 
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) stopped attacking the industry’s health issues to help it 
survive.1126 When considering the best interests of its members, the union understood that 
jobs were more important than health. While it continued to advocate for occupational 
health and safety regulations to protect workers from industrial disease, the CLC no 
longer made the toxicity of the mineral a major issues, stating instead that it could be 
extracted and processed safely if proper regulations were followed.  
The people of Asbestos appreciated the support of their industry. Not knowing 
what the community would do if the markets completely collapsed, townspeople became 
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comfortable with government protection, to the point of expecting it. The expectation of 
government aid remains today and differs greatly from the fiercely independent 
community this dissertation has shown Asbestos once was, showing just how 
dramatically the local cultural identity changed in order for townspeople to adapt to the 
realities of a collapsing industry. Council used the money it received to create new jobs 
for its citizens and generated 72 temporary positions for the summer and an additional 
114 with more funding.1127 These efforts were not enough, however, and in March the 
Comité des Chômeurs requested that the local outdoor skating rink remain open as long 
as weather allowed and asked for the donation of a ping-pong table in order to give 
unemployed Jeffrey Mine workers something to do.1128 The community had become a 
place where people drifted from activity to activity with no real purpose and no real 
connection to the Jeffrey Mine. Their cultural identity was shaken. 
The people of Asbestos had worked throughout the community’s history to 
negotiate a balance between the interests of the workers, the company, and the town 
council, but with the collapse of the industry, JM began to opt out. Council funded 
activities for its unemployed citizens, but it was not successful in generating jobs. The 
Jeffrey Mine defined Asbestos and the land was the community’s reason for existence. 
Aside from providing temporary summer jobs and activities, there was little the town 
could do to help its citizens.  
Fortunately for Asbestos, both the provincial and the federal government were 
supporting its cause. Council met with the PQ cabinet minister Yves Duhaime in March 
1982 to discuss how his government would help the community. Duhaime had just 
returned from a European trip to evaluate the global market for the mineral and suspected 
the industry would soon rebound.1129 In June 1982, the Department of National Defence 
contacted town council and asked to extend their business agreement for another 5 
years.1130 This meant that Jeffrey Mine fibre would continue to be used in military 
equipment despite growing health concerns. The federal government also showed its 
support at Montreal’s 1982 World Symposium on Asbestos when Minister of Industry 
Herb Grey spoke out against countries that banned shipments of the mineral, and sought 
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markets in developing nations.1131 Grey also stated that 9 out of 10 Canadian provinces 
supported the continuation of the industry because the health risks were manageable. 
The provincial and federal governments were aware that reinvention possibilities 
were limited for a place named Asbestos, but while its population was not large and the 
revenue from its industry dwindled each year, the community refused to be abandoned. 
International asbestos markets had collapsed and there was no sign public opinion on the 
mineral would change. The land was scarred by a century of mining and Asbestos and 
Thetford were too far away from Montreal and Quebec City to be viable for smaller scale 
industrial development: they had to be closed and there were ways to do so without it 
looking like the province was abandoning the people. The government instead chose to 
sustain the dying industry and its collapsed communities to avoid having to address the 
problem of entire towns of unemployed asbestos workers in l’Estrie.  
While JM did not see itself having a future in Asbestos, it asked the Canadian 
government for $35 million in order to support the industry. An earlier Récupération 
Régionale Richmond-Wolfe project had only created 9 new jobs in the region1132 and so 
chances were good that the funding JM asked for would be granted, as the continued 
mining of asbestos was the only way the town would survive.1133 By the start of February 
1983, the people of Asbestos were more hopeful about their future and JM told town 
council that the company was optimistic about the Jeffrey Mine’s future.1134 The 
company’s optimism was contagious and townspeople expressed their hope for the future 
by organizing community activities to keep spirits up while waiting to be sent back to the 
Jeffrey Mine.1135 Their hope was short-lived. A week later, JM suddenly lost its optimism 
and revoked its request for money from the federal government.1136 The company would 
not be rehiring any of its laid-off workers in the near future and in June 1983 it sold the 
Jeffrey Mine to a handful of JM executives and left Asbestos. It was now up to the town 
to solve its problems.  
The survival of Asbestos depended on new industrial development and in the 
spring of 1983, council allocated half a million dollars to attract new industry, and 
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partnered with federal Minister of Employment and Immigration Lloyd Axworthy and the 
Société nationale de l’amiante to create 300 new jobs with almost $10,000 given for 
industrial development,1137 but no new industry has since come to the town. While the 
workers, company, and council had not always cooperated with each other, there was 
stability in their relationship. Without the company and its global reach, the community 
lost a portion of its local cultural identity and was left with an uncertain future. Projects 
and subsidies continued to pour into the town and there were hopes for a time that the 
community would become a regional centre for a variety of educational and health 
services.1138 These efforts were in vain. The Jeffrey Mine is so large and physically 
central in the town that it cannot be covered up and Asbestos is not a community that can 
be reinvented. Although the industry has collapsed, the people of Asbestos remain, 
committed to their past, and waiting for a new creation story.  
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Conclusion: Surviving Collapse, Asbestos Post-1983 
In 2009 I was interviewed by Lorraine Mallinder, an investigative journalist 
reporting on Canada’s continued support of the asbestos industry for BBC Radio. As I 
explained to her the local historical context of this support, mainly the depth of the 
interconnection between people and the natural environment, Mallinder interrupted me, 
asking if what I was saying meant that I was “pro-asbestos.” The question was startling, 
because knowing what the mineral does to the human body has convinced me that the 
industry is dangerous and cannot continue. Reflecting on what I had told Mallinder, I 
realized why she had become confused and I explained that after all my research and 
writing, while I was not pro-asbestos the mineral, I was pro-Asbestos the community.  
This dissertation has shown that the history of Asbestos—glory and shame, 
rewards and sacrifices—was driven by the complex interaction between the people of the 
community and the land, as they worked together locally to supply a global industry. In 
the process, townspeople developed a cultural identity rooted in this interaction that has 
given them a pride, an ambition, and a confidence, which has enabled them to keep the 
industry alive through government support. Contemporary critics of this support calling 
for its immediate end1139 fail to consider the local perspective of the issue and how we as 
a society are to manage collapsed resource communities. Closure is one option, of course, 
but it would be more effective and appropriate to find solutions that address and maintain 
the historical interconnection between people and the natural environment.  
The situation surrounding Asbestos the place and asbestos the mineral in Canada 
today has much to do with the marked lack of interest the national press and the national 
medical community had in the issue during the second half of the twentieth century. The 
lack of outside interest and pressure allowed the people of Asbestos to further develop 
and refine their local cultural identity around the Jeffrey Mine and their historical, 
complex interaction with the land. Contemporary press coverage of the community 
attacks this identity without attempting to understand it. The townspeople are confronted 
with the realities of their past each day, inscribed on the land around them, dominated by 
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the Jeffrey Mine, on their own bodies and those of their family and friends who have 
died, and on the local cultural identity of the community, uncertain of its future.  
The collapse of Asbestos was unlike that of other mining communities like 
Cobalt, Ontario, or St. Clair, Pennsylvania, because the local mineral deposits have not 
been exhausted.1140 It was different than the bust of the uranium towns of the American 
west, which survive by marketing their communities to tourists in search of 1950s 
nostalgia-inspiring destinations.1141 Furthermore, Jeffrey Mine employees have never 
tried to romanticize the work they do unlike Cape Breton coal miners who sing in the 
“world-renowned” Men of the Deeps choir dressed in their work uniforms, 
overshadowing occurrences of coal worker’s pneumoconiosis1142 (black lung disease) and 
putting a positive, friendly image on another deadly industry that has allowed them to 
effectively lobby for the establishment of new coal mines as recently as May 2010.1143 In 
fact, throughout their history and during the present collapse, Jeffrey Mine workers were, 
and continue to be unlike other asbestos industry employees, including those who worked 
for JM. They were not the industry’s only miners, they were not its only French Canadian 
workers, but this dissertation has shown that the community interpreted its local role in 
the global industry in such a way that complicates and challenges the international 
literature on the asbestos industry that places workers firmly in the role of victims, not 
agents.1144  
Their past agency has carried through to the present, and instead of fighting for 
workers compensation, they instead utilize a lobbying strength greater than a town of 
6,000 typically has in order to keep the industry—and the community—alive. “Asbestos” 
is more than the name of the community: it is a past, it is a heritage, and it is a 
fundamental part of the town’s cultural identity. Because of their continuous lobby of the 
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provincial and federal governments, the Jeffrey Mine continues to be worked today, 
although only for half the year, while during the other six months much of the local 
population survives on unemployment insurance. Once described as heroes who helped 
the allies win the First and Second World Wars, townspeople are now criticized for 
supplying asbestos to developing countries that do not uphold strict occupational health 
and safety regulations for handling the mineral. International criticism was seen on 24 
June and 1 July 2010, Quebec’s Fête nationale and Canada Day, respectively, when anti-
asbestos organizations held demonstrations in several countries to protest continued 
government and local support of the industry.1145  
This has been a steady, yet radical local-global reorientation for the people of 
Asbestos since the early 1980s, and many have left the community due to lack of work. 
Schools are boarded up, houses are for sale, and the local cultural identity, so rooted in a 
connection to the land, has been profoundly shaken with the collapse of the industry, as 
have the town’s political, economic, and societal foundations. The name of the 
community once connoted notions of safety and reliability, but now it invokes ideas of 
cancer and death, and the people who have remained in Asbestos have had to reconcile 
their cultural identity to accept this transformation while continuing to have faith in the 
land and their ability to work with it for survival. The Jeffrey Mine continues to have the 
potential to be a profitable asbestos mine if the international image of the mineral became 
favourable once again, which allows the community to hope for its revitalization as they 
continue to root their identity and their future in the land.  
The purpose of this study has been to question the historical interaction and 
exchange of bodies of land, human bodies, and the body politic. The insistence of G. 
Claude Théroux at the Société d’Histoire d’Asbestos that we must understand asbestos 
the mineral in order to understand Asbestos the place played a fundamental role in 
pursuing the answer to this question. Asbestos houses the largest chrysotile mine in the 
world, but the physical, psychological, and political impact of the Jeffrey Mine has never 
been mentioned in previous studies on the community or the mineral, which have focused 
only on the 1949 strike or on the diseases asbestos causes. By using sources never 
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examined before and by looking at the global issues facing the community from a local 
perspective, this study has shown how the people shaping the land in Asbestos led to the 
land shaping them and their community. This dissertation has also challenged the 
historiography on resource communities, the asbestos industry, and environmental 
history, showing what can be gained by looking beyond declensionist narratives of 
destruction and victimization.   
If not for the land, and the mineral found in it, the community as it was and as it is 
would not exist. Every decision that was made in Asbestos by the working class, the town 
councillors, or JM officials was made with consideration to the land and how it would 
impact the future of the industry and the community that relied on it. Over their history of 
interacting with the land, the people of Asbestos developed a balanced system of land use 
and a sense of ownership of the Jeffrey Mine, which they were never hesitant to defend, 
as seen in the labour disputes and civil protests against mine expansion this dissertation 
has highlighted. With this balance and ownership came a sense of trust in the land. The 
continued reluctance of Jeffrey Mine workers to wear respirators and the fact that the 
1949 strike was the only time they raised the issue of occupational health with JM and the 
media demonstrates that local residents were not committed to the town because of a 
steady paycheque, but rather because of their connection to the land and the local cultural 
identity they created with it. The understanding of risk in Asbestos is remarkable, as it 
was based on a combination of bodily knowledge and several exposés that informed them 
the mineral was dangerous.  
Agricultural land has been an important historical figure in much of Quebec’s 
past, but this history of Asbestos has shown how the people of the province became 
attached to industrialized land, which had powerful effects on the identity and pride of the 
local population. The land could not and would never be harmful as long as a balance was 
maintained between people and place. Critics and organizations from outside Asbestos 
were, and still are, unable to understand this need for balance, and even though the 
industry has now lost any resemblance to the profitable one it once was, the land remains 
the same, and the people who choose to remain in Asbestos will continue to defend it. 
This dissertation has shown the great lengths to which JM went to keep medical 
reports and discoveries on the dangers of the mineral from the people of Asbestos and the 
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general public, while slowly introducing inadequate dust control measures at the Jeffrey 
Mine. By funding confidential medical studies rather than informing employees of their 
illnesses or the risk the mineral posed to their bodies until the 1970s, the company used 
the people of Asbestos as scientists used mice in a laboratory, watching and waiting for 
the progression of disease. This study has in no way attempted to excuse JM’s actions, 
but I have placed them in the local context of Asbestos and compared them to the ways 
Jeffrey Mine workers learned of, and reacted to, the knowledge of what the mineral could 
do to their bodies. It is here that we can advance our understanding of how a lack of 
action to insist on better dust control methods at the Jeffrey Mine and in the community 
can be seen as a reaction, an acceptance of risk. Medical knowledge and bodily 
knowledge combined in Asbestos, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes 
clashing. One of the major clashes occurred during the 1949 strike and drastically 
changed how human bodies were seen and used in Asbestos. Townspeople read Burton 
LeDoux’s exposé on the health effects of the mineral just before the strike and the things 
he highlighted were things they recognized in their own bodies.  
The strike was such a traumatic event for the community that in order for it to end, 
the people of Asbestos had to put their concern for their lives behind concerns for their 
livelihoods. If stricter health regulations were put in place, production would slow and 
impact both the local and global economy. With the onslaught of international negative 
publicity due to the mineral’s health effects, the people of Asbestos put their bodies on 
display to defend the Jeffrey Mine and the mineral it contained. The land had to be safe 
and the people had to be healthy for the community to survive, and this belief remains 
strong in Asbestos today. In June 2010, the Canadian Cancer Society, which has only 
come out against asbestos in the past three years, wrote to the Quebec government urging 
it to stop supporting the industry because the mineral continues to cause the deaths of 
around 90,000 people annually all over the world.1146 The people of Asbestos reacted 
immediately and fiercely to this perceived attack and cancelled the town’s annual Relay 
for Life, for which they have raised almost $350,000 for cancer research over the past 
four years. André Beaulieu, a representative from the Canadian Cancer Society, attributed 
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the town’s reaction to their concerns for their economic future, which is a simplification 
of the complex local cultural identity of Asbestos.  Mayor Hughes Grimard challenged 
Beaulieu’s assumption and explained that, “We want to work with our partners and not 
with our detractors...It’s our past, it’s our history, therefore the population is united in 
support of the mining industry.”1147 The local cultural and community identity this 
dissertation has traced, although battered by recent realities, remains strong. The cancers 
the people of Asbestos are suffering from are fast-acting, painful, and often incurable,1148 
yet they continue to support the industry, perpetuating the deadly cycle of work and 
disease that has existed in the community for over a century. The decision to stop 
supporting the Canadian Cancer Society could not have been made easily, but the 
importance of history to Asbestos—the history this dissertation has examined—trumps 
the severity of risk and disease. 
Everything in Asbestos has occurred in the extreme: land exploitation, profits, 
labour disputes, global renown, and industrial collapse. The global rejection of the 
mineral led to the collapse of the community and the loss of JM, an important presence in 
the town from 1918 to 1983. The different factions of the town did not always exist 
harmoniously, and often went through periods of great animosity, as seen with the 1949 
strike, but through constant negotiation and recognition that they shared common goals, a 
unique and fierce identity was created in Asbestos; that identity did not leave with JM in 
1983. When faced with the collapse of the industry, the community clung to this identity 
and their trust in the land, which has allowed them to keep the Jeffrey Mine in operation 
and the community in existence.  
The provincial and federal governments have been receptive to the continued 
support of Asbestos and its industry since 1983. This has required government officials to 
use tax revenue to subsidize the industry and to minimize the negative health effects of 
the mineral in order to keep international trade and health organizations from banning 
asbestos in the global market. In 2005, the Canadian government attempted to justify its 
actions when it filed an official World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint against 
France for banning imports of asbestos, claiming that France was discriminating against 
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 Ibid. 
1148
 The Canadian Cancer Society provides financial support, group therapy, and palliative care to many community 
members dying of asbestos-related cancers. Ibid. 
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one of Canada’s cultural industries.1149  Under WTO rules, cultural industries were 
exempt from international policies and regulations on issues like health and safety. 
Whether the government called asbestos a national cultural industry because it understood 
the deep connection the people of Asbestos had with the land they worked, or whether it 
was simply a useful loophole in global politics is unclear, but it does help us look at the 
local-national-global issues raised by the community of Asbestos from a new perspective. 
This dissertation should encourage us to question our assumptions of how people 
and the natural environment interrelate, and reconsider how and why communities 
internalize and accept risk. In doing so, we can gain a more holistic understanding of 
resource communities and how they reflect and influence debate surrounding commodity 
flows, industrial pollution, and environmental justice on a local and global scale. This 
renewed perspective will help us create new solutions to address the problems facing 
collapsed resource communities that sufficiently include their attachment to the natural 
environment they live and labour in, and to the global trade networks they supply.  
Although it is small, Asbestos has global reach, and this study of a single 
community has also been a study of massive environmental change, controversial health 
and safety issues, and clashes between local and international responsibilities. The 
experiences the community, the province, and the nation have gained through the history 
of Asbestos can lead to a re-evaluation of the way Canada industrializes and markets its 
natural resources today. Many parallels can be drawn between Asbestos and the Alberta 
tar sands, as millions rely on the oil found in communities like Fort McMurray, just as 
people once relied on the asbestos found in the Jeffrey Mine. The natural environment in 
Alberta is undergoing radical technological changes because of the market demand for 
oil, despite the fact that global organizations are working against the industry and towards 
reducing the use of petroleum because of its negative effects on the environment and 
human health.  
The situation unfolding in places like Fort McMurray mirrors what happened in 
Asbestos when the public became aware of the health risks of the mineral. Just as 
asbestos was to Quebec, oil is a main supply of wealth and employment in Alberta and it 
will be extremely difficult to forego, having become a fundamental part of the economy 
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 Michael Hahn, “A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International Trade Law,” Journal 
of International Economic Law, vol. 6, no. 3 (September 2006), p. 551. 
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and local cultural identity. When a reliable, more environmentally friendly and 
sustainable replacement for oil comes to market, communities like Fort McMurray could 
collapse much in the same way as Asbestos did in the 1980s, and all that will be left is an 
industrialized natural environment built for an industry that is no longer viable, populated 
by people who no longer have stable employment opportunities. The governments of 
Quebec and Canada subsidize the Jeffrey Mine and Asbestos to the detriment of the 
country’s international reputation, and it is possible that the same will happen in Alberta 
with the petroleum industry. As long as there is demand, there will be supply, and what 
reporters and officials of international organizations fail to understand when they criticize 
this support is the historical and personal context of communities rooted in the 
industrialization of the environment. There is an intimacy that forms through life and 
labour in resource communities. Cultural identities based on past glories, if understood 
from the perspective of the local population, are difficult to challenge and change. This 
dissertation has show how international responsibility can clash with local obligation and 
the choice communities and governments have to make in order to survive are not always 
easy. The industrialization of the natural environment may be inevitable, but this study of 
Asbestos should inspire us think of new ways to interact with the land, to use new 
technologies, to rely on governments for guidance rather than damage control, and to 
manage our own ambitions.  
The way land, people, and politics interact in this examination of Asbestos also 
advances our understanding of how humans articulate their connection with the natural 
world. While each of these elements has had their own role in the history of Asbestos, 
they reflect and shape each other, providing catalysts and cautions for change and shaping 
a strong cultural identity. In Asbestos, the land is more than toxic, the people are more 
than statistics, and the community is not something that history just happened to. This 
was and is a living, breathing, working society. By remembering that the land, the people, 
and the community depend on each other for existence, we can draw larger conclusions 
about the way nature and culture interact. They are not mutually exclusive, and to treat 
them as such is to ignore the richly textured traditions negotiated between people and 
place that have shaped cultural identities and have allowed a resource community like 
Asbestos to survive collapse. 
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Appendix 
Confidential Sources 
 
In the course of exploring the global asbestos trade, historians David Egilman and 
Geoffrey Tweedale compiled a considerable body of primary sources about the Canadian 
industry, via archival research and legal subpoena. They were generous enough to share 
much of this material with me.  
 
What follows is an accounting of these sources as they were used in this dissertation. 
More details as to the sources can be provided upon request. 
 
Asbestos Claims Research Facility, Aurora, Colorado, United States of America 
All documents from this archive have been obtained by David Egilman via a combination 
of access to the archives and legal subpoena. The Research Facility is run by the Claims 
Resolution Management Corporation, which states that the “facility is available for use by 
beneficiaries of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust and others who are 
interested in asbestos claims, litigation and history. The Research Facility contains a 
collection of more than 32,000 boxes, 7,200 rolls of microfilm, and 5,000 subject-related 
and witness files turned over to the facility by the Johns-Manville Corporation.” (For 
more information, please see: http://www.mantrust.org/ “Asbestos Claims Research 
Facility.”) Egilman, archivist Maggie Baumgardner, and the facility’s legal counsel, Jared 
Garelick, have each given me permission to use these files. 
 
“Asbestos Chronology”  
This 200-page document was created during workers’ compensation litigation against JM 
in the United States. It provides correspondence between JM officials and the medical 
professionals under their control from the 1890s to the 1980s, detailing the health and 
safety issues arising in all JM operations, including Asbestos, Quebec. 
 
“Doc 7”  
This is Egilman’s name for a document he created in September 2001 using ACRF 
documents comparing published medical reports and confidential medical research 
funded by JM in the early 20th century.  
 
Dr. Wright to Dr. Knight, 1926.  
A letter arranging the establishment of McGill University’s Industrial Health Department 
with funding from JM and Sun Life Insurance, explaining that a degree of company 
control over what the department produced would be acceptable. 
 
Frank G. Pedley, “Report of the Physical Examinations and X-Ray Examination of 
Asbestos Workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines, Quebec,” 1930.  
A confidential medical report submitted to JM and detailing the occurrence of asbestosis 
in Jeffrey Mine and Thetford Mine workers. 
 
Kenneth Smith, “Industrial Hygiene—Survey of Men in Dusty Areas,” 1949. A 
confidential medical report commissioned by JM that details the results of Smith’s study 
on the health of 708 Jeffrey Mine employees. 
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David C. Braun and Daniel T. Truan, “An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in 
Asbestos Miners,” 1957.  
A confidential report for the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association detailing the 
occurrence of asbestosis and lung cancer in the workers at the Jeffrey Mine and at 
Thetford Mines.  
 
Herbert E. Stokinger to Daniel C. Braun, January 1958. 
A letter from the editor of the American Medical Association’s Archives of Industrial 
Health thanking Braun for his published study on asbestos and human health and saying it 
confirmed his own suspicions that the mineral was not harmful. 
 
Turner & Newall Corporate Archives, Manchester, England 
Turner & Newall was a British asbestos manufacturing company with holdings in Quebec 
(including a mine in Thetford). All relevant documents here were obtained via legal 
subpoena by Geoffrey Tweedale, who has granted me use of the files.   
 
R.H. Stevenson, “Asbestosis: Talk by Dr. Stevenson to Quebec Asbestos Producers,” 
May 1938. A Transcript of a talk Stevenson gave to convince Quebec asbestos producers 
that Canadian asbestos was safe and did not cause industrial disease like South African 
asbestos did. Correspondence between Turner & Newall officials suggesting that 
Stevenson was wrong in his conclusions are attached to the transcript. 
 
R.H. Stevenson, “Asbestosis,” 1940.  
An industry report compiled by Stevenson detailing the absence of asbestosis in Jeffrey 
Mine workers and explaining his methods of diagnosis. Letters between Turner & Newall 
officials discussing Stevenson’s results are also included in this document.  
 
J.F. Knox, “Report on Visit to Thetford Mines, Asbestos, and Montreal,” December 1964. 
A report detailing Knox’s observations on working conditions at the Jeffrey Mine, 
suggesting that they were not up to British standards of occupational health and safety.  
 
Quebec Asbestos Mining Association (QAMA) Minutes of the Annual Meetings, 1950s-
1970s. Details the discussion and decisions of heads of the companies operating Quebec’s 
asbestos mines. QAMA destroyed its files when it dissolved, and as a result these minutes 
are unavailable in Canadian archives. Turner & Newall, however, as a member of 
QAMA, retained a copy. Tweedale shared his full run of the organization’s annual 
meeting minutes with me. 
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